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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1993

Applying formal methods and object-oriented analysis to existing flight software

Correctness is paramount for safety-critical software control systems. Critical software failures in medical radiation treatment, communications, and defense are familiar to the public. The significant quantity of software malfunctions regularly reported to the software engineering community, the laws concerning liability, and a recent NRC Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board report additionally motivate the use of error-reducing and defect detection software development techniques. The benefits of formal methods in requirements driven software development ('forward engineering') is well documented. One advantage of rigorously engineering software is that formal notations are precise, verifiable, and facilitate automated processing. This paper describes the application of formal methods to reverse engineering, where formal specifications are developed for a portion of the shuttle on-orbit digital autopilot (DAP). Three objectives of the project were to: demonstrate the use of formal methods on a shuttle application, facilitate the incorporation and validation of new requirements for the system, and verify the safety-critical properties to be exhibited by the software.

Cheng, Betty H. C.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Optical Instruments

Precision Lapping and Optical Co. has developed a wide variety of hollow retroreflector systems for applications involving the entire optical spectrum; they are, according to company literature, cheaper, more accurate, lighter and capable of greater size than solid prisms. Precision Lapping's major customers are aerospace and defense companies, government organizations, R&D and commercial instrument companies. For example, Precision Lapping supplies hollow retroreflectors for the laser fire control system of the Army's Abrams tank, and retroreflectors have been and are being used in a number of space tests relative to the Air Force's Strategic Defense Initiative research program. An example of a customer/user is Chesapeake Laser Systems, producer of the Laser Tracker System CMS-2000, which has applications in SDI research and industrial robotics. Another customer is MDA Scientific, Inc., manufacturer of a line of toxic gas detection systems used to monitor hazardous gases present in oil fields, refineries, offshore platforms, chemical plants, waste storage sites and other locations where gases are released into the environment.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Overview of Ground-Based Radar and Optical Measurements Utilized By the Nasa Orbital Debris Program Office

For over 30 years, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has led the characterization of orbital debris (OD) too small to be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN), yet which may pose the greatest threat to human spaceflight and robotic missions. Measurements from specialized sensors, including ground-based radars and telescopes capable of detecting smaller objects, provide the foundation for developing statistical models to describe the current state and future evolution of the OD environment from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Since 1990, the ODPO has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect data using the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) – formerly Haystack – to characterize OD in LEO with a sensitivity of approximately 5 mm at 1000 km altitude. In addition, since 1993, the Goldstone Orbital Debris Radar, operated by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, has provided data on OD as small as approximately 2-3 mm for altitudes below 1000 km, some of the most sensitive ground-based measurements achievable at these altitudes. Recently, collaborations with the 18 th Space Control Squadron of the U.S. Space Force have also provided the ODPO with special datasets from the Space Fence to extend coverage below the historical SSN limit of 10 cm and to characterize individual breakup events in LEO. For GEO altitudes, the Eugene Stansbery Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (ES-MCAT), a joint NASA-Air Force Research Laboratory project that reached full operational capability in 2021, collects data on debris smaller than 1 m and provides coverage of debris in historically under-sampled high-altitude orbital regimes. This paper summarizes the radar and optical sensors utilized by the ODPO, their unique capabilities, and recent datasets and applications for statistical sampling of the dynamic OD environment.

Alyssa Manis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Overview of Ground-Based Radar and Optical Measurements Utilized By the Nasa Orbital Debris Program Office

For over 30 years, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has led the characterization of orbital debris (OD) too small to be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN), yet which may pose the greatest threat to human spaceflight and robotic missions. Measurements from specialized sensors, including ground-based radars and telescopes capable of detecting smaller objects, provide the foundation for developing statistical models to describe the current state and future evolution of the OD environment from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Since 1990, the ODPO has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect data using the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) – formerly Haystack – to characterize OD in LEO with a sensitivity of approximately 5 mm at 1000 km altitude. In addition, since 1993, the Goldstone Orbital Debris Radar, operated by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, has provided data on OD as small as approximately 2-3 mm for altitudes below 1000 km, some of the most sensitive ground-based measurements achievable at these altitudes. Recently, collaborations with the 18 th Space Control Squadron of the U.S. Space Force have also provided the ODPO with special datasets from the Space Fence to extend coverage below the historical SSN limit of 10 cm and to characterize individual breakup events in LEO. For GEO altitudes, the Eugene Stansbery Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (ES-MCAT), a joint NASA-Air Force Research Laboratory project that reached full operational capability in 2021, collects data on debris smaller than 1 m and provides coverage of debris in historically under-sampled high-altitude orbital regimes. This paper summarizes the radar and optical sensors utilized by the ODPO, their unique capabilities, and recent datasets and applications for statistical sampling of the dynamic OD environment.

