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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS1980

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

A comprehensive study of near midair collisions in terminal airspace, derived from the ASRS database is presented. A selection of controller and pilot reports on airport perimeter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and on winter operations is presented. A sampling of typical Alert Bulletins and their responses is presented.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Tech Briefs, March 2007

Topics include: Advanced Systems for Monitoring Underwater Sounds; Wireless Data-Acquisition System for Testing Rocket Engines; Processing Raw HST Data With Up-to-Date Calibration Data; Mobile Collection and Automated Interpretation of EEG Data; System for Secure Integration of Aviation Data; Servomotor and Controller Having Large Dynamic Range; Digital Multicasting of Multiple Audio Streams; Translator for Optimizing Fluid-Handling Components; AIRSAR Web-Based Data Processing; Pattern Matcher for Trees Constructed From Lists; Reducing a Knowledge-Base Search Space When Data Are Missing; Ground-Based Correction of Remote-Sensing Spectral Imagery; State-Chart Autocoder; Pointing History Engine for the Spitzer Space Telescope; Low-Friction, High-Stiffness Joint for Uniaxial Load Cell; Magnet-Based System for Docking of Miniature Spacecraft; Electromechanically Actuated Valve for Controlling Flow Rate; Plumbing Fixture for a Microfluidic Cartridge; Camera Mount for a Head-Up Display; Core-Cutoff Tool; Recirculation of Laser Power in an Atomic Fountain; Simplified Generation of High-Angular-Momentum Light Beams; Imaging Spectrometer on a Chip; Interferometric Quantum-Nondemolition Single-Photon Detectors; Ring-Down Spectroscopy for Characterizing a CW Raman Laser; Complex Type-II Interband Cascade MQW Photodetectors; Single-Point Access to Data Distributed on Many Processors; Estimating Dust and Water Ice Content of the Martian Atmosphere From THEMIS Data; Computing a Stability Spectrum by Use of the HHT; Theoretical Studies of Routes to Synthesis of Tetrahedral N4; Estimation Filter for Alignment of the Spitzer Space Telescope; Antenna for Measuring Electric Fields Within the Inner Heliosphere; Improved High-Voltage Gas Isolator for Ion Thruster; and Hybrid Mobile Communication Networks for Planetary Exploration.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

Constraint and Flight Rule Management for Space Mission Operations

The exploration of space is one of the most fascinating domains to study from a human factors perspective. Like other complex work domains such as aviation (Pritchett and Kim, 2008), air traffic management (Durso and Manning, 2008), health care (Morrow, North, and Wickens, 2006), homeland security (Cooke and Winner, 2008), and vehicle control (Lee, 2006), space exploration is a large-scale sociotechnical work domain characterized by complexity, dynamism, uncertainty, and risk in real-time operational contexts (Perrow, 1999; Woods et al, 1994). Nearly the entire gamut of human factors issues - for example, human-automation interaction (Sheridan and Parasuraman, 2006), telerobotics, display and control design (Smith, Bennett, and Stone, 2006), usability, anthropometry (Chaffin, 2008), biomechanics (Marras and Radwin, 2006), safety engineering, emergency operations, maintenance human factors, situation awareness (Tenney and Pew, 2006), crew resource management (Salas et al., 2006), methods for cognitive work analysis (Bisantz and Roth, 2008) and the like -- are applicable to astronauts, mission control, operational medicine, Space Shuttle manufacturing and assembly operations, and space suit designers as they are in other work domains (e.g., Bloomberg, 2003; Bos et al, 2006; Brooks and Ince, 1992; Casler and Cook, 1999; Jones, 1994; McCurdy et al, 2006; Neerincx et aI., 2006; Olofinboba and Dorneich, 2005; Patterson, Watts-Perotti and Woods, 1999; Patterson and Woods, 2001; Seagull et ai, 2007; Sierhuis, Clancey and Sims, 2002). The human exploration of space also has unique challenges of particular interest to human factors research and practice. This chapter provides an overview of those issues and reports on some of the latest research results as well as the latest challenges still facing the field.

