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At least 199 records · Page 11

Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution (KISS) (Technology Landscape Analysis Report)

The following landscape analysis explores blockchain or distributed ledger technologies application to securing electricity infrastructure. The exploration of how distributed ledger technologies can be used to increase the trustworthiness and integrity of the grid’s edge is imperative to the economic, security and well-being of all modern societies that rely on electricity. Blockchain technology’s ability to secure, track and optimize complex data transactions provides an exciting value proposition to securing and optimizing the U.S. power grid. An energy delivery system (EDS) operating at the grid’s edge requires unprecedented levels of security and trustworthiness to verify integrity of data and manage complex transactive and distributed Energy Resources (DERs) exchanges. Moreover, grid-edge devices lack visibility, control and security to conduct real-time energy transactions with the required security, speed and scale. The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires secure, reliable and trustworthy EDSs. Grid modernization has increased the speed and size of data sets exchanged on these systems (Gordes and Mylrea 2014). Exasperating the challenge is these systems are increasingly distributed creating new data fidelity and interoperability challenges for grid operators struggling to balance and incorporate DERs. Blockchain technology provides an atomically verifiable cryptographic signature to help increase the trustworthiness of EDSs at the grid’s edge. This feature is especially important at distribution level since EDSs and field devices have increasing operational and security requirements that are often diametrically opposed. For example, as data, speed and analytic requirements increase, security and functionality requirements increase. Further, as the grid’s edge incorporate DERs and transacts in real time, availability is prioritized over the integrity and confidentially of that data. Blockchain presents the prospect of solving some of these complex challenges related to grid security and modernization. However, there are more questions about blockchain applicability than answers. There are number of theoretical blockchain applications to the energy sector, but few energy utilities have actually applied, implemented or even experimented with the underlying distributed ledger technology and consensus algorithms that enable blockchain to exchange data more efficiently and securely.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗

Lessons Learned in Over a Decade of Technical Support for U.S. Nuclear Cyber Security Programmes

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) nuclear cyber security team has been providing technical support to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) since 2002. This team has provided cyber security technical experties in conducting cyber security inspections, developing of regulatory rules and guidance, reviewing facility cyber security plans, developing inspection guidance, and developing and teaching NRC inspectors how to conduct cyber security assessments. The extensive experience the PNNL team has gathered has allowed them to compile a lenghty list of recommendations on how to improve cyber security programs and conduct assessments. A selected set of recommendations are presented, including the need to: integrate an array of defenisve strategies into a facility’s cyber security program, coordinate physical and cyber security activities, train phycial security forces to resist a cyber-enabled physical attack, improve estimates of the consequences of a cyber attack, properly resource cyber security assessments, appropropriately account for insider threats, routinely monitor security devices for potential attacks, supplement compliance-based requirements with risk-based decision making, and introduce the concept of resilience into cyber security programs.

Glantz, Clifford S.↗

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Prototype Radio - Generation 2 Security Architecture Lab Test Report

NASA Glenn Research Center, in cooperation with Rockwell Collins, is working to develop a prototype Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) radio platform as part of NASA Integrated Systems Research Program's (ISRP) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. A primary focus of the project is to work with the FAA and industry standards bodies to build and demonstrate a safe, secure, and efficient CNPC architecture that can be used by industry to evaluate the feasibility of deploying a system using these technologies in an operational capacity. GRC has been working in conjunction with these groups to assess threats, identify security requirements, and to develop a system of standards-based security controls that can be applied to the current GRC prototype CNPC architecture as a demonstration platform. The security controls were integrated into a lab test bed mock-up of the Mobile IPv6 architecture currently being used for NASA flight testing, and a series of network tests were conducted to evaluate the security overhead of the controls compared to the baseline CNPC link without any security. The aim of testing was to evaluate the performance impact of the additional security control overhead when added to the Mobile IPv6 architecture in various modes of operation. The statistics collected included packet captures at points along the path to gauge packet size as the sample data traversed the CNPC network, round trip latency, jitter, and throughput. The effort involved a series of tests of the baseline link, a link with Robust Header Compression (ROHC) and without security controls, a link with security controls and without ROHC, and finally a link with both ROHC and security controls enabled. The effort demonstrated that ROHC is both desirable and necessary to offset the additional expected overhead of applying security controls to the CNPC link.

