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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Communicating Risk to Program Managers

Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).

Shivers, C. Herbert↗
NASA NTRS2007

Learning from Past Experiences

Space flight is a risky business. This truism has been bandied about since the earliest days of the space program. When asked by the young daughter of a coworker, one of the Mercury astronauts likened launching into space to "riding a Roman candle" -- it was both exciting and dangerous. Even in these more technologically advanced days, the solid rocket boosters and external tanks of the space shuttle provide a no less exciting, or dangerous, ride into space. However much the phrase "risk mitigation" is bandied about within the U.S. space program, there is still the history of the Apollo 1 fire during a ground test at Cape Canaveral, Fla., the loss of the shuttle Challenger during liftoff, and the loss of the shuttle Columbia when returning to Earth to remind us that while we give lip-service to risk management, we have not learned to manage risk as well as we ought. Moreover, there are many more less dramatic, but equally critical, incidents that have occurred in association with the space program that also highlight our inability to accurately gauge and manage risk. Why do we seem caught in a senseless spiral in which we focus most on risk only after a tragedy? Why do we repeat serious mishaps and not learn from our mistakes? This paper reviews some possible explanations for our risk-taking behavior and provides examples of interest to the NASA centers, while also discussing inter center and intra-center opportunities for sharing information to mitigate risk.

Hulet, Michael W.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Propulsion safety almost equals mission safety

Propulsion system hardware and monitoring/control software constitute a given manned or unmanned aerospace system's primary risk-management issue. The present inquiry into the reasons for this dominance attempts to identify development routes to the reduction of propulsion-related management risk issues. A 'life management plan' for propulsion systems would give attention to service life requirements, criteria for the monitoring and evaluation of useful life, a method for the tracking of service life, criteria for hardware reusability and operations inspection, and hardware preassembly screening practices.

Roth, Gilbert L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

SOFIA Program SE and I Lessons Learned

Once a "Troubled Project" threatened with cancellation, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Program has overcome many difficult challenges and recently achieved its first light images. To achieve success, SOFIA had to overcome significant deficiencies in fundamental Systems Engineering identified during a major Program restructuring. This presentation will summarize the lessons learn in Systems Engineering on the SOFIA Program. After the Program was reformulated, an initial assessment of Systems Engineering established the scope of the problem and helped to set a list of priorities that needed to be work. A revised Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was written to address the new Program structure and requirements established in the approved NPR7123.1A. An important result of the "Technical Planning" effort was the decision by the Program and Technical Leadership team to re-phasing the lifecycle into increments. The reformed SOFIA Program Office had to quickly develop and establish several new System Engineering core processes including; Requirements Management, Risk Management, Configuration Management and Data Management. Implementing these processes had to consider the physical and cultural diversity of the SOFIA Program team which includes two Projects spanning two NASA Centers, a major German partnership, and sub-contractors located across the United States and Europe. The SOFIA Program experience represents a creative approach to doing "System Engineering in the middle" while a Program is well established. Many challenges were identified and overcome. The SOFIA example demonstrates it is never too late to benefit from fixing deficiencies in the System Engineering processes.

Ray, Ronald J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Collaborative Systems Engineering in the Ascent Abort-2 Crew Module/Separation Ring Project

Generally speaking, systems engineering (SE) tool-sets face a dilemma balancing power and accessibility. High-powered SE tools (MagicDraw, Cradle, Core, etc.) tend to be specialized and are available only to highly trained Systems Engineers, and/or through the use of a 'back room' developer team making the output products available to the broader team. On the other hand, highly accessible tools (MS Word, Excel, etc.) do not have the power to implement SE in a rigorous manner. NASA has to test all aspects of the new human-rated Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle spacecraft prior to its first crewed mission. The test program includes uncrewed launch abort flight tests to demonstrate the capability to save the crew in the event that a launch failure occurs. Orion's second abort flight test will be a low-altitude flight test known as "Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2)." This test is currently scheduled to be carried out at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46) in Florida in 2019. NASA's in-house AA-2 Crew Module and Separation Ring (CSR) Team is producing the crew module and separation ring. Operating jointly as both an Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Project and an Orion Project, the CSR project charter includes development of innovative, streamlined and generally more efficient practices for creation of flight hardware and software. One result of this tasking has been development of a collaborative and data-centric systems engineering environment within the team's shared web environment (Microsoft SharePoint). Through the use of built-in, 'out of the box capabilities' present in MS SharePoint, the CSR Systems Engineering team has created (with some limited developer support) a data-centric architecture for the project's SE implementation, including functional and interface analysis, requirements development and management, risk management, verification planning and management, test results, and end item management. Data elements are linked between data structures so as to define and control relationships between item types, link requirements to parents and children, and link tests to the requirements that they verify. The overall project team integration is increased by also linking SE content to project management content over the project life cycle, including team communication, action items, configuration management, decisional and meeting materials, and life cycle reviews. This presentation will provide an overview of the collaborative SE environment, showing how it provides the power for a number of SE tasks while still providing the accessibility and transparency to allow the full project team to collaborate and succeed. Given the project phase, we'll be able to present a nearly full lifecycle discussion, from concept through verification and approaching delivery.

Systems Engineering environments↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

technology gaps↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

technology gaps↗
NASA NTRS2003

Managing information technology security risk

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task for the organization to protect against the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT resources. As systems bgecome more complex and diverse and and attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security risk. This paper describes a two-pronged approach in addressing IT security risk and risk management in the organization: 1) an institutional enterprise appraoch, and 2) a project life cycle approach.

security toolset↗
NASA NTRS2014

Managing Research in a Risk World

The Office of Chief Medical Officer (OCHMO) owns all human health and performance risks managed by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). While the HSRB manages the risks, the Human Research Program (HRP) manages the research portion of the overall risk mitigation strategy for these risks. The HSRB manages risks according to a process that identifies and analyzes risks, plans risk mitigation and tracks and reviews the implementation of these strategies according to its decisions pertaining to the OCHMO risk posture. HRP manages risk research work using an architecture that describes evidence-based risks, gaps in our knowledge about characterizing or mitigating the risk, and the tasks needed to produce deliverables to fill the gaps and reduce the risk. A planning schedule reflecting expected research milestones is developed, and as deliverables and new evidence are generated, research progress is tracked via the Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) that reflects a risk's research plan for a design reference mission. HRP's risk research process closely interfaces with the HSRB risk management process. As research progresses, new deliverables and evidence are used by the HSRB in conjunction with other operational and non-research evidence to inform decisions pertaining to the likelihood and consequence of the risk and risk posture. Those decisions in turn guide forward work for research as it contributes to overall risk mitigation strategies. As HRP tracks its research work, it aligns its priorities by assessing the effectiveness of its contributions and maintaining specific core competencies that would be invaluable for future work for exploration missions.

Anton, W.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation for Managing On-Orbit Anomalies

This slide presentation reviews strategies for managing risk mitigation that occur with anomalies in on-orbit spacecraft. It reviews the risks associated with mission operations, a diagram of the method used to manage undesirable events that occur which is a closed loop fault analysis and until corrective action is successful. It also reviews the fish bone diagram which is used if greater detail is required and aids in eliminating possible failure factors.

La, Jim↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Managing Spacecraft Risk With Space Environments Testing Via Process Safety Management At The NASA Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility

The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.

Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Managing Spacecraft Risk with Space Environments Testing via Process Safety Management at the NASA Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF)

The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.

Safety↗