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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1989

Tethered Dynamics Explorer and Tethered Atmospheric Probe - A low-cost, low-risk tethered satellite program

A tethered satellite flight program to test theoretical studies of tether concepts is proposed. The program consists of multiple flights of an ELV such as the Delta II, using the Small Expendable Deployment System (SEDS) to deploy two instrumented satellite payloads, the Tethered Dynamics Explorer (TDE) and the Tethered Atmospheric Probe (TAP). The applications and characteristics of the TDE and the TAP are described, including verification of the SEDS, the validation of the dynamics and control model for low-tension deployment and the force and moment instrumentation, the demonstration of tether initiated reentry, the collection of in-situ atmospheric and aerothermodynamic data, and the study of long-term tether exposure.

Deloach, R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Moon Base Life Support Design Depends on Launch Cost, Crew Size, and Mission Duration

Brief human space missions such as Apollo and the Space Shuttle used material storage for life support but a long mission such as a space station uses a recycling life support system. The upcoming Moon visits will probably be brief with few crew at first but in the future there may be a long-term or even permanent Moon base with a large crew. The initial life support system will probably use storage and resupply of materials from Earth, but it could be replaced later by recycling, especially if launch cost per kilogram is high. Moon base life support design is investigated considering requirements, performance, reliability, cost, and risk. The launch cost, crew size, and mission duration are variable parameters that affect the life support design choice. Greater launch cost, crew size, or mission duration all tend to make recycling more cost-effective than resupply.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis of the cost, schedule, and risk for Lynx mirror assembly production

This paper analyzes a recently published model for Lynx Mirror Assembly production duration, to understand the sensitivity of duration to various factors. The factors considered are finite process yield, knowledge of the individual process times and finite server reliability. In all of these cases, closed form estimates are given along with numerical examples. This initial analysis indicates that accurate and precise knowledge of the process times is fundamental to making an accurate prediction of schedule duration. Analysis of the failure of any given server is also explained and can be used as the basis of a rational sparing policy.

Jonathan W. Arenberg↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) for a Robust Commercial Lunar Ecosystem

Modular Open Systems Approaches (MOSAs) have been adopted worldwide to solve a myriad of challenges. Open systems by their nature maximize accessibility, reduce barriers to entry, and prevent vendor lock. Similarly, modularity speeds innovation, fosters design re-use, and enables incremental development & growth. Architectures developed using a MOSA synergize the benefits of modularity and open systems to produce better products at lower developmental cost and risk, saving the consumer money while allowing greater developer profit margins. Specific to the challenge of lunar exploration, a MOSA will ensure interoperability among diverse commercial, government, and international partners. Complex spaceflight systems can be assembled, upgraded, and serviced far more easily and with greater commercial involvement with the use of a MOSA. By allowing partners to self-limit their scope to key strengths, they can focus on producing premier components without carrying the high risk and associated cost of auxiliary tasks they don’t specialize in. We survey commercial and Department of Defense (DoD) lessons learned in past decades, discuss DoD robotics’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (first without then with MOSAs), and analyze the flourishing commercial ecosystem that has resulted from DoD MOSA adoption. We explore the future of lunar operations to demonstrate the criticality of MOSA adoption in key areas at the right time. Two specific lunar technical fields are studied as examples: Power and In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU). Finally, recognizing that the lunar ISRU campaign will be an eminently collaborative operation requiring seamless partnering among diverse commercial, government, and international partners, a comprehensive technology development ecosystem is explored aimed at enabling ISRU in a way that systems and components are affordable for commercial partners to design, build, and sustain.

Mathew DeMinico↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Transit Life Support, Open, Closed, or Mixed?

Brief human space missions such as Apollo and shuttle used material storage to provide life support but long missions such as a trip to Mars and back are expected to use a recycling life support system similar to the one on the International Space Station (ISS). Mars transit life support design is investigated considering requirements, performance, reliability, cost, and risk. The launch cost, crew size, and reliability are variable parameters that affect the life support design choice. Greater launch cost and larger crew size tend to make recycling more cost-effective than resupply. A higher reliability requirement tends to favor resupply over recycling. A mixed system combining direct supply of minimal survival materials for very high reliability with additional materials provided by recycling systems seems the best choice.

