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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1993

The western highland province at the Apollo 14 site

Recent petrologic studies of pristine nonmare samples from the Apollo 14 site have demonstrated the unique character of the western highlands crust. Many of the lithologies which occur here are not found at other highland sites or represent unique variations of more common lithologies. Rare highland samples found at the Apollo 12 site have petrologic and geochemical affinities with the Apollo 14 highland suite, and the two sites taken together constitute what can be called the Western Highland Province. Rocks of the Western Highland Province are geochemically distinct from similar lithologies found at eastern highland sites (Apollo 15, Apollo 16, Apollo 17, and the Luna sites)--a fact which adds further complications to current petrogenetic models for the lunar crust. Nonetheless, and understanding of how the Western Highlands Province formed and why it differs from highland crust in the east is crucial to our overall understanding of primordial lunar differentiation and petrogenesis.

Shervais, John W.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned from Project Apollo

There have been many detailed historical studies of the process of deciding on and executing the Apollo lunar landing during the 1960s and early 1970s. From the announcement of President John F Kennedy on May 25, 1961, of his decision to land an American on the Moon by the end of the decade, through the first lunar landing on July 20, 1969, on to the last of six successful Moon landings with Apollo 17 in December 1972, NASA carried out Project Apollo with enthusiasm and aplomb. While there have been many studies recounting the history of Apollo, at the time of the 30th anniversary of the first lunar landing by Apollo 11, it seems appropriate to revisit the process of large-scale technological management as it related to the lunar mission. Consequently, the NASA History Office has chosen to publish this monograph containing the recollections of key partcipants in the management process. The collective oral history presented here was recorded in 1989 at the Johnson Space Center's Gilruth Recreation Center in Houston, Texas. It includes the recollections of key participants in Apollo's administration, addressing issues such as communication between field centers, the prioritization of technological goals, and the delegation of responsibility. The following people participated: George E. Muller, Owen W. Morris, Maxime A. Faget, Robert R. Gilruth, Christopher C. Kraft, and Howard W. (Bill) Tindall. The valuable perspectives of these individuals deepen and expand our understanding of this important historical event. This is the 14th in a series of special studies prepared by the NASA History Office. The Monographs in Aerospace History series is designed to provide a wide variety of investigations relative to the history of aeronautics and space. These publications are intended to be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive format to allow timely and broad dissemination to researchers in aerospace history.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1971

Apollo 14 - Press Kit

Apollo 14, the sixth United States manned flight to the Moon and fourth Apollo mission with an objective of landing men on the Moon, is scheduled for launch Jan. 31 at 3:23 p.m. EST from Kennedy Space Center, Fla. The Apollo 14 lunar module is to land in the hilly upland region north of the Fra Mauro crater for a stay of about 33 hours, during which the landing crew will leave the spacecraft twice to set up scientific experiments on the lunar surface and to continue geological explorations. The two earlier Apollo lunar landings were Apollo 11 at Tranquility Base and Apollo 12 at Surveyor 3 crater in the Ocean of Storms.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

Apollo: Learning From the Past, For the Future

This paper shares an interesting and unique case study of knowledge capture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an ongoing project to recapture and make available the lessons learned from the Apollo lunar landing project so that those working on future projects do not have to "reinvent the wheel". NASA's new Constellation program, the successor to the Space Shuttle program, proposes a return to the Moon using a new generation of vehicles. The Orion Crew Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander will use hardware, practices, and techniques descended and derived from Apollo, Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, the new generation of engineers and managers who will be working with Orion and Altair are largely from the decades following Apollo, and are likely not well aware of what was developed in the 1960s. In 2006 a project at NASA's Johnson Space Center was begun to find pertinent Apollo-era documentation and gather it, format it, and present it using modern tools for today's engineers and managers. This "Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation Personnel" project is accessible via the web from any NASA center for those interested in learning "how did we do this during Apollo?"

