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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Brick Schema Standardized Plug Load Control Strategies for Load Reduction: Preprint

Plug loads comprise a significant percentage of commercial building energy consumption. Applying intelligent controls to turn off plug loads when unused can provide dynamic load reduction and flexibility, which are key traits of grid-interactive efficient buildings. This capability is important for equitable decarbonization as it can enable disadvantaged communities to electrify buildings without costly upgrades to electrical infrastructure. In this work, we present the effectiveness of various control strategies along with the operational lessons that informed their design. During a three-year period, we operated over 600 smart outlets in 12 university office buildings. The attached plug loads consisted primarily of printers, TVs, water dispensers, and copiers. After recording baseline power measurements for one year, we designed plug load control (PLC) strategies for each plug load type, use, and for different risk tolerance levels because PLC can potentially be disruptive to daily work. We used the Brick Schema to facilitate the management of plug load locations and other metadata. For advanced controls, we integrated the smart plugs with heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems through the campus building automation system. We found static schedules to be the least disruptive and most predictable for occupants, resulting in 38% and 66% energy savings in two studies. For printers, print server-triggered PLC produced 86% savings, the highest of all strategies with minimal occupant impact. Scheduling of water dispensers and digital signage TVs produced 49% and 70% savings respectively with opportunities to improve performance with the use of HVAC occupancy data.

ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber100 Compass: Quantification of Cybersecurity Risks for Systems Transitioning to High Levels of Renewables (Final Report)

The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Justifications for Outdoor Bulk Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Setback Distances

Setback distances define a prescribed distance between a potentially hazardous system and different types of other systems, people, buildings, or materials that may be exposed to that hazard. Riskinformed separation distances are not meant to completely eliminate risk, but rather to limit the risk to an acceptable level. A sensitivity study of risk suggested that a leak size of 3% of the pipe cross-sectional area would be a conservative but reasonable basis. Calculation of the setback distances for gaseous hydrogen was done in a deterministic manner, using a selected leak size and harm criteria for each group of exposures. Harm criteria have been updated to better reflect the exposure types under consideration, and to be consistent with setback distances for liquid hydrogen. The resulting setback distance values are primarily driven by radiative heat flux values for all exposure groups. For the typical pipe sizes, the setback distances slightly increase compared to the previous version of NFPA 2.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS1999

Risk Management at the Total Project Level

Flight Projects plan their work against challenging technical objectives and tight schedules, and in the new environment of Faster-Better-Cheaper, low, rigid budgets.

Risk Management Space Projects↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lower neck injury criteria for THOR and Hybrid III dummies in rear impact

The objectives of the study are to derive lower-neck-injury probability curves under rear impact loading from matched pair Hybrid III and THOR dummy tests. Methods: Twelve whole-body and 15 isolated head-neck rear-impact sled tests were conducted using the 2 dummies. They were positioned on a rigid seat that was attached to an acceleration sled. The dummies were positioned with the head parallel to the ground, torso against the seat back, and legs stretched such that there was no axial rotation. The acceleration pulse matched the previous in-house human cadaver tests. The 6-axis lower-neck load cell was used in both dummies. For the isolated rear-impact tests,the head-neck was excised from the dummies, and the lower-neck load cell was mounted to the top of the sled with the head parallel to the ground and such that the acceleration vector was in the rear impact mode. Lower-neck loads and lower-neck-injury criteria (LNij) were obtained using the load cell data and survival analysis to develop injury-assessment-risk values and curves for both dummies. The LNij criteria were determined for both dummies using the intercept value corresponding to the 90% probability level for the forces and moments. Results: The log normal and Weibull distributions were the optimal distributions for the Hybrid III and THOR devices. At the 50% risk level, the mean LNij of 1.1 and NCIS was 0.77 for the Hybrid III, and 1.5 NCIS was 0.30 for the THOR device. The quality indices were in the fair range and good range for the 2 dummies, respectively, at this risk level. Conclusions: The lower-neck-based IARCs and IARVs serve as the first dataset for injury assessments, and the THOR may be a better test device for assessing injures in rear impact environments.

Narayan Yoganandan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Assessing the Risk of Crew Injury Due to Dynamic Loads During Spaceflight