Barreiro, J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors in Space Exploration

The exploration of space is one of the most fascinating domains to study from a human factors perspective. Like other complex work domains such as aviation (Pritchett and Kim, 2008), air traffic management (Durso and Manning, 2008), health care (Morrow, North, and Wickens, 2006), homeland security (Cooke and Winner, 2008), and vehicle control (Lee, 2006), space exploration is a large-scale sociotechnical work domain characterized by complexity, dynamism, uncertainty, and risk in real-time operational contexts (Perrow, 1999; Woods et ai, 1994). Nearly the entire gamut of human factors issues - for example, human-automation interaction (Sheridan and Parasuraman, 2006), telerobotics, display and control design (Smith, Bennett, and Stone, 2006), usability, anthropometry (Chaffin, 2008), biomechanics (Marras and Radwin, 2006), safety engineering, emergency operations, maintenance human factors, situation awareness (Tenney and Pew, 2006), crew resource management (Salas et aI., 2006), methods for cognitive work analysis (Bisantz and Roth, 2008) and the like -- are applicable to astronauts, mission control, operational medicine, Space Shuttle manufacturing and assembly operations, and space suit designers as they are in other work domains (e.g., Bloomberg, 2003; Bos et al, 2006; Brooks and Ince, 1992; Casler and Cook, 1999; Jones, 1994; McCurdy et ai, 2006; Neerincx et aI., 2006; Olofinboba and Dorneich, 2005; Patterson, Watts-Perotti and Woods, 1999; Patterson and Woods, 2001; Seagull et ai, 2007; Sierhuis, Clancey and Sims, 2002). The human exploration of space also has unique challenges of particular interest to human factors research and practice. This chapter provides an overview of those issues and reports on sorne of the latest research results as well as the latest challenges still facing the field.

FROM↗
NASA NTRS2021

Sample Return Container Opening Process Concept for Potential Mars Sample Return

Proposed Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions would require a pristine and secure opening method to ensure sample Contamination Control and backward Planetary Protection. In order to reach the samples, a series of five containers would need to be opened inside of a Mars Returned Sample Handling (MRSH) facility. The process would include opening the Containment Assurance Module (CAM) aboard the Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV), the Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV), Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), and the Orbiting Sample (OS) container, and finally removing and opening the Returned Sample Tube Assemblies (RSTA). Some of these containers can be opened by reversing the mechanical assembly process while others would require destructive means. Several containers are still in a conceptual design phase while others are en route to Mars aboard the M2020 rover. In order to inform the design of the containers that are still in the conceptual stages, a study was performed at each level of the containment assembly. The studies were used to determine the least destructive and most robust methods to disassemble and open the containers while minimizing risk to the samples or the personnel. In addition to the envisioned disassembly and breaching method, contingency plans were made for completing the disassembly if damage to the vehicle and containment system occurred.

Liu, Yang↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Environmental Effects on Additively Manufactured (AM) Parts on MISSE-9/10

The Materials on International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) experiments have made a continuous presence on the ISS and allowed for testing of performance and durability of materials exposed to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space environment. Additive Manufacturing (AM) has been included on several MISSE flights, and many companies (Made in Space and Stratasys) and NASA centers wanted to test various AM material samples. The goal of studying Space Environmental Effects on AM Parts with MISSE 9/10 was to fly promising metal and polymer AM material samples (dogbones) that could have future manufacturing capabilities in space and conduct post-flight analysis of these materials via mechanical and optical properties. On these flights, MISSE-9 contained three Inconel and 12 polymer samples and MISSE-10 included three Inconel and 16 polymer samples. Before flying to the ISS, all the samples underwent thermal vacuum bakeout (at 60°C for 24 hours and 10-6 torr). After bakeout, control and flight experiments were weighed, and optical properties were taken. Optical properties such as solar absorptance and infrared emittance were taken on the control samples and the flight samples (preflight and postflight). To understand more about the mechanical properties of the AM samples, tensile testing was conducted on the samples to determine the yield and ultimate tensile strength of the dogbone samples against the control. Lastly, the torque on the fasteners securing the dogbone samples were loosened and measured using a torque wrench, and they were compared to their preflight torque specification required. Optical properties and masses were recorded before flight, and the postflight results were recorded and collected in June 2022 to study the effects. With the postflight analysis, NASA engineers can now better characterize how UV radiation and thermal cycling affect the material properties.

