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High temperature mechanical properties of fluorite crystal structured materials (CeO 2 , ThO 2 , and UO 2 ) and advanced accident tolerant fuels (U 3 Si 2 , UN, and UB 2 )

The mechanical interaction between the fuel and cladding that occurs during operation of a nuclear reactor is important to understand as it can lead to cladding failures and release of radioactive material into the coolant. Additionally, in order to develop better models of the pellet-clad mechanical interactions, the mechanical properties of the fuel at relevant operating temperatures, like the elastic moduli, are needed for current and advanced accident tolerant fuels (ATFs). In this work, elevated temperature nanoindentation and resonant ultrasound spectroscopy were used to measure the moduli and hardness of several fluorite materials (CeO 2 , ThO 2 , UO 2 ) and several ATF candidates (ATF) (U 3 Si 2 , UN, UB 2 ). In addition, a comparison of the two techniques was performed in this study to independently validate the mechanical properties.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Recommendations for Secure Transport: Material Conveyance Physical Protection Technology

Nuclear material is at higher risk of theft and sabotage during transport than during any other phase of the nuclear fuel lifecycle. Nuclear materials are transported in the public domain where adversaries have an upper hand by taking advantage of the time and location of the theft or sabotage attempt. As such, even modest threat profiles for transport of nuclear and radioactive material can require substantial detection and delay measures to support timely response. Conveyance tracking augmented with technology that improves on-the-scene situational awareness at a remote monitoring center has been adopted as a de-facto standard approach for transportation security. At present, the extended tracking and situational awareness capabilities needed for a nuclear material shipment, as is provided by the purpose designed, Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System, do not exist in a single commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution. Typically, the COTS systems that excel in one area are deficient in other areas, presenting challenges to designing well-rounded, robust systems. Still, COTS solutions can offer the basic set of tracking and situational awareness capabilities by indicating last update time, current location, and route taken. By incorporating vehicle and driver performance measures via the vehicle’s controller area network (CAN bus) and video alongside other data streams allows telemetry and other shipment information to be assessed in novel ways.This paper describes the operation, capabilities and features of various conveyance protection systems and approaches, assesses emerging technologies and how they could be used through a unified interface, and enumerates additional ways to provide early detection using vehicle, onboard technologies, effective delay technologies and approaches and simple equipment to improve protection during transport.

Shannon, Michael↗

TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR USED FUEL AND ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

This study focuses on requirements and challenges pertaining to advanced transportable nuclear energy systems, which are currently in development and feature varying degrees of mobility. These reactors mostly use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel, and only limited refueling is required during their lifecycles. Due to the smaller source terms, higher burnup fuel, and potentially higher thermal efficiency involved, the waste inventory will be less than that generated by conventional light-water reactors. However, the relevant regulatory requirements must be met when transporting HALEU fuel (whether fresh or used) inside the reactor vessel—mainly the fuel material transportation, siting, and physical protection requirements outlined in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations 10 CFR 71 and 73. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF), as well as irradiated fuel (used during any interval of reactor operation), contains highly radioactive materials that generate heat and necessitate special precautions during transportation. This study addresses the challenges that this incurs, and outlines potential solutions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR USED FUEL AND ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

This study focuses on requirements and challenges pertaining to advanced transportable nuclear energy systems, which are currently in development and feature varying degrees of mobility. These reactors mostly use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel, and only limited refueling is required during their lifecycles. Due to the smaller source terms, higher burnup fuel, and potentially higher thermal efficiency involved, the waste inventory will be less than that generated by conventional light-water reactors. However, the relevant regulatory requirements must be met when transporting HALEU fuel (whether fresh or used) inside the reactor vessel—mainly the fuel material transportation, siting, and physical protection requirements outlined in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations 10 CFR 71 and 73. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF), as well as irradiated fuel (used during any interval of reactor operation), contains highly radioactive materials that generate heat and necessitate special precautions during transportation. This study addresses the challenges that this incurs, and outlines potential solutions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Microscopic Measurement: Need for Nuclear Material Sample Specimen Characterization Capability

