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NASA NTRS2010

Visualization of Traffic Accidents

Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Wang, Jie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going beyond reliability to robustness and resilience in space systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience, are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environments is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes are usually unanticipated. They often invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging events. These three are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems, the ability to perform after unanticipated events, would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness can be done by dealing with known sources of problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. Two contrasting approaches are reducing system complexity and adding supervisory control. The need for resilience has been claimed for decades but little has been accomplished. Systems designers assume that they understand requirements, technologies, designs, architectures, integration, testing, operations, and environments. The potential problems of changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns are ignored. Systems designers are typically overconfident and ignore the need for robustness and resilience.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials for Return-to-Flight following the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

During the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, it was determined that a large chunk of polyurethane insulating foam (= 1.67 lbs) on the External Tank (ET) came loose during Columbia's ascent on 2-1-03. The foam piece struck some of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing in the mid-wing area. This impact damaged Columbia to the extent that upon re-entry to Earth, superheGed air approaching 3,000 F caused the vehicle to break up, killing all seven astronauts on board. A paper after the Columbia Accident Investigation highlighted thermal analysis testing performed on External Tank TPS materials (1). These materials included BX-250 (now BX-265) rigid polyurethane foam and SLA-561 Super Lightweight Ablator (highly-filled silicone rubber). The large chunk of foam from Columbia originated fiom the left bipod ramp of the ET. The foam in this ramp area was hand-sprayed over the SLA material and various fittings, allowed to dry, and manually shaved into a ramp shape. In Return-to-Flight (RTF) efforts following Columbia, the decision was made to remove the foam in the bipod ramp areas. During RTF efforts, further thermal analysis testing was performed on BX-265 foam by DSC and DMA. Flat panels of foam about 2-in. thick were sprayed on ET tank material (aluminum alloys). The DSC testing showed that foam material very close to the metal substrate cured more slowly than bulk foam material. All of the foam used on the ET is considered fully cured about 21 days after it is sprayed. The RTF culminated in the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on 7-26-05. Although the flight was a success, there was another serious incident of foam loss fiom the ET during Shuttle ascent. This time, a rather large chunk of BX-265 foam (= 0.9 lbs) came loose from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) PAL ramp, although the foam did not strike the Shuttle Orbiter containing the crew. DMA testing was performed on foam samples taken fiom a simulated PAL ramp panel. It was found that the smooth rind on the foam facing the cable tray did significantly affect the properties of foam at the PAL ramp surface. The smooth rind increased the storage modulus E' of the foam as much as 20- 40% over a temperature range of -145 to 95 C. Because of foam loss fiom the PAL ramp, future Shuttle flights were grounded indefinitely to allow further testing to better understand foam properties. The decision was also made to remove foam from the LH2 PAL, ramp. Other RTF efforts prior to the launch of Discovery included

Wingard, Doug↗
NASA NTRS1987

An investigation of transitional management problems for the NSTS

Analysis and recommendations were provided to the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) on managing the transition from a research and development (R/D) structure to an operational structure. Summaries of published literature on the theory and applications of transition, or change management, and the results of interviews with additional industry personnel whose organizations either have gone through or are now going through change are contained. The issues of flight rates and the flight decision are addressed. The use of a computer simulation model to analyze the effect of varying different parameters on the flight rate was also discussed. The issue of NASA's changing demographics was examined and why this may be a cause for concern. The impact of the whole shuttle system structure on the Challenger accident was presented along with the highlights of the Rogers Commission Report. The proposed reorganization of the NSTS management structure is discussed and how this transition from R/D to operations can be performed.

Hunsucker, John L.↗
NASA NTRS2009

An Update on Mortality in the U.S. Astronaut Corps: 1959-2009

Although it has now been over 50 years since mankind first ventured into space, the long-term health impacts of human space flight remain largely unknown. Identifying factors that affect survival and prognosis among those who participate in space flight is vitally important, as the era of commercial space flight approaches and NASA prepares for missions to Mars. The Longitudinal Study of Astronaut Health is a prospective study designed to examine trends in astronaut morbidity and mortality. The purpose of this analysis was to describe and explore predictors of overall and cause-specific mortality among individuals selected for the U.S. astronaut corps. All U.S. astronauts (n=321), regardless of flight status, were included in this analysis. Death certificate searches were conducted to ascertain vital status and cause of death through April 2009. Data were collected from medical records and lifestyle questionnaires. Multivariable Cox regression modeling was used to calculate the mortality hazard associated with embarking on space flight, adjusted for sex, race, and age at selection. Between 1959 and 2009, there were 39 (12.1%) deaths. Of these deaths, 18 (42.2%) were due to occupational accidents; 7 (17.9%) were due to other accidents; 6 (15.4%) were attributable to cancer; 6 (15.4%) resulted from cardiovascular/circulatory diseases; and 2 (5.1%) were from other causes. Participation in space flight did not significantly increase mortality hazard over time (adjusted hazard ratio=0.57; 95% confidence interval=0.26-1.26. Because our results are based on a small sample size, future research that includes payload specialists, other space flight participants, and international crew members is warranted to maximize statistical power.

