Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “communication system security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

EnergyPlus Model Context Protocol Server (EnergyPlus-MCP) v0.1

EnergyPlus-MCP is the first open-source Model Context Protocol server specifically designed for EnergyPlus building energy simulation. This innovative software enables AI assistants and other applications to interact programmatically with EnergyPlus through a standardized, secure interface, eliminating traditional technical barriers in building energy modeling. The software provides specialized tools across five functional domains: server management, model configuration and loading, comprehensive building component inspection, systematic model modification, and simulation execution with results visualization. Key features include automated HVAC system discovery and topology mapping, advanced schedule analysis, intelligent model validation, and interactive visualization capabilities. EnergyPlus-MCP's layered architecture ensures robust separation between protocol communication and domain expertise, enabling scalable deployment across organizations, educational institutions, and research teams. Unlike direct LLM approaches that suffer from inconsistent results and security gaps, EnergyPlus-MCP provides validated, reliable interactions while maintaining scientific rigor. This democratizes sophisticated building energy analysis, making EnergyPlus accessible to broader audiences through conversational interfaces and streamlined workflows.

Li, Han [Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LB↗

A Unified Testing Platform to Mature Blockchain Applications for Grid Emulation Environments

Blockchain technology is a relatively novel technology that can be used to develop more decentralized, autonomous and tamper-evident solutions. A feature that can aid Transactive Energy Systems to reach their goals by enabling individual actors to communicate and reach consensus with other participants in a more decentralized fashion. However, technical barriers to evaluate and adopt this type of technology within the electrical domain still exist. To facilitate this task, BLOSEM Unified Testing Platform (UTP), a DOE-sponsored, multi-lab effort intends to accelerate the development of solutions by offering a common set of reusable services that can be used to interconnect existent grid tools with blockchain services. UTP is intended to serve as development platform that can provide application engineers with the technical means to evaluate potential blockchain solutions, by enabling them to concentrate on the actual application functionalities while at the same time abstracting the connectivity and performance measurement tasks. The use of BLOSEM UTP is further demonstrated by implementing two potential use cases that are intended to validate both the feasibility of implementing these applications as blockchain-based solutions while also demonstrating the features provided by UTP.

blockchain co-simulation↗

Nomenclatural issues concerning cultured yeasts and other fungi: why it is important to avoid unneeded name changes

The unambiguous application of fungal names is important to communicate scientific findings. Names are critical for (clinical) diagnostics, legal compliance, and regulatory controls, such as biosafety, food security, quarantine regulations, and industrial applications. Consequently, the stability of the taxonomic system and the traceability of nomenclatural changes is crucial for a broad range of users and taxonomists. The unambiguous application of names is assured by the preservation of nomenclatural history and the physical organisms representing a name. Fungi are extremely diverse in terms of ecology, lifestyle, and methods of study. Predominantly unicellular fungi known as yeasts are usually investigated as living cultures. Methods to characterize yeasts include physiological (growth) tests and experiments to induce a sexual morph; both methods require viable cultures. Thus, the preservation and availability of viable reference cultures are important, and cultures representing reference material are cited in species descriptions. Historical surveys revealed drawbacks and inconsistencies between past practices and modern requirements as stated in the International Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi, and Plants (ICNafp). Improper typification of yeasts is a common problem, resulting in a large number invalid yeast species names. With this opinion letter, we address the problem that culturable microorganisms, notably some fungi and algae, require specific provisions under the ICNafp. We use yeasts as a prominent example of fungi known from cultures. But viable type material is important not only for yeasts, but also for other cultivable Fungi that are characterized by particular morphological structures (a specific type of spores), growth properties, and secondary metabolites. We summarize potential proposals which, in our opinion, will improve the stability of fungal names, in particular by protecting those names for which the reference material can be traced back to the original isolate.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Inverters: A Pivotal Role in PV Generated Electricity

This presentation discusses the pivotal role inverters play in PV generated electricity. Topics include: the inverter as the center of the system--increasingly becoming the brain, with more features and capabilities (hybrid systems, safety, islanding, monitoring, etc.); increasing inverter-based generated electricity associated with many renewable energy sources; increased dependence for grid support and forming capability; communication within the grid and security increasingly required; increasing complexity leads to more chances to fail; as in most PV segments, there is cost reduction pressure, which makes it more challenging to keep the reliability high.