Mars life support↗
NASA NTRS1994

Strategies for Tailoring Reliability Test Standards

The paper suggests a simple strategy for the tailoring of the ground testing of unmanned spacecraft including considerations of project costs and risks. It is simply stated in five steps: (1) access the specific project's requirements and constraints, (2) use the existing comprehensive quality assurance programs as a guide, (3) prioritize the risks, (4) prioritize the tests, and (5) tailor the test program as appropriate. This approach addresses the specific project needs without unduly compromising the wealth of accumulated flight experience. Tailoring falls into three categories: tailoring of test levels, tailoring of test configurations, and tailoring of test techniques. Three examples are included to illustrate these types of tailoring activities. This paper on stratagies for tailoring spacecraft standards both advocates for and cautions against tailoring depending on the situation. Applied sensibly and carefully, tailoring can improve the test effectiveness and relax constraints on certain project resources. On the other hand, tailoring a product assurance program usually incurres some element of risk and may increase project costs.

tailoring↗
NASA NTRS1978

Costing the satellite power system

The paper presents a methodology for satellite power system costing, places approximate limits on the accuracy possible in cost estimates made at this time, and outlines the use of probabilistic cost information in support of the decision-making process. Reasons for using probabilistic costing or risk analysis procedures instead of standard deterministic costing procedures are considered. Components of cost, costing estimating relationships, grass roots costing, and risk analysis are discussed. Risk analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation model is used to estimate future costs.

Hazelrigg, G. A., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2013

TPSAS-NF1676L-17243-DND

This presentation captures ERA Project's effort in using integrated cost-schedule-risk analysis tool, identifying and capturing explicit relationships between program funds, schedule, and discrete risks. The project team merged a myriad of cost and schedule data for timely, objective, uncertainty analysis of the ITD's budget and schedule. The project team conducted detailed schedule uncertainty analysis showing schedule activities and how their interrelationships were impacted, representing an impressive advance beyond routine Gantt charts. Furthermore, the ERA Project collected discrete risk events including their impacts to costs and/or schedule and interwove these risks into cost and schedule logic networks, providing the foundation to conduct cost and schedule analyses. The team integrated this data into the analysis model, providing probabilistic results that were then used by the ERA Project's senior management for decision-making purposes. The ERA Project management team, through technical and pathfinder expertise in integrating cost, schedule, risk, and technical content, consistently provided risk-informed recommendations to Implementing Centers and ISRP senior management which ultimately ensured the successful ARMD Key Decision Point (KDP) review of the ERA Phase 2 ITD Portfolio and increased the likelihood of achieving technical objectives within cost and schedule constraints.

Gaudy M Bezos-O'Connor↗
NASA NTRS2003

Study of a High-Energy Upper Stage for Future Shuttle Missions

Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to remain in service to 2020 or beyond for servicing the International Space Station and for launching very high value spacecraft. There is a need for a new STS-deployable upper stage that can boost certain Orbiter payloads to higher energy orbits, up to and including Earth-escape trajectories. The inventory of solid rocket motor Inertial Upper Stages has been depleted, and it is unlikely that a LOX/LH2-fueled upper stage can fly on Shuttle due to safety concerns. This paper summarizes the results of a study that investigated a low cost, low risk approach to quickly developing a new large upper stage optimized to fly on the existing Shuttle fleet. Two design reference missions (DRMs) were specified: the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) and the Space Interferometry Mission (SIM). Two categories of upper stage propellants were examined in detail: a storable liquid propellant and a storable gel propellant. Stage subsystems 'other than propulsion were based largely on heritage hardware to minimize cost, risk and development schedule span. The paper presents the ground rules and guidelines for conducting the study, the preliminary conceptual designs margins, assessments of technology readiness/risk, potential synergy with other programs, and preliminary estimates of development and production costs and schedule spans. Although the Orbiter Columbia was baselined for the study, discussion is provided to show how the results apply to the remaining STS Orbiter fleet.

Dressler, Gordon A.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Assessment and Management of the Risks of Debris Hits During Space Station EVAs

The risk of EVAs is critical to the decision of whether or not to automate a large part of the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). Furthermore, the choice of the technologies of the space suit and the life support system will determine (1) the immediate safety of these operations, and (2) the long-run costs and risks of human presence in space, not only in lower orbit (as is the case of the ISS) but also perhaps, outside these orbits, or on the surface of other planets. The problem is therefore both an immediate one and a long-term one. The fundamental question is how and when to shift from the existing EMU system (suit, helmet, gloves and life support system) to another type (e.g. a hard suit), given the potential trade-offs among life-cycle costs, risks to the astronauts, performance of tasks, and uncertainties about new systems' safety inherent to such a shift in technology. A more immediate issue is how to manage the risks of EVAs during the construction and operation of the ISS in order to make the astronauts (in the words of the NASA Administrator) "as safe outside as inside". For the moment (June 1997), the plan is to construct the Space Station using the low-pressure space suits that have been developed for the space shuttle. In the following, we will refer to this suit assembly as EMU (External Maneuvering Unit). It is the product of a long evolution, starting from the U.S. Air Force pilot suits through the various versions and changes that occurred for the purpose of NASA space exploration, in particular during the Gemini and the Apollo programs. The Shuttle EMU is composed of both soft fabrics and hard plates. As an alternative to the shuttle suit, at least two hard suits were developed by NASA: the AX5 and the MRKIII. The problem of producing hard suits for space exploration is very similar to that of producing deep-sea diving suits. There was thus an opportunity to develop a suit that could be manufactured for both purposes with the economies of scale that could be gained from a two-branch manufacturing line (space and deep sea). Of course, the space suit would need to be space qualified. Some of the problems in adopting one of the hard suits were first that the testing had to be completed, and second that it required additional storage space. The decision was made not to develop a hard suit in time for the construction and operation of the ISS. Instead, to improve the safety of the current suit, it was decided to reinforce the soft parts of the shuttle EMU with KEVLAR linings to strengthen it against debris impacts. Test results, however, show that this advanced suit design has little effect on the penetration characteristics.