Amirian, E.↗
NASA NTRS2000

CFD Applications in Support of the Space Shuttle Risk Assessment

The paper describes a numerical study of a potential accident scenario of the space shuttle, operating at the same flight conditions as flight 51L, the Challenger accident. The interest in performing this simulation is derived by evidence that indicates that the event itself did not exert large enough blast loading on the shuttle to break it apart. Rather, the quasi-steady aerodynamic loading on the damaged, unbalance vehicle caused the break-up. Despite the enormous explosive potential of the shuttle total fuel load (both liquid and solid), the post accident explosives working group estimated the maximum energy involvement to be equivalent to about five hundreds of pounds of TNT. This understanding motivated the simulation described here. To err on the conservative side, we modeled the event as an explosion, and used the maximum energy estimate. We modeled the transient detonation of a 500 lbs spherical charge of TNT, placed at the main engine, and the resulting blast wave propagation about the complete stack. Tracking of peak pressures and impulses at hundreds of locations on the vehicle surface indicate that the blast load was insufficient to break the vehicle, hence demonstrating likely crew survivability through such an event.

Baum, Joseph D.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Effect of temperature and gap opening rate on the resiliency of candidate solid rocket booster O-ring materials

In the redesign of the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor following the Challenger accident, the field and nozzle-to-case joints were designed to minimize gap opening caused by internal motor pressurization during ignition. The O-ring seals and glands for these joints were designed both to accommodate structural deflections and to promote pressure assisted sealing. The resiliency behavior of several candidate O-ring materials was evaluated for the effects of temperature and gap opening rates. The performance of three of the elastomeric materials was tested under the specific redesign gap opening requirement. Dynamic flexure conditions unique to launch produce low frequency vibrations in the gap opening. The effect of these vibrations on the ability of the O-ring to maintain contact with the sealing surface was addressed. The resiliency of the O-ring materials was found to be extremely sensitive to variations in temperature and gap opening rate. The top three elastomeric materials tracked the simulated solid rocket booster (SRB) field joint deflection at 75 and 120 F. The external tank/SRB attach strut load vibrations had a negligible effect on the ability of the O-ring to track the simulated SRB field joint deflection.

Lach, Cynthia L.↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA's Radio Frequency Bolt Monitor: A Lifetime of Spinoffs

This story begins in the 1970s, when Dr. Joseph Heyman, a young scientist at NASA s Langley Research Center, was asked to support the investigation of a wind tunnel accident at a sister center. Although the work was outside of his physics background, it sparked a research focus that guided his lengthy NASA career and would earn him a slew of accolades, including NASA s highest award medals for Exceptional Leadership, Exceptional Achievement, and Exceptional Service; the coveted Silver Snoopy Astronaut Award for Space Shuttle Return to Flight; and the Arthur Fleming Award for being one of the Top Ten Federal Scientists in Government Service. He won 30 additional NASA awards, including the Agency s Invention of the Year and the Agency s highest award for technology transfer, and was the only person to ever win 4 R&D 100 Awards. Back in 1973, though, Heyman was a young civil servant with a background in physics who was asked to sit on an accident review panel. The panel met at Ames Research Center, in Moffet Field, California, and after considerable investigation, concluded that a high-pressure pebble heater used for heating gas had failed, due to improperly tightened bolts in a 1,000-pound gate valve control section. The accident showered the facility with incendiary ceramic spheres and nearly a ton of metal, but, luckily, caused no injuries. Heyman returned to Langley and began work on a solution. He developed an ultrasonic device that would measure bolt elongation, as opposed to torque, the factor typically measured in testing bolt preload or tension. Torque measurement can lead to load errors, with miscalculations as high as 80 percent that can be passed over during installation. Bolt stretch, however, is nearly always accurate to 1 percent or better. Within 1 month, he had an acoustic resonance solution that accurately determined bolt elongation. He assumed his work on this project had ended, but it was actually the start of nearly 15 years of work perfecting, improving, inventing, and modifying the "bolt monitor", all the while, filing numerous patents, presenting papers, and holding demonstrations as the technology matured. Industry engineers challenged Heyman s inventiveness, and reminded the physicist that most bolts are not perfect resonators, and that early devices required that the bolt have reasonably flat and parallel faces. The U.S. Geological Survey asked NASA for help in determining the load in mine roof bolts, which are 8- to 10-feet-long and rough cut. To solve that problem, Heyman modified the original device to operate at a lower frequency and to generate propagation modes that could be used to "lock" the instrument on a particular mode. Further work in this vein led to the development of the Pulsed Phase Locked Loop (P2L2) that worked on the mine bolts. The next set of problems involved high-strength bolts with head markings. For this solution, Heyman invented a modified P2L2 that tracked a specific phase point in the measurement wave. This class of instrumentation, well suited to measuring small changes in acoustic velocity, won the NASA "Invention of the Year" award in 1982. Other scientists and engineers have continued the evolution of this technology both inside NASA and outside of the Agency. Within NASA, the technology has been improved for medical applications, with a particular focus on intercranial pressure (ICP) monitoring.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1979