ENGINEERING,SOLAR ENERGY↗

OmniFed: A Modular Framework for Configurable Federated Learning from Edge to HPC

Federated Learning (FL) is critical for edge and High Performance Computing (HPC) where data is not centralized and privacy is crucial. We present OmniFed, a modular framework designed around decoupling and clear separation of concerns for configuration, orchestration, communication, and training logic. Its architecture supports configuration-driven prototyping and code-level override-what-you-need customization. We also support different topologies, mixed communication protocols within a single deployment, and popular training algorithms. It also offers optional privacy mechanisms including Differential Privacy (DP), Homomorphic Encryption (HE), and Secure Aggregation (SA), as well as compression strategies. These capabilities are exposed through well-defined extension points, allowing users to customize topology and orchestration, learning logic, and privacy/compression plugins, all while preserving the integrity of the core system. We evaluate multiple models and algorithms to measure various performance metrics. By unifying topology configuration, mixed-protocol communication, and pluggable modules in one stack, OmniFed streamlines FL deployment across heterogeneous environments. Github repository is available at https://github.com/at-aaims/OmniFed.

Tyagi, Sahil [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000783144745)↗

Detection of DoS Attacks Using ARFIMA Modeling of GOOSE Communication in IEC 61850 Substations

Integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in modern smart grids (SGs) offers many advantages including the use of renewables and an effective way to protect, control and monitor the energy transmission and distribution. To reach an optimal operation of future energy systems, availability, integrity and confidentiality of data should be guaranteed. Research on the cyber-physical security of electrical substations based on IEC 61850 is still at an early stage. In the present work, we first model the network traffic data in electrical substations, then, we present a statistical Anomaly Detection (AD) method to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) network communication. According to interpretations on the self-similarity and the Long-Range Dependency (LRD) of the data, an Auto-Regressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was shown to describe well the GOOSE communication in the substation process network. Based on this ARFIMA-model and in view of cyber-physical security, an effective model-based AD method is developed and analyzed. Two variants of the statistical AD considering statistical hypothesis testing based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) are presented to detect flooding attacks that might affect the availability of the data. Our work presents a novel AD method, with two different variants, tailored to the specific features of the GOOSE traffic in IEC 61850 substations. The statistical AD is capable of detecting anomalies at unknown change times under the realistic assumption of unknown model parameters. The performance of both variants of the AD method is validated and assessed using data collected from a simulation case study. We perform several Monte-Carlo simulations under different noise variances. The detection delay is provided for each detector and it represents the number of discrete time samples after which an anomaly is detected. In fact, our statistical AD method with both variants (CUSUM and GLRT) has around half the false positive rate and a smaller detection delay when compared with two of the closest works found in the literature. Our AD approach based on the GLRT detector has the smallest false positive rate among all considered approaches. Whereas, our AD approach based on the CUSUM test has the lowest false negative rate thus the best detection rate. Depending on the requirements as well as the costs of false alarms or missed anomalies, both variants of our statistical detection method can be used and are further analyzed using composite detection metrics.

