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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 217 records · Page 12

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2017

Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an industrial automation system that remotely monitor, and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. According to the 2015 Dell security annual threat report, the number of cyber-attacks against SCADA systems has doubled in the past year. Cyber-attacks (i.e., buffer overflow, rootkits and code injection) could cause serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages. Moreover, some specific cyber-attacks against SCADA systems could become a threat to human life. Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. In 2014 a report by Mandiant stated that only 69% of organizations learned about their breaches from third entities, meaning that these companies lack of their own detection system. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. The average time between compromise and detection (for those intrusions that were detected) was 205 days. To address this challenge, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects SCADA-specific cyber-attacks by analyzing the power consumption of a SCADA device. Specifically, to validate the proposed approach, we chose to monitor in real-time the power usage of a a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). To this end, we configured the hardware of the tetsbed by installing the required sensors to monitor and collect its power consumption. After that two SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and TracerDAQ Pro was used to collect the power consumption of the PLC under normal and anomalous scenarios. Results showed that is possible to distinguish between the regular power usage of the PLC and when the PLC was under specific cyber-attacks.

Hernandez Jimenez, Jarilyn M↗

DOE OSTI2023

Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR)

The Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR) is an open source Python package designed to simulate and analyze resilience of water distribution networks. The United States Environmental Protection Agency, in partnership with Sandia National Laboratories, developed WNTR to integrate critical aspects of resilience modeling for water distribution networks into a single software framework. The software includes capability to: • Generate water network models • Modify network structure and operations • Assign fragility and survival curves to network components • Model disruptive events such as power outages, earthquakes, fires, pipe breaks, and contamination incidents • Model response and repair strategies • Simulate hydraulics and water quality • Evaluate resilience using a wide range of metrics • Integrate dependency with other critical infrastructure and supply chains • Analyze results and generate graphics SAND2019-450 M

Villa, Daniel↗

NASA NTRS2005

Materials Challenges in Space Exploration

United States civil space program administered by National Aeronautics and Space Administration has a new strategic direction to explore the solar system. This new 'vision for space exploration' encompasses a broad range of human and robotic missions, including the Moon. Mars and destinations beyond. These missions require advanced systems and capabilities that will accelerate the development of many critical technologies, including advanced materials and structural concepts. Specifically, it is planned to develop high-performance materials for vehicle structures, propulsion systems, and space suits; structural concepts for modular assembly for space infrastructure: lightweight deployable and inflatable structures for large space systems and crew habitats; and highly integrated structural systems and advanced thermal management systems for reducing launch mass and volume. This paper will present several materials challenges in advanced space systems-high performance structural and thermal materials, space durable materials, radiation protection materials, and nano-structural materials. Finally, the paper will take a look at the possibility of utilizing materials in situ, i.e., processing materials on the surface of the Moon and Mars.

Bhat, Biliyar N.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Materials Challenges in Space Exploration

United States civil space program administered by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has a new strategic direction to explore the solar system. This new 'vision for space exploration' encompasses a broad range of human and robotic missions, including the Moon, Mars and destinations beyond. These missions require advanced systems and capabilities that will accelerate the development of many critical technologies, including advanced materials and structural concepts. Specifically, it is planned to develop high-peformance materials for vehicle structures, propulsion systems, and space suits; structural concepts for modular assembly for space infrastructure; lightweight deployable and inflatable structures for large space systems and crew habitats; and highly integrated structural systems and advanced thermal management systems for reducing launch mass and volume. This paper will present several materials challenges in advanced space systems-high performance structural and thermal materials, space durable materials, radiation protection materials, and nano- structural materials. The paper will also address smart materials and structures and examine space environmental effects on materials and methods of mitigating them. Finally, the paper will take a look at the possibility of utilizing materials in situ, i.e., processing and using desired materials on the surface of the Moon and Mars.

Bhat, Biliyar N.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Characterization and design of the FutureGen 2.0 carbon storage site

Not Available

Gilmore, Tyler↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Physical Resiliency for Wind Power Generation

During the next three years, wind power generation is expected to add more generation capacity to the national electrical grid than any other energy sector. With new wind turbine designs rated power over 10 MW and wind farms reaching over 1 GW capacities, the consequences of cyber-attacks on wind power generation are becoming increasingly more critical. Moreover, the known vulnerabilities of wind turbine control systems and the potential damaging effects of intrusions, motivate an urgent protection improvement for the wind power generation sector. This program has developed a variety of new adaptive defense technologies that enable wind power generation systems to survive sophisticated cyberattacks by enhancing the control systems capabilities of detection, localization, and accommodation. The introduction of these technologies in the on-shore and the emerging off-shore market will result in a significantly more reliable and secure wind power infrastructure.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2018