Monte Carlo simulation of single accident airport risk profile

A computer simulation model was developed for estimating the potential economic impacts of a carbon fiber release upon facilities within an 80 kilometer radius of a major airport. The model simulated the possible range of release conditions and the resulting dispersion of the carbon fibers. Each iteration of the model generated a specific release scenario, which would cause a specific amount of dollar loss to the surrounding community. By repeated iterations, a risk profile was generated, showing the probability distribution of losses from one accident. Using accident probability estimates, the risks profile for annual losses was derived. The mechanics are described of the simulation model, the required input data, and the risk profiles generated for the 26 large hub airports.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Hydrogen Sensors Boost Hybrids; Today's Models Losing Gas?

Advanced chemical sensors are used in aeronautic and space applications to provide safety monitoring, emission monitoring, and fire detection. In order to fully do their jobs, these sensors must be able to operate in a range of environments. NASA has developed sensor technologies addressing these needs with the intent of improving safety, optimizing combustion efficiencies, and controlling emissions. On the ground, the chemical sensors were developed by NASA engineers to detect potential hydrogen leaks during Space Shuttle launch operations. The Space Shuttle uses a combination of hydrogen and oxygen as fuel for its main engines. Liquid hydrogen is pumped to the external tank from a storage tank located several hundred feet away. Any hydrogen leak could potentially result in a hydrogen fire, which is invisible to the naked eye. It is important to detect the presence of a hydrogen fire in order to prevent a major accident. In the air, the same hydrogen-leak dangers are present. Stress and temperature changes can cause tiny cracks or holes to form in the tubes that line the Space Shuttle s main engine nozzle. Such defects could allow the hydrogen that is pumped through the nozzle during firing to escape. Responding to the challenges associated with pinpointing hydrogen leaks, NASA endeavored to improve propellant leak-detection capabilities during assembly, pre-launch operations, and flight. The objective was to reduce the operational cost of assembling and maintaining hydrogen delivery systems with automated detection systems. In particular, efforts have been focused on developing an automated hydrogen leak-detection system using multiple, networked hydrogen sensors that are operable in harsh conditions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1981

Effect of heavy rain on aircraft

A summary on heavy rain effects on aircraft aerodynamics validation of research and some wind shear accidents in which heavy rain were an important factor. Frost formation and what frost does to the lift and drag curves for an airfoil was examined. If frost could cause severe aerodynamic problems for both general aviation and transport aircraft due to its roughness, then heavy rain produce a similar result. The influencing parameters of heavy rain on an aircraft are studied. Sources of aerodynamic roughness due to rain and wind shear and heavy rain accidents are outlined.

Luers, J. K.↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as it returned to Earth from a 16-day science mission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at [http://www.caib.us]) on August 26, 2003, concluding that the tragedy was caused by technical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Board specified must be completed before the shuttle returns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, and observations. Further information on Columbia and issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated.

Smith, Marcia S.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact

On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.