Pate-Cornell, Elisabeth↗
NASA NTRS2012

Guidelines for Successful Use and Communication of Instrument Heritage in Early Mission Development with a Focus on Spectrometers

Heritage is important for both cost and risk related issues and as such, it is heavily discussed in NASA proposal evaluations. If used and communicated efficiently, heritage can lower both the perception of risk and the associated costs. Definitions of heritage vary between engineering, cost, and scientific communities, but when applied appropriately, heritage provides a benefit to the proposed mission. By making an instrument at least once before, the cost of producing it again can be reduced. The time and effort needed to develop the instrument concept and test the product represent an expense that can be lowered through the use of a previously built and developed instrument. This same thought can be applied when using a flight spare or build-to-print model of the heritage instrument. The lowered perception of risk is a result of the confidence gained in the instrument through successful use in the target environment. This is extremely important in early mission development to the evaluation board. This analysis will use JPL-managed proposals from 2003 to 2011, including Discovery, New Frontiers, and Mars Scout missions. Through the examination of these proposals and their associated debriefs, a set of guidelines have been created for successful use and communication of instrument heritage in early mission development

specrtometers↗
NASA NTRS2017

The Impact of Mission Duration on a Mars Orbital Mission

Performance alone is insufficient to assess the total impact of changing mission parameters on a space mission concept, architecture, or campaign; the benefit, cost, and risk must also be understood. This paper examines the impact to benefit, cost, and risk of changing the total mission duration of a human Mars orbital mission. The changes in the sizing of the crew habitat, including consumables and spares, was assessed as a function of duration, including trades of different life support strategies; this was used to assess the impact on transportation system requirements. The impact to benefit is minimal, while the impact on cost is dominated by the increases in transportation costs to achieve shorter total durations. The risk is expected to be reduced by decreasing total mission duration; however, large uncertainty exists around the magnitude of that reduction.

Arney, Dale↗
NASA NTRS2019

Program Promotion Can Distort Space Systems Engineering and Deny Risk

NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings was achieved against the odds by an obsessive dedication to reducing the great risk. But risk analysis predicted so many astronaut fatalities that it was thought to be unreasonably pessimistic and potentially damaging to the Apollo program. Risk analysis was discontinued, risk was neglected in space shuttle engineering, and so the space shuttle design was unnecessarily dangerous. Since the Apollo era it has been understood that long human space missions would recycle oxygen and water to avoid the very high launch cost of directly supplying them. The development of recycling systems was justified by the need to increase material closure and reduce launch mass. When it was recognized that increasing closure leads to rapidly diminishing returns, the program goal was changed to reducing launch mass and reliability, cost, and risk were considered irrelevant. Systems engineering and especially the discouraging problems of risk and cost have been deliberately ignored because they detract from program promotion, with unfortunate results. Current human launch system design does account for risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Current life support design continues to assume recycling, even though the recent great reduction in launch cost now allows direct supply of oxygen and water with significantly better quality, reliability, cost, and risk.

Advocacy↗
NASA NTRS1980

Prototype solar power satellite options

The choice of options for the prototype solar power satellite is addressed relative to risk and cost. Emphasis is placed on the reduction of the risk of failure. Risk is the program cost multiplied by the reduction in probability of program success due to the risky action. Four classes of risk are identified. It is suggested that prototyping would reduce the technical risk as well as reduce the effects of the other three types of risk by allowing them to be quantified earlier. Prototype demonstration requirements addressed include electromagnetic power link feasibility demonstration, component integration verification, construction technology verification, and cost performance verification. Specific prototype requirements are listed and prototyping options are given in tabular form.

Sperber, B. R.↗