Hydrogen Quantitative Risk Assessment

DOE has identified consistent safety, codes, and standards as a critical need for the deployment of hydrogen technologies, with key barriers related to the availability and implementation of technical information in the development of regulations, codes, and standards. Advances in codes and standards have been enabled by risk-informed approaches to create and implement revisions to codes, such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 2, NFPA 55, and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Specification (TS)-19880-1. This project provides the technical basis for these revisions, enabling the assessment of the safety of hydrogen fuel cell systems and infrastructure using QRA and physics-based models of hydrogen behavior. The risk and behavior tools that are developed in this project are motivated by, shared directly with, and used by the committees revising relevant codes and standards, thus forming the scientific basis to ensure that code requirements are consistent, logical, and defensible.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2019

Hydrogen Quantitative Risk Assessment (Annual Progress Report)

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2026

Fleet Utilization

A key goal of NextGen Profiles' fleet utilization study was to conduct a comprehensive, strategic, and standardized assessment of the operational behavior and utilization patterns across EV and EVSE production-ready fleets. These data-driven insights were intended to inform current fleet management strategies and support future infrastructure planning, ensuring the effective adoption and adaptation of the growing EV fleet market. The study applied a series of metrics defined in NextGen Profiles to evaluate diverse fleet operations across various use cases, emphasizing trends in charging, routing, and other critical behaviors. The fleet utilization dataset includes these three sets of metrics from 17 EV fleets, each consisting of a wide range of vehicle types and operational categories, as well as two EVSE fleets. Data were collected from a variety of sources and reformatted into a unified structure before metric computation, ensuring consistency and comparability across all fleets. To protect confidentiality, all fleet metadata are anonymized, and the publicly released metric datasets are aggregated to an hourly cadence.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Novel Architecture for Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection and Control System in Smart Grid

Wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) systems are widely applied in the energy management system (EMS) that rely on a wide-area communication network to maintain system stability, security, and reliability. As technology and grid infrastructure evolve to develop more advanced WAPAC applications, however, so do the attack surfaces in the grid infrastructure. This paper presents an attack-resilient system (ARS) for the WAPAC cybersecurity by seamlessly integrating the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with intrusion mitigation and prevention system (IMPS). In particular, the proposed NIDS utilizes signature and behavior-based rules to detect attack reconnaissance, communication failure, and data integrity attacks. Further, the proposed IMPS applies state transition-based mitigation and prevention strategies to quickly restore the normal grid operation after cyberattacks. As a proof of concept, we validate the proposed generic architecture of ARS by performing experimental case study for wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), one of the critical WAPAC applications, and evaluate the proposed NIDS and IMPS components of ARS in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting and mitigating different classes of cyberattacks while supporting an alert visualization dashboard to provide an accurate situational awareness in real-time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Concept of Operations: National Technology Test Bed Network for Water Resource Recovery

There is an urgency to advancing wastewater technologies due to aging water infrastructure and emerging regulations. A crosscutting working group proposes a conceptual design for a test bed network to understand and evaluate wastewater technologies to drive acceptance and deployment of new technologies to enhance performance. The working group includes contributors from the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. National Science Foundation, and the Water Research Foundation (formerly known as the Water Environment & Reuse Foundation). Upgrading today's aging wastewater treatment infrastructure to a new generation of water resource recovery facilities (WRRFs) requires the development and deployment of innovative technologies. The path to technology adoption depends on expensive, time consuming, and often repetitive cycles of testing and validation. Existing water resource recovery technology testing facilities (e.g., test beds) are underutilized and cannot, by themselves, broaden technology uptake. It has been proposed that technology adoption could be accelerated by a network linking these test facilities with innovators, manufacturers, utilities, regulators, policymakers, and educators. This document proposes a structure for a National Test bed Network (TBN) for water resource recovery. The concepts for its operation are explored herein. This document identifies drivers to launch a TBN and critical needs for successful implementation of the network. An important driver to technology implementation at WRRFs is the relationship between local utilities and state regulators. The TBN could provide access to validated performance data and facilitate deployment. To link the stakeholders and accelerate deployment, the TBN will require standards for methods, data quality, data management, and data security. These standards will enable validation of performance and will expand the “toolbox” that utilities and regulators could consider. Design, set up, and launch of this toolbox is beyond the scope of operations of utilities and regulators and will likely require external support to achieve full operation. Herein, a pathway is proposed to achieve this full operation. This document defines the function of a WRRF TBN. It also proposes a structure for the TBN to achieve its stated goals and mission. Finally, this document summarizes findings from several sources, including a series of workshops about the TBN concept, operators of test beds in ancillary industries, and discussions with regulators and permitting agencies. A description of this work was published in the peer-reviewed literature (Mihelcic 2017).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2018