IEC 61850 electrical substations↗

Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) – Security and Administration: Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Research and Development

A critical component of the Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) approach is the integrated security contained within its processing. This document describes how that security is designed and expected to be implemented by UUDEX Implementations (U-Implementations), including the UUDEX Server (U-Server) and UUDEX Clients (U-Clients). The UUDEX security hierarchy consists of three levels: 1. The UUDEX Instance (U-Instance) itself, which sits at the top of the hierarchy and contains the U-Server, the UUDEX Identity Authority (U-Identity Authority), and the UUDEX Administrator (U-Administrator) functions; 2. A group of one or more UUDEX Participants (U-Participants) that present “organizations” that participate in the U-Instance and contains the UUDEX Administrator Participant (U-U-Administrator Participant) function; 3. A group of one or more UUDEX Endpoints (U-Endpoints) that represent the individual UUDEX Publish Clients (U-Publish Client) responsible for supplying data to the U-Instance that is consumed by UUDEX Subscriber Clients (U-Subscriber Clients). U-Endpoints can be either autonomous devices that publish and subscribe data such as data exchange servers found in supervisory control and data acquisition and energy management systems, or they can be tied to users of applications that, for example, submit DOE OE-417 disturbance reports. U-Participants and U-Endpoints can be organized into UUDEX Groups (U-Groups). Any number of U-Participants or U-Endpoints can be members of a U-Group. A given U-Participant or U-Endpoint can be a member of multiple U-Groups, but a U-Group cannot contain other U-Groups. For example, a U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Transmission Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator, and another U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Generator Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator. U-Participants that are both Transmission Operators and Generator Operators would be members of both U-Groups. U-Participants, U-Endpoints, and U-Groups are used in the access control structures to provide access to individual UUDEX Subjects (U-Subjects). U-Groups are created by the U-Administrator and are managed by the U-Administrator or the designated U-Group Managers. U-Endpoints can be assigned UUDEX Roles (U-Roles) that can be used to further restrict access. U-Roles are assigned to individual U-Endpoints. For example, a U-Role of “Security Analyst” could be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish or subscribe security incident reports and vulnerability notifications, while a U-Role of “Transmission Planner” can be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish power system model updates. U-Role definitions are created by the U-Administrator, but the U-Roles are assigned to U-Endpoints by their respective UUDEX Participant Administrators (U-Participant Administrator). Because all information required to make security decisions is either included within the U-Endpoint’s X.509 digital certificate or stored in a datastore on the U-Server, all security decisions are performed and enforced within the U-Server. This reduces the complexity of the U-Client code and minimizes the chance for compromise of the integrity of the UUDEX security features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Review of Software for Designing and Operating Quantum Networks

Quantum networks development is crucial to realizing a production-grade network that can support distributed sensing, secure communication, and utility-scale quantum computation. However, the transition from laboratory demonstration to deployable networks requires software implementations of architectures and protocols tailored to the unique constraints of quantum systems. This paper reviews the current state of software implementations for quantum networks, organized around a three-plane abstraction of infrastructure, logical, and control/service planes. We cover software for both designing quantum network protocols (e.g., SeQUeNCe, QuISP, and NetSquid) and operating testbeds, with a focus on essential control/service plane functions such as entanglement, topology, and resource management, in a proposed taxonomy. Our review highlights a persistent gap between theoretical architecture and protocol proposals and their realization in simulators or testbeds, particularly in dynamic topology and network management. We conclude by outlining open challenges and proposing a roadmap for developing scalable software architectures to enable hybrid, large-scale quantum networks.

Network Design↗

Evaluation of Real-Time Mitigation Techniques forCyber Security in IEC 61850 / IEC 62351Substations

This paper presents the design logic and implementation aspects of three potential real-time mitigation techniques capable of countering GOOSE-based attacks: (i) IEC 62351-compliant message authentication code (MAC) scheme, (ii) a semantics-enforced rule- based intrusion detection system (IDS), and (iii) a hybrid approach integrating both MAC verification and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). A comparative evaluation of these real-time mitigation approaches is conducted using a cyber-physical system(CPS) security testbed. The results show that the hybrid integration significantly enhances mitigation capability. Furthermore, the processing delays of all three methods remain within the strict delivery requirements of GOOSE communication. The study also identifies limitations that none of the techniques can fully address, highlighting areas for future work.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and St↗

Modeling Data Flows with Network Calculus in Cyber-Physical Systems: Enabling Feature Analysis for Anomaly Detection Applications

