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NASA NTRS2006

Experimental Assessment of the Reciprocating Feed System

The primary goal of this project was to design, construct, and test a full scale, high pressure simulated propellant feed system test bed that could evaluate the ability of the Reciprocating Feed System (RFS) to provide essentially constant flow rates and pressures to a rocket engine. The two key issues addressed were the effects of the transition of the drain cycle from tank to tank and the benefits of other hardware such as accumulators to provide a constant pressure flow rate out of the RFS. The test bed provided 500 psi flow at rates of the order of those required for engines in the 20,000 lbf thrust class (e.g., 20 to 40 lb/sec). A control system was developed in conjunction with the test article and automated system operation was achieved. Pre-test planning and acceptance activities such as a documented procedure and hazard analysis were conducted and the operation of the test article was approved by, and conducted in coordination with, appropriate NASA Marshall Space Flight Center personnel under a Space Act Agreement. Tests demonstrated successful control of flow rates and pressures.

Eddleman, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Stardust Entry: Landing and Population Hazards in Mission Planning and Operations

The 385 kg Stardust mission was launched on Feb 7, 1999 on a mission to collect samples from the tail of comet Wild 2 and from interplanetary space. Stardust returned to Earth in the early morning of January 15, 2006. The sample return capsule landed in the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) southwest of Salt Lake City. Because Stardust was landing on Earth, hazard analysis was required by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, UTTR, and the Stardust Project to ensure the safe return of the landing capsule along with the safety of people, ground assets, and aircraft. This paper focuses on the requirements affecting safe return of the capsule and safety of people on the ground by investigating parameters such as probability of impacting on UTTR, casualty expectation, and probability of casualty. This paper introduces the methods for the calculation of these requirements and shows how they affected mission planning, site selection, and mission operations. By analyzing these requirements before and during entry it allowed for the selection of a robust landing point that met all of the requirements during the actual landing event.

Desai, P.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Frictional Ignition Testing of Composite Materials

The space flight community has been investigating lightweight composite materials for use in propellant tanks for both liquid and gaseous oxygen for space flight vehicles. The use of these materials presents some risks pertaining to ignition and burning hazards in the presence of oxygen. Through hazard analysis process, some ignition mechanisms have been identified as being potentially credible. One of the ignition mechanisms was reciprocal friction; however, test data do not exist that could be used to clear or fail these types of materials as "oxygen compatible" for the reciprocal friction ignition mechanism. Therefore, testing was performed at White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) to provide data to evaluate this ignition mechanism. This paper presents the test system, approach, data results, and findings of the reciprocal friction testing performed on composite sample materials being considered for propellant tanks.

Peralta, Steve↗

NASA NTRS2006

LOX, GOX and Pressure Relief

Oxygen relief systems present a serious fire hazard risk with often severe consequences. This presentation offers a risk management solution strategy which encourages minimizing ignition hazards, maximizing best materials, and utilizing good practices. Additionally, the relief system should be designed for cleanability and ballistic flow. The use of the right metals, softgoods, and lubricants, along with the best assembly techniques, is stressed. Materials should also be tested if data is not available and a full hazard analysis should be conducted in an effort to minimize risk and harm.

McLeod, Ken↗

NASA NTRS2003

Reliability, Safety and Error Recovery for Advanced Control Software

For long-duration automated operation of regenerative life support systems in space environments, there is a need for advanced integration and control systems that are significantly more reliable and safe, and that support error recovery and minimization of operational failures. This presentation outlines some challenges of hazardous space environments and complex system interactions that can lead to system accidents. It discusses approaches to hazard analysis and error recovery for control software and challenges of supporting effective intervention by safety software and the crew.

Malin, Jane T.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Operational Evaluation of VEGGIE Food Production System in the Habitat Demonstration Unit

The 2010 Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) of the VEGGIE Food Production System in the Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) was the first operational evaluation of salad crop production technology in a NASA analog test. A systematic evaluation of rooting media and nutrient delivery systems were evaluated for three lettuce cultivars that have shown promise as candidates for a surface based food production system. The VEGGIE nutrient delivery system worked well, was able to be maintained by multiple operators with a minimum of training, and supported excellent lettuce growth for the duration of the test. A Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) evaluation was performed using ProSan(tm) as sanitation agent prior to consumption was approved, and the crew was allowed to consume the lettuce grown using the VEGGIE light cap and gravity based nutrient delivery system at the completion of the 14-day DRAT field test. The DRAT field test validated the crew operations; Growth of all lettuce cultivars was excellent. The operational DRAT field testing in the HDU identified light quality issues related to morphology and pigment development that will need to be addressed through additional testing. Feedback from the crew, ground support personnel, and human factors leads was uniformly positive on the psychological value of having the crop production system in the excursion module. A number of areas have been identified for future work, to minimize the "footprint" of the Food Production system through creative use of unused wall and floor space in the unit.