Communication Networks↗

A conceptual framework for residential energy security in the context of clean energy transitions

Energy security is a crucial aspect of human well-being. As climate change impacts become more evident, countries are constructing equitable, resilient, and sustainable clean energy transition policies to reduce emissions while ensuring energy security. Climate policies globally highlight the importance of national energy security. Furthermore, adequate and affordable access to household energy is also critical to the continued prioritization of climate mitigation. However, past energy security discussions within the broader climate research and policymaking community primarily focused on national-level energy supply as a critical metric of energy security. Less research has explored the potential implications of energy transitions for residential energy security, often focusing on a single dimension of residential energy security. Thus, we conduct a review of journal articles and governmental plans to develop a conceptual framework of residential energy security and facilitate communication among researchers and policymakers. The framework is designed around four foundational pillars, five metrics measuring residential energy security, and seven drivers influencing the metrics. Additionally, we provide policy examples to show how this framework can be applied to inform decision-making. Thus, this paper makes important contributions to the literature by (a) creating a framework to better understand the concept of energy security at the household level for future research and policy-relevant communications, (b) identifying gaps in the current literature, and (c) highlighting instances where aspects of residential energy security are discussed in policies and governmental plans, which help serve as guiding examples for future applications of our framework in the policymaking processes.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Impacts of Vehicle (In)Security

Nuclear and radioactive material is routinely transported worldwide every day. Since 2010, the complexity of the transport vehicle to support such activities has grown exponentially. Many core functions of a vehicle are now handled by small embedded computer modules with more being added each year to enhance the owner’s experience and convenience. With a system as complex as today’s automobile, the potential for cyber security issues is certain. Hackers have begun exploring this new domain with public information increasingly disseminated. Because vehicles are allowed into and around secure nuclear facilities, the potential for using a vehicle as a new cyber entry point or vector into the facility is now plausible and must be mitigated. In addition, compromising such a vehicle could aide in illicit removal of nuclear material, putting sensitive cargo at risk. Because cyber attacks can now be introduced using vehicles, cyber security, needs to be integrated into an organization’s design basis threat document. Essentially, a vehicle now extends the perimeter for which security professionals are responsible.Electronic Control Units (ECU) responsible for handling all core and ancillary vehicle functions are interconnected using the controller area network (CAN) bus. A typical CAN network in a modern automobile contains 50 or more ECUs. The CAN protocol now supports a wide variety of areas, including automotive, road transportation, rail transportation, industrial automation, power generation, maritime, military vehicles, aviation, and medical devices. In many ways, the nuclear industry is employing the CAN bus protocol or other similar broadcast serial networks. This paper will provide an overview of the current state of automobile and CAN Bus security, as well as an overview of what has been publicly disclosed by many research organizations. It will then present several hypotheses of how vehicle security issues may impact nuclear activities. An initial discussion of how a vehicle can be used as a new threat vector to penetrate secure facilities will be presented. This includes how a modern automobile can be used as the exploitation mechanism for nearby devices such as laptops, cell phones, and wireless access points. Additional discussion will highlight how vehicle security might impact transportation of nuclear material through remote exploitation of a moving vehicle. The final discussion will include what possible implications might be relative to the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities. The audience will also be given details regarding the complexity of attack, thus implying the likelihood of successful exploitation, and information on how such attacks may be mitigated. Emerging security products for automobiles will be discussed and other mitigation methods will be detailed (e.g. disabling vehicle cellular modems). As a result, the audience will have a greater understanding of how to add vehicle security as a part of a comprehensive nuclear security policy.Finally, this paper will highlight the similarities between CAN Bus and other broadcast serial bus networks such as Profibus or DeviceNet, helping educate the reader on how susceptible this type of networking is to nefarious attacks and how it might affect components connected to many different nuclear systems, including control systems, safety systems, emergency systems, and support systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗

Shifting Left for Machine Learning: An Empirical Study of Security Weaknesses in Supervised Learning-based Projects

Context: Supervised learning-based projects (SLPs), i.e., software projects that use supervised learning algorithms, such as decision trees are useful for performing classification-related tasks. Yet, security weaknesses, such as the use of hard-coded passwords in SLPs, can make SLPs susceptible to security attacks. A characterization of security weaknesses in SLPs can help practitioners understand the security weaknesses that are frequent in SLPs and adopt adequate mitigation strategies. Objective: The goal of this paper is to help practitioners se-curely develop supervised learning-based projects by conducting an empirical study of security weaknesses in supervised learning-based projects. Methodology: We conduct an empirical study by quantifying the frequency of security weaknesses in 278 open source SLPs. Results: We identify 22 types of security weaknesses that occur in SLPs. We observe ‘use of potentially dangerous function’ to be the most frequently occurring security weakness in SLPs. Of the identified 3,964 security weaknesses, 23.79 % and 40.49 % respectively, appear for source code files used to train and test models. We also observe evidence of co-location, e.g., instances of command injection co-locates with instances of potentially dangerous function. Conclusion: Based on our findings, we advocate for a shift left approach for SLP development with security-focused code reviews, and application of security static analysis.