The electric grid is becoming increasingly cyber-physical with the addition of smart technologies, new communication interfaces, and automated grid-support functions. Because of this, it is no longer sufficient to only study the physical system dynamics, but the cyber system must also be monitored as well to examine cyber-physical interactions and effects on the overall system. To address this gap for both operational and security needs, cyber-physical situational awareness is needed to monitor the system to detect any faults or malicious activity. Techniques and models to understand the physical system (the power system operation) exist, but methods to study the cyber system are needed, which can assist in understanding how the network traffic and changes to network conditions affect applications such as data analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and anomaly detection. In this paper, we examine and develop models of data flows in communication networks of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and explore how network calculus can be utilized to develop those models for CPSs, with a focus on anomaly and intrusion detection. This provides a foundation for methods to examine how changes to behavior in the CPS can be modeled and for investigating cyber effects in CPSs in anomaly detection applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Trust Model Utilization for Energy Grid Communication

The internet information that is used by the Energy Grid of Things requires both preventative security measures as well as surveillance measures. The preventative security measures include certificates, encryption, and all of the basic security protocols as defined by published standards. The surveillance measures include monitoring information flow activities and evaluating these messages for indications of potential security attacks. We describe in this paper the utilization of a Distributed Trust Model that was developed specifically for monitoring communication within an Energy Grid of Things. The goal for the Distributed Trust Models is to provide a level of aggregate trust that a Distributed Energy Resource Management System can meet its grid service obligations, as opposed to a detailed individual Distributed Energy Resources assessment.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

ChatGPT and Other Large Language Models for Cybersecurity of Smart Grid Applications

Cybersecurity breaches targeting electrical substations constitute a significant threat to the integrity of the power grid, necessitating comprehensive defense and mitigation strategies. Any anomaly in information and communication technology (ICT) should be detected for secure communications between devices in digital substations. This paper proposes large language models (LLMs), e.g., ChatGPT, for the cybersecurity of IEC 61850-based communications. Multi-cast messages such as generic object oriented system events (GOOSE) and sampled values (SV) are used for case studies. The proposed LLM-based cybersecurity framework includes, for the first time, data pre-processing of communication systems and human-in-the-loop (HITL) training (considering the cybersecurity guidelines recommended by humans). The results show a comparative analysis of detected anomaly data carried out based on the performance evaluation metrics for different LLMs. A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed is used to generate and extract a dataset of IEC 61850 communications.

ChatGPT↗

FLC Award: QED: Quantum Ensured Defense of the Smart Electric Grid

A reliable electric power supply is crucial for modern day life as well as national security, economic productivity, and life-and-death essentials. During the COVID pandemic, internet and cell communications became a “must-have” for government and business operations, education, and communicating COVID testing for vaccine information. Loss of electric power quickly leads to human health and national security emergencies. When a major winter storm hit Texas in mid-February 2021, the system was overwhelmed and over 4M people lost power. Although this crisis arose from an unprecedented weather event - not a cyberattack - it serves as a vivid illustration of the impact power disruption can have on our American way of life. The recent cyberattack on the Colonial Oil Pipeline also provides a stark reminder that infrastructure supporting our daily lives has vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Enhanced Control, Optimization, and Integration of Distributed Energy Applications (ECO-IDEA)

