Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “human-rating”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

Space Launch System Spacecraft and Payload Elements: Progress Toward Crewed Launch and Beyond

While significant and substantial progress continues to be accomplished toward readying the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket for its first test flight, work is already also underway on preparations for the second flight - using an upgraded version of the vehicle - and beyond. Designed to support human missions into deep space, Space Launch System (SLS), is the most powerful human-rated launch vehicle the United States has ever undertaken, and is one of three programs being managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Exploration Systems Development division. The Orion spacecraft program is developing a new crew vehicle that will support human missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), and the Ground Systems Development and Operations program is transforming Kennedy Space Center into a next-generation spaceport capable of supporting not only SLS but also multiple commercial users. Together, these systems will support human exploration missions into the proving ground of cislunar space and ultimately to Mars. For its first flight, SLS will deliver a near-term heavy-lift capability for the nation with its 70-metric-ton (t) Block 1 configuration. Each element of the vehicle now has flight hardware in production in support of the initial flight of the SLS, which will propel Orion around the moon and back. Encompassing hardware qualification, structural testing to validate hardware compliance and analytical modeling, progress in on track to meet the initial targeted launch date. In Utah and Mississippi, booster and engine testing are verifying upgrades made to proven shuttle hardware. At Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana, the world's largest spacecraft welding tool is producing tanks for the SLS core stage. Providing the Orion crew capsule/launch vehicle interface and in-space propulsion via a cryogenic upper stage, the Spacecraft/Payload Integration and Evolution (SPIE) element serves a key role in achieving SLS goals and objectives. The SPIE element marked a major milestone in 2014 with the first flight of original SLS hardware, the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA) which was used on Exploration Flight Test-1 with a design that will be used again on the first flight of SLS. The element has overseen production of the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), an in-space stage derived from the Delta Cryogenic Second Stage, which was manufactured at United Launch Alliance in Decatur, Alabama, prior to being shipped to Florida for flight preparations. Manufacture of the Orion Stage Adapter and the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA) took place at the Friction Stir Facility located at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Marshall is also home to the Integrated Structural Test of the ICPS, LVSA, and OSA, subjecting the stacked components to simulated stresses of launch. The SPIE Element is also overseeing integration of 13 "CubeSat" secondary payloads that will fly on the first flight of SLS, providing access to deep space regions in a way currently not available to the science community. At the same time as this preparation work is taking place toward the first launch of SLS, however, the Space Launch System Program is actively working toward its second launch. For its second flight, SLS will be upgraded to the more-capable Block 1B configuration. While the Block 1 configuration is capable of delivering more than 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit, the Block 1B vehicle will increase that capability to 105 t. For that flight, the new configuration introduces two major new elements to the vehicle - an Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) that will be used for both ascent and in-space propulsion, and a Universal Stage Adapter (USA) that serves as a "payload bay" for the rocket, allowing the launch of large exploration systems along with the Orion spacecraft. Already, flight hardware is being prepared for the Block 1B vehicle. Welding is taking place on the second rocket's core stage. Flight hardware production has begun on booster components. An RS-25 engine slated for that flight has been tested. Development work is taking place on the Exploration Upper Stage, with contracts in place for both the stage and the RL10 engines which will power it. (The EUS will use four RL10 engines, an increase from one on the ICPS.) For the crew configuration of the Block 1B vehicle, the SLS SPIE element is managing the USA and accompanying Payload Adapter, which will accommodate both large payloads co-manifested with Orion and small-satellite secondary payloads. This co-manifested payload capacity will be instrumental for missions into the Proving Ground around the moon, where NASA will test new systems and demonstrate new capabilities needed for human exploration farther into deep space.

Schorr, Andrew A.↗

Agile Approach to Adding Assurance and Mitigating Overall Mission Risk for Orion Software on EM-1

Human-rated missions like Orion are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software contribution to achieving mission objectives, and this creates a resource challenge for everyone whose job is to add assurance that the mission is going to fly safely. Orion IV&V has addressed this challenge by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V was evaluating areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the Agile software development cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer. As a result of evolving the approach to providing assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance data and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and aspirations for long-term performance.