Grabois, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

PDS Lunar Data Node Restoration of Apollo In-Situ Surface Data

The Apollo missions between 1969 and 1972 deployed scientific instruments on the Moon's surface which made in-situ measurements of the lunar environment. Apollo II had the short-term Early Apollo Surface Experiments Package (EASEP) and Apollos 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17 each set up an Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP). Each ALSEP package contained a different suite of instruments which took measurements and radioed the results back to Earth over periods from 5 to 7 years until they were turned off on 30 September 1977. To this day the ALSEP data remain the only long-term in-situ information on the Moon's surface environment. The Lunar Data Node (LDN) has been formed under the auspices of the Planetary Data System (PDS) Geosciences Node to put relevant, scientifically important Apollo data into accessible digital form for use by researchers and mission planners. We will report on progress made since last year and plans for future data restorations.

Williams, David R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Apollo: Learning From the Past, For the Future

This paper shares an interesting and unique case study of knowledge capture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an ongoing project to recapture and make available the lessons learned from the Apollo lunar landing project so that those working on future projects do not have to "reinvent the wheel". NASA's new Constellation program, the successor to the Space Shuttle program, proposes a return to the Moon using a new generation of vehicles. The Orion Crew Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander will use hardware, practices, and techniques descended and derived from Apollo, Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, the new generation of engineers and managers who will be working with Orion and Altair are largely from the decades following Apollo, and are likely not well aware of what was developed in the 1960s. In 2006 a project at NASA's Johnson Space Center was begun to find pertinent Apollo-era documentation and gather it, format it, and present it using modern tools for today's engineers and managers. This "Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation Personnel" project is accessible via the web from any NASA center for those interested in learning "how did we do this during Apollo?"

Grabois, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Restoration and Reexamination of Apollo Lunar Dust Detector Data from Original Telemetry Files

We are recovering the original telemetry (Figure I) from the Apollo Dust, Thermal, Radiation Environment Monitor (DTREM) experiment, more commonly known as the Dust Detector, and producing full time resolution (54 second) data sets for release through the Planetary Data System (PDS). The primary objective of the experiment was to evaluate the effect of dust deposition, temperature, and radiation damage on solar cells on the lunar surface. The monitor was a small box consisting of three solar cells and thermistors mounted on the ALSEP (Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package) central station. The Dust Detector was carried on Apollo's 11, 12, 14 and 15. The Apollo 11 DTREM was powered by solar cells and only operated for a few months as planned. The Apollo 12, 14, and 15 detectors operated for 5 to 7 years, returning data every 54 seconds, consisting of voltage outputs from the three solar cells and temperatures measured by the three thermistors. The telemetry was received at ground stations and held on the Apollo Housekeeping (known as "Word 33") tapes. made available to the National Space Science Data Center (NSSDC) by Yosio Nakamura (University of Texas Institute for Geophysics). We have converted selected parts of the telemetry into uncalibrated and calibrated output voltages and temperatures.

McBride, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Restoration and Reexamination of Data from the Apollo 11, 12, 14, and 15 Dust, Thermal and Radiation Engineering Measurements Experiments

As part of an effort by the Lunar Data Node (LDN) we are restoring data returned by the Apollo Dust, Thermal, and Radiation Engineering Measurements (DTREM) packages emplaced on the lunar surface by the crews of Apollo 11, 12, 14, and 15. Also commonly known as the Dust Detector experiments, the DTREM packages measured the outputs of exposed solar cells and thermistors over time. They operated on the surface for up to nearly 8 years, returning data every 54 seconds. The Apollo 11 DTREM was part of the Early Apollo Surface Experiments Package (EASEP), and operated for a few months as planned following emplacement in July 1969. The Apollo 12, 14, and 15 DTREMs were mounted on the central station as part of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) and operated from deployment until ALSEP shutdown in September 1977. The objective of the DTREM experiments was to determine the effects of lunar and meteoric dust, thermal stresses, and radiation exposure on solar cells. The LDN, part of the Geosciences Node of the Planetary Data System (PDS), operates out of the National Space Science Data Center (NSSDC) at Goddard Space Flight Center. The goal of the LDN is to extract lunar data stored on older media and/or in obsolete formats, restore the data into a usable digital format, and archive the data with PDS and NSSDC. For the DTREM data we plan to recover the raw telemetry, translate the raw counts into appropriate output units, and then apply calibrations. The final archived data will include the raw, translated, and calibrated data and the associated conversion tables produced from the microfilm, as well as ancillary supporting data (metadata) packaged in PDS format.