Materials on International Space Station Experimen↗
DOE OSTI2026

Engineering Against Digital Risk in CIP Applications: Cyber-Informed Engineering Use Cases

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This presentation discusses engineered controls of 7 categories and the CIE database of controls that provides clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2002

Compact Video Microscope Imaging System Implemented in Colloid Studies

Long description Photographs showing fiber-optic light source, microscope and charge-coupled discharge (CCD) camera head connected to camera body, CCD camera body feeding data to image acquisition board in PC, and Cartesian robot controlled via PC board. The Compact Microscope Imaging System (CMIS) is a diagnostic tool with intelligent controls for use in space, industrial, medical, and security applications. CMIS can be used in situ with a minimum amount of user intervention. This system can scan, find areas of interest in, focus on, and acquire images automatically. Many multiple-cell experiments require microscopy for in situ observations; this is feasible only with compact microscope systems. CMIS is a miniature machine vision system that combines intelligent image processing with remote control. The software also has a user-friendly interface, which can be used independently of the hardware for further post-experiment analysis. CMIS has been successfully developed in the SML Laboratory at the NASA Glenn Research Center and adapted for use for colloid studies and is available for telescience experiments. The main innovations this year are an improved interface, optimized algorithms, and the ability to control conventional full-sized microscopes in addition to compact microscopes. The CMIS software-hardware interface is being integrated into our SML Analysis package, which will be a robust general-purpose image-processing package that can handle over 100 space and industrial applications.

McDowell, Mark↗
DOE OSTI2025

IEEE PES GM Poster - Cyber-Informed Engineering Approach to Mitigating BESS Supply Chain Concerns

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are increasingly important to meet the needs of grid resilience and reliability. BESS provide critical grid services, maintaining stability of the grid with increased variable conditions. However, there are significant geopolitical and security concerns regarding their operation in critical infrastructure, due to lack of a domestic supply chain and prevalence of foreign entity of concern (FEOC) components in BESS and associated inverter-based resources. The supply chain challenge is dually exacerbated by a lack of alternative suppliers who can meet the economic targets for energy delivery and a potentially adversarial supply chain. Solutions are needed to secure components, addressing mixed layers of risk and engineering controls. This paper presents a specific application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles for BESS and recommends an alternative strategy to blocking the supply chain, ensuring that grid modernization targets can be met despite lack of a validated or secure supply chain. This study focuses on the United State (U.S.) use case, but the process can be applied globally to address supply chain security challenges. CIE practices represent the next step in functional assurance and risk mitigation, ensuring optimal resource allocation and enhancing security measures to safeguard the future of energy in the U.S. and beyond.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Safe Grid

The biggest users of GRID technologies came from the science and technology communities. These consist of government, industry and academia (national and international). The NASA GRID is moving into a higher technology readiness level (TRL) today; and as a joint effort among these leaders within government, academia, and industry, the NASA GRID plans to extend availability to enable scientists and engineers across these geographical boundaries collaborate to solve important problems facing the world in the 21 st century. In order to enable NASA programs and missions to use IPG resources for program and mission design, the IPG capabilities needs to be accessible from inside the NASA center networks. However, because different NASA centers maintain different security domains, the GRID penetration across different firewalls is a concern for center security people. This is the reason why some IPG resources are been separated from the NASA center network. Also, because of the center network security and ITAR concerns, the NASA IPG resource owner may not have full control over who can access remotely from outside the NASA center. In order to obtain organizational approval for secured remote access, the IPG infrastructure needs to be adapted to work with the NASA business process. Improvements need to be made before the IPG can be used for NASA program and mission development. The Secured Advanced Federated Environment (SAFE) technology is designed to provide federated security across NASA center and NASA partner's security domains. Instead of one giant center firewall which can be difficult to modify for different GRID applications, the SAFE "micro security domain" provide large number of professionally managed "micro firewalls" that can allow NASA centers to accept remote IPG access without the worry of damaging other center resources. The SAFE policy-driven capability-based federated security mechanism can enable joint organizational and resource owner approved remote access from outside of NASA centers. A SAFE enabled IPG can enable IPG capabilities to be available to NASA mission design teams across different NASA center and partner company firewalls. This paper will first discuss some of the potential security issues for IPG to work across NASA center firewalls. We will then present the SAFE federated security model. Finally we will present the concept of the architecture of a SAFE enabled IPG and how it can benefit NASA mission development.

