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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 217 records · Page 12
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NASA NTRS1984

The cost of landing man on Mars

In a period where the space program budget is generally static at about 1/3 of the level reached during the Apollo program, manned planetary flight is not considered by NASA planners to be a realistic near term goal. Much of NASA's current planning is based on the perception that manned planetary flight would be more costly than the Apollo lunar landing. This paper demonstrates that with current technological improvements in avionics, structure, and space transportation, the landing of an American on Mars would cost only 1/3 to 2/3 of the lunar landing; on a per capita basis such a program would cost less than $200, compared to Apollo's $325 (all dollars in 1981 base). Given the fact that a manned Mars landing is the last such exploration feat left to this generation, the cost should clearly not be a major deterrent.

Mandell, H. C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA's Space Launch System Progress Report

Exploration beyond Earth orbit will be an enduring legacy for future generations, as it provides a platform for science and exploration that will define new knowledge and redefine known boundaries. NASA s Space Launch System (SLS) Program, managed at the Marshall Space Flight Center, is responsible for designing and developing the first exploration-class rocket since the Apollo Program s Saturn V that sent Americans to the Moon in the 1960s and 1970s. The SLS offers a flexible design that may be configured for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle with associated life-support equipment and provisions for long journeys or may be outfitted with a payload fairing that will accommodate flagship science instruments and a variety of high-priority experiments. Building on legacy systems, facilities, and expertise, the SLS will have an initial lift capability of 70 tonnes (t) in 2017 and will be evolvable to 130 t after 2021. While commercial launch vehicle providers service the International Space Station market, this capability will surpass all vehicles, past and present, providing the means to do entirely new missions, such as human exploration of Mars. Building on the foundation laid by over 50 years of human and scientific space flight and on the lessons learned from the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs the SLS team is delivering both technical trade studies and business case analyses to ensure that the SLS architecture will be safe, affordable, reliable, and sustainable. This panel will address the planning and progress being made by NASA s SLS Program.

May, Todd A.↗
NASA NTRS1965

Network systems

Network equipment installation at remote sites for Apollo program

SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM↗
NASA NTRS1975

Apollo command and service module and lunar module environmental control systems

The environmental control systems and system requirements of the Apollo command service module and the lunar module are described. The overall performance of both systems during the Apollo program is discussed. Other topics covered include: dust control, EVA provisions, Apollo 13 emergency, component redundancy, modular construction, and subatmospheric design.

James C. Brady↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Space Launch System Progress Report

Exploration beyond Earth will be an enduring legacy for future generations, confirming America's commitment to explore, learn, and progress. NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Program, managed at the Marshall Space Flight Center, is responsible for designing and developing the first exploration-class rocket since the Apollo Program's Saturn V that sent Americans to the Moon. The SLS offers a flexible design that may be configured for the MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle and associated equipment, or may be outfitted with a payload fairing that will accommodate flagship science instruments and a variety of high-priority experiments. Both options support a national capability that will pay dividends for future generations. Building on legacy systems, facilities, and expertise, the SLS will have an initial lift capability of 70 metric tons (mT) and will be evolvable to 130 mT. While commercial launch vehicle providers service the International Space Station market, this capability will surpass all vehicles, past and present, providing the means to do entirely new missions, such as human exploration of asteroids and Mars. With its superior lift capability, the SLS can expand the interplanetary highway to many possible destinations, conducting revolutionary missions that will change the way we view ourselves, our planet and its place in the cosmos. To perform missions such as these, the SLS will be the largest launch vehicle ever built. It is being designed for safety and affordability - to sustain our journey into the space age. Current plans include launching the first flight, without crew, later this decade, with crewed flights beginning early next decade. Development work now in progress is based on heritage space systems and working knowledge, allowing for a relatively quick start and for maturing the SLS rocket as future technologies become available. Together, NASA and the U.S. aerospace industry are partnering to develop this one-of-a-kind asset. Many of NASA's space centers across the country will provide their unique expertise to the Space Launch System endeavor. Unique infrastructure to be used includes the Michoud Assembly Facility for tank manufacturing, Stennis Space Center for engine testing, and Kennedy Space Center for processing and launch. As this panel will discuss, the SLS team is dedicated to doing things differently-from applying lean oversight/insight models to smartly using legacy hardware and existing facilities. Building on the foundation laid by over 50 years of human and scientific space flight--and on the lessons learned from the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs-the SLS team has delivered both technical trade studies and business case analyses to ensure that the SLS architecture will be safe, affordable, reliable, and sustainable.