The Surveillance, Fabrication, and Off-Site Operations team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is beginning an update to the nuclear material machining lab in Superblock. Plutonium and other nuclear materials tend to accelerate the aging process for equipment and machines that would otherwise be maintainable for long lives. They have their lifespans shortened from deteriorated seals, embrittled polymer components, accelerated corrosion, and damage to electronics from exposure to radioactive materials. The cost of installation of equipment into a glove box (GB) tends to outstrip the cost of the equipment itself. Due to the magnification of cost, the historical approach to equipment installs has been to purchase and install the highest-quality and most robust equipment available to maximize time between failures and updates. To make room for the installation of a new lathe, the inspection GB is being moved to a different location within the machining lab. As part of the overall effort, the equipment within the inspection GB is being revisited. Current measurement capabilities are antiquated and starting to become problematic due to age. Advances in metrology are sought for more comprehensive characterization of scientific samples. This document aims to identify several options for the replacement of current measurement equipment and identify a system for purchase and eventual installation. The intention is not to select the cheapest system, but rather to identify a system that best meets the needs of both the operators and principal investigators (PI). Following the convention of the SYSM-5620 Design Thinking and System Engineering, it was determined that a laser confocal measurement system from Keyence is the most suitable option for our programmatic need. Form factor, capability, and maintainability were considered. Along with stakeholder input, to ensure the best decision for the Nuclear Material Technology Program.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

H-Canyon Jumper Gasket Sealing Evaluation

H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis approved December 2019 credits the leak integrity of H-Canyon (HCA) process tanks, piping, and jumpers in preventing the release of radioactive material in a post seismic environment. Demonstration of leak tightness capability for this equipment was achieved through substantial analytical effort. However, one potential weak point that affects leak integrity exists at the gasketed joint between Hanford Connectors (HC) and nozzles. Review of the HCA Crane Log over a three-year period indicates the HCs periodically leak. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to perform gasket compression tests that evaluate gasket relaxation characteristics, i.e., creep, and provide improvements to the HC installation process that can reduce or eliminate the frequency of leaks at HCs. A HC torque value of 312 ft-lbf is the target value used because it is the minimum torque value, with 95% confidence, when an unlubricated HC is impacted for standard sealing period of 9 seconds. In the HCA pipe-jumper connections are installed remotely by using HCs. HCs inherently add to the uncertainty of a gasketed joint because a calibrated torque value cannot be applied. The gasket material is a special material made of asbestos-fiber impregnated with Teflon. This material has been used for decades and generally performs well but does leak intermittently as gaskets creep and preloaded torque is lost. Gasket types are either snap-ring (SR) or lampshade (LS). Both gasket types cover the same seating area. The SR gasket is designed to remain with the jumper when the jumper is removed leaving the nozzle faces clean of any debris. SR gaskets are initially installed when the jumper is fabricated. Changing gaskets is time consuming and the radioactive environment presents risks to personnel. When jumpers are removed LS gaskets could be used to better seal the connection to reduce down time and ALARA concerns. That is, an LS gasket would be remotely positioned over the nozzle and the HC reinstalled. Testing also included two situations not typical of plant operation. One situation was the use of the non-standard double-layered gaskets (DG), and the other situation was the use of a LS without removal of the installed SR gasket. The DG was used when the supply of LS gaskets ended, so that testing could continue. It was of interest to demonstrate this gasket’s creep response because the DG, which was two gaskets glued together, was thicker than the LS gasket and the thicker material was expected to elicit a greater creep characteristics. The second situation of using two gaskets together by installing an LS gasket without removing the installed gasket is not allowed by the ASME Codes. However, by demonstrating the creep history of such a gasket arrangement it could be considered as an option that could possibly seal a connection while significantly reducing operational down time and personnel risk. Forty tests were conducted, and the overall results demonstrate the initial applied force and how the gasket changes with time. The change in sealing force, in terms of torque, was then measured to obtain a force history as the gaskets creep. This report documents the results of those tests as well as the method used to perform the tests.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Update of Receptor Locations for INL National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) Assessments

This report documents the selection of updated public receptor locations for use in conducting regulatory assessments of radioactive air emissions for Idaho National Laboratory (INL) facilities. The basis for this receptor location analysis is found in 40 CFR 61 Subpart H, “National Emissions Standards for Emissions of Radionuclide Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities,” where the requirements for identifying National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) receptor locations are outlined. Receptor locations (residences, schools, businesses, or farm operations) were identified using high-resolution satellite imagery. This assessment identified 31 unique receptor locations for all INL Site facilities, and 30 receptor locations for INL in-town facilities that have the potential to emit radioactive materials. Identification of receptors for each in-town facility is new to this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Neptunium transition probabilities estimated through laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) measurements

in tis report calibration free–laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (CF-LIBS) approaches are promising for the analysis of radioactive materials; however, a lack of reported fundamental properties for these materials is an obstacle to implementation. Spectra of laser induced plasmas containing Np and Sr, along with Saha–Boltzmann methods, were used to estimate the first reported transition probabilities (TPs) of Np. These TPs enabled the first attempt at CF-LIBS analysis of radioactive samples to predict Np/Sr ratios with a mean error of 3.86%. The presented methodology of TP estimation will be applied to the study of other actinides and allow broader applications of CF-15 LIBS in the nuclear field.