Chow, Edward T.↗
NASA NTRS1987

The hack attack - Increasing computer system awareness of vulnerability threats

The paper discusses the issue of electronic vulnerability of computer based systems supporting NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) by unauthorized users. To test the security of the system and increase security awareness, NYMA, Inc. employed computer 'hackers' to attempt to infiltrate the system(s) under controlled conditions. Penetration procedures, methods, and descriptions are detailed in the paper. The procedure increased the security consciousness of GSFC management to the electronic vulnerability of the system(s).

Quann, John↗
DOE OSTI2025

Resilient State Recovery Using Prior Measurement Support Information

Resilient state recovery of cyber-physical systems has attracted much research attention due to the unique challenges posed by the tight coupling between communication, computation, and the underlying physics of such systems. By modeling attacks as additive adversary signals to a sparse subset of measurements, this resilient recovery problem can be formulated as an error correction problem. To achieve exact state recovery, most existing results require less than 50% of the measurement nodes to be compromised, which limits the resiliency of the estimators. In this paper, we show that observer resiliency can be further improved by incorporating data-driven prior information. Here, we provide an analytical bridge between the precision of prior information and the resiliency of the estimator. By quantifying the relationship between the estimation error of the weighted ℓ 1 observer and the precision of the support prior, this quantified relationship provides guidance for the estimator’s weight design to achieve optimal resiliency. Several numerical simulations and an application case study are presented to validate the theoretical claims.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1991

An overview of computer viruses in a research environment

The threat of attack by computer viruses is in reality a very small part of a much more general threat, specifically threats aimed at subverting computer security. Here, computer viruses are examined as a malicious logic in a research and development environment. A relation is drawn between the viruses and various models of security and integrity. Current research techniques aimed at controlling the threats posed to computer systems by threatening viruses in particular and malicious logic in general are examined. Finally, a brief examination of the vulnerabilities of research and development systems that malicious logic and computer viruses may exploit is undertaken.

Bishop, Matt↗
NASA NTRS2002

Summary report on the enterprise security workshop

This report summarizes the presentations of the 7th IEEE Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE 2002) Enterprise Security (ES) Workshop.

software security cryptography authentication acce↗
NASA NTRS2012

On Applications of Disruption Tolerant Networking to Optical Networking in Space

The integration of optical communication links into space networks via Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) is a largely unexplored area of research. Building on successful foundational work accomplished at JPL, we discuss a multi-hop multi-path network featuring optical links. The experimental test bed is constructed at the NASA Glenn Research Center featuring multiple Ethernet-to-fiber converters coupled with free space optical (FSO) communication channels. The test bed architecture models communication paths from deployed Mars assets to the deep space network (DSN) and finally to the mission operations center (MOC). Reliable versus unreliable communication methods are investigated and discussed; including reliable transport protocols, custody transfer, and fragmentation. Potential commercial applications may include an optical communications infrastructure deployment to support developing nations and remote areas, which are unburdened with supporting an existing heritage means of telecommunications. Narrow laser beam widths and control of polarization states offer inherent physical layer security benefits with optical communications over RF solutions. This paper explores whether or not DTN is appropriate for space-based optical networks, optimal payload sizes, reliability, and a discussion on security.

Hylton, Alan Guy↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