Spaceflight requires tremendous amounts of energy to achieve Earth orbit and to attain escape velocity for interplanetary missions. Although the majority of the energy is managed in such a way as to limit the accelerations on the crew, several mission phases may result in crew exposure to dynamic loads. In the automotive industry, risk of serious injury can be tolerated because the probability of a crash is remote each time a person enters a vehicle, resulting in a low total risk of injury. For spaceflight, the level of acceptable injury risk must be lower to achieve a low total risk of injury because the dynamic loads are expected on each flight. To mitigate the risk of injury due to dynamic loads, the NASA Human Research Program has developed a research plan to inform the knowledge gaps and develop relevant tools for assessing injury risk. The risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be further subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic risk factors. Extrinsic risk factors include the vehicle dynamic profile, seat and restraint design, and spacesuit design. Human tolerance to loads varies considerably depending on the direction, amplitude, and rise-time of acceleration therefore the orientation of the body to the dynamic vector is critical to determining crew risk of injury. Although a particular vehicle dynamic profile may be safe for a particular design, the seat, restraint, and suit designs can affect the risk of injury due to localized effects. In addition, characteristics intrinsic to the crewmember may also contribute to the risk of injury, such as crewmember sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight, and each astronaut may have a different risk profile because of these factors. The purpose of the research plan is to address any knowledge gaps in the risk factors to mitigate injury risk. Methods for assessing injury risk have been well documented in other analogous industries and include human volunteer testing, human exposure to dynamic environments, post-mortem human subject (PMHS) testing, animal testing, anthropomorphic test devices (ATD), dynamic models of the human, numerical models of ATDs, and numerical models of the human. Each has inherent strengths and limitations. For example, human volunteer testing is advantageous because a population can be selected that is similar to the astronaut corps; however, because of the inherent ethical limitations, only sub-injurious conditions can be tested. PMHSs can be tested in a variety of conditions including injurious levels, but the responses are not completely analogous to living human subjects. In addition, it is exceedingly difficult to select a PMHS population that is similar to the astronaut corps. ATDs are currently widely used in the automotive industry and military because they are highly repeatable and durable. Unfortunately, because they are mechanical models of the human body, the biofidelity of the responses are limited to dynamic conditions used to validate the ATD. Numerical models of the ATD, in addition to the strengths and limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional uncertainty. Dynamic models are simple and easy to use, but do not account for localized effects of the seat and suit. Finally, numerical models of the human have the potential to have the most advantages; however, the current models are not validated for the conditions expected during spaceflight. To properly assess spaceflight conditions with numerical human models, human data would be needed to optimize the model responses for those conditions. Using the appropriate assessment method with the knowledge gained for each risk factor, an appropriate approach for mitigating the risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be developed ensuring crew safety in future NASA vehicles.

Somers, J. T.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Developing and Implementing Risk-Based Research Safety at Argonne National Laboratory

Facilities operated by the US Department of Energy (DOE) are required to have extensive worker safety and health programs by regulation. Here we describe how Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has implemented the DOE requirements to bring the Laboratory’s multidisciplinary research risk to an acceptable level to safely execute ANL’s mission to perform cutting-edge research.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Risk Management: Speaking the Format of Risk

NASA's Risk Management Program is designed to communicate risk at all levels of the Agency. This presentation serves as an introduction to NASA Risk Management principles and risk-informed decision making. The contents of this presentation are intended to familiarize attendees of NASA's Quality Leadership Forum with how to incorporate risk communication into their practices.

Dacko, Taylor↗
NASA NTRS2005

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Impact of representative ground motion level on seismic PSA with the boundary between overestimation and underestimation

One commonly used approach in seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is the discrete method. This method follows the standard PSA framework and can be applied to various models, such as multi-unit models, while reducing computational costs using standard software. However, due to the inability to subdivide intervals infinitely, the discrete method approximates with a finite number of subintervals. In practice, different numbers of subintervals are applied, and the representative ground motion level is selected based on expert judgment. When employing a smaller number of subintervals, it is important to take caution to prevent underestimation. This study analyzes the impact of the representative ground motion level on seismic risk. It confirms that underestimation can occur with a small number of subintervals depending on the representative ground motion level. This study also proposes a method for determining the boundary of underestimation and overestimation. The method is demonstrated through examples, providing a mathematical foundation for selecting appropriate representative ground motion levels. By avoiding underestimation, this research helps prevent the oversight of significant risk contributors and enhances the understanding of seismic risk.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Resource Prospector (RP): A Cost-Effective Lunar Resource Pathfinder

Resource Prospector (RP) is an in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) technology demonstration mission under study by the NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates (HEOMD). This clever mission is currently planned to launch in 2020 and will demonstrate extraction of oxygen, water and other volatiles, as well measure mineralogical content such as silicon and light metals, like aluminum and titanium, from lunar regolith. Expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to asteroids and Mars will require the maximum possible use of local materials, so-called in-situ resources, and the moon presents a unique destination to conduct robotic investigations that advance ISRU capabilities, as well as providing significant exploration and science value. This mission is equally important; however, for how it executes as a risk-tolerant, cost-effective mission. RP follows on the path-finding approaches of the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission. The LCROSS mission confirmed the presence of water-ice on the moon, but also established a new lightweight-approach to project and mission execution which was considerably cheaper and faster than traditional NASA missions. RP has been designated as a Class D mission, just as LCROSS. This mission classification is the most risk-tolerant class of mission within the NASA risk framework and as such, is given more latitude to accept higher-levels of residual risk. The intention is that by saving monies normally spent attempting to assure a single missions success, more missions can be funded. A well-designed portfolio can accept occasional mission failure, as it still gets more done for the same investment of resources. This classification enables tailoring the NASA Policy Requirements (NPRs) to lighter-weight approaches to mission management and execution. RP is also studying both international and commercial partnerships as a means to maximize return on the investment. International partnerships provide both capabilities synergies and cost-sharing opportunities, while the evolving new space commercial options are revealing new approaches to acquiring cost-effective services, including the benefits of bundling services. Even the world of launch vehicles is changing, offering much less expensive access to space, especially if NASA is able to be flexible in how it approaches mission assurance. Finally, leveraging investments being made elsewhere within a program portfolio, can enable cost-savings by enabling two applications with one investment. RP will be the next pathfinder mission to both enable exploration capabilities for future missions, and continue to evolve cost-effective approaches for NASA.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Risk Management System