Stutte, Gary W.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Operation Evaluation of the VEGGIE Food Production System in the Habitat Demonstration Unit

The 2010 Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) of the VEGGIE Food Production System in the Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) was the first operational evaluation of salad crop production technology in a NASA analog test. A systematic evaluation of rooting media and nutrient delivery systems were evaluated for three lettuce cultivars that have shown promise as candidates for a surface based food production system. The VEGGIE nutrient delivery system worked well, was able to be maintained by multiple operators with a minimum of training, and supported excellent lettuce growth for the duration of the test. A Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) evaluation was performed using ProSantm as sanitation agent prior to consumption was approved, and the crew was allowed to consume the lettuce grown using the VEGGIE light cap and gravity based nutrient delivery system at the completion of the 14-day DRAT field test. The DRAT field test validated the crew operations; Growth of all lettuce cultivars was excellent. The operational DRAT field testing in the HDU identified light quality issues related to morphology and pigment development that will need to be addressed through additional testing. Feedback from the crew, ground support personnel, and human factors leads was uniformly positive on the psychological value of having the crop production system in the excursion module. A number of areas have been identified for future work, to minimize the "footprint" of the Food Production system through creative use of unused wall and floor space in the unit.

Stutte, Gary W.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Automating the Generation of Heterogeneous Aviation Safety Cases

A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, which provides a convincing and valid justification that a system is acceptably safe for a given application in a given operating environment. This report describes the development of a fragment of a preliminary safety case for the Swift Unmanned Aircraft System. The construction of the safety case fragment consists of two parts: a manually constructed system-level case, and an automatically constructed lower-level case, generated from formal proof of safety-relevant correctness properties. We provide a detailed discussion of the safety considerations for the target system, emphasizing the heterogeneity of sources of safety-relevant information, and use a hazard analysis to derive safety requirements, including formal requirements. We evaluate the safety case using three classes of metrics for measuring degrees of coverage, automation, and understandability. We then present our preliminary conclusions and make suggestions for future work.

Denney, Ewen W.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Design of Test Support Hardware for Advanced Space Suits

As a member of the Space Suit Assembly Development Engineering Team, I designed and built test equipment systems to support the development of the next generation of advanced space suits. During space suit testing it is critical to supply the subject with two functions: (1) cooling to remove metabolic heat, and (2) breathing air to pressurize the space suit. The objective of my first project was to design, build, and certify an improved Space Suit Cooling System for manned testing in a 1‐G environment. This design had to be portable and supply a minimum cooling rate of 2500 BTU/hr. The Space Suit Cooling System is a robust, portable system that supports very high metabolic rates. It has a highly adjustable cool rate and is equipped with digital instrumentation to monitor the flowrate and critical temperatures. It can supply a variable water temperature down to 34 deg., and it can generate a maximum water flowrate of 2.5 LPM. My next project was to design and build a Breathing Air System that was capable of supply facility air to subjects wearing the Z‐2 space suit. The system intakes 150 PSIG breathing air and regulates it to two operating pressures: 4.3 and 8.3 PSIG. It can also provide structural capabilities at 1.5x operating pressure: 6.6 and 13.2 PSIG, respectively. It has instrumentation to monitor flowrate, as well as inlet and outlet pressures. The system has a series of relief valves to fully protect itself in case of regulator failure. Both projects followed a similar design methodology. The first task was to perform research on existing concepts to develop a sufficient background knowledge. Then mathematical models were developed to size components and simulate system performance. Next, mechanical and electrical schematics were generated and presented at Design Reviews. After the systems were approved by the suit team, all the hardware components were specified and procured. The systems were then packaged, fabricated, and thoroughly tested. The next step was to certify the equipment for manned used, which included generating a Hazard Analysis and giving a presentation to the Test Readiness Review Board. Both of these test support systems will perform critical roles in the development of next‐generation space suits. They will used on a regular basis to test the NASA's new Z‐2 Space Suit. The Space Suit Cooling System is now the primary cooling system for all advanced suit tests.

Watters, Jeffrey A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Managing Space System Faults: Coalescing NASA's Views

Managing faults and their resultant failures is a fundamental and critical part of developing and operating aerospace systems. Yet, recent studies have shown that the engineering "discipline" required to manage faults is not widely recognized nor evenly practiced within the NASA community. Attempts to simply name this discipline in recent years has been fraught with controversy among members of the Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM), Fault Management (FM), Fault Protection (FP), Hazard Analysis (HA), and Aborts communities. Approaches to managing space system faults typically are unique to each organization, with little commonality in the architectures, processes and practices across the industry.

