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At least 199 records · Page 11

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NASA NTRS1998

Space Shuttle Main Engine Quantitative Risk Assessment: Illustrating Modeling of a Complex System with a New QRA Software Package

During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).

Smart, Christian↗

NASA NTRS2019

Overview of Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET)

The objective of the Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) projects is to mature a 3-D Woven Thermal Protection System (TPS) to Technical Readiness Level (TRL) 6 to support future NASA missions to destinations such as Venus and Saturn. Destinations that have extreme entry environments with heat fluxes > 3500 W/cm2 and pressures up to 5 atmospheres, entry environments that NASA has not flown since Pioneer-Venus and Galileo. The scope of the project is broad and can be split into roughly four areas, Manufacturing/Integration, Structural Testing and Analysis, Thermal Testing and Analysis and Documentation. Manufacturing/Integration covers from raw materials, piece part fabrication to final integration on a 1-meter base diameter 45-degree sphere cone Engineering Test Unit (ETU). A key aspect of the project was to transfer as much of the manufacturing technology to industry in preparation to support future mission infusion. The forming, infusion and machining approaches were transferred to Fiber Materials Inc. and FMI then fabricated the piece parts from which the ETU was manufactured. The base 3D-woven material consists of a dual layer weave with a high-density outer layer to manage recession in the system and a lower density, lower thermal conductivity inner layer to manage the heat load. At the start of the project it was understood that due to weaving limitations the heat shield was going to be manufactured from a series of tiles. And it was recognized that the development of a seam solution that met the structural and thermal requirements of the system was going to be the most challenging aspect of the project. It was also recognized that the seam design would drive the final integration approach and therefore the integration of the ETU was kept in-house within NASA. A final seam concept has been successfully developed and implemented on the ETU. The structural testing and analysis covers from characterization of the different layers of the infused material as functions of weave direction and temperature to sub-component level testing such as 4pt bend testing at sub-ambient and elevated temperature and culminates in testing of the ETU results from which will validate the structural models developed using the element and sub-component level tests. Given the seam has to perform both structurally and aerothermally during entry a novel 4pt bend test fixture was developed allowing articles to be tested while the front surface is heated with a laser. These tests are being utilized to establish the systems structural capability during entry.A broad range of aerothermal tests (arcjet tests) were performed to develop material response models for predicting the required TPS thickness to meet a missions needs and to evaluate failure modes and establish the capability of the system. The final aspect of the project is to develop a comprehensive Design and Data Book such that a future mission will have the information necessary to adopt the technology. This presentation will provide an overview for each of these areas and argue that HEEET has successfully achieved TRL 6.

HEEET↗

NASA NTRS2018

Overview of Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) Project

The objective of the Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) projects is to mature a 3-D Woven Thermal Protection System (TPS) to Technical Readiness Level (TRL) 6 to support future NASA missions to destinations such as Venus and Saturn. Destinations that have extreme entry environments with heat fluxes up to 5000 watts per square centimeter and pressures up to 5 atmospheres, entry environments that NASA has not flown since Pioneer-Venus and Galileo. The scope of the project is broad and can be split into roughly four areas, Manufacturing/Integration, Structural Testing and Analysis, Thermal Testing and Analysis and Documentation. Manufactruing/Integration covers from raw materials, piece part fabrication to final integration on a 1-meter base diameter 45-degree sphere cone Engineering Test Unit (ETU). A key aspect of the project was to transfer as much of the manufacturing technology to industry in preparation to support future mission infusion. The forming, infusion and machining approaches were transferred to Fiber Materials Inc. and FMI then fabricated the piece parts from which the ETU was manufactured. The base 3D-woven material consists of a dual layer weave with a high density outer layer to manage recession in the system and a lower density, lower thermal conductivity inner layer to manage the heat load. At the start of the project it was understood that due to weaving limitations the heat shield was going to be manufactured from a series of tiles. And it was recognized that the development of a seam solution that met the structural and thermal requirements of the system was going to be the most challenging aspect of the project. It was also recognized that the seam design would drive the final integration approach and therefore the integration of the ETU was kept in-house within NASA. A final seam concept has been successfully developed and implemented on the ETU and will be discussed. The structural testing and analysis covers from characterization of the different layers of the infused material as functions of weave direction and temperature, to sub-component level testing such as 4-pt bend testing at sub-ambient and elevated temperature. ETU test results are used to validate the structural models developed using the element and sub-component level tests. Given the seam has to perform both structurally and aerothermally during entry a novel 4-pt bend test fixture was developed allowing articles to be tested while the front surface is heated with a laser. These tests are intended to establish the system's structural capability during entry. A broad range of aerothermal tests (arcjet tests) are being performed to develop material response models for predicting the required TPS thickness to meet a mission's needs and to evaluate failure modes. These tests establish the capability of the system and assure robustness of the system during entry. The final aspect of the project is to develop a comprehensive Design and Data Book such that a future mission will have the information necessary to adopt the technology. This presentation will provide an overview and status of the project and describe the status of the tehnology maturation level for the inner and outer planet as well as earth entry sample return missions.