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS↗

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Package in KAC (2020 Status Report)

Savannah River Site (SRS) stores plutonium materials within model 9975 shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The 9975 shipping package consists of a 35 gallon stainless steel drum, Celotex fiberboard insulation, lead shield, and primary and secondary containment vessels. The 9975 shipping package design, performance, and analysis for safe transport of radioactive material are described in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Celotex fiberboard provides three safety functions: thermal insulation to limit internal temperature during a fire, criticality control, and resistance to package crushing. The fiberboard material must retain its dimensions and density within certain ranges to provide the required impact resistance, criticality control, and fire resistance. The SRS Surveillance Program monitors material performance to establish a basis for service life and ensures the continued integrity of 9975 packages. Fiberboard samples, taken from multiple fiberboard assemblies fabricated from cane and softwood fiberboard, have been conditioning in elevated temperature environments since 2005. The samples are periodically examined to monitor thermal, mechanical, and physical properties, and assess degradation trends. Fiberboard properties of interest that are evaluated to demonstrate acceptable long-term performance include dimensional stability, density, compressive strength, thermal conductivity, and specific heat capacity. Duplicate samples from multiple package sources have been tested to identify the range of variability in fiberboard properties and degradation rates. Baseline and long-term testing of fiberboard material properties have been reported previously; reference 6 summarized experimental results of cane and softwood fiberboard through May 2019 and presented degradation models for the measured properties. This report presents the cumulative data collected through June 2020 and the corresponding updated aging models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Review of Nuclear Forensics: 2016-2020

The study of nuclear forensics harkens back to the Manhattan Project-era, when scientists first started to analyze the debris from the 1945 Trinity test. Political turmoil stemming from the Cold War and the rehabilitation of Germany following WWII has led to new challenges in international security involving nuclear proliferation. Nuclear materials have, on occasion, been lost, misplaced, or stolen from former Soviet countries, and illicit materials have been interdicted all over the world. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) was established in 2006, and has been at the forefront of drive to advance nuclear forensic capabilities in the United States. The ultimate goal of nuclear forensics is to examine nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine origin and history of the material, particularly in the context of law enforcement investigations. Nuclear forensics can be divided into two parts: predetonation and post-detonation. Pre-detonation forensics, as the name implies, is the investigation of a nuclear material or weapon that has not been detonated or involved in an explosion, whereas postdetonation forensics is the study of activation or fission products in debris or the environment following the use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Both parts require a number of analytical chemical and radiochemical techniques to determine identification of the material. Many advancements in analytical techniques, including rapidity, sample size, and forensic signatures have been made in recent years. The analytical methods that can be used in a nuclear forensic investigation, such as mass spectrometry and gamma spectroscopy, have been described in detail in previous reviews, including Straub et.al, and will not be explained here. This review will discuss recent publications (from 2016 to present) describing advancements of techniques such as radiochronometry, morphology, development of novel reference materials, and inter-laboratory collaborations for both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Identification of Distorted Gamma-Ray Signature Patterns Using Digital Filtering and Auto-Associative Memory Implemented with a Hopfield Neural Network

The detection and identification of radioactive sources in search applications involve analyzing passive gamma-ray emissions from high-level radioactive materials. This process uses a mobile detector-spectrometer in a complex field test environment. Recently, the use of artificial intelligence for gamma-ray spectrum analysis has shown promising results. However, challenges persist in identifying isotopic signatures from spectral measurements that may be distorted due to source shielding, random variations in natural radioactive background, or insufficient measurement time to obtain clear spectral lines. Here, this paper presents a novel intelligent signature recognition method that combines digital filtering techniques with an artificial Hopfield Neural Network (HNN). The HNN leverages auto-associative memory to store training sample patterns and match them with incoming gamma spectra from distorted sources. It restores the testing sources’ measurements by finding the closest matching signature patterns in the spectral library. Before HNN recognition, the measured spectrum undergoes preprocessing with a digital image filter to reduce fluctuations. Performance of the proposed method is evaluated using a set of gamma-ray spectra measured with a sodium iodide detector. The data collected include measurements from six pure samples: 241 Am, 60 Co, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 239 Pu, and 235 U, which are used for training and validation (i.e. six cases). Additionally, the data set contains 24 distorted synthesized sources with various fluctuating backgrounds. Test results demonstrate the potential of the proposed method to accurately recognize the correct isotope with high precision, achieving an accuracy rate exceeding 85%. Furthermore, the proposed method exhibits superior performance compared to the conventional multiple regression fitting and simple feedforward neural network methods.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Survey Report on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Tracking Tools