Phased‐approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks - not just risk office personnel. Each group/department is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest‐level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management.  Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Regulatory and Technical Issues Concerning the Detection and Treatment of NDMA-Contaminated Groundwater at NASA WSTF

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was established in 1963 primarily to provide rocket engine testing services for several NASA programs. The groundwater underlying the site has been contaminated as a result of historical operations. Groundwater contaminants include several volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and two semi-volatile compounds: N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) and N-nitrodimethylamine (DMN). This paper discusses some of the technical, analytical, regulatory, and health risk issues associated with the contaminant plume. The plume has moved approximately 2.5 miles downgradient of the facility industrial boundary, with evidence of continued migration. As a result, NASA has proposed a pump and treat system using air strippers and ultraviolet (UV) oxidation to stabilize future movement of the contaminant plume. The system has been designed to treat 1,076 gallons (4,073 liters) per minute, with provisions for future expansion. The UV oxidation process was selected to treat NDMA-contaminated groundwater based on successes at other NDMA-contaminated sites. Bench- and pilot-scale testing of WSTF groundwater confirmed the ability of UV oxidation to destroy NDMA and generated sufficient data to design the proposed full-scale treatment system. NDMA is acutely toxic and is a probable human carcinogen. EPA-recommended health risk criteria for the residential consumption of NDMA/DMN-contaminated groundwater was used to determine that a 1.0 x 10(exp -6) excess cancer risk corresponds to 1.7 parts per trillion (ppt). EPA analytical methods are unable to detect NDMA and DMN in the low ppt range. EPA's current Appendix IX analytical method used to screen for NDMA, Method 8270, can detect NDMA only at levels that are orders of magnitude greater than the recommended health risk level. Additionally, EPA Method 607, the most sensitive EPA approved method, has a detection limit of 150 ppt. This corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 9.0 x 10(exp -5), which exceeds the State of New Mexico's water quality standard of a cancer risk less than 1 x 10(exp -5). The treatment system has been engineered to treat contaminated groundwater to levels significantly below the New Mexico standard. However, the inability of EPA-approved analytical methods to detect NDMA and DMN at low ppt levels, and to provide verification of compliance with the 1 x 10(exp -5) cancer risk, introduces a notable risk to the long-term operation of the system. WSTF has been working with Southwest Research Institute to develop a non-EPA analytical method that can achieve a reporting limit of 1 ppt, which corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 7.6 x 10(exp -7). WSTF is currently developing a proposal to obtain approval from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) of this non-EPA method.

Wiebe, D. T.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prediction of Calcium Oxalate Stone Risk with Interventions

Introduction Mitigations intended to reduce bone mineral loss in-flight also influence the level of renal stone risk to astronauts. Extending a recent study completed by our group [1], we investigate the likely influence of combined fluid intake and Ca excretion mitigation strategies. Methods A computational biochemistry model representing CaOx crystal precipitation, growth, and agglomeration [2] is combined with a probabilistic analysis to predict the in-flight CaOx renal stone incidence risk ratio (IRR) relative to pre-flight values using 1517 astronaut 24-hour urine chemistries. The output of this simulation is used to assess the combined impact of controlling fluid intake and Ca excretion on maintaining IRR < 1.2 for > 95% of the population, a threshold determined from initial analysis of the model output compared to referent populations [1]. Results and Conclusions Figure 1 illustrates the simulated in-flight astronaut population (n=40000) with CaOx IRR > 1.2. The red lines indicate the known clinical risk boundary of each factor, and the white box is considered the area of high combined clinical risk. The simulation and identified risk threshold conform well to the expected clinical risk boundaries. The results, assuming insensible water losses equal or exceed 0.7 L/day, imply mitigations achieve risks similar to pre-flight levels when either Ca < 150 mg/day or fluid volume intake > 3.2 L/day individually, or combined Ca < 200 and fluid volume intake > 2.5 L/day. We continue to investigate similar compounded effects and look to apprise engineering trades by informing relative risk changes during mission design. References [1] D. A. Goodenow-Messman, S. A. Gokoglu, M. Kassemi, and J. Myers, Jerry G., “Characterization of Astronaut CaOx Renal Stone Incidence Rates to Quantify In-flight and Post-flight Relative Risk,” npj Microgravity, in review, 2021. [2] M. Kassemi and D. Thompson, “Prediction of renal crystalline size distributions in space using a PBE analytic model. 1. Effect of microgravity-induced biochemical alterations,” Am. J. Physiol. Physiol., vol. 311, no. 3, pp. F520–F530, Sep. 2016, doi: 10.1152/ajprenal.00401.2015.

Debra A Goodenow↗