Singer, Joan A.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Remembering Apollo 11: The 30th Anniversary Data Archive CD-ROM

On July 20, 1969, the human race accomplished its single greatest technological achievement of all time when a human first set foot on another celestial body. Six hours after landing at 4:17 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (with less than thirty seconds of fuel remaining), Neil A. Armstrong took the "small step" into our greater future when he stepped off the Lunar Module, named Eagle, onto the surface of the Moon, from which he could look up and see Earth in the heavens as no one had done before him. He was shortly joined by Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin, and the two astronauts spent twenty-one hours on the lunar surface and returned forty-six pounds of lunar rocks. After their historic walks on the Moon, they successfully docked with Michael Collins, patiently orbiting the cold but no longer lifeless Moon alone in the Command module Columbia. This CR-ROM is intended as a collection of hard to find technical data and other interesting information about the Apollo 11 mission, as well as the apollo program in general. It includes basic overviews, such as a retrospective analysis, an annotated bibliography, and history of the lunar-orbit rendezvous concept. It also contains technical data, such as mission operations reports, press kits, and news references for all of the Apollo missions, the Apollo spacecraft, and the Saturn V launch vehicle. Rounding out this CD-ROM are extensive histories of the lunar Orbiter program (the robotic predecessor to Apollo, biographies of the Apollo astronauts and other key individuals, and interesting audio-visual materials, such as video and audio clips, photo galleries, and blueprint-like diagrams of the Apollo spacecraft.

Edgar M Cortright↗
NASA NTRS1964

How soon to the moon/ques/

Stretch-out of Apollo program, evaluating cost aspect and space environment effects on time scheduling

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT↗
NASA NTRS1965

Prediction analysis and management decisions.

Prediction analysis techniques /PAT/ using statistical methods, computers, error analysis, etc, for system weight, performance and other parameter predictions in Apollo program

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT↗
NASA NTRS1984

Space reliability technology - A historical perspective

The progressive improvements in reliability of launch vehicles is traced from the Vanguard rocket to the STS. The Vanguard, built with minimal redundancy and a high mass ratio, was used as an operational vehicle midway through its test program in an attempt to meet the perceived challenge represented by the Sputnik. The fourth Vanguard failed due to inadequate contamination prevention and lack of inspection ports. Automatic firing sequences were adopted for the Titan rockets, which were an order of magnitude larger than the Vanguard and therefore had room for interior inspections. Qualification testing and reporting were introduced for components, along with X ray inspection of fuel tank welds. Dual systems were added for flight critical components when the Titan became man-rated for the Gemini program. Designs incorporated full failure mode effects and criticality analyses for the Apollo program, which exposed the limits of applicability of numerical reliability models. Fault tree analyses and program milestone reviews were initiated. The worth of man-in-the-loop in space activities for reliability was demonstrated with the rescue of Skylab after solar panel and meteoroid shield failures. It is now the reliability of the payload, rather than the vehicle, that is questioned for Shuttle launches.

Cohen, H.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Mercury, Skylab, Spacehab, International Space Station: A Continuum

We have conducted real research in space. Virtually all that we conducted in the first decade and a half of the space age was government funded and basic research like the carrier vehicles we call satellites and Sputniki, but direction human interaction began with Project Mercury. When the Apollo program ended with success, we got back to research again. Skylab was using Apollo hardware, using Apollo systems in a manner that offered spacious accomodations for researchers. Education began to move into space. This document describes Skylab's role in spaceborne experiments.

Walker, Charles↗
NASA NTRS2007

Science and the Constellation Systems Program Office

An underlying tension has existed throughout the history of NASA between the human spaceflight programs and the external scientific constituencies of the robotic exploration programs. The large human space projects have been perceived as squandering resources that might otherwise be utilized for scientific discoveries. In particular, the history of the relationship of science to the International Space Station Program has not been a happy one. The leadership of the Constellation Program Office, created in NASA in October, 2005, asked me to serve on the Program Manager s staff as a liaison to the science community. Through the creation of my position, the Program Manager wanted to communicate and elucidate decisions inside the program to the scientific community and, conversely, ensure that the community had a voice at the highest levels within the program. Almost all of my technical contributions at NASA, dating back to the Apollo Program, has been within the auspices of what is now known as the Science Mission Directorate. However, working at the Johnson Space Center, where human spaceflight is the principal activity, has given me a good deal of incidental contact and some more direct exposure through management positions to the structures and culture of human spaceflight programs. I entered the Constellation family somewhat naive but not uninformed. In addition to my background in NASA science, I have also written extensively over the past 25 years on the topic of human exploration of the Moon and Mars. (See, for example, Mendell, 1985). I have found that my scientific colleagues generally have little understanding of the structure and processes of a NASA program office; and many of them do not recognize the name, Constellation. In many respects, the international ILEWG community is better informed. Nevertheless, some NASA decision processes on the role of science, particularly with respect to the formulation of a lunar surface architecture, are not well known, even in ILEWG. At the recent annual Lunar and Planetary Science Conference, I reviewed the evolution of the program as a function of Agency leadership and the constraints put on NASA by the President in his 2004 announcement. I plan to continue my long-time ILEWG tradition of reporting a personal view of the state of development of human exploration of the solar system, this time coming from within the program office tasked to implement the vision for the United States. The current NASA implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration is consistent with certain classical scenarios that have been discussed extensively in the literature. I will discuss the role of science within the Vision, both from official policy and from a de facto interaction. While science goals are not officially driving the implementation of the Vision, the tools of scientific exploration are integral to defining the extraterrestrial design environments. In this respect the sharing of results from international missions to the Moon can make significant contributions to the success of the future human activities.