With support from the U.S. Department of Energy Solar Energy Technologies Office, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) partnered with Xcel Energy, Schneider Electric, Varentec, and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to meet the goals of the Enabling Extreme Real-Time Grid Integration of Solar Energy (ENERGISE) program. This project developed and validated an innovative data-enhanced hierarchical control architecture that enables the efficient, reliable, resilient, and secure operation of future distribution systems with a high penetration of distributed energy resources like solar energy. The architecture enables a hybrid control approach where a centralized control layer is complemented by distributed control algorithms for solar inverters and autonomous control of grid edge devices. It is fully interoperable and includes all the cybersecurity aspects necessary for reliable and secure system operation. The hybrid approach can seamlessly integrate multiple voltage-regulation technologies, both at central and grid-edge levels, which enables reliable and efficient system operation in the face of unpredictable conditions. The overarching goal of the Eco-Idea project is to develop, validate, and deploy a unique and innovative Data-Enhanced Hierarchical Control (DEHC) architecture that comprehensively addresses the formidable challenges associated with proliferation of high penetration of distributed PV such as reverse power flows, transients from variability of PV systems, feeder load balancing, and voltage stability. These issues are exposing the weaknesses of existing grid operations and controls - including, but not limited to, lack of grid situational awareness, heuristic and slow-acting control actions, latency of control for emergency situations, and points of failure in communications. The proposed architecture will comprehensively resolve the deficiencies of current operational settings - where monitoring and control solutions proposed across industry and academia may not be interoperable and may not coexist in the same system - and will enable an efficient, reliable, resilient, and secure operation of future distribution systems with penetration of solar energy well beyond current limits. The DEHC architecture was developed and validated rigorously through hardware-in-loop simulations in the laboratory environment and deployed on the field.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Certification Requirements for Distributed Energy Resources: A Survey of SunSpec Alliance Standards

This survey paper explores the cybersecurity certification requirements defined by the SunSpec Alliance for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) devices, focusing on aspects such as software updates, device communications, authentication mechanisms, device security, logging, and test procedures. The SunSpec cybersecurity standards mandate support for remote and automated software updates, secure communication protocols, stringent authentication practices, and robust logging mechanisms to ensure operational integrity. Furthermore, the paper discusses the implementation of the SAE J3072 standard using the IEEE 2030.5 protocol, emphasizing the secure interactions between electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) for functionalities like vehicle-to-grid (V2G) capabilities. This research also examines the SunSpec Modbus standard, which enhances the interoperability among DER system components, facilitating compliance with grid interconnection standards. This paper also analyzes the existing SunSpec Device Information Models, which standardize data exchange formats for DER systems across communication interfaces. Finally, this paper concludes with a detailed discussion of the energy storage cybersecurity specification and the blockchain cybersecurity requirements as proposed by SunSpec Alliance.

Tsikteris, Sean (ORCID:0009000524202250)↗

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Energy Emergency and Preparedness Data: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and Quick Guidance on Crisis Communications

State Energy Offices and Public Utility Commissions rely on timely, accurate, and actionable information to perform their energy emergency response duties and execute their roles as state energy security planners. In support of this need, the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions (NARUC) hosted an Energy Security and Data Analysis Workshop in Washington, DC to identify energy security response and planning data sources; and to share successful methods of data use and integration in state, federal, and private sector tools. Following the workshop, NASEO and NARUC hosted two topical data-centric webinars based on state priorities to identify best practices in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Crisis Communications programs leveraged in energy assurance planning and response. The Crisis Communications webinar covered best practice tactics for how states can respond during energy emergencies and other crises. Based on the workshop and webinars, this document summarizes commonly used data sources and includes frequently asked questions which may be used by state energy officials (i.e., consisting of staff from Public Utility Commissions and Governor-designated State Energy Offices) to help guide them in developing or improving their Crisis Communications capabilities. A strong public information program is a key crisis management tool. Timely and accurate information helps prevent confusion and uncertainty and encourages public support and cooperation. As energy subject matter experts, state energy officials are vital in the distilling, clarifying, and conveying energy sector information and implications to decision-makers and the public. Other participants in an effective public information program include the Governor’s Office, other state agencies, local governments, energy providers, local businesses, state legislature, and the federal government. It is essential to provide stakeholders and the public with information about the nature, severity, and duration of an emergency because inadequate understanding and awareness can lead to undesirable actions that could further exacerbate the situation. Before a state government can provide information to the public, it must gather information, describe the emergency accurately, and develop recommendations to manage the situation.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