Huyse, Luc J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Accident Precursor Analysis Process Tailored for NASA Space Systems

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system and which may differ in frequency or type from those in the various models. These discrepancies between the models (perceived risk) and the system (actual risk) provide the leading indication of an underappreciated risk. This paper presents an APA process developed specifically for NASA Earth-to-Orbit space systems. The purpose of the process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system risk as evidenced by anomalous events which, although not necessarily presenting an immediate safety impact, may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident precursors because they signal the potential for severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification allows them to be integrated into the overall system risk model used to intbrm decisions relating to safety.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2016

Evaluation of Observed and Modelled Aerosol Lifetimes Using Radioactive Tracers of Opportunity and an Ensemble of 19 Global Models

Aerosols have important impacts on air quality and climate, but the processes affecting their removal from the atmosphere are not fully understood and are poorly constrained by observations. This makes modelled aerosol lifetimes uncertain. In this study, we make use of an observational constraint on aerosol lifetimes provided by radionuclide measurements and investigate the causes of differences within a set of global models. During the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant accident of March 2011, the radioactive isotopes cesium-137 (Cs-137) and xenon-133 (Xe-133) were released in large quantities. Cesium attached to particles in the ambient air, approximately according to their available aerosol surface area. Cs-137 size distribution measurements taken close to the power plant suggested that accumulation mode (AM) sulfate aerosols were the main carriers of cesium. Hence, Cs-137 can be used as a proxy tracer for the AM sulfate aerosol's fate in the atmosphere. In contrast, the noble gas Xe-133 behaves almost like a passive transport tracer. Global surface measurements of the two radioactive isotopes taken over several months after the release allow the derivation of a lifetime of the carrier aerosol. We compare this to the lifetimes simulated by 19 different atmospheric transport models initialized with identical emissions of Cs-137that were assigned to an aerosol tracer with each model's default properties of AM sulfate, and Xe-133 emissions that were assigned to a passive tracer. We investigate to what extent the modelled sulfate tracer can reproduce the measurements, especially with respect to the observed loss of aerosol mass with time. Modelled Cs-137and Xe-133 concentrations sampled at the same location and times as station measurements allow a direct comparison between measured and modelled aerosol lifetime. The e-folding lifetime e, calculated from station measurement data taken between 2 and 9 weeks after the start of the emissions, is 14.3 days (95% confidence interval 13.1-15.7 days). The equivalent modelled e lifetimes have a large spread, varying between 4.8 and 26.7 days with a model median of 9.42.3 days, indicating too fast a removal in most models. Because sufficient measurement data were only available from about 2 weeks after the release, the estimated lifetimes apply to aerosols that have undergone long-range transport, i.e. not for freshly emitted aerosol. However, modelled instantaneous lifetimes show that the initial removal in the first 2 weeks was quicker (lifetimes between 1 and 5 days) due to the emissions occurring at low altitudes and co-location of the fresh plume with strong precipitation. Deviations between measured and modelled aerosol lifetimes are largest for the northernmost stations and at later time periods, suggesting that models do not transport enough of the aerosol towards the Arctic. The models underestimate passive tracer (Xe-133) concentrations in the Arctic as well but to a smaller extent than for the aerosol (Cs-137) tracer. This indicates that in addition to too fast an aerosol removal in the models, errors in simulated atmospheric transport towards the Arctic in most models also contribute to the underestimation of the Arctic aerosol concentrations.

Radioactive isotopes↗
NASA NTRS1994

Ocular hazards of light

The eye is protected against bright light by the natural aversion response to viewing bright light sources. The aversion response normally protects the eye against injury from viewing bright light sources such as the sun, arc lamps and welding arcs, since this aversion limits the duration of exposure to a fraction of a second (about 0.25 s). The principal retinal hazard resulting from viewing bright light sources is photoretinitis, e.g., solar retinitis with an accompanying scotoma which results from staring at the sun. Solar retinitis was once referred to as 'eclipse blindness' and associated 'retinal burn'. Only in recent years has it become clear that photoretinitis results from a photochemical injury mechanism following exposure of the retina to shorter wavelengths in the visible spectrum, i.e., violet and blue light. Prior to conclusive animal experiments at that time, it was thought to be a thermal injury mechanism. However, it has been shown conclusively that an intense exposure to short-wavelength light (hereafter referred to as 'blue light') can cause retinal injury. The product of the dose-rate and the exposure duration always must result in the same exposure dose (in joules-per-square centimeter at the retina) to produce a threshold injury. Blue-light retinal injury (photoretinitis) can result from viewing either an extremely bright light for a short time, or a less bright light for longer exposure periods. This characteristic of photochemical injury mechanisms is termed reciprocity and helps to distinguish these effects from thermal burns, where heat conduction requires a very intense exposure within seconds to cause a retinal coagulation otherwise, surrounding tissue conducts the heat away from the retinal image. Injury thresholds for acute injury in experimental animals for both corneal and retinal effects have been corroborated for the human eye from accident data. Occupational safety limits for exposure to UVR and bright light are based upon this knowledge. As with any photochemical injury mechanism must consider the action spectrum, which describes the relative effectiveness of different wavelengths in causing a photobiological effect. The action spectrum for photochemical retinal injury peaks at approximately 440 nm.

Sliney, David H.↗