Assurance↗

Collaborative Systems Engineering in the Ascent Abort-2 Crew Module/Separation Ring Project

Generally speaking, systems engineering (SE) tool-sets face a dilemma balancing power and accessibility. High-powered SE tools (MagicDraw, Cradle, Core, etc.) tend to be specialized and are available only to highly trained Systems Engineers, and/or through the use of a 'back room' developer team making the output products available to the broader team. On the other hand, highly accessible tools (MS Word, Excel, etc.) do not have the power to implement SE in a rigorous manner. NASA has to test all aspects of the new human-rated Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle spacecraft prior to its first crewed mission. The test program includes uncrewed launch abort flight tests to demonstrate the capability to save the crew in the event that a launch failure occurs. Orion's second abort flight test will be a low-altitude flight test known as "Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2)." This test is currently scheduled to be carried out at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46) in Florida in 2019. NASA's in-house AA-2 Crew Module and Separation Ring (CSR) Team is producing the crew module and separation ring. Operating jointly as both an Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Project and an Orion Project, the CSR project charter includes development of innovative, streamlined and generally more efficient practices for creation of flight hardware and software. One result of this tasking has been development of a collaborative and data-centric systems engineering environment within the team's shared web environment (Microsoft SharePoint). Through the use of built-in, 'out of the box capabilities' present in MS SharePoint, the CSR Systems Engineering team has created (with some limited developer support) a data-centric architecture for the project's SE implementation, including functional and interface analysis, requirements development and management, risk management, verification planning and management, test results, and end item management. Data elements are linked between data structures so as to define and control relationships between item types, link requirements to parents and children, and link tests to the requirements that they verify. The overall project team integration is increased by also linking SE content to project management content over the project life cycle, including team communication, action items, configuration management, decisional and meeting materials, and life cycle reviews. This presentation will provide an overview of the collaborative SE environment, showing how it provides the power for a number of SE tasks while still providing the accessibility and transparency to allow the full project team to collaborate and succeed. Given the project phase, we'll be able to present a nearly full lifecycle discussion, from concept through verification and approaching delivery.

Systems Engineering environments↗

Command and Control Software Development

As NASA’s role in spaceflight operations change, so too does its design priorities. NASA’s flagship venture, the Space Launch System (SLS), is being created primarily to explore deep space. While commercial partners conduct low Earth orbit resupplies, tests, and even transportation of astronauts, NASA can divert more resources to more exciting projects - going back to the moon, or onwards to Mars. In the short term, this goal manifests in the upcoming Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) test of the SLS, slated for as early as 2019. SLS, with the Orion capsule, will travel farther than any human-rated spacecraft has gone before. As the most powerful launch vehicle ever created, SLS requires many new innovations to ensure mission success. One such technology is the launch control software, which is the focus of this internship. The SLS launch control software is composed of many functions, all of which require rigorous testing to meet the standard of life-critical code. To facilitate easier testing, the first project I undertook was to customize the open-source tool Wireshark to the software team’s needs. Wireshark is a network protocol analyzer that can take in information about custom information packets. The launch control software will have several protocols that are custom to NASA. I ensured that all necessary component files were the correct file type and in the correct structure for Wireshark to compile. Having allowed Wireshark access to understand custom NASA data packets, testers of the launch control software will be able to find anomalies easier.

Wang, Zhengdong↗

Nasa's Space Launch System: Exceptional Opportunities for Secondary Payloads to Deep Space

When NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) launches for the first time from Kennedy Space Center, it will send the Orion crew vehicle farther into space than a human-rated spacecraft has ever traveled. The primary objectives of this first uncrewed mission, Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1), focus on verifying and validating the new technologies and integrated systems developed for SLS, Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), which together comprise NASA’s new deep space exploration system. EM-1 also provides the opportunity for 13 6U CubeSat secondary payloads to be deployed in deep space. As progress is being made toward that first launch, planning is also taking place for secondary payload opportunities on future missions. This paper will provide an overview of the status of the SLS Block 1 launch vehicle and an overview of the 6U payloads selected for EM-1. In addition, an overview of the EM-1 mission trajectories and the “bus stops” along the trajectory where the payloads will be deployed will be noted. Challenges and new workflows required in identifying and certifying potential payloads will be discussed. The paper will also discuss opportunities that will be presented by future evolutions of SLS.

Robinson, Kimberly F.↗

Bigelow Expandable Activity Module (BEAM) ISS Year - Two

Bigelow Expandable Activity Module's (BEAM) life has been extended and in addition to being a test bed of the first human-rated expandable space module, BEAM will be utilized as an ISS (International Space Station) stowage module. Hear about BEAM's on-orbit performance as well as highlights of BEAM's use on ISS as a technology demonstration.

BEAM↗

Development of an Inflatable Airlock for a Deep Space Gateway

Inflatable structures technology utilizes high-strength fabric materials and internal pressure to create a stiffened pressure vessel that can replace traditional metallic primary structure in a habitable spacecraft. The flexibility of fabric structures allows them to be compactly stowed for launch and expanded in space, providing significant launch volume savings. The unique construction and design flexibility of these structures can be customized for a variety of uses in space including landing bags, decelerators, long duration in-space and planetary surface habitats, and even airlocks. An airlock is often a required component of a crewed spacecraft to allow for maintenance and human exploration outside of the vehicle. Airlock designs in use today rely on complex hatches and seals connected by metallic walls. Recent developments towards the design of an inflatable airlock structure show feasibility and a significant launch volume savings over a traditional metallic design. This paper will provide a high-level summary of these projects and the current state-of-the-art in inflatable airlock development with additional references and detail about previous and on-going research, providing guidance for the design of a softgoods airlock system. The use of inflatables in space has been in development since the 1960’s for both habitats and airlocks. The first ever EVA was conducted by the USSR in 1965 using an inflatable airlock known as the Volga. This airlock was attached to the Voskhod 2 spacecraft and turned the vehicle into a dual chamber airlock. The airlock was successfully deployed, used and jettisoned after Alexey Leonov’s historic spacewalk. Additional work on human-rated inflatable structures was not continued until the late 1990’s when NASA-JSC led an effort to demonstrate these structures as feasible long-term pressurized elements with the TransHab project. The technology developed and pioneered during this project led to multiple patents and proven feasibility that inflatables could be used for large habitable structures. Following TransHab, Bigelow Aerospace continued the development of inflatable structures with technical support from NASA. This partnership eventually led to the successful flight certification, launch, attachment and deployment of the Bigelow Expandable Activities Module (BEAM) on the ISS in 2016. Inflatable and expandable airlock structures have undergone various detailed feasibility studies and testing for over 15 years, most notably with the Advanced Inflatable Airlock (AIA), Dual-Chamber Hybrid Inflatable Suitlock (DCIS), Minimalistic Advanced Soft Hatch (MASH), and Lightweight External Inflatable Airlock (LEIA). During this time, full-scale articles have been built and pressure-tested, and mock-ups and demonstrators have been constructed and evaluated. During the 2001-2003 timeframe, the AIA concept was matured through requirements development, conceptual design, subscale and full-scale engineering breadboards subjecting various test articles to deployment and pressure testing up to four times operating pressure. These tests proved the feasibility of successful deployment and structural integrity of an inflatable crewlock. Additional testing was performed in the ensuing years, as funding permitted, to further refine additional structural and deployment concepts and to understand the EVA crewmember interfaces, hatches and EVA support equipment interfaces that would be required for a fully functioning airlock. This work resulted in a refinement of the structural requirements and an accounting of the systems needed in an inflatable airlock. In 2014, the MASH project developed an ultra-lightweight airlock concept with a fabric hatch that utilized a unique pressure vessel shape to minimize structural loads around a linear seal. The concept uses an automated zipper-like seal that allows for crew egress/ingress. Most of the development work on the project thus far has focused on the design, analysis and testing of the primary structure and the zipper-like seal system is in the preliminary stages of development with a successful proof-of-concept test. As part of the 2017 LEIA effort, studies were conducted on EVA crewmember interfaces on the inside of an inflatable airlock. These efforts included the design of an internal secondary structure and placement of handholds and foot restraints to enable hatch opening, closing and translation through the airlock. Structural design, analysis and testing was completed on several secondary structure candidates. Crew interface testing was also completed using an inflatable crewlock mockup and the JSC Active Response Gravity Offload System (ARGOS) to simulate the movement of an EVA crewmember through an inflatable crewlock in microgravity. The results of these tests helped demonstrate the feasibility of utilizing an inflatable structure as an airlock and informed the required volume, hatch size, and configuration and location of translation aids for crewmembers in a microgravity crewlock. The ISS Quest airlock uses a dual-chamber design with isolated compartments known as the equipment-lock and the crewlock. The equipment-lock houses the Servicing, Performance and Checkout Equipment (SPCE) items (suit batteries, consumables, etc.) while the crewlock has limited internal hardware and is the nominally depressurized compartment during US EVAs. While inflatable dual chamber airlocks have been studied, the current state of the art emphasizes an inflatable crewlock-type structure attached to a rigid equipment-lock type or habitat structure. Since a large portion of the hardware in the equipment-lock are rigid components and connectors that are installed on the ground - and an inflatable structure does not achieve full structural capabilities until pressurized in space - a depressurized fabric structure cannot provide the capabilities of a full equipment-lock. The use of an inflatable as a crewlock, however, provides all the required capabilities for EVA operations in a small launch package that offers significant volume savings over a metallic crewlock. The functions of a traditional equipment lock, including the SPCE, could be provided by a spacecraft’s habitat module or node and not necessarily in a separate equipment lock. An inflatable crewlock would be attached to the vehicle and launched in a packed and compressed state, saving volume under the launch shroud and mass for the overall airlock element compared to a rigid crewlock. Work is currently underway to continue development of an inflatable airlock with a variety of focus areas including the consideration of crew-induced loads and interfaces, the design and development of an internal sub-structure to provide translation aids and restraints, the thermal considerations of a fabric shell depressurized during an EVA, the micrometeorite environment in deep space, and the packaging and deployment of an inflatable airlock.