Radioactive/nuclear (R/N) materials are integral parts of many business sectors such as medicine, industry, and research. In the United States alone, approximately 3 million packages containing R/N materials are shipped annually via highways, rail, air, and water. These materials are utilized in medical diagnostics and treatments, industrial radiography, and scientific research. The secure and efficient transportation of R/N materials is paramount to public safety and national security. Recent incidents involving the loss of R/N materials during transportation highlight significant security and safety concerns. For instance, in December 2024, a package containing four encapsulated Selenium-75 sources was reported lost in transit from the Czech Republic to Madrid, raising alarms about the security of such shipments. Similarly, a Germanium-68 pin source was reported lost in transit in New Jersey in December 2024, underscoring the risks associated with transporting radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory 2022 Annual Site Environmental Report (Rev. 2)

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory) annual site environmental reports are prepared each year by the Laboratory’s environmental organizations as required by U.S. Department of Energy Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, and Order 458.1, Administrative Change 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. The chapters in this report discuss our compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and orders (Chapter 2, Compliance Summary); how we manage the Laboratory’s environmental performance and assure the quality of data from analysis of environmental samples (Chapter 3, Environmental Programs and Analytical Data Quality); how we monitor for air emissions of radioactive materials and for weather conditions (Chapter 4, Air Quality); how we monitor for effects of Laboratory operations on groundwater quality (Chapter 5, Groundwater Protection); how we monitor the levels of chemicals and radionuclides in storm water runoff and sediment (Chapter 6, Watershed Quality); how we monitor for the levels and effects of chemicals and radionuclides in plants, animals, soil, and vegetation (Chapter 7, Ecosystem Health); and finally, what radioactive dose or risk from chemical exposure that members of the public could experience as a result of Laboratory operations (Chapter 8, Public Dose and Risk Assessment).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Physical Sciences Vistas: Issue 4 2021

In this issue of Physical Sciences Vistas we highlight examples of “excellence in nuclear security.” In this issue, highlights of our outstanding work supporting the Laboratory’s nuclear security enterprise include the following: The complete refurbishment of Sigma’s surface finishing lab. Pride in the lab’s revitalized condition on the part of the operations and R&D staff responsible for this complex operation is well justified. Development of advanced materials and processes enabling next-generation weapons designs, much of which has been facilitated by projects supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program. The use of proton radiography in illuminating elements important to validating high explosive burn models. The experimental series was a collaboration between Los Alamos researchers and staff at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia national laboratories and the United Kingdom’s Atomic Weapons Establishment. Deployment of a sophisticated remote handling unit to safely transfer highly radioactive materials required to support mission-critical projects. The skillful swap of an electrical transformer at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE). The deliberate operation restored power to the accelerator in less than estimated time. A look at George Goff ’s role in translating fundamental science into applied solutions essential to the Lab’s nuclear security mission.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Production of Precursor Materials for the Development of Iron-Based Superconductor (IBS) Wire

The objective of the activities under this Annex is to address the extrinsic Jc limitations uncovered in pioneering work. In order to engineer the defects pinning landscape charged particle irradiations experiments on bulk samples, different doping and chemical additions will be performed at different National facilities (Test Beam Facility at Fermilab; Linac Isotope Producer at Brookhaven National Laboratory; Integrated Biology Laboratory at University of Wisconsin-Madison; Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University). The samples will be produced at ENEA by different techniques. Magnetization and advanced microscopy measures will be performed at Fermilab. After irradiation, depending on the level of radioactivity, the samples will be tested at Fermilab or where it is possible to measure radioactive materials as University of Wisconsin-Madison.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Corrosion Analysis of 121103072 (SAVY-4000)

