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NASA NTRS2023

Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) Mission

NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission was humanity’s first attempt to move a celestial body, demonstrating the capability to perform a kinetic impact on a planetary defense–relevant sized asteroid. DART was part of the international collaboration known as the Asteroid Impact & Deflection Assessment (AIDA), involving NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI), and scientists around the world. DART was a key step to demonstrating preparedness to respond to planetary defense scenarios, and it provides a crucial data point for likely outcomes. Near-Earth objects (NEOs) greater than 140 m in size are of particular interest to planetary defense because they have the potential to cause significant damage if they were to impact Earth, and also because they are difficult to detect, with less than 50% of the predicted population discovered as of 2022 (National Academies Press, 2022). With an appropriately sized spacecraft and enough warning (typically many years to decades), a kinetic impact can slightly alter the orbit of an asteroid in a way that, over time, prevents the asteroid from colliding with Earth in the future. DART’s target was Dimorphos, the smaller (~150-m-diameter) member of the binary asteroid system (65803) Didymos, which is a near-Earth, potentially hazardous, and well-characterized asteroid system. By simply observing changes to the system after impact and comparing them with a pre-impact reference, it was possible to use ground-based telescopes to observe the deflection in the orbit of Dimorphos after impact. Developed and operated by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), the mission entered formulation in 2015 after multiple years of concept development. The project was administered according to NPR 7120.5, with technical oversight and funding through the Planetary Missions Program Office (PMPO) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and overall support as a directed mission from NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO). The DART spacecraft hosted a singular payload, the Didymos Reconnaissance and Asteroid Camera for Optical navigation (DRACO), and a deployable CubeSat contributed by ASI named the Light Italian CubeSat for Imaging of Asteroids (LICIACube). On 11 September 2022, DART deployed LICIACube, which subsequently followed the DART spacecraft at a safe distance and observed the immediate aftermath of the DART impact. DART was designed to autonomously detect, navigate to, and impact Dimorphos. This autonomous design was chosen to maximize the probability of impact, since commanding from the ground could result in course corrections arriving too late. On the day of impact, 26 September 2022, the spacecraft’s autonomous systems successfully detected and locked on to Dimorphos, impacting its surface within 2 m of the center of the illuminated figure (Jensenius et al., 2023). No human intervention was required for a successful impact, demonstrating that humanity possesses the technology to perform a kinetic impact. Within 2 weeks of impact, it was clear that the orbit of Dimorphos had been significantly altered. On 11 October 2022, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson announced that the new orbital period of Dimorphos was shortened by approximately 32 ± 2 min, from 11 h and 55 min before impact to 11 h and 23 min after impact. With additional observations over the following months, the accuracy of this measurement improved to a –33.24 min ± 1.4 s orbital period change (Naidu et al., 2023; Scheirich et al., 2023), and Beta (β), the momentum transfer enhancement parameter, was reported to be 3.6 (Cheng et al., 2023). Subsequent studies examined the details of DART’s impact site, modeled the impact event, investigated the ejecta produced, and analyzed the dynamics of the Didymos system. These combined results clearly demonstrate that the project met all Level 1 mission requirements.

asteroid↗

NASA NTRS2024

Interim Measure Report South Water Pump Station Potential Release Location 213 – Location of Concern 2 Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) interim measure (IM) activities that occurred in December 2022 and March 2023 at Location of Concern (LOC) 2 – Electrical Equipment Area associated with the South Water Pump Station (SWPS) Potential Release Location (PRL) 213, located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The SWPS site is monitored under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program, which also meets the requirements of Chapter 62-780, Florida Administrative Code. Assessment activities have previously been performed at six SWPS LOCs identified during a Solid Waste Management Unit assessment in 2013. Based on the data collected during these assessments, it was determined that IM activities would be completed at one of the LOCs, LOC 2 – Electrical Equipment Area, and an IM Work Plan was prepared and approved. In 2019, demolition of the SWPS buildings and structures was completed, allowing for additional assessment at LOC 2, and it was determined that soil excavation to remove PCB-impacted soils was no longer required for LOC 2. The IM activities conducted following demolition are presented in this report and include shallow soil sample collection, conducted in December 2022, and monitoring well installation and groundwater sampling, both conducted in March 2023. AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) personnel collected two soil samples from two boring locations, SWPS-SB0005 and SWPS-SB0018. The samples were collected at 0 to 0.5 feet below land surface (bls). AECOM also conducted oversight of one monitoring well installation, SWPS-MW0001 screened from 4 to 14 feet bls, and then subsequently collected one groundwater sample from SWPS-MW0001. The samples were submitted to a fixed-based laboratory for analysis by United States Environmental Protection Agency Method 8082A for total PCBs. There were no detections of PCBs in soil or groundwater during the reporting period.

Chadwick Sloan Lee↗

NASA NTRS2025

A Minority Report Submitted as an Addendum to the Report of the Mars 2020 Organic Contamination Panel

This Minority Report (MR) presents seven findings in addition to or contrary to the main OCP report: 1. Contamination control for the Mars 2020 cache must be strict. Mars’ surface is known to be organics-poor from laboratory studies, Mars meteorite analyses, and from four previous NASA missions. It is imperative that contamination control measures are enacted that enable reliable and robust detection of potential biomarker compounds at the ppb level. 2. Since Mars 2020 is a sample return mission and analyses of samples in the returnable cache are expected to occur after return to Earth, positive controls are not recommended for flight on Mars 2020 unless a compelling case can be made for their use. 3. The findings of previous panels dedicated to organic compound analysis in Martian samples (OCSSG, ND-SAG, SDT) recommend TOC limits between 10-40 ppb. The MR finds that the lower limit of 10 ppb is recommended and that insufficient justification is given by the OCP Panel Report (PR) to raise the TOC limit to 40 ppb. 4. Analytical capability is sufficiently advanced that analytical capability is an irrelevant consideration with respect to differentiating between 10 and 40 ppb TOC. 5. Perceived contamination control challenges are an irrelevant consideration for raising the TOC contamination limit from 10 to 40 ppb since those challenges, and the procedures to ameliorate them, will exist regardless of whether the limit is 10 or 40 ppb. 6. The “dilution cleaning” method has not been adequately proven for utilization on the Mars 2020 mission. Shortcomings have been identified in terms of peer review, method verification, analytical and testing approach, application to space flight hardware, and performance under Martian conditions. The method should be revisited and independently tested using statistically and analytically robust methods, and scrutinized in a rigorous peer review process. 7. The Mars 2020 mission claims considerable heritage from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission, but MSL contamination control efforts contain significant errors and implementation discrepancies that would imperil the Mars 2020 caching mission were they repeated. A standing contamination control panel should be formed to provide independent oversight for the Mars 2020 mission.

Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRS2024

2023 Artemis Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Model Development

While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper

Systems engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Information Systems for Crew-Led Operations Beyond Low-Earth Orbit

On past and present human space missions, the management of vehicle health and status has primarily been executed from Earth. Missions such as Apollo, Space Shuttle, and ISS have relied on a safety net of ground-based experts with access to real-time telemetry data, broad and deep systems expertise, and powerful analytical and computing capabilities. The ground team monitors and manages the vehicle’s health in real-time and responds quickly to critical situations and malfunctions. Ground operators also provide real-time oversight and verbal guidance to flight crew members, especially during complex procedure execution and high-risk activities like extra-vehicular activities. However, this operational paradigm, in place for 60 years, will not transfer to long duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). Lunar and deep-space crewed missions will encounter delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational and medical support. Additionally, there will be infrequent resupply and a diminished capacity to evacuate or rescue crew members. A small crew must operate independently, managing the vehicle’s state, responding to time-critical events, and executing complex procedures, all without the safety net of real-time support.

data representation↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Summary of NASA Progress on the Development and Qualification of a 12-kW Hall-Effect, Solar Electric Propulsion Thruster

Beginning in 2014, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) began a project to increase the state of the art for the Hall-Effect Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) technology. The Technology Demonstration Missions (TDM) Program Office provides programmatic oversight of SEP with the project being led by Glenn Research Center, supported by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and development, qualification & flight hardware all provided by Aerojet Rocketdyne (AR). This technology was pursued as the propulsion system for the Asteroid Redirect and Robotic Mission (ARRM). While the concept was originally slated for ARRM, it was realigned to Gateway to support future Moon to Mars objectives. The Gateway lunar station was established and will play a key role in NASA’s Artemis Program which utilizes collaboration with the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA). The 12-kW hardware will be the primary propulsion for the Gateway element, Power & Propulsion Element (PPE), from Low Earth Orbit to a Near Rectilinear Halo Orbit around the Moon. Initial efforts began with utilizing Technology Development Units (TDU) built by NASA as the predecessor to the contract activity with AR. Over the past few years, AR has built Engineering Test Units (ETU), Engineering Development Units (EDU) and qualification & flight models (QM and FM, respectively). With requirement changes from the AARM mission to PPE, the joint team has modified the design and has started qualification activities for environment testing (shock, vibe) at multiple facilities in the US leading to eventual life testing. This paper will explore the various design changes, system modeling and the latest status for qualification testing.