Deep Space Exploration↗

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like those in NASA's Orion Program continue to grow in complexity. The role of software in achieving ambitious mission objectives has expanded dramatically in the last few decades. Assuring the safety and performance of the embedded flight software is quickly growing beyond the reach of traditional methods and resource levels. The methods used to build these software-dominant systems evolve in an on-going attempt to keep pace with the scope of our ambitions. Agile software development is now commonplace. The long timelines and large batches of work associated with traditional methods are being replaced by rapid delivery of small increments _ as system capabilities are realized in waves. Assurance of these critical software capabilities must therefore conquer an ever-expanding frontier of challenges, and do so with an approach matched to the evolving development methods. This paper recounts the journey of the Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) team as we addressed this dynamic environment. Widening our aperture to encompass a dramatically larger mission scope, while adjusting our cadence to synchronize with the rapid pace of agile software development, a new approach to IV&V is emerging. This approach is characterized by a sharper focus on mission capabilities, matched with a method to dynamically _follow the risk' as the IV&V team delivers more compelling assurance data in waves. Traditional methods prevalent in IV&V tend to scope the work using artifacts of the development process as they evolve from preliminary to final versions, and the pace of delivery was synchronized with the development timelines prevalent in the waterfall lifecycle. That more static approach is out of phase with the demands of the new environment. Scoping work according to the critical capabilities of the system (rather than artifacts of development) and synchronizing with the rapid pace of agile development, we are moving toward more effective parity with the demands of the environment. We explain the concrete steps we took, the principles that motivated our choices, and the results we have achieved to date.

Capability based assurance↗

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗

Seeker 1.0: Prototype Robotic Free Flying Inspector Mission Overview

Seeker 1.0 is a prototype free flying robot that will one day be capable of inspecting human-rated spacecraft. Building off previous free flyer experience, this technology will eventually improve safety of human spacecraft by offering a variety of inspection capabilities for both routine and emergency scenarios providing increased capability and safety over current inspection methods. Seeker 1.0 is capable of 6 degree of freedom flight via a cold gas propulsion system and can operate up to 1 hour via a semi-autonomous guidance, navigation, and control system. The prototype spacecraft is capable of capturing still images at a variety of resolutions up to 13 MP. The initial test flight utilizes a command and data relay box called Kenobi. Kenobi is a derivative of the Seeker design and will communicate between Cygnus and Seeker and store data for post-mission downlink. Seeker and Kenobi have launched inside a NanoRacks External CubeSat Deployer (NRCSD-E) attached to the NG-11 Cygnus ISS resupply vehicle and will operate after Cygnus departs ISS and moves to a safe altitude. Operations will last approximately 30 minutes and will consist of basic vehicle maneuvers while capturing high-resolution still images. With any remaining time and propellant, Seeker will demonstrate additional safety capabilities and maneuvers required for operations around a crewed spacecraft. The Seeker project utilized the Class IE process that allows for streamlined flight hardware development and increased mission risk tolerance.