McBride, Marie J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Restoration of the Apollo Heat Flow Experiments Metadata

Geothermal heat flow probes were deployed on the Apollo 15 and 17 missions as part of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP). At each landing site, the astronauts drilled 2 holes, 10-m apart, and installed a probe in each. The holes were 1- and 1.5-m deep at the Apollo 15 site and 2.5-m deep at the Apollo 17 sites. The probes monitored surface temperature and subsurface temperatures at different depths. At the Apollo 15 site, the monitoring continued from July 1971 to January 1977. At the Apollo 17 site, it did from December 1972 to September 1977. Based on the observations made through December 1974, Marcus Langseth, the principal investigator of the heat flow experiments (HFE), determined the thermal conductivity of the lunar regolith by mathematically modeling how the seasonal temperature fluctuation propagated down through the regolith. He also determined the temperature unaffected by diurnal and seasonal thermal waves of the regolith at different depths, which yielded the geothermal gradient. By multiplying the thermal gradient and the thermal conductivity, Langseth obtained the endogenic heat flow of the Moon as 21 mW/m(exp 2) at Site 15 and 16 mW/m(exp 2) at Site 17.

HFE metadata↗
NASA NTRS1967

Report of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration : Schedule of Physical Evidence - Appendix F

Immediately following the Apollo 204 accident of January 27, 1961. all associated equipment and material were impounded. Release of this equipment and material for normal use was under the close control of the Apollo 204 Review Board. Apollo Review Board Administrative Procedure No. 11, February 11, 1961, established the Apollo 204 Review Board Material Release Record (MRR). This MRR was the official form used to release material from full impoundment and was valid only after being approved by the Board and signed by a Member. The form was used as the authority to place any impounded item into one of the three Categories defined in Administrative Procedure No. 11. This appendix contains all of the authorized MRR's. Each item submitted on an MRR was given a control number; a description, including the part number and serial number; the relevance and location to the accident; any constraints before release; and the control category. The categories placed on the equipment were as follows: Category A - Items which may have a significant influence or bearing on the results or findings of the Apollo 204 Review Board; Category B - All material other than Category A which is considered relevant to the Apollo 204 Review Board investigation; Category C - Material released from Board jurisdiction. Several classes of equipment were released by special Board action prior to the establishment of the MRR system. The operating procedure for release of these classes is Enclosure F-l to this appendix.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2020

Analysis of Volatile Organic Compounds in the Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis (ANGSA) 73002 Core Sample

Understanding the organic content of lunar regolith was an early priority upon the return of Apollo samples, with amino acids being of special interest because of their importance to life on Earth and their astrobiological relevance. Many initial studies focused on the detection of amino acids in these samples and attempts to determine the origin of those compounds. Although no consensus on the origin of the amino acids was reached in those early studies, more recent work determined that the detected amino acids originated from both terrestrial contamination and meteoritic or cometary in fall to the lunar surface. A majority of the amino acids in the Apollo samples studied originated from precursor molecules, either indigenous to the lunar samples or contaminants, that reacted during the water extraction and acid hydrolysis process for analysis in the laboratory, but the identities of the amino acid precursors still remain poorly understood. Such precursors could include hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and other volatile organic compounds such as amines, carboxylic acids, or aldehydes and ketones. The identities of these compounds, as well as the effects of years of curation on their abundances in lunar regolith samples stored at ambient temperature under nitrogen gas purge, are not clear. The specially curated samples available through the Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis (ANGSA) program provide a unique opportunity to use state-of- the-art analytical techniques to examine previously unstudied lunar materials. The ANGSA samples include three types of samples: 1) samples stored frozen since <1 month after Earth arrival; 2) samples stored under helium; and 3) a double drive tube collected by Apollo 17 astronauts, with the bottom portion of the drive tube sealed under vacuum on the Moon and never opened. In contrast to the typically curated Apollo samples that have been kept for decades at room temperature under flowing nitrogen purge that may have significantly reduced the abundance of volatiles, the vacuum-sealed and frozen samples may have enhanced preservation of these volatiles. Our initial investigation examines amino acids and their potential volatile precursors, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN), aldehydes, ketones, amines, and mono-carboxylic acids, in a sample from the top portion of the Apollo 17 double drive tube. These results will aid in understanding the lunar abundances of these molecules and will also be compared to future analyses of other drive tube and frozen ANGSA samples.