Subject Matter Expert Workshop for the Use of Municipal and Commercial Equipment for Radiological Response and Recovery: National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Workshop Summary Report

This report documents equipment and methods to aid in a wide-area radiological or nuclear response and recovery effort in an urban environment. This report summarizes a workshop held in New York City. The objective of this workshop was to incorporate lessons learned from a prior workshop, close the gaps on some areas that were not discussed in the prior workshop, and include additional subject matter experts from critical infrastructure operations, such as tunnels and bridges, the Port Authority, and mass transit. Various missions were postulated in a hypothetical emergency scenario under five broad support goal categories. Based on the findings and input from a series of such workshops and meetings, we plan to develop “best practices” for use of equipment responding to and recovering from a wide-area radiological incident.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2017

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Optimize the Autonomous Sensor Fish Device for Understanding Interactions of Aquatic Animals with Marine and Hydrokinetic and Hydro Systems (CRADA 476) Final Report

This project at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) enhances our understanding of how aquatic life interacts with marine renewable energy (MRE) and hydropower systems through the development and testing of advanced sensor technology. The Marine Sensor Fish (MSF) and its smaller variants, the Sensor Fish Mini (SF Mini) and Flexible Sensor Fish (FSF), measure critical environmental stressors, such as shear forces, pressure changes, and strike impacts, that are essential for assessing the risks posed by energy devices, including tidal turbines, hydropower installations, and other MRE infrastructure. Rigorous field testing has shown that these tools are effective in capturing detailed data on turbulence, pressure variations, strike impacts, and other stressors near these devices, providing valuable insights into the conditions faced by aquatic species. Economically, these tools offer renewable energy developers a practical solution for streamlining environmental assessments and ensuring regulatory compliance, ultimately reducing costs associated with evaluating and mitigating ecological impacts. This research also benefits the public by promoting the growth of renewable energy sources that protect aquatic ecosystems, advancing both sustainable energy production and environmental stewardship.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2018

Development of Defenses against False Data Injection Attacks for Nuclear Power Plants

With the recent successful attempts against the digital control systems of critical infrastructures, there is a need to develop new defense strategies that recognize two important realities, 1) state- sponsored attackers can rely on a number of techniques including espionage, social engineering, and brute force techniques, etc. to gain access to the raw data used to control system behavior, 2) attackers can falsify operational data in manners that do not trigger conventional outlier/anomaly detection techniques in order to go undetected, which is referred to as false data injection attacks. Therefore, there is a strong need to explore another class of defense measures, referred to as physical process defense, serving as a new line of defense in the event existing defenses relying on information protection measures are breached. This physical process defenses utilize the physics and engineering models of the system to build unique signatures for genuine system behavior. If successful, the signatures would be able to detect attacks that falsify the operational data and render them harmless before they can inflict physical damage on the system. This report is focused on exploring the feasibility of physical process defenses for nuclear reactors, and their associated functional requirements to maximize their resiliency against state-sponsored, or equivalent, attackers.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance for Grid Reliability in the Era of Large Load Growth

The rapid expansion of large electric loads is reshaping the operational and regulatory landscape of the U.S. electric grid. These facilities are reaching new scales of expansion, now exceeding a gigawatt per site, and their highly sensitive, digitally driven behaviors introduce new reliability risks. Recent grid events, including large load losses following routine transmission disturbances, highlight the consequences of limited ride-through capability, inconsistent protection settings, inadequate modeling, and lack of behind-the-meter visibility. Parallels to earlier integration challenges of new grid technologies suggest that the grid’s existing processes, standards, and interconnection frameworks are no longer adequate for emerging large loads. This brief synthesizes lessons from the evolution of inverter-based resource regulation and applies them to large-load integration. It identifies critical gaps in modeling accuracy, interconnection processes, performance standards, and compliance mechanisms. Technical recommendations emphasize advanced monitoring, improved modeling, coordinated communication protocols, modernized substations, and structured behind-the-meter control schemes. Collectively, these measures provide a roadmap to maintain bulk power system reliability while enabling the continued growth of large, electrified digital infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