Alyssa Manis↗
DOE OSTI2020

Device and system for selective ionization and analyte detection and method of using the same

Disclosed herein are embodiments of a system for selectively ionizing samples that may comprise a plurality of different analytes that are not normally detectable using the same ionization technique. The disclosed system comprises a unique split flow tube that can be coupled with a plurality of ionization sources to facilitate using different ionization techniques for the same sample. Also disclosed herein are embodiments of a method for determining the presence of analytes in a sample, wherein the number and type of detectable analytes that can be identified is increased and sensitivity and selectivity are not sacrificed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Malware Analysis Report for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll

SolarWinds Orion is a software suite designed to provide “single pane of glass” monitoring of network devices and applications. On December 13 2020, FireEye revealed that SolarWinds Orion was the victim of a supply chain attack and that the SolarWinds signed file SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll contained a backdoor. SolarWinds deployed the back-doored patch to customers beginning in March 2020. FireEye first identified this backdoor and labeled it SUNBURST. The backdoor is composed of roughly 4,000 lines1 of lightly obfuscated .NET within the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.OrionImprovementBusinessLayer class of the malicious dll. The backdoor’s capabilities include: the ability to detect and potentially disable antivirus and forensics tools, basic command and control via DNS, and more advanced command and control via HTTP.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Multiparameter Constraints on Empirical Infrasound Period-Yield Relations for Bolides and Implications for Planetary Defense

How effective are methods for estimating bolide energies from infrasound signal period-yield relationships? A single global period–energy relation can obscure significant variability introduced by parameters such as the atmospheric Doppler wind profile and the bolide’s energy deposition profile as a function of altitude. Bolide speed, entry angle, burst altitude, and multiepisode fragmentation may all play a role in defining the detected period of the shockwave. By leveraging bolide light-curve data from the Center for Near Earth Object Studies, we re-examined the period–energy relation as a function of these parameters. Through a bootstrap approach, we show that various event subsets can deviate from widely cited period–energy models and we identify which specific conditions most strongly reshape the period–energy scaling. The results define both the fidelity and reliability of period–energy relations when no additional data beyond the infrasound record is available and improve the outcome when supporting data from bolide trajectories and light curves are included. Ultimately, these findings expand the scope of earlier models, providing a nuanced and robust framework for infrasound-only yield estimation under a range of bolide scenarios.

Planetary science↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multi-phenomenology Yield Characterization

This report serves as the first delivery of a four-year applied science effort to transform and advance the error bounds for the yield estimate of an explosion. Each year’s delivery will be in this form, culminating in the submission of this work for peer review to a scientific journal. Importantly, the yearly progress reports can then also be viewed as expanding drafts working towards a formal journal article submission. For the first tranche of funding, we collaborated with Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) scientists to identify unclassified real-world data that demonstrate and validate our advanced error propagation methods. Collaboration includes visits to AFTAC and telecons. For this development, we illustrate the fusion of seismic, acoustic, optical, and surface effect signatures from an explosion. The mathematics and code being adapted to this specific application (Williams et al., 2021) involves physics models of multiple sensor signatures. We have also identified related physics models and have integrated them into code. Current methods of underground explosion yield estimation for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) have served the US treaty monitoring mission well for decades. A research objective of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has always been to provide new technical capabilities for monitoring lower thresholds. The general model and error propagation code to be developed in this project is based on significant advances in error modeling and propagation needed to analyze data at lower detection thresholds. The second tranche of funding for this project began on May 1, 2022, and planned work for the second tranche includes: i) completing the integration of physical model code into the general error model framework; this code accommodates a wide range of linear/nonlinear source models, fixed/ random effects, and frequentist/Bayesian analyses (the purpose of which is not to dictate to users how to analyze data, but instead to allow users the maximum flexibility in their work); ii) illustrative application of code to identified data, and; iii) initial planning with AFTAC researchers on delivery of code