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At least 199 records · Page 11

HPC and Cloud Convergence Beyond Technical Boundaries: Strategies for Economic Sustainability, Standardization, and Data Accessibility

At the IEEE/ACM International Conference for High-Performance Computing, Networking, Storage, and Analysis (SC23), held in Denver, experts discussed the convergence of high-performance computing and cloud computing. Experts explored how this integration could address current scientific computing limitations, enhance computational capabilities, and foster global collaboration while focusing on economic, security, technical, and community challenges and opportunities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA s third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA's third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗

Literature Review on Modeling Cyber Networks and Evaluating Cyber Risks

The National Infrastructure Simulations and Analysis Center (NISAC) conducted a literature review on modeling cyber networks and evaluating cyber risks. The literature review explores where modeling is used in the cyber regime and ways that consequence and risk are evaluated. The relevant literature clusters in three different spaces: network security, cyber-physical, and mission assurance. In all approaches, some form of modeling is utilized at varying levels of detail, while the ability to understand consequence varies, as do interpretations of risk. This document summarizes the different literature viewpoints and explores their applicability to securing enterprise networks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Stucco System

Security event data, such as intrusion detection system alerts, provide a starting point for analysis, but are information impoverished. To provide context, analysts must manually gather and synthesize relevant data from myriad sources within their enterprise and external to it. Analysts search system logs, network flows, and firewall data; they search IP blacklists and reputation lists, software vulnerability information, malware and threat data, OS and application vendor blogs, and news sites. All of these sources are manually searched for data relevant to the event being investigated. Relevant results must then be brought together and synthesized to put the event in context and make decisions about its importance and impact.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems

"CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems" outlines a comprehensive methodology for integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into both new and existing engineered systems. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER), the process aims to achieve cyber-informed decisions by producing functional security requirements for new systems and retrofitting existing systems to mitigate digital risks. The document details a step-by-step approach, including mission and function definition, digital asset awareness, consequence analysis, and mitigation analysis. It emphasizes the importance of documenting mechanical, electrical, programmable, and network components to protect system functions and provides examples and considerations for each step. The ultimate goal is to ensure that engineered systems remain resilient against cyber threats, maintaining safety, performance, and reliability.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Revolution in nuclear detection affairs

The detection of nuclear or radioactive materials for homeland or national security purposes is inherently difficult. This is one reason detection efforts must be seen as just one part of an overall nuclear defense strategy which includes, inter alia, material security, detection, interdiction, consequence management and recovery. Nevertheless, one could argue that there has been a revolution in detection affairs in the past several decades as the innovative application of new technology has changed the character and conduct of detection operations. This revolution will likely be most effectively reinforced in the coming decades with the networking of detectors and innovative application of anomaly detection algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗

Managing Multi-Instrument Data Streams in Secure Environments

The capture and curation of all primary instrument data is a potentially valuable source of added insight into experiments or diagnostics in laboratory experiments. The data can, when properly curated, enable analysis beyond the current practice that uses just a subset of the as-measured data. Complete curated data can also be input for machine learning and other data exploration tools. Conveniently storing and accessing instrument data requires that the instruments are connected to databases and users through a networking infrastructure. This infrastructure needs to accommodate a wide array of instruments which can range from single laboratory mounted probes for environment monitoring to computers managing multiple instruments. These resources may also include mobile devices on which researchers record instrument and experiment state related notes. These varied data sources bring with them the challenges of different communications capabilities and protocols as well as the primary data typically being produced in proprietary formats. These challenges are further compounded when the instruments need to operate in secure environments such as required in national laboratories. We will discuss the SmartLab, an ongoing effort to set up a system for instrument and simulation data curation at NASA Langley Research Center. We will outline the challenges faced in managing the data sources required for ongoing research activities and the solutions that are being considered and implemented to address those challenges.

instrument data management↗

Advancing the Standards for Unmanned Air System Communications, Navigation and Surveillance

Under NASA program NNA16BD84C, new architectures were identified and developed for supporting reliable and secure Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) needs for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) operating in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. An analysis of architectures for the two categories of airspace and an implementation technology readiness analysis were performed. These studies produced NASA reports that have been made available in the public domain and have been briefed in previous conferences. We now consider how the products of the study are influencing emerging directions in the aviation standards communities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Communications Panel (CP), Working Group I (WG-I) is currently developing a communications network architecture known as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network with Internet Protocol Services (ATN/IPS). The target use case for this service is secure and reliable Air Traffic Management (ATM) for manned aircraft operating in controlled airspace. However, the work is more and more also considering the emerging class of airspace users known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), which refers to certain UAS classes. In addition, two Special Committees (SCs) in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) are developing Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS. RTCA SC-223 is investigating an Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) and AeroMACS aviation data link for interoperable (INTEROP) UAS communications. Meanwhile, RTCA SC-228 is working to develop Detect And Avoid (DAA) equipment and a Command and Control (C2) Data Link MOPS establishing LBand and C-Band solutions. These RTCA Special Committees along with ICAO CP WG/I are therefore overlapping in terms of the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) alternatives they are seeking to provide for an integrated manned- and unmanned air traffic management service as well as remote pilot command and control. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts developed under the NASA program that apply to all three of the aforementioned committees. It discusses the similarities and differences in the problem spaces under consideration in each committee, and considers the application of a common set of CNS alternatives that can be widely applied. As the works of these committees progress, it is clear that the overlap will need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and safe framework for worldwide aviation. In this study, we discuss similarities and differences in the various operational models and show how the CNS architectures developed under the NASA program apply.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗

Self port scanning tool : providing a more secure computing Environment through the use of proactive port scanning

Secure computing is a necessity in the hostile environment that the internet has become. Protection from nefarious individuals and organizations requires a solution that is more a methodology than a one time fix. One aspect of this methodology is having the knowledge of which network ports a computer has open to the world, These network ports are essentially the doorways from the internet into the computer. An assessment method which uses the nmap software to scan ports has been developed to aid System Administrators (SAs) with analysis of open ports on their system(s). Additionally, baselines for several operating systems have been developed so that SAs can compare their open ports to a baseline for a given operating system. Further, the tool is deployed on a website where SAs and Users can request a port scan of their computer. The results are then emailed to the requestor. This tool aids Users, SAs, and security professionals by providing an overall picture of what services are running, what ports are open, potential trojan programs or backdoors, and what ports can be closed.

nMap↗

Securely Aggregated Coded Matrix Inversion

Coded computing is a method for mitigating straggling workers in a centralized computing network, by using erasure-coding techniques. Federated learning is a decentralized model for training data distributed across client devices. In this work we propose approximating the inverse of an aggregated data matrix, where the data is generated by clients; similar to the federated learning paradigm, while also being resilient to stragglers. To do so, we propose a coded computing method based on gradient coding. We modify this method so that the coordinator does not access the local data at any point; while the clients access the aggregated matrix in order to complete their tasks. Here, the network we consider is not centrally administrated, and the communications which take place are secure against potential eavesdroppers.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Workshop on Current Issues in Predictive Approaches to Intelligence and Security Analytics: Fostering the Creation of Decision Advantage through Model Integration and Evaluation

The increasing asymmetric nature of threats to the security, health and sustainable growth of our society requires that anticipatory reasoning become an everyday activity. Currently, the use of anticipatory reasoning is hindered by the lack of systematic methods for combining knowledge- and evidence-based models, integrating modeling algorithms, and assessing model validity, accuracy and utility. The workshop addresses these gaps with the intent of fostering the creation of a community of interest on model integration and evaluation that may serve as an aggregation point for existing efforts and a launch pad for new approaches.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

Advanced Metering Infrastructure↗

A Passive Network Cyber Threat Intelligence Framework for Legacy Critical Control Systems using Machine Learning

The importance of Internet and communication networks in our daily life and in any organization’s daily operations is well known and cannot be overstressed. A nation’s economy is fully reliant on its critical infrastructure. Energy sector is one of the 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors identified by the Department of Homeland Security. Securing these critical infrastructure sectors is challenging but is also of utmost priority in this day of constant and persistent cyber threats. Threat is any circumstance or event that has the potential to adversely impact an agency's assets and operations. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is the process of collection, analysis, and identification of potential cyber threats to the organization. This goal of current research performed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Aiken, SC, is to develop a Cyber Threat Intelligence framework for gathering Threat Intelligence passively from the network traffic from and to a real or simulated Critical Control Systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Fracture Network Prediction Using Physics-based Machine Learning Algorithms

In recent years, systematic CO2 injection into geological reservoirs across the U.S. has gained traction as a strategy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This approach necessitates precise monitoring to ensure secure containment, minimize risks, and optimize storage management. Our study leverages machine learning (ML) techniques to advance the understanding of CO2 injection processes, focusing on the Illinois Basin. Over a three-year injection period, we analyzed microseismic data, identifying 19 temporal intervals with significant bottom-hole pressure changes. By partitioning microseismic events into these intervals and estimating b-values, we revealed over 100 clusters of events related to fracture initiation or reactivation. Advanced spatial analysis highlighted horizontally-oriented fractures along the NNW-SSE axis. This quantification of fracture networks informs dynamic injection scheduling, work-over strategies, and risk assessments, enhancing carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) operations. Additionally, our methodology offers valuable insights for oil and gas operations and geothermal development, supporting fracture-based monitoring and risk mitigation.

Kumar, Abhash↗

On-demand Overlay Networks for Large Scientific Data Transfers

Large scale scientific data transfers are central to scientific processes. Data from large experimental facilities have to be moved to local institutions for analysis or often data needs to be moved between local clusters and large supercomputing centers. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a network overlay architecture to enable highthroughput, on-demand, coordinated data transfers over wide-area networks. Our work leverages Phoebus and On-demand Secure Circuits and AdvanceReservation System (OSCARS) to provide high performance wide-area network connections. OSCARS enables dynamic provisioning of network paths with guaranteed bandwidth and Phoebus enables the coordination and effective utilization of the OSCARS network paths. Our evaluation shows that this approach leads to improved end-to-end data transfer throughput with minimal overheads. The achievedthroughput using our overlay was limited only by the ability of the end hosts to sink the data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