Ellerby, Don↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Supportability Engineering Implementation Utilizing DoD Practices and Processes

The Ares I design and development program made the determination early in the System Design Review Phase to utilize DoD ILS and LSA approach for supportability engineering as an integral part of the system engineering process. This paper is to provide a review of the overall approach to design Ares-I with an emphasis on a more affordable, supportable, and sustainable launch vehicle. Discussions will include the requirements development, design influence, support concept alternatives, ILS and LSA planning, Logistics support analyses/trades performed, LSA tailoring for NASA Ares Program, support system infrastructure identification, ILS Design Review documentation, Working Group coordination, and overall ILS implementation. At the outset, the Ares I Project initiated the development of the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) and a Logistics Support Analysis process to provide a path forward for the management of the Ares-I ILS program and supportability analysis activities. The ILSP provide the initial planning and coordination between the Ares-I Project Elements and Ground Operation Project. The LSA process provided a system engineering approach in the development of the Ares-I supportability requirements; influence the design for supportability and development of alternative support concepts that satisfies the program operability requirements. The LSA planning and analysis results are documented in the Logistics Support Analysis Report. This document was required during the Ares-I System Design Review (SDR) and Preliminary Design Review (PDR) review cycles. To help coordinate the LSA process across the Ares-I project and between programs, the LSA Report is updated and released quarterly. A System Requirement Analysis was performed to determine the supportability requirements and technical performance measurements (TPMs). Two working groups were established to provide support in the management and implement the Ares-I ILS program, the Integrated Logistics Support Working Group (ILSWG) and the Logistics Support Analysis Record Working Group (LSARWG). The Ares I ILSWG is established to assess the requirements and conduct, evaluate analyses and trade studies associated with acquisition logistic and supportability processes and to resolve Ares I integrated logistics and supportability issues. It established a strategic collaborative alliance for coordination of Logistics Support Analysis activates in support of the integrated Ares I vehicle design and development of logistics support infrastructure. A Joint Ares I - Orion LSAR Working Group was established to: 1) Guide the development of Ares-I and Orion LSAR data and serve as a model for future Constellation programs, 2) Develop rules and assumptions that will apply across the Constellation program with regards to the program's LSAR development, and 3) Maintain the Constellation LSAR Style Guide.

Smith, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Ocean Optics Protocols for Satellite Ocean Color Sensor Validation, Revision 4, Volume IV: Inherent Optical Properties: Instruments, Characterizations, Field Measurements and Data Analysis Protocols

This document stipulates protocols for measuring bio-optical and radiometric data for the Sensor Intercomparision and Merger for Biological and Interdisciplinary Oceanic Studies (SIMBIOS) Project activities and algorithm development. The document is organized into 6 separate volumes as Ocean Optics Protocols for Satellite Ocean Color Sensor Validation, Revision 4. Volume I: Introduction, Background, and Conventions; Volume II: Instrument Specifications, Characterization and Calibration; Volume III: Radiometric Measurements and Data Analysis Methods; Volume IV: Inherent Optical Properties: Instruments, Characterization, Field Measurements and Data Analysis Protocols; Volume V: Biogeochemical and Bio-Optical Measurements and Data Analysis Methods; Volume VI: Special Topics in Ocean Optics Protocols and Appendices. The earlier version of Ocean Optics Protocols for Satellite Ocean Color Sensor Validation, Revision 3 is entirely superseded by the six volumes of Revision 4 listed above.