Mendell, Wendell↗
NASA NTRS1972

NASA program decisions using reliability analysis.

NASA made use of the analytical outputs of reliability people to make management decisions on the Apollo program. Such decisions affected the amount of the incentive fees, how much acceptance testing was necessary, how to optimize development testing, whether to approve engineering changes, and certification of flight readiness. Examples of such analysis are discussed and related to programmatic decisions.-

Steinberg, A.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Solar-wind composition experiment

The Apollo program techniques for studying elemental and isotopic abundances in the solar wind are described. During Apollo 11, 12, 14 and 15 missions, aluminum foils were deployed on the lunar surface as targets for collecting solar wind ions. The foils were returned to earth, and the implanted solar wind particles were analyzed. The preliminary results showing the helium and neon concentrations are presented.

Geiss, J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Biomedical Monitoring and Countermeasures Facility

The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) represents the transition within the US Space program from the 'heroic' era of space flight (characterized most vividly by the Mercury and Apollo programs) to an epoch characterized by routine access to the space environment. In this new era, the unique characteristics of the microgravity environment will enable new types of research activities, primarily in the life sciences, materials science, and biotechnology fields. In addition to its role as a'microgravity science laboratory,' Space Station Freedom (SSF) constitutes the operational platform on which the knowledge and skills needed to continue our exploration of space will be acquired. In the area of spacecraft operations, these skills include the ability to assemble, operate, and maintain large structures in space. In the area of crew operations, the potentially harmful effects of extended exposure to microgravity must be understood in order to keep the crew mission capable. To achieve this goal, the complex process of physiological deconditioning must be monitored, and countermeasures utilized as needed to keep the individual crew members within acceptable physiological limits. The countermeasures program under development for the SSF Program is titled the Biomedical Monitoring and Countermeasures (BMAC) program. As implied by the name, this activity has two primary products, a biomedical monitoring element and a countermeasures development effort. The program is a critical path element in the overall SSF Program, and should be considered an essential element of operations on board the space station. It is readily apparent that the capability to both protect and optimize the health and performance of the human operators on board SSF will be a critical element in the overall success of the SSFP. Previous experience within the Russian space program has demonstrated that the time required for countermeasures on extended missions can become a monumental operational burden. Therefore, one of the primary objectives of the countermeasures development activity will be to design and implement countermeasures which are significantly more effective than the existing generation. Other primary objectives include the following: to set health and human performance standards for all mission phases; to determine critical issues that affect performance or return to flight status; to develop and implement monitoring systems to follow health and performance status; and to understand risk, and balance the resource costs of countermeasures vs. the benefit gained.

Stewart, Donald F.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Results and Lessons Learned from Performance Testing of Humans in Spacesuits in Simulated Reduced Gravity

NASA's Constellation Program has plans to return to the Moon within the next 10 years. Although reaching the Moon during the Apollo Program was a remarkable human engineering achievement, fewer than 20 extravehicular activities (EVAs) were performed. Current projections indicate that the next lunar exploration program will require thousands of EVAs, which will require spacesuits that are better optimized for human performance. Limited mobility and dexterity, and the position of the center of gravity (CG) are a few of many features of the Apollo suit that required significant crew compensation to accomplish the objectives. Development of a new EVA suit system will ideally result in performance close to or better than that in shirtsleeves at 1 G, i.e., in "a suit that is a pleasure to work in, one that you would want to go out and explore in on your day off." Unlike the Shuttle program, in which only a fraction of the crew perform EVA, the Constellation program will require that all crewmembers be able to perform EVA. As a result, suits must be built to accommodate and optimize performance for a larger range of crew anthropometry, strength, and endurance. To address these concerns, NASA has begun a series of tests to better understand the factors affecting human performance and how to utilize various lunar gravity simulation environments available for testing.

Chappell, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRS1974

In-situ measurements of lunar heat flow

During the Apollo program two successful heat flow measurements were made in situ on the lunar surface. At the Apollo 15 site a value of 0.0000031 watts/sqcm was measured and at the Apollo 17 site a value of 0.0000022 watts/sqcm was determined. Both measurements have uncertainty limits of + or - 20% and have been corrected for perturbing topographic effects. The apparent difference between the observations may correlate with observed variations in the surface abundance of thorium. Comparison with earlier determinations of heat flow, using the microwave emission spectrum from the moon, gives support to the high gradients and heat flows observed in situ.

Langseth, M. G.↗