A surveillance feedlist for fiscal year (FY) 2022 was developed with the intent to target containers with contents known to generate corrosive gasses. One SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) container with a serial number 121103072 was selected due to the reasonable wattage and known molten salt extraction (MSE) material corrosive behavior. The material was measured at 3.08 W with approximately 200 g of material placed inside of the SAVY for 6.07 years. The inner packaging configuration included a ¼ Qt stainless steel slip top inner container and a sPVC bag-out bag enclosing the inner container. Visual observations of the container during retrieval revealed several concerning features on the exterior of the container, notably on the lid. Fig. 1 shows the container lid along with an inset image further magnifying the features of interest. The corroded tamper indicating device (TID) wire and the corroded radioactive material tag wire indicated that corrosive gas species for steel were produced during storage. Although the TID wire and rad tag wire are not the same composition as the SAVY body and lid, these are often used as an indicator of potential corrosion inside of the SAVY container. The oxide residing inside of the filter holes and significant buildup around one hole provided further evidence supporting the presence of corrosive species inside of the container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Production of Precursor Materials for the Development of Iron-Based Superconductor (IBS) Wire

The objective of the activities under this Annex is to address the extrinsic Jc limitations uncovered in pioneering work. In order to engineer the defects pinning landscape charged particle irradiations experiments on bulk samples with different doping and chemical additions will be performed at different National facilities (Test Beam Facility at Fermilab; Linac Isotope Producer at Brookhaven National Laboratory; Integrated Biology Laboratory at University of Wisconsin-Madison; Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University). The samples will be produced at TUAT by different synthesis techniques. Magnetization and advanced microscopy measures will be performed at Fermilab. After irradiation, depending on the level of radioactivity, the samples will be tested at Fermilab or where it is possible to measure radioactive materials as University of Wisconsin-Madison. In parallel, the precursor materials produced by TUAT will be used for IBS-wire fabrication at Fermi

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Intentional Uranium Tagging for Material Provenance and Pathway Forensics (LA19-Intentional-Forensics-NDD3Bb) (Annual Report for FY21)

This report describes the outcomes of the third and final year of a project to research the feasibility of tagging uranium materials, especially nuclear fuels. The experimental focus remained on metallic uranium forms under prospective surface and bulk tagging scenarios. Overall, the results showed that the tags could be successfully imparted and characterized in both as-built and degraded conditions. This was in line with expectations coming into this project, indicating promise for both surface and bulk tagging of metallic forms of uranium. Multiple surface tagging techniques and detection strategies were explored in FY21, with an emphasis on improving tag quality, readability, and detection in the field. Non-radioactive materials were used as a testbed. Selective deposition via laser beam was determined to be successful in imparting a readable titanium deposit on a stainless steel base plate, and can be read with high resolution characterization techniques (e.g., scanning electron microscopy) and field capable tools (e.g., eddy current testing). Other deposition techniques, such as selective deposition via electron beam and photoluminescent tags, were explored in FY21, and while success for these techniques would be dependent on additional work, these techniques showed potential for surface tagging applications. To survey bulk taggant elements for bulk uranium metal, 16 tagging elements were spread among 18 depleted uranium castings (4 baseline, 3 mix, 1 dilution, and 10 recycle). Most of these were made and characterized in FY21. Taggant acceptability was based upon manufacturability, detectability, and persistence from the standpoint of two detection options: bulk chemical analysis (for “chemical taggants”) and microstructural analysis (for “second phase taggants”). Taggant detection in both up-front manufacturing and in the face of “degradations” such as dilution, mixing, and recycling was generally good. Two independent laboratories carried out chemical analysis on most of the castings, and often at several locations within a casting, and the results are discussed. Scanning electron microscopy+EDS microanalysis revealed the second phases mostly contained the expected tagging elements. The shapes and 2 spatial distributions of these micron-sized carbides, oxides, and intermetallic particles offers opportunities for further science-based investigation and tagging optimization. Overall, V and Co currently appear as the best choices for chemical taggants while Al, Ti, Mn, Co, Pd, and Tb all look good as second phase taggants. The other elements considered here – Sc, Ni, Ge, Nb, Ce, Ta, W, Ir, and Au – while not being ruled out, require more study to become viable options. It is of special note that in the recycling study only one of the 12 elements fell out of detection even after 10 meltings, demonstrating their persistence. An Appendix tabulates all chemical analysis results to enable more quantitative and statistical studies of detection opportunities and limitations, as a part of a related project.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