Elsila, J. E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRS1966

Apollo network

Although the design of the Apollo network followed closely behind the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) modification for the Gemini program, many site modifications were necessary to provide Apollo support due to the greater scope of the Apollo program. The Apollo program requires instrumentation for support of the S-I, S-11, S IV-B/IU, Command Service Module (CSM) and Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) stages. Command Service Module (CSM) and Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) stages. Support must also be provided at both orbital and lunar distances. Increased data processing capability is required for processing and displaying significantly larger amounts of information. The ground network requires the capability of processing both Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) telemetry and command data for the CSM, LEM, and S IV-B/IU. In various stages of the Apollo program, both tone (on UHF) and digital [on Unified S-Band (USB) and UHF] command capabilities are required. Also at various stages both USB and VHF telemetry links are required.

Ground support system↗
NASA NTRS2017

Kennedy Space Center: Apollo to Multi-User Spaceport

NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was established as the gateway to exploring beyond earth. Since the establishment of KSC in December 1963, the Center has been critical in the execution of the United States of Americas bold mission to send astronauts beyond the grasp of the terra firma. On May 25, 1961, a few weeks after a Soviet cosmonaut became the first person to fly in space, President John F. Kennedy laid out the ambitious goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth by the end of the decade. The resultant Apollo program was massive endeavor, driven by the Cold War Space Race, and supported with a robust budget. The Apollo program consisted of 18 launches from newly developed infrastructure, including 12 manned missions and six lunar landings, ending with Apollo 17 that launched on December 7, 1972. Continuing to use this infrastructure, the Skylab program launched four missions. During the Skylab program, KSC infrastructure was redesigned to meet the needs of the Space Shuttle program, which launched its first vehicle (STS-1) on April 12, 1981. The Space Shuttle required significant modifications to the Apollo launch pads and assembly facilities, as well as new infrastructure, such as Orbiter and Payload Processing Facilities, as well as the Shuttle Landing Facility. The Space Shuttle was a workhorse that supported many satellite deployments, but was key for the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station, which required additional facilities at KSC to support processing of the flight hardware. After reaching the new Millennium, United States policymakers searched for new ways to reduce the cost of space exploration. The Constellation Program was initiated in 2005 with a goal of providing a crewed lunar landing with a much smaller budget. The very successful Space Shuttle made its last launch on July 8, 2011, after 135 missions. In the subsequent years, KSC continues to evolve, and this paper will address past and future efforts of the transformation of the KSC Apollo and Space Shuttle heritage infrastructure into a more versatile, multi-user spaceport. The paper will also discuss the US Congressional and NASA initiatives for developing and supporting multiple commercial partners, while simultaneously supporting NASAs human exploration initiative, consisting of Space Launch System (SLS), Orion spacecraft and associated ground launch systems. In addition, the paper explains the approach with examples for NASA KSC to leverage new technologies and innovative capabilities developed to reduce the cost to individual users.

launchpad↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Oxidation State of Sulfur in Apollo Samples 71035 and 71055