Mueller, J. L.↗

DOE OSTI2022

H-Canyon Jumper Gasket Sealing Evaluation

H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis approved December 2019 credits the leak integrity of H-Canyon (HCA) process tanks, piping, and jumpers in preventing the release of radioactive material in a post seismic environment. Demonstration of leak tightness capability for this equipment was achieved through substantial analytical effort. However, one potential weak point that affects leak integrity exists at the gasketed joint between Hanford Connectors (HC) and nozzles. Review of the HCA Crane Log over a three-year period indicates the HCs periodically leak. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to perform gasket compression tests that evaluate gasket relaxation characteristics, i.e., creep, and provide improvements to the HC installation process that can reduce or eliminate the frequency of leaks at HCs. A HC torque value of 312 ft-lbf is the target value used because it is the minimum torque value, with 95% confidence, when an unlubricated HC is impacted for standard sealing period of 9 seconds. In the HCA pipe-jumper connections are installed remotely by using HCs. HCs inherently add to the uncertainty of a gasketed joint because a calibrated torque value cannot be applied. The gasket material is a special material made of asbestos-fiber impregnated with Teflon. This material has been used for decades and generally performs well but does leak intermittently as gaskets creep and preloaded torque is lost. Gasket types are either snap-ring (SR) or lampshade (LS). Both gasket types cover the same seating area. The SR gasket is designed to remain with the jumper when the jumper is removed leaving the nozzle faces clean of any debris. SR gaskets are initially installed when the jumper is fabricated. Changing gaskets is time consuming and the radioactive environment presents risks to personnel. When jumpers are removed LS gaskets could be used to better seal the connection to reduce down time and ALARA concerns. That is, an LS gasket would be remotely positioned over the nozzle and the HC reinstalled. Testing also included two situations not typical of plant operation. One situation was the use of the non-standard double-layered gaskets (DG), and the other situation was the use of a LS without removal of the installed SR gasket. The DG was used when the supply of LS gaskets ended, so that testing could continue. It was of interest to demonstrate this gasket’s creep response because the DG, which was two gaskets glued together, was thicker than the LS gasket and the thicker material was expected to elicit a greater creep characteristics. The second situation of using two gaskets together by installing an LS gasket without removing the installed gasket is not allowed by the ASME Codes. However, by demonstrating the creep history of such a gasket arrangement it could be considered as an option that could possibly seal a connection while significantly reducing operational down time and personnel risk. Forty tests were conducted, and the overall results demonstrate the initial applied force and how the gasket changes with time. The change in sealing force, in terms of torque, was then measured to obtain a force history as the gaskets creep. This report documents the results of those tests as well as the method used to perform the tests.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Formal Analysis of the Compact Position Reporting Algorithm

This presentation documents the formal analysis of the compact position reporting (CPR) algorithm. CPR is a fundamental part of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), which is a global protocol for aircraft communication. The formal analysis found and corrected issues with the algorithm, proposed simplifications, and created a formally verified reference implementation, all of which are incorporated in the governing standards document.

Formal Methods↗

DOE OSTI2021

ORNL Input to GDSA Repository Systems Analysis FY21

This document satisfies the M3 milestone M3SF-21OR010304082 titled “ORNL Input to GDSA Repository Systems.” This document describes the current status of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) efforts related to analyses of dual-purpose canister (DPC) disposal in unsaturated alluvium with a focus on thermal hydrological constraints on criticality timing and power output. This analysis updates previous analyses of thermal hydrological constraints on timing and power output of a potential criticality event in Dual-Purpose Canisters (DPCs) in a hypothetical repository in unsaturated alluvium using a more realistic representation of heat transport inside dry DPCs. PFLOTRAN was used for the simulations of multiphase thermal hydrology near a single DPC. The scenario considers a DPC failure at 9000 years, allowing water to enter and eventually fill the DPC. Once the DPC is filled to a level that could support a criticality event, different values for criticality power output were added to the decay heat. The main objective is to bound the power output that could be produced by a criticality event without driving water out of the package. For the conditions analyzed here, following a package breach, the alluvial formation could supply enough water to allow enough accumulation in the DPC to support a criticality event. However, the power output that would be generated is limited to modest values by loss of water moderator due to evaporation and vapor diffusion. In the reference case scenario, the DPC would not start to fill with water until about 16,000 years post closure and would not fill to a level that allows a criticality event until approximately 25,000 years post closure. The long-term average power output that could be sustained without driving off the water and terminating the criticality event is limited to approximately 100 W. Sensitivity to assumed conditions and parameters in the reference case, especially the deep percolation rate, need to be addressed but could not be undertaken because of numerical failures of the PFLOTRAN code running in general mode in the dry conditions of an unsaturated alluvium repository

