Results for “safety critical software” — Page 11

NASA NTRS1990

Improving system reliability through formal analysis and use of checks in software

Software is playing increasingly important roles in avionics systems. It is widely used in navigation and, in some cases, in control loops that maintain aircraft stability. To guarantee the safety of flight systems, the FAA requires that critical components have a probability of failure no greater than 10(exp -9) per hour of flight. Software is being used to diagnose system components for failure. SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) was a computer system developed to study the use of software to check for failure and manage processor reconfiguration. To guarantee that software satisfies its specifications, formal verification can be used. With this a program and its specification are viewed as mathematical objects, and a mathematical proof is used to show that the program and its specification are equivalent. In previous research, a theory of checking was developed to offer assistance in analyzing specifications and designing run-time checks. In the theory, checking is considered abstractly in terms of n-ary relations much like those of relational database theory. Within the theory check are categorized, checks on input and checks on results are considered, and formal attention is given to the minimization and logical combination of checks. The focus is upon input checks and the obstacles in checking input to critical systems. A central concern is with a property referred to as independence. The concern is with circumstances under which it is possible to apply isolated, independent checks to separate sensor inputs and be assure that all illegal input will be properly detected. Presently, independence is being investigated and checked in the context of the GCS (Guidance and Control System). The GCS simulator is intended for testing software that implements control laws for landing spacecraft. The large number of inputs and their complex interrelationships provide an exciting context in which to investigate independence and the difficulties of supplying input checks.

Staknis, Mark E.↗

NASA NTRS2000

A Model-based Framework for Risk Assessment in Human-Computer Controlled Systems

The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems. This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions. Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

Hatanaka, Iwao↗

DOE OSTI2025

Safety Assurance of Software and Machine Learning Development for Nuclear Instrumentation and Controls

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems monitor and control parameters in nuclear power plants. Ensuring their safety is a critical part of ensuring overall plant safety. Nuclear power plant licensing generates thousands of safety documents that could be organized more effectively using a safety assurance case (SAC). We conducted a literature survey of SACs and created a SAC framework for DI&C software using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). This framework focuses on four software development processes: management & assurance, pre-developed software (PDS) qualification, the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), and the Machine Learning Development Life Cycle (MLDLC). We organized our framework using a novel level structure that can be applied to other SACs to improve their clarity. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be incorporated as part of a SAC for a larger reactor system.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRS1993

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.

Knight, John C.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Command and Control Software Development Memory Management

This internship was initially meant to cover the implementation of unit test automation for a NASA ground control project. As is often the case with large development projects, the scope and breadth of the internship changed. Instead, the internship focused on finding and correcting memory leaks and errors as reported by a COTS software product meant to track such issues. Memory leaks come in many different flavors and some of them are more benign than others. On the extreme end a program might be dynamically allocating memory and not correctly deallocating it when it is no longer in use. This is called a direct memory leak and in the worst case can use all the available memory and crash the program. If the leaks are small they may simply slow the program down which, in a safety critical system (a system for which a failure or design error can cause a risk to human life), is still unacceptable. The ground control system is managed in smaller sub-teams, referred to as CSCIs. The CSCI that this internship focused on is responsible for monitoring the health and status of the system. This team's software had several methods/modules that were leaking significant amounts of memory. Since most of the code in this system is safety-critical, correcting memory leaks is a necessity.

Programmin↗

DOE OSTI2023

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Verification Testing for Sodium Fast Reactor Applications: Acceptance Testing Report

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (SAS) is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analyses of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over forty-five years and represents a critical investment in safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy. To support demonstration of software pedigree and confirm key functional requirements, this report has been generated to provide detailed verification of the software. Although SAS was developed to support the analysis of any liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactor, the acceptance testing described in this document focuses on the verification of SAS capabilities as they relate to pool-type Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs). This report includes documentation of the test problem definition, analytical solution(s), computational solution(s), acceptance criteria, comparisons of analytical/computational solutions, and determination of acceptance of the computational solution(s). Deviations from acceptance criteria are noted.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Verification Testing for Sodium Fast Reactor Applications (Acceptance Testing Report)

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (SAS) is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analyses of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal- cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over fifty years and represents a critical investment in safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy. To support demonstration of software pedigree and confirm key functional requirements, this report has been generated to provide detailed verification of the software. Although SAS was developed to support the analysis of any liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactor, the acceptance testing described in this document focuses on the verification of SAS capabilities as they relate to pool-type Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs). This report includes documentation of the test problem definition, analytical solution(s), computational solution(s), acceptance criteria, comparisons of analytical/computational solutions, and determination of acceptance of the computational solution(s). Deviations from acceptance criteria are noted.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1992

RICIS Symposium 1992: Mission and Safety Critical Systems Research and Applications

This conference deals with computer systems which control systems whose failure to operate correctly could produce the loss of life and or property, mission and safety critical systems. Topics covered are: the work of standards groups, computer systems design and architecture, software reliability, process control systems, knowledge based expert systems, and computer and telecommunication protocols.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1985

SSME digital control design characteristics

To protect against a latent programming error (software fault) existing in an untried branch combination that would render the space shuttle out of control in a critical flight phase, the Backup Flight System (BFS) was chartered to provide a safety alternative. The BFS is designed to operate in critical flight phases (ascent and descent) by monitoring the activities of the space shuttle flight subsystems that are under control of the primary flight software (PFS) (e.g., navigation, crew interface, propulsion), then, upon manual command by the flightcrew, to assume control of the space shuttle and deliver it to a noncritical flight condition (safe orbit or touchdown). The problems associated with the selection of the PFS/BFS system architecture, the internal BFS architecture, the fault tolerant software mechanisms, and the long term BFS utility are discussed.