Joel Robinson↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planetary Protection at Marshall Space Flight Center

Planetary Protection (PP) at NASA aims to 1) protect solar system bodies from contamination by Earth life and 2) protect Earth from possible life forms that may be returned from other solar system bodies. It is particularly relevant for missions focused on life detection. PP specialists at MSFC act as subject matter experts to interpret PP requirements and communicate with other NASA centers and/or vendors to ensure compliance. This includes insight and oversight to help projects consider and plan PP implementation during design phases. It also includes physical implementation during build, assembly, and test operations, (i.e. microbial sampling of environments and spacecraft) to help maintain cleanliness. MSFC has also expanded to include PP research which included standing up a fully functional BSL2 microbiology laboratory.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Summary of NASA Progress on the Development and Qualification of a 12 kW Hall Effect, Solar Electric Propulsion Thruster

Joel W Robinson↗

NASA NTRS2024

Presound: UAV Diagnostic System Enabled by Vibration-Based Machine Learning

A low-weight, inexpensive small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) that takes off, performs a mission, lands, and safely stows and recharges itself has myriad future applications ranging from agricultural imaging to last-mile package delivery. Likewise, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) systems will enable people to take air taxis from point to point in cities, rapidly moving commuters long distances without concern for road traffic and congestion. Fully electric aviation systems will be cleaner and quieter than ground transport. Cities could eliminate cars and buses, and convert roads to higher capacity bike and pedestrian throughways. Yet, for sUAS as well as UAM, system reliability and assurance is a limiting factor to deploying affordable autonomous flight systems. For this bright future of aviation to be realized, aircraft must be able to autonomously and accurately self-diagnose health issues both before takeoff and during flight. The GreenSight PreSound system is designed to identify defects on aircraft through intelligent analysis of vibration. It accomplishes this by measuring structural vibrations induced by the vehicle’s own propellers, and analyzing that data using a machine learning model that determines whether a defect is present. The PreSound system is designed to require no human oversight, and to operate across a wide array of vehicles through re-training of the model for each target aircraft. PreSound has been developed and seen limited early success using data collected from the GreenSight Dreamer sUAS, a 5lb quadrotor vehicle designed for aerial imaging applications. The final detection model, trained on data with props spinning at 50% throttle, achieves excellent performance with over 99% average accuracy in detecting blade damage using a single FFT vector input. It demonstrates the ability to generalize to new types of blade damage, correctly classifying a different type of blade damage with 98% accuracy. Full test pulses were classified with 100% accuracy, and in live testing, all sets of data during blade movement were classified accurately with over 95% confidence. When trained on in-flight data, the same model achieves an average accuracy of 85% in distinguishing between undamaged and blade-damaged states in flight. The authors believe that these accuracies show significant potential of this approach to expand unmanned flight safety, with significant potential benefits in accelerating Advanced Aerial Mobility (AAM) and UAM aviation applications.

UAS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advancing Air Mobility: Few-Shot Learning in Airspace Research and Development

The advancement of Air Mobility, particularly in the context of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM), represents a transformative shift in aviation's role in modern society. A comprehensive understanding of requirement consistency is paramount for fostering interoperability, standardization, and cost-effectiveness within airspace systems. This paper introduces a novel approach utilizing a pretrained Sentence Transformers model and few-shot learning to address this crucial aspect task of flagging potentially inconsistent requirements. Few-shot learning supports the development of this future through ensuring the accuracy and consistency of identified requirements with little human oversight. This approach offers a promising solution to the challenges of requirement consistency identification in airspace systems. By harnessing the power of advanced NLP techniques with fine-tuned models, stakeholders can enhance efficiency, accuracy, and scalability; ultimately fostering improved interoperability, standardization, and cost-effectiveness in airspace management.