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Solidification of REDC Organics and Airborne Release Fraction Measurements

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for REDC uses an airborne release fraction of 5 x 10 -4 with a respirable fraction of 0.2 for plutonium and other actinides from packaged solid debris waste during a fire scenario, for an overall airborne release fraction/respirable fraction of 10 -4 . Solidifying the organic liquids, either by using PM-199 Organoclay ® or by grouting, would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The use of Organoclay would be much simpler to implement inside a hot cell. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours. Grouting the liquids would require using multiple ingredients and mixing steps. Both methods produced waste forms that trapped cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, inside the waste, with airborne release fractions during fire scenario tests of well below the 10 -4 limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Liquid Chromatography Mass Spectrometry of eutectic bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) acetal/formal: Analyzed Results

This report documents the analysis results produced using liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) to investigate the chemical changes produced by accelerated aging of a eutectic bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) acetal/formal nitroplasticizer (NP). A detailed discussion is given to explain the significance of identified NP degradation ions, which are essential to understand purposed degradation mechanisms. This report is the third of a series on the use of LC-MS/MS to understand the mechanisms of NP degradation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

Nimble Feedthrough Qualification - 125% High Explosive Overpressure Test Plan RevA

The primary purpose of this High Explosive (HE) Over-Pressure Test (OPT) is to qualify top cover diagnostic feedthroughs that will be used on LLNL Nimble Subcritical Experiment (SCE) Series designs per experimental design verification requirements specified in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case 2564, Impulsively-Loaded Pressure Vessels, Section VIII, Division 3; and to satisfy the over-test requirement of DOE-STD-1212. The diagnostic feedthroughs are part of the Vessel Confinement System (VCS), which is credited as a Safety Significant Design Feature per the U1a Facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). The OPT will be conducted at the LANL Area 1, R306 Firing Site (TA-15-R306) in a 3-foot diameter VCS depicted in Figure 1.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2021

Alternative Liquid DSA Containers for Sludge Slurry Storage in the SRNL Shielded Cells

A pending revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) defines “DSA containers” for liquid sludge slurries as containers not susceptible to a flashing spray release in a fire and requires that a list of DSA containers be maintained. High Level Waste (HLW) samples are typically received from the Savannah River Site (SRS) tank farm after retrieval from the storage tanks. Glass bottles are preferred for long-term storage of radioactive liquid sludge slurry samples but are not on the DSA container list. An evaluation has been conducted to identify vessel lids for the glass bottles that would vent prior to pressurization and liquid superheating in a fire event. Low melting Field’s Metal eutectic alloy with a melting point of 62 °C has been identified as a preferred material of construction for vessel lids for this application because the material is resistant to puncture and is expected to have good chemical compatibility and radiation stability in the shielded cells environment. A test vessel was designed to evaluate the alloy and confirm that it would melt before the water in the vessel reaches the boiling point. The tests confirmed: 1) that the reported melting point of the alloy was accurate, 2) that a top fashioned from this material will melt creating an open atmosphere in the vessel headspace prior to sample boiling under moderate and fast heating rates, and 3) that nonuniform heating of the bottle from the bottom also results in melting of the alloy prior to boiling. Based on the results, neither an engulfing fire with standing or toppled bottles or a fire producing localized heat at the vessel bottom would result in flashing spray conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Temperature Effect of Cesium Exchange onto Crystalline Silicotitanate in AP-107 and AP-105 Hanford Tank Wastes and Two Simulants

