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For a flight hardware system to be launched and/or retrieved by the Space Shuttle, the development of its structures must address both personnel safety and safety of the mission. Safety of personnel and the Shuttle has been a paramount concern for the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) since the first Shuttle flight in 1980.
The automation and robotics requirements for the Space Station Initial Operational Concept (IOC) are discussed. The amount of tasks to be performed by an eight-person crew, the need for an automated or directed fault analysis capability, and ground support requirements are considered. Issues important in determining the role of automation for the IOC are listed.
Kennedy Space Center is not only home to one of the largest buildings in the world - the massive Vehicle Assembly Building - it also hosts a number of one-of-a-kind facilities. The more than 30-mile-long campus has witnessed every launch from the Space Shuttle Launch Pad, as well as many homecomings at the Shuttle Landing Facility. Just as important, the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) has seen each element of the International Space Station (ISS) that passes through Kennedy before it goes into orbit. The SSPF is where ISS components are checked, tested, and adjusted before being packed into the Space Shuttle for transport. In an environment like the SSPF - spanning 457,000 square feet of processing areas, operational control rooms, laboratories, logistics areas, and office space - large workstands and equipment used to support the processing of ISS components need to be moved around the facility. One of the devices employed for this task is an air pallet. An air pallet moves on cushions of air instead of wheels. Compressed air inflates the cushions underneath the pallet and is then expelled through exhaust holes. This forms a thin film of air between the cushions and the floor, lifting the platform off the floor and making it easy to move the heavy workstands, equipment, and ISS components. Concerned with the safety of the connections on the pressurized air hoses used for the air pallets, engineers at Kennedy modified an existing commercial cam and groove fitting to control the air supply hose in the event of an accidental release of a pressurized hose. This modification prevented the hose from detaching and, propelled by compressed air, striking workers or equipment. "At the time, these were not available on commercial coupling halves, so NASA made a modification and then put them into use. If a worker were to accidentally try to remove a pressurized hose from the pallet, it no longer rapidly separated, and it safely relieved the pressure," says Paul Schwindt, an engineer at Kennedy who together with Alan Littlefield, also an engineer at Kennedy, designed the modification.
The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.
Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.
he space shuttle Discovery is carrying some 300 waivers to technical specifications as it enters the home stretch of its planned return to flight next month. There were about 6,000 waivers in place when Columbia crashed. Shuttle managers say they are working to reduce the number of waivers remaining by fixing the problems they highlight, a change prompted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. In the wake of the accident, NASA has heeded the CAWS recommendation that waivers be the responsibility of an "independent technical authority" (ITA), rather than the shuttle program itself. To carry out the recommendation of the CAIB-which found an inherent conflict of interest in having the same managers make decisions about cost, schedule and safety-then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe designated the agency's chief engineer as the formal ITA. He is responsible for setting, maintaining and granting waivers across the agency. In mid-January, Fred Gregory, then O'Keefe's deputy and now his acting replacement, launched the ITA within NASA under Chief Engineer Rex Geveden, the former program manager on the Gravity Probe B experiment.
Cryogenic fuels evaluated for operational safety in space environment simulation laboratory /SESL/
The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.
During confined space entry operations as well as Shuttle-safing operations, United Space Alliance (USA)/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) safety personnel use a variety of portable instrumentation to monitor for hazardous levels of compounds such as nitrogen dioxide (N%), monomethylhydrazine (NMM), FREON 21, ammonia (NH3), oxygen (O2), and combustibles (as hydrogen (H2)). Except for O2 and H2, each compound is monitored using a single analyzer. In many cases these analyzers are 5 to 10 years old and require frequent maintenance. In addition, they are cumbersome to carry and tend to make the job of personnel monitoring physically taxing. As part of an effort to upgrade the sensor technology background information was requested from a total of 27 manufacturers of portable multi-gas instruments. A set of criteria was established to determine which vendors would be selected for laboratory evaluation. These criteria were based on requests made by USA/NASA Safety personnel in order to meet requirements within their respective areas for confined-space and Shuttle-safing operations. Each of the 27 manufacturers of multi-gas analyzers was sent a copy of the criteria and asked to fill in the appropriate information pertaining to their instrumentation. Based on the results of the sensor criteria worksheets, a total of 9 vendors out of 27 surveyed manufacturers were chosen for evaluation. Each vendor included in the final evaluation process was requested to configure each of two analyzers with NO2, NH3, O2, and combustible sensors. A set of lab tests was designed in order to determine which of the multi-gas instruments under evaluation was best suited for use in both shuttle and confined space operations. These tests included linearity/repeatability, zero/span drift response/recovery, humidity, interference, and maintenance. At the conclusion of lab testing three vendors were selected for additional field testing. Based on the results of both the lab and field evaluations a single vendor was recommended for use by NASA/IJSA Safety personnel. Vendor selection criteria, as well as the results from both laboratory and field testing of the multi-gas analyzers, are presented as part of this paper.
Before technical safety guidelines and requirements are established, a common understanding of their origin and importance must be shared between Space Station Program Management, the User Community, and the Safety organizations involved. Safety guidelines and requirements are driven by the nature of the experiments, and the degree of crew interaction. Hazard identification; development of technical safety requirements; operating procedures and constraints; provision of training and education; conduct of reviews and evaluations; and emergency preplanning are briefly discussed.
The safety policy and requirements are established applicable to the Space Transportation System (STS) payloads and their ground support equipment (GSE). The requirements are intended to protect flight and ground personnel, the STS, other payloads, GSE, the general public, public-private property, and the environment from payload-related hazards. The technical and system safety requirements applicable to STS payloads (including payload-provided ground and flight supports systems) during ground and flight operations are contained.