Mitchell, W. T.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Formal Verification, Distributed Computing, and Path Planning Algorithms

The safety- and mission-critical nature of much of the work done at NASA requires algorithms and software to be exceedingly reliable. Formal methods techniques are one way of ensuring this high level of robustness. This talk will discuss the development and formal verification of autonomous aircraft path planning algorithms related to the Bellman-Ford shortest path algorithm, including consideration of distributed computation of the algorithm.

Formal Methods↗

NASA NTRS2005

Development of Advanced Verification and Validation Procedures and Tools for the Certification of Learning Systems in Aerospace Applications

Adaptive control technologies that incorporate learning algorithms have been proposed to enable automatic flight control and vehicle recovery, autonomous flight, and to maintain vehicle performance in the face of unknown, changing, or poorly defined operating environments. In order for adaptive control systems to be used in safety-critical aerospace applications, they must be proven to be highly safe and reliable. Rigorous methods for adaptive software verification and validation must be developed to ensure that control system software failures will not occur. Of central importance in this regard is the need to establish reliable methods that guarantee convergent learning, rapid convergence (learning) rate, and algorithm stability. This paper presents the major problems of adaptive control systems that use learning to improve performance. The paper then presents the major procedures and tools presently developed or currently being developed to enable the verification, validation, and ultimate certification of these adaptive control systems. These technologies include the application of automated program analysis methods, techniques to improve the learning process, analytical methods to verify stability, methods to automatically synthesize code, simulation and test methods, and tools to provide on-line software assurance.

Jacklin, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2009

Towards A Comprehensive Consideration of Epistemic Questions in Software System Safety

For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is, 'How do we know the system is safe?' Despite the critical importance of this question, no widely accepted, generally applicable answer exists. Instead, debate continues to rage over the question, with theorists and practitioners quarrelling with each other and amongst themselves. This paper suggests a possible way forward towards quelling the quarrels, based on refining the critical safety question into additional questions, which may be more likely to have answers on which a consensus can be reached.

Holloway, C. M.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Development and analysis of the Software Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT) computer

SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) is an experimental, fault-tolerant computer system designed to meet the extreme reliability requirements for safety-critical functions in advanced aircraft. Errors are masked by performing a majority voting operation over the results of identical computations, and faulty processors are removed from service by reassigning computations to the nonfaulty processors. This scheme has been implemented in a special architecture using a set of standard Bendix BDX930 processors, augmented by a special asynchronous-broadcast communication interface that provides direct, processor to processor communication among all processors. Fault isolation is accomplished in hardware; all other fault-tolerance functions, together with scheduling and synchronization are implemented exclusively by executive system software. The system reliability is predicted by a Markov model. Mathematical consistency of the system software with respect to the reliability model has been partially verified, using recently developed tools for machine-aided proof of program correctness.

Goldberg, J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Formal Methods in the Development of Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In traditional software development methodologies, operational and functional requirements of systems are often specified in structured natural language notations. These restricted notations provide good documentation support, but only provide limited support for semantic analysis. These notations are generally not rich enough to unambiguously specify the requirements of safety-critical systems that, for example, involve complex numerical computations or that interact with the physical environment. Examples of these safety-critical systems are autonomous vehicles such as unmanned aircraft systems. This talk advocates the use of expressive formal logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the operational and functional requirement of unmanned systems and to prove the correctness of these requirements. Semantic analysis of requirements written in higher-order logic is supported through the use of interactive theorem provers. Formal models serve as ideal reference implementations of functional requirements. Hence, formal logics enable software validation techniques where software implementations can be checked against functional requirements in a mechanical way. The Formal Methods group in the Safety-Critical Avionics Systems Branch at NASA Langley Research Center has conducted research on the development and application of formal verification techniques to safety-critical applications of interest to NASA for more than 30 years. This talk illustrates the use of formal methods in the development of highly-assured autonomous unmanned aircraft systems.

Formal Methods↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Handling Qualities Safety Analysis For Conceptual Design of Urban Air Mobility Vehicles

The recent emergence of distributed electric propulsion Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft has created a rapid introduction of new design concepts with unique stability and control characteristics. A challenge to realizing the full potential of these vehicles for urban transportation is to gain public acceptance which is largely driven by flight safety. This paper describes ongoing research to address the feasibility of integrating flying qualities safety metrics into conceptual design of VTOL Urban Air Mobility (UAM) vehicles. The discussion is composed of the approach and progress toward a toolbox that integrates with existing NASA rotorcraft design software and processes. Several key challenges are highlighted including modeling requirements for failures, identification of critical failures, and capturing critical failures, with robustness to model uncertainty. A discussion of requirements for safety metrics, specific to UAM vehicles, as well as the effects of the control system design is also included. Results to date have demonstrated the degradation in flying qualities metrics due to propulsion failures.

George Altamirano↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS)

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS) is a disruptive software platform and processes being developed by SSC Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL). Autonomous operations are critical for the success, safety and crew survival of NASA deep space missions beyond low Earth orbit, including Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway, and for the future of cost-effective ground mission operations. NPAS represents the embodiment of an innovative implementation for "thinking" autonomy in contrast to brute-force autonomy. It also uniquely addresses the requirements and integrates five primary functionalities for autonomous operations including: (1) Integrated System Health Management (ISHM), (2) autonomy, guided by health and system concepts of operations; (3) knowledge models of applications; (4) infrastructure to create, schedule, and execute mission plans; and (5) infrastructure to integrate distributed autonomous applications across networks.

Figueroa, Fernando↗