Muirhead, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2015

SimSup's Loop: A Control Theory Approach to Spacecraft Operator Training

Immersive simulation is a staple of training for many complex system operators, including astronauts and ground operators of spacecraft. However, while much has been written about simulators, simulation facilities, and operator certification programs, the topic of how one develops simulation scenarios to train a spacecraft operator is relatively understated in the literature. In this paper, an approach is presented for using control theory as the basis for developing the immersive simulation scenarios for a spacecraft operator training program. The operator is effectively modeled as a high level controller of lower level hardware and software control loops that affect a select set of system state variables. Simulation scenarios are derived from a STAMP-based hazard analysis of the operator's high and low level control loops. The immersive simulation aspect of the overall training program is characterized by selecting a set of scenarios that expose the operator to the various inadequate control actions that stem from control flaws and inadequate control executions in the different sections of the typical control loop. Results from the application of this approach to the Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission are provided through an analysis of the simulation scenarios used for operator training and the actual anomalies that occurred during the mission. The simulation scenarios and inflight anomalies are mapped to specific control flaws and inadequate control executions in the different sections of the typical control loop to illustrate the characteristics of anomalies arising from the different sections of the typical control loop (and why it is important for operators to have exposure to these characteristics). Additionally, similarities between the simulation scenarios and inflight anomalies are highlighted to make the case that the simulation scenarios prepared the operators for the mission.

LADEE↗

NASA NTRS2016

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗

NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗

NASA NTRS2015

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗

NASA NTRS2016

You Can't Reach for the Stars if You are Tripping Over the Ground! (Preventing Slips, Trips, and Falls)

Although there are very few mishaps related to ground, vehicle or payload processing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), employees have experienced a significant number of injuries due to slips, trips, and falls outside of performing flight processing operations. Slips, trips, and falls are major causes of occupational injuries at KSC, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and in general industry. To help KSC employees avoid these injuries, and allow them to be fully productive, KSC launched an initiative in 2013 to reduce slips, trips, and falls. This initiative is based on a four-part model focusing on DATA analysis, HAZARD awareness, PREVENTIVE methods, and BALANCE.

Falls↗

NASA NTRS2017

Preparing for Veg-04 and Veg-05: Improving Pick-And-Eat Food Capabilities for the International Space Station

The capability to grow nutritious, palatable food for crew consumption during spaceflight has the potential to provide health-promoting, bioavailable nutrients, enhance the dietary experience, and reduce launch mass as we move toward longer-duration missions. Studies of edible produce during spaceflight have been limited, leaving a significant knowledge gap in the methods required to grow safe, acceptable, nutritious crops for consumption in space. Researchers from Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Purdue University and ORBITEC have teamed up to explore the potential for plant growth and food production on the International Space Station (ISS) and future exploration missions. Ground testing of Chinese cabbage and dwarf tomato crops under different LED lighting and fertilizer conditions is being conducted to allow for a preliminary down selection of the two best lighting recipes and the best fertilizer treatment. Two trials of Chinese cabbage and one trial on dwarf tomato have been completed in on-going ground tests. Horticultural data on crop growth and productivity and chemical data on specific nutrients have been collected and are being analyzed to allow preliminary down selection. Taste test evaluations are planned on the preliminary down selection treatments to allow a final down selection for flight testing. Microbial assessment for hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) evaluation is also underway to enable implementation of food consumption. Following down selection flight preparation will commence for testing these crops in the Veggie vegetable-production system on the ISS. A crew questionnaire has been developed to better understand the impact of crop growth in Veggie on crew behavioral health. A single Veggie plant growth chamber is currently installed on ISS, and preparations are underway to launch a second Veggie, allowing side-by-side testing under different lighting conditions. Veg-04 will be the first mission that will use this dual-Veggie capability, where the selected cultivar of Tokyo bekana Chinese cabbage will be grown under two different red-to-blue light ratios. ORBITEC has developed custom lighting software allowing independent selection of red and blue light levels. The VEG-05 experiment will test similar light treatments using Red Robin dwarf tomato. These tests offer an opportunity to develop a pick-and-eat fresh vegetable component to the ISS food system as a first step to regular supplemental food production. Our work will help define light colors, levels, and horticultural best practices to achieve high yields of safe, nutritious leafy greens and tomatoes to supplement a space diet of prepackaged food. With this work we will continue the synergistic research to help close gaps in the human research roadmap, and enable humans to venture to Mars and beyond. This research was co-funded by the Human Research Program and Space Biology (MTL1075) in the ILSRA 2015 NRA call.

International Space Station↗

NASA NTRS2016

Exit Presentation

Skills Acquired: Tensile Testing: Prepare materials and setting up the tensile tests; Collect and interpret (messy) data. Outgassing Testing: Understand TML (Total Mass Loss) and CVCM (Collected Volatile Condensable Material); Collaboration with other NASA centers. Z2 (NASA's Prototype Space Suit Development) Support: Hands on building mockups of components; Analyze data; Work with others, understanding what both parties need in order to make a run successful. LCVG (Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment) Flush and Purge Console: Both formal design and design review process; How to determine which components to use - flow calculations, pressure ratings, size, etc.; Hazard Analysis; How to make design tradeoffs.

Melone, Kate↗

NASA NTRS2017

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision E

The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems.

Roberts, Barry C.↗