Spacecraft Inspection↗

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

Final Paper is attached. This paper discusses how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to "fracture critical" additive manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing spacecraft standards and is required by NASA on all human-rated space structures. Recently, standards have been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain metallic additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control implementation on additive manufactured parts are not yet addressed in detail in any standard or guidance document.The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large including industry, academia, and government. Three Fracture Control Certification Methods are proposed for discussion. Additionally, a concept for "Design for AM fracture control" is introduced. The goals of this paper are to further expose the need for maturing additive manufacturing fracture control guidance in the spacecraft industry and to generate discussion on what this guidance should consist of.

McElroy, Mark↗

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA's Human Lunar Landing Strategy

In response to the 2018 White House Space Policy Directive-1 to lead an innovative and sustainable lunar exploration, and to the Vice President’s March 2019 direction to do so by 2024, NASA is working to establish humanity's presence on and around the Moon by: 1) sending payloads to its surface, 2) assembling the Gateway outpost in orbit, and 3) conducting the first human lunar landings since 1972. NASA’s Artemis program is implementing a multi-faceted and coordinated agency-wide approach with a focus on the lunar South Pole. The Artemis missions will demonstrate new technologies, capabilities and business approaches needed for future exploration, including Mars. Assessing options to accelerate development of systems, NASA is utilizing public-private engagements to develop and demonstrate capabilities that meet the agency’s human space exploration objectives while stimulating the commercial space industry. Utilizing efforts across mission directorates, the Artemis effort will benefit from programs such as the Science Mission Directorate’s Commercial Lunar Payloads Services program and the Space Technology Mission Directorate’s Tipping Point partnerships for Moon and Mars technologies. This paper will discuss the strategic landscape for NASA's exploration campaign, the agency's approach to accessing the lunar surface with an affordable human-rated landing system, current status and role of U.S. industry, and future plans.

Human landing system↗

An Update on the CCSDS Optical Communications Working Group Interoperability Standards

International space agencies around the world are working together in the Interagency Operation Advisory Group (IOAG) and the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) to develop interoperability standards for optical communications. The standards support optical communication systems for both Near Earth and Deep Space robotic and human-rated spacecraft. The standards generally address both free space links between spacecraft and free space links between spacecraft and ground. This paper will overview the history and structure of the CCSDS Optical Communications Working Group and provide an update on the set of optical communications standards being developed. The paper will address the ongoing work on High Photon Efficiency communications, High Data Rate communications, and Optical On/Off Keying communications. It will also cover the working being done within CCSDS on documenting atmospheric measurement techniques and link operations concepts.

Edwards, Bernard L.↗

NASA’s Space Launch System Progress Report

NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) continues to achieve assembly and testing milestones on its way to the launch of the first human-rated spacecraft to the Moon since the Apollo Program. Major flight hardware for Artemis I (see Fig. 1), formerly known as Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), is complete, including the liquid and solid main propulsion systems. The Artemis I core stage is fully assembled and engine integration and checkout is underway. Structural testing on the core stage engine and payload sections and intertank are complete. Liquid hydrogen tank structural testing is under way, and liquid oxygen tank structural testing will begin in fall 2019. Major structural components for the second and third flights are also in production; hardware has been fabricated for each element of the Artemis II vehicle. SLS and the Orion crew vehicle along with the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) launch facilities at Kennedy Space Center are critical to the nation’s plans to return to the Moon to stay in a measured, sustainable fashion. Lunar exploration will expand our understanding of Earth’s formation, serve as a proving ground for technologies for pushing deeper into the solar system, and inspire a new generation. This paper will discuss details of 2018-2019 progress and the work ahead to ready SLS for launch.

Honeycutt, John↗