Artificial intelligence (AI) R&D projects for the successful and efficient operation of the Space Station are described. The book explores the most advanced AI-based technologies, reviews the results of concept design studies to determine required AI capabilities, details demonstrations that would indicate the existence of these capabilities, and develops an R&D plan leading to such demonstrations. Particular attention is given to teleoperation and robotics, sensors, expert systems, computers, planning, and man-machine interface.
The space environment consists of a complex mixture of different types of ionizing radiation and altered gravity that represents a threat to humans during space missions. In particular, individual radiation sensitivity is strictly related to the risk of space radiation carcinogenesis. Therefore, in view of future missions to the Moon and Mars, there is an urgent need to estimate as accurately as possible the individual risk from space exposure to improve the safety of space exploration. In this review, we survey the combined effects from the two main physical components of the space environment, ionizing radiation and microgravity, to alter the genetics and epigenetics of human cells, considering both real and simulated space conditions. Data collected from studies on human cells are discussed for their potential use to estimate individual radiation carcinogenesis risk from space exposure.
The Trilateral partners — the European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the United States Government (USG) in their execution of safe and successful missions, have a long-standing history of sustaining the shared space environment of operational Earth-Moon orbits with their global space-stewardship, or spacekeeping, of these areas. This has driven missions to limit the generation of new and long-lived debris, control debris releases, minimize accidental explosions and collisions, and ensure Post-Mission Disposal of space systems, so that the environment remains safe for future operations and explorations. Given the continued need for space systems to support global mandatory infrastructure and commercial enterprise, spacefarers are extending beyond the Trilateral partners, more and smaller satellites are being deployed, and current assets are being utilized much longer than expected. This is making space more congested than ever; therefore, the Trilateral partners are evaluating potential future debris mitigation strategies, evolving technology, developing on-orbit servicing capabilities, and advancing their abilities to assess disposal and mission extension plans. They are also sharing their lessons learned and identifying opportunities for future state-of-the-art advancements for current and future space enterprises. Sustaining the space environment cannot be ensured by any one agency or country. Thus, the Trilateral authors have shared their lessons learned, insights, and guidance, herein, on disposal and mission extension assessment strategies with the gratitude of each agency. As such, this document is not prescriptive, but was formulated to enhance value-and-risk-balanced operational decision-making, support policy refinement, and guide spacefaring partners beyond these agencies to assess their activities in space with safety and a global space-stewardship, or spacekeeping, in mind. This includes not only the disposal and mission extension assessment addressed herein, but also preserving space history, ensuring collaboration/interoperability of technology, supporting fellow operators without interfering, and the utilization of in-situ resources for the common benefit of humankind. It is the intention of the Trilateral partners that this document evolves based on community lessons learned and the introduction of new assessment methodologies. So, all readers are encouraged to share their insights with the authors from their own application of this guidance or other strategies to ensure each mission has a successful, safe, and judicious life and conclusion.
Since the end of the Apollo program in 1972, human space flight has been restricted to altitudes below 600 km above the Earth s surface with most missions restricted to a ceiling below 400 km. An investigation of the tracked satellite population transiting and influencing the human space flight regime during the past 11 years (equivalent to a full solar cycle) has recently been completed. The overall effects of satellite breakups and solar activity are typically less pronounced in the human space flight regime than other regions of low Earth orbit. As of January 2006 nearly 1500 tracked objects resided in or traversed the human space flight regime, although two-thirds of these objects were in orbits of moderate to high eccentricity, significantly reducing their effect on human space flight safety. During the period investigated, the spatial density of tracked objects in the 350-400 km altitude regime of the International Space Station demonstrated a steady decline, actually decreasing by 50% by the end of the period. On the other hand, the region immediately above 600 km experienced a significant increase in its population density. This regime is important for future risk assessments, since this region represents the reservoir of debris which will influence human space flight safety in the future. The paper seeks to put into sharper perspective the risks posed to human space flight by the tracked satellite population, as well as the influences of solar activity and the effects of compliance with orbital debris mitigation guidelines on human space flight missions. Finally, the methods and successes of characterizing the population of smaller debris at human space flight regimes are addressed.
Reports in the field of space flight safety applicable to current and future operational space activities which appeared between July 1980 and June 1981 are surveyed. Subjects in the area of flight rescue and safety during launch, on-orbit, reentry and landing phases include the major activities and findings of the first Shuttle test flight, a slidewire system for emergency egress from the Space Shuttle on the launch pad, and the testing of the Spacelab engineering model. In the area of human capabilities and crew roles, attention is given to reports of repairs to the Salyut 6 space station made by a Soyuz crew, and an assessment of weightlessness effects on space worker health and safety. Safety requirements for STS payloads including pressure vessels, and the Orbiter window system and for spacecraft testing are also presented, along with those for a television system to aid in monitoring astronaut extravehicular activities. For the operation of large space structures, reports include EVA equipment for satellite servicing and the safety aspects of connectors used in construction. Finally, attention is given to safety-related criteria in a study of Shuttle interactions with the proposed Space Operations Center.
Auxiliary Power Units (APU's) play a critical role in space vehicles. On the space shuttle, APU's provide the hydraulic power for the aerodynamic control surfaces, rocket engine gimballing, landing gear, and brakes. Future space vehicles, such as the Reusable Launch Vehicle, will also need APU's to provide electrical power for flight control actuators and other vehicle subsystems. Vehicle designers and mission managers have identified safety, reliability, and maintenance as the primary concerns for space APU's. In 1997, the NASA Lewis Research Center initiated an advanced technology development program to address these concerns.
The detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space Base program mission are presented. The trees are graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions.