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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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185 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Platform and Certification Framework Development for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC)-Integrated Charging Ecosystem (Final Project Report)

This report summarizes a pioneering effort in Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure ecosystem cybersecurity requirements, assessment methodologies, functional verification, as well as embodiment of the key technologies in the form of hardware and software tools being made available to the public. EPRI led a team of experts, as well as a stakeholder coalition encompassing all key actors in the EV charging infrastructure ecosystem that includes eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) equipment (defined as 200kW or above). EV charging infrastructure in the United States is a patchwork of networks that have continued to grow organically and have been designed to serve the charging needs of the EV owners, who are their customers. In doing so, each network provider, as well as their connected entities such as the cloud Electric Vehicle Service Providers or EVSPs, utility back office, utility AMI networks, payment networks, as well as Original Equipment Manufacturer (EV manufacturer) telematics networks, have designed systems that may work well individually, but no single entity is responsible for the entire ecosystem to be secure in terms of data exchange. Furthermore, there is no uniformity in how each actor has implemented the cybersecurity requirements since no system-wide cybersecurity requirements existed prior to this project. The final project report describes the technical approach guided by the EV charging infrastructure cybersecurity working group, convened specifically for this project. The technical approach included definition of requirements at the ecosystem level, treated as a ‘system of systems’, and then passed down to individual systems (EVSE, EV, cloud EVSP, utility, and the payment networks), followed by developing the cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessment methods, that were later applied to real-world cyber-physical systems at EPRI, ANL, and NREL laboratories, to validate both the process and the results. Finally, in a spotlight over the most vulnerable equipment, which is the EV charge station (AC or DC), the team developed a multi-layer cybersecurity implementation in the embedded domain embodied by the open-source Secure Network Interface Card (SNIC) demonstrating the various ways in which the infrastructure can be secured protecting against the identified attack surfaces. Finally, the entire process of EV infrastructure cybersecurity assessment was encapsulated in the Electric Vehicle Charging Cybersecurity Management (EVC2M) online GUI-based tool, that is expected to be released to the public. The report presents the objectives, the technical approach, the key results, and recommendations for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE VTO funded project DE- EE0008451, where ABB Inc. (ABB), in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory (INL), APS Global (APS), and XOS Trucks (XOS) pursued the development of a cyber-resilient extreme fast charging (XFC) management system. This project entitled Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) focuses on a resilient architecture for smart charging EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) device control and Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) features that can be added at the charging site depot level to increase cybersecurity. The project was split into two budget periods focused first on developing the threat model and resilient control concepts and second on testing, improving, and validating those developed resilient control algorithms and features with a focus on key vulnerabilities identified during the threat assessment portion of the project. During the first budget period of the CyberX project, the ABB led team focused on activities to identify, model, and quantitatively prioritize high-impact attack scenarios with potential cyber-physical effects while also modeling and developing concepts for a resilient control system that could securely address integration of DERs and other resources with EV charging. Development of the security focused XFC management system (XMS) was accomplished first by offline simulation using a developed XFC station or depot with 480V input level and simulating measurement inputs to monitoring and control systems in concept development. A representative distribution grid model was developed supporting an EV charging site model with BESS and 6 general EV charging models. These EV charging models allowed multiple configurations of charging level, multiple connected protection and measurement devices, and simulation function to show general compromise of EV, BESS, and protection features based on parallel threat analysis. During the second budget period, the EV site and supporting systems model was developed in more detail and converted from offline model to real-time to real-time with EV charging hardware in the loop (HIL). The resilient control architecture developed as concept in the first part of the project was further tested and validated for integration of local energy resources and XFC charging station site equipment while maintaining cybersecure operating principles. The proposed resilient architecture for smart charging and cybersecurity features consists of two main concepts developed and tested within the project. The first concept is an XFC management system (XMS) consisting of a hardware gateway, software platform, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or Distribution Management System integration components. The second concept is a Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) which forms a primarily software-related subsystem of the total CyberX solution focused on monitoring system measurements, estimation of measurement states, and predicting current at the utility point of interaction based on machine learning for anomaly detection.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Towards Provable Security in Industrial Control Systems Via Dynamic Protocol Attestation

Industrial control systems (ICSs) increasingly rely on digital technologies vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attackers can infiltrate ICSs and execute malicious actions. Individually, each action seems innocuous. But taken together, they cause the system to enter an unsafe state. These attacks have resulted in dramatic consequences such as physical damage, economic loss, and environmental catastrophes. This paper introduces a methodology that restricts actions using protocols. These protocols only allow safe actions to execute. Protocols are written in a domain specific language we have embedded in an interactive theorem prover (ITP). The ITP enables formal, machine-checked proofs to ensure protocols maintain safety properties. We use dynamic attestation to ensure ICSs conform to their protocol even if an adversary compromises a component. Since protocol conformance prevents unsafe actions, the previously mentioned cyber attacks become impossible. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using an example from the Fischertechnik Industry 4.0 platform. We measure dynamic attestation's impact on latency and throughput. Our approach is a starting point for studying how to combine formal methods and protocol design to thwart attacks intended to cripple ICSs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

ByzSec — A Multi-layered Byzantine Resilient Architecture for Bulk Power System Protective Relays

Reliability, selectivity, and sensitivity are the fundamental attributes of any protection system, acting as the main drivers in the selection of schemes, and equipment. In high-voltage systems, microprocessor-based relays represent the industry’s preferred solution, providing engineers with a vast array of benefits. However, they remain vulnerable to cybersecurity events that may compromise their functionality. To help mitigate against potential cybersecurity risks, this paper presents a fault-tolerant, Byzantine Resilient (BR) architecture that significantly increases the cybersecurity attributes of a protection system while minimizing the amount of performance impacts and integration overheads introduced. The solution relies on an array of independent relays that utilize robust consensus methods (based on Spire [1], [2]) to ensure correct system behavior is achieved even when a relay has been compromised. Furthermore, the solution has been complemented with a custom-built Situational Awareness engine that can be used to detect and identify potential threats. The implemented solution has been developed in consultation with three hardware vendors and has been tested to comply with the performance requirements of a 345kV differential protection scheme (87T). The results indicate that the proposed architecture is a comprehensive solution that: supports the strict correctness and performance requirements of the bulk power grid while providing a cost-effective alternative that offers a seamless, long-term solution.

byzantine security, Fault Tolerant Application Sof↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