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) is charged with the development of the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system to process Hanford tank waste supernates in preparation for vitrification. In addition to a filtration step, TSCR will remove cesium (Cs) using ion exchange columns filled with crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media. CST is produced by Honeywell UOP, LLC. The documented safety analysis (DSA) developed for the TSCR system limits a single column loading to 141,600 Ci 137 Cs. Given a 137 Cs isotopic mass fraction of 20% and the planned CST bed size of 596 L (157.5 gal) in a TSCR column, this equates to 0.10 mmole Cs per g CST (Cs distribution coefficient, K d , 1400 mL/g). Factors that influence Cs uptake by CST include (but are not limited to) (1) CST production (lot-to-lot variations), (2) contact temperature, (3) contact duration, (4) competitors in the tank waste feed, (5) anionic composition of the tank waste feed, and (6) the 137 Cs isotopic mass fraction (differs slightly among tank wastes and decreases with time).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Environmental Protection Agency Drinking Water Protective Action Guides Implementation Recommendations

This report documents the analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories on the effect of various alterations to published methodologies to calculate Derived Response Levels for Environmental Protection Agency Drinking Water Protective Action Guides. Specifically, this study sought to assess and provide recommendations on calculation of the Derived Response Level accounting for decay during the consumption period, assess the impact of decay on laboratory Minimal Detectable Concentration in water samples as compared to the Derived Response Level, make a recommendation on the calculation of Derived Response Level consistent with existing Public Protection Methods, and make a recommendation on the use of six age groups versus eight age groups based on available dose coefficients for calculation of the Derived Response Level. The authors analyzed these various factors using nominal radionuclide mixes from four scenarios and compared calculation of the Derived Response Level accounting for decay and no decay and then compared those results to the laboratory Minimal Detectable Concentrations. The authors concluded that decay should be included in the calculation of the Derived Response Level, existing Public Protection Methods should be employed to calculate the Derived Response Level, six age groups should be used versus eight, and the use of both decay and Public Protection Methods result in little to no concern for water samples meeting the Minimum Detectable Concentration requirements. The results of this study may be used in further developing and implementing a method for the Environmental Protection Agency Water Derived Response Level calculation in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Assessment Manual.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

As-Run Physics Analysis for the EPRI Zirconium Growth C Capsule

This engineering calculation and analysis report documents the as-run nuclear-heating term, source-term, and radiation damage (measured in displacements per atom [dpa]) accumulation for the Electric Power Research Institute zirconium growth experiment's C capsule (EPRI-ZG-C). These data have been calculated using MCNP 6.1 and SCALE 6.2.3. These data can be used for: the shipping of the EPRI-ZG-C capsule, the acceptance of the capsule at the Materials and Fuels Complex, and programmatic scientific needs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

3013 Surveillance Program Interim Summary Report (FY16-FY21)

The K-Area Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requires the facility participate in the SRS Site Surveillance Program as a part of Shipping Package Qualification and Storage Surveillance Program. The Site Surveillance Program outlines activities for field surveillance and laboratory tests that demonstrate the 3013 containers meet the functional performance requirements described in the DSA. The SRS Surveillance Program also supports the complex-wide Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) for 3013 containers in accordance with DOESTD-3013. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the SRS portion of the surveillance program activities from FY16 through FY21 and formally communicate the interpretation of these results by the Surveillance Program Authority (SPA).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

H-Canyon Jumper Gasket Sealing Evaluation

H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis approved December 2019 credits the leak integrity of HCanyon (HCA) process tanks, piping, and jumpers in preventing the release of radioactive material in a post seismic environment. Demonstration of leak tightness capability for this equipment was achieved through substantial analytical effort. However, one potential weak point that affects leak integrity exists at the gasketed joint between Hanford Connectors (HC) and nozzles. Review of the HCA Crane Log over a three-year period indicates the HCs periodically leak. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to perform gasket compression tests that evaluate gasket relaxation characteristics, i.e., creep, and provide improvements to the HC installation process that can reduce or eliminate the frequency of leaks at HCs. A HC torque value of 312 ft-lbf is the target value used because it is the minimum torque value, with 95% confidence, when an unlubricated HC is impacted for standard sealing period of 9 seconds.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