Bhuiyan, Farzana Ahamed↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

Protecting intellectual property in space; Proceedings of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference, McLean, VA, March 20, 1985

The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.

Source record↗

Building a Successful Security Infrastructure: What You Want vs. What You Need vs. What You Can Afford

With the fast growing popularity of the Internet, many organizations are racing to get onto the on-ramp to the Information Superhighway. However, with frequent headlines such as 'Hackers' break in at General Electric raises questions about the Net's Security', 'Internet Security Imperiled - Hackers steal data that could threaten computers world-wide' and 'Stanford Computer system infiltrated; Security fears grow', organizations find themselves rethinking their approach to the on-ramp. Is the Internet safe? What do I need to do to protect my organization? Will hackers try to break into my systems? These are questions many organizations are asking themselves today. In order to safely travel along the Information Superhighway, organizations need a strong security framework. Developing such a framework for a computer site, whether it be just a few dozen hosts or several thousand hosts is not an easy task. The security infrastructure for a site is often developed piece-by-piece in response to security incidents which have affected that site over time. Or worse yet, no coordinated effort has been dedicated toward security. The end result is that many sites are still poorly prepared to handle the security dangers of the Internet. This paper presents guidelines for building a successful security infrastructure. The problem is addressed in a cookbook style method. First is a discussion on how to identify your assets and evaluate the threats to those assets; next are suggestions and tips for identifying the weak areas in your security armor. Armed with this information we can begin to think about what you really need for your site and what you can afford. In this stage of the process we examine the different categories of security tools and products that are available and then present some tips for deciding what is best for your site.

Crabb, Michele D.↗

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Potential impacts of China's climate policies on energy security

Highlights: • We develop an energy security assessment framework in a 3E-integrated system model. • The potential relations between climate targets and energy security are examined. • Climate policy reduces risks of energy system in terms of main safety metrics. • The impact of emission budgets on energy diversity relies on the time scale options. • Co-benefits of energy security would improve the economics of climate policies. - Abstract: Energy security, as an indispensable constituent of economic security, has long been a top research priority, and the dynamics of energy security become particularly complicated with the involvement of climate change. In this work, we combined a one-sector integrated assessment framework with a series of well-proposed energy security metrics to extensively explore the unidirectional consistency between climate policy and energy security from the national perspective. Implementation of climate policy is generally beneficial for improving energy security. Specifically, climate policy helps to reduce the systematic risk of China's energy system according to the metrics of energy (oil) intensity, energy (oil) expenditures and per capita energy (oil) consumption independent of time scale options. As observed from the perspective of energy diversity, co-benefits arising from climate policy primarily emerge in the first half of this century, and they may gradually decline as emission constraints and the phasing out of fossil fuels are enhanced. Additionally, the macroeconomic costs required to reach China's committed carbon-peaking target might be far lower than the costs required to fulfill the emission budgets under the global 2-degree warming rise threshold. If the co-benefits of energy security are considered, the economics of climate policy is expected to significantly improve.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Wide Area Security Region Final Report

This report develops innovative and efficient methodologies and practical procedures to determine the wide-area security region of a power system, which take into consideration all types of system constraints including thermal, voltage, voltage stability, transient and potentially oscillatory stability limits in the system. The approach expands the idea of transmission system nomograms to a multidimensional case, involving multiple system limits and parameters such as transmission path constraints, zonal generation or load, etc., considered concurrently. The security region boundary is represented using its piecewise approximation with the help of linear inequalities (so called hyperplanes) in a multi-dimensional space, consisting of system parameters that are critical for security analyses. The goal of this approximation is to find a minimum set of hyperplanes that describe the boundary with a given accuracy. Methodologies are also developed to use the security hyperplanes, pre-calculated offline, to determine system security margins in real-time system operations, to identify weak elements in the system, and to calculate key contributing factors and sensitivities to determine the best system controls in real time and to assist in developing remedial actions and transmission system enhancements offline . A prototype program that automates the simulation procedures used to build the set of security hyperplanes has also been developed. The program makes it convenient to update the set of security hyperplanes necessitated by changes in system configurations. A prototype operational tool that uses the security hyperplanes to assess security margins and to calculate optimal control directions in real time has been built to demonstrate the project success. Numerical simulations have been conducted using the full-size Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system model, and they clearly demonstrated the feasibility and the effectiveness of the developed technology. Recommendations for the future work have also been formulated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