Natural Language Processing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Systems and Operational Autonomy for Gateway

The Lunar Gateway space station will be operated with less human oversight and control than any human spacecraft thus far. An autonomous software control architecture has been developed to allow the spacecraft to maintain safe operations of the vehicle during times of no human involvement. The development of these autonomous control functionalities has been both technical and process driven. Given that the Gateway will be built modularly with contributions from all over the world, the systems engineering processes had to be shaped to fit with the contractual and political realities of the construction of the international lunar habitat. This paper will describe these challenges and contributions to the development of human spacecraft for sustainable deep space missions.

J M Badger↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Communication Delays in Cislunar Space: A Lab Study Examining Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA) and Team Risk Concerns

BACKGROUND: Communication delays are an inherent challenge of space missions to the Moon and beyond. Past research studies showed that 50+ second delays adversely affected individual well-being, team cohesion, and overall task performance (Kintz et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2019). However, there is a dearth of research on the effects of shorter delays (on the order of 4-12 seconds one-way) that may present a more immediate challenge during the upcoming Artemis missions. Even these shorter delays could make it difficult or infeasible for ground control to provide real-time support to Artemis astronauts, especially in complex and time-critical tasks such as extra-vehicular activities (EVAs). Results from studies on longer or Mars-like delays cannot be directly applied to Artemis-like delays, due to the large differences in delay magnitude and task types between these mission categories. For example, real-time oversight and guidance from ground control is impossible under Mars-like delays but may be performed under Artemis-like delays, albeit with potentially high workload and communication difficulty. Thus, a better understanding of the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance is needed. Additionally, there is a need to develop reliable task paradigms that can be used in future studies on communication delays. METHODS: This project will study the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance in a simulated space-to-ground team task via a lunar Gateway-like interface prototype. Teams of two astronaut-like participants - one serving as “crewmember” and one as “flight controller” - will perform a spaceflight-relevant task under six delay conditions (i.e., 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 seconds). Audio, video, texting, and file transfer will be delayed between the participants to mimic lunar-like communication delays. Measures related to workload, situation awareness, system usability, task performance, team cohesion, well-being, and communication strategies will be collected. These measures will be compared across delay levels, participant roles, and off-nominal and nominal tasks. Participants will be given the choice to use any combination of video and text communication in order to study preferences in interaction modality. RESEARCH AIMS: One aim is to identify a delay level or range of levels at which there may be significant decrements in individual and team-based measures. Identifying such ranges may help design novel workload management or communication countermeasures for future space missions. Also, the spaceflight-relevant research tasks and corresponding communication delay technology developed as part of this effort may be used for future studies on communication delays. Results from this work are also expected to inform study scenarios in the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) Campaign.

S Upasani↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Qualification Progress and Mission-Enabling Capabilities of the 12-kW Hall-Effect, Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) Thruster

An update of the 12 kW Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) qualification and flight thruster status is provided. Three flight thrusters completed acceptance testing in 2025 and have been delivered to NASA. Environmental qualification is complete and preparations are under way for long-duration life-demonstration testing. Programmatic lessons learned associated with risk management, contract oversight, and requirement definition during the fabrication and assembly are discussed. In addition, the extensibility of the AEPS thruster to enable a variety of NASA missions is presented.

Electric Propulsion↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Qualification Progress and Mission-Enabling Capabilities of the 12-kW Hall-Effect, Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) Thruster

An update of the 12 kW Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) qualification and flight thruster status is provided. Three flight thrusters completed acceptance testing in 2025 and have been delivered to NASA. Environmental qualification is complete and preparations are under way for long-duration life-demonstration testing. A brief overview of three of SEP’s programmatic lessons learned are discussed: risk management, contract oversight, and requirement definition. In addition, the extensibility of the AEPS thruster to enable a variety of NASA missions is presented.

Mars Exploration↗

NASA NTRS2013

Manager's Role in Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Control

This presentation captures the essence of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineering from a project manager's perspective. It explains the basics of EMC and the benefits to the project of early incorporation of EMC best practices. The EMC requirement products during a project life cycle are identified, along with the requirement verification methods that should be utilized. The goal of the presentation is to raise awareness and simplify the mystique surrounding electromagnetic compatibility for managers that have little or no electromagnetics background

Safety↗