Lunar apatites contain 100s-1000s ppm sulfur [1-3]. This was initially puzzling because lunar basalts are thought to form, including at the time of apatite crystallization, in low oxygen fugacity (fO2) conditions where sulfur exists in its reduced form (S2-), a substitution not previously observed in natural apatite. It has been recently shown, using S-XANES measurements of the oxidation state of sulfur in apatites and proximal mesostasis in the lunar basalts 12039 and 10044, that sulfur is indeed present as S2- in both the mesostasis glass and apatite when measurements were performed far from cracks or pits in the thin section [4]. This observation is consistent with other mineralogical indications of the low fO2 during formation of these samples (~IW-1) such as the presence of Fe-metal, ulvöspinel, ilmenite, fayalite, and silica in the thin sections. In the same study, in addition to clear spectral evidence for the dominance of S2-, analyses of apatite grains in both samples that occurred near cracks or pits in the thin section sometimes revealed non-negligible spectral evidence (e.g., S6+/ΣS > 0.03; [4]) for the presence of S6+. Because S6+ was not observed in the mesostasis glass near the apatite grains measured, or in any phase far from cracks or pits in the studied thin sections, this S6+ was interpreted as either primary S2- in the sulfide altered to S6+ in the thin section, or S6+ of secondary origin, deposited in the fractures of the samples [4, 5]. Whether this is of lunar or terrestrial origin is unknown but has implications for lunar petrogenesis if lunar [e.g., 5], or sample handling and curation if terrestrial. To test between lunar and terrestrial origins for observed S6+ in Apollo-era thin sections, we will measure the oxidation state of sulfur in apatite and associated phases in a specially frozen sample from a boulder sampled at Station 1A during the Apollo 17 mission as part of the NASA Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis (ANGSA) program. Here, we present “control” measurements of samples 71035 and 71055, using Apollo era thin sections of aliquots of these rocks that were processed upon return to Earth and since stored under N2 atmospheres at room temperature. These will be compared to measurements using newly made thin sections of aliquots of the same rocks (71035 and 71055). In addition, 71036, which has been in cold storage (-20℃) since the return of the Apollo 17 mission to Earth, has been recently made available through the ANGSA program. With 71036 we can test the effect of storage temperature on potential oxidation of S2- to S6+ in the relatively oxidizing and warm conditions of Earth’s surface.

apollo↗
NASA NTRS1963

Summary of Apollo and Lunar Logistics System Plans

The basic mission objective of Project Apollo is to land men on the Moon and return them to Earth at the earliest practicable date. The Apollo crew will consist of three men, two of whom will land on the surface of the Moon, conduct surface operations for up to 24 hr, and then rejoin the third crew member in lunar orbit for return to Earth. Initial Apollo spacecraft capabilities will require the early landings to be within +or-lO deg of the lunar equator on the visible side of the Moon, with preference for landing sites in the leading quadrant (between 270 and 360 deg lunar longitude). As presently planned, the Apollo spacecraft will be capable of carrying approximately 200 lb of scientific equipment to the lunar surface and of bringing approximately 80 lb of lunar material back to Earth. A detailed plan for utilization of crew capabilities while on the lunar surface is not expected to be complete for some time. The first Apollo lunar mission is now scheduled for the late 1960's with additional launches planned at reasonable intervals. i

Taylor, W. B.↗
NASA NTRS1971

Bulk, rare earth and other trace elements in Apollo 14 and 15 and Luna 16 samples

The chemical abundances were measured by instrumental and radiochemical neutron activation analysis in a variety of lunar specimens. Apollo 14 soils are characterized by significant enrichments of Al2O3, Na2O and K2O and depletions of TiO2, FeO, MnO and Cr2O3 relative to Apollo 11 and to most of Apollo 12 soils. The uniform abundances in 14230 core tube soils and three other Apollo 14 soils indicate that the regolith is uniform to at least 22 cm depth and within approximately 200 m from the lunar module. Two Luna 16 breccias are similar in composition to Luna 16 soils. Four Apollo 15 soils (LM, STA 4, 9, and 9a) have variable compositions. Interelement correlations between MnO-FeO, Sc-FeO, V-Cr2O3 and K2O-Hf negate the hypothesis that howardite achondrites may be primitive lunar matter, argue against the fission hypothesis for the origin of the moon, and precludes any selective large scale volatilization of alkalies during lunar magmatic events.

Laul, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Project management in the Apollo program: An interdisciplinary study

Findings concerning project management in the NASA Apollo program are presented. The Apollo program in the context of the total NASA organization is examined along with the nature of project management and the manner in which project managers functioned in the Apollo program. The utilization of the in-house technical competence in the support of the Apollo program, and the formal and informal relationships between Apollo managers and the contractors are discussed.

Drucker, E. E.↗