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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

The editors of Loss of Signal wanted to document the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia mishap. The book is intended to be an accurate and easily understood account of the entire process of recovering and analyzing the human remains, investigating and analyzing what happened to the crew, and using the resulting information to recommend ways to prevent mishaps and provide better protection to crewmembers. Our goal is to capture the passions of those who devoted their energies in responding to the Columbia mishap. We have reunited authors who were directly involved in each of these aspects. These authors tell the story of their efforts related to the Columbia mishap from their point of view. They give the reader an honest description of their responsibilities and share their challenges, their experiences, and their lessons learned on how to enhance crew safety and survival, and how to be prepared to support space mishap investigations. As a result of this approach, a few of the chapters have some redundancy of information and authors' opinions may differ. In no way did we or they intend to assign blame or criticize anyone's professional efforts. All those involved did their best to obtain the truth in the situations to which they were assigned.

Stepaniak, Philip C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons We Learned Designing and Building the Chandra Telescope

2014 marks the crystal (15th) anniversary of the launch of the Chandra X‐ray Observatory. This paper offers some of the major lessons learned by some of the key members of the Chandra Telescope team. We offer some of the lessons gleaned from our experiences developing, designing, building and testing the telescope and its subsystems, with 15 years of hindsight. Among the topics to be discussed are the early developmental tests, known as VETA‐I and VETA‐II, requirements derivation, the impact of late requirements and reflection on the conservatism in the design process.

Arenberg, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDRs approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

radio equipment↗
NASA NTRS2011

An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned from Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior

Pica Kahn conducted "An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned in Human and Hardware Behavior" on August 16, 2011. With more than 40 years of experience in the aerospace industry, McMann has gained a wealth of knowledge. This presentation focused on lessons learned in human and hardware behavior. During his many years in the industry, McMann observed that the hardware development process was intertwined with human influences, which impacted the outcome of the product.

McMann, Joe↗
NASA NTRS2014

Veggie Hardware Validation Test Preliminary Results and Lessons Learned

The Veggie hardware validation test, VEG-01, was conducted on the International Space Station during Expeditions 39 and 40 from May through June of 2014. The Veggie hardware and the VEG-01 experiment payload were launched to station aboard the SpaceX-3 resupply mission in April, 2014. Veggie was installed in an Expedite-the-Processing-of-Experiments-to-Space-Station (ExPRESS) rack in the Columbus module, and the VEG-01 validation test was initiated. Veggie installation was successful, and power was supplied to the unit. The hardware was programmed and the root mat reservoir and plant pillows were installed without issue. As expected, a small amount of growth media was observed in the sealed bags which enclosed the plant pillows when they were destowed. Astronaut Steve Swanson used the wet/dry vacuum to clean up the escaped particles. Water insertion or priming the first plant pillow was unsuccessful as an issue prevented water movement through the quick disconnect. All subsequent pillows were successfully primed, and the initial pillow was replaced with a backup pillow and successfully primed. Six pillows were primed, but only five pillows had plants which germinated. After about a week and a half it was observed that plants were not growing well and that pillow wicks were dry. This indicated that the reservoir was not supplying sufficient water to the pillows via wicking, and so the team reverted to an operational fix which added water directly to the plant pillows. Direct watering of the pillows led to a recovery in several of the stressed plants; a couple of which did not recover. An important lesson learned involved Veggie's bellows. The bellows tended to float and interfere with operations when opened, so Steve secured them to the baseplate during plant tending operations. Due to the perceived intensity of the LED lights, the crew found it challenging to both work under the lights and read crew procedures on their computer. Although the lights are not a safety hazard, for visual comfort crewmembers were advised to wear sunglasses when working with the plants and then they can lift glasses to read procedures. Steve Swanson had already trail-blazed this procedure when he initiated VEG-01. The temperature and humidity data logger was relocated mid-experiment to provide measurements on both sides of the unit. Images of the plants were downlinked weekly, and videos of installation and harvest were recorded. This imaging frequency was not sufficient to monitor and respond to changes in plant growth. Plants, samples, and data loggers will be returned on SpaceX-4, scheduled to return the fall of 2014. Lessons learned will be translated into hardware and operational modifications for future Veggie payloads.

International Space Station↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDR's approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

space communication↗
NASA NTRS2014

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗
NASA NTRS2013

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned.

Fernandez, Rene↗
NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from the Kepler Mission and Space Telescope Management

This paper presents lessons learned over the course of several space telescope mission and instrument developments spanning two decades. These projects involved astronomical telescopes developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and were designed to further our understanding of the Universe. It is hoped that the lessons drawn from these experiences may be of use to future mission developers.

GALEX↗
NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program Lessons Learned

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the COTS Program. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

COTS↗
NASA NTRS2013

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗
NASA NTRS2015

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

Thermal Design↗
NASA NTRS2015

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope Using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

WFIRST↗
NASA NTRS2016

Thermal Design, Tvac Testing, and Lessons Learned for Critical GSE of ATLAS and the ICESat-2 Mission

This presentation describes the thermal design of the three main of optical components which comprise the Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE) for the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument, which is flying on the ICESat-2 mission. Thermal vacuum testing of these components is also described in this presentation, as well as a few lessons learned. These BCE components serve as critical GSE for the mission; their purpose is to verify ATLAS is performing well. It has been said that, in one light, the BCE is the most important part of ATLAS, since, without it, ATLAS cannot be aligned properly or its performance verified before flight. Therefore, careful attention was paid to the BCEs thermal design, development, and component-level Tvac testing prior to its use in instrument-level and spacecraft-level Tvac tests with ATLAS. This presentation describes that thermal design, development, and testing, as well as a few lessons learned.

Thermal ATLAS BCE↗
NASA NTRS2017

Cleared for Launch - Lessons Learned from the OSIRIS-REx System Requirements Verification Program

Requirements verification of a large flight system is a challenge. It is especially challenging for engineers taking on their first role in space systems engineering. This paper describes our approach to verification of the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) system requirements. It also captures lessons learned along the way from developing systems engineers embroiled in this process. We begin with an overview of the mission and science objectives as well as the project requirements verification program strategy. A description of the requirements flow down is presented including our implementation for managing the thousands of program and element level requirements and associated verification data. We discuss both successes and methods to improve the managing of this data across multiple organizational interfaces. Our approach to verifying system requirements at multiple levels of assembly is presented using examples from our work at instrument, spacecraft, and ground segment levels. We include a discussion of system end-to-end testing limitations and their impacts to the verification program. Finally, we describe lessons learned that are applicable to all emerging space systems engineers using our unique perspectives across multiple organizations of a large NASA program.

Requirements Verification↗
NASA NTRS2017

Orbiter Water Dump Nozzles Redesign Lessons Learned

Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Rotter, Hank↗
NASA NTRS2015

CloudSat Anomaly and Return to the A-Train: Lessons Learned for Satellite Constellations

In April 2011, CloudSat suffered a severe battery anomaly, leaving the space-craft in emergency mode without the ability to command or maneuver the spacecraft. Before the team was able to recover spacecraft operability, CloudSat passed close to the Aqua satellite in the A-Train and then exited the A-Train. A new mode of operations, termed Daylight Only Operations (DO-Op) mode was developed to enable CloudSat to resume science operations in an orbit under the A-Train by November 2011, and in July 2012 CloudSat re-entered the A-Train. This paper describes challenges and lessons-learned during the anomaly, the exit from the A-Train and the return to the A-Train. These lessons-learned may ap-ply to other current and future satellite constellations in Earth orbit.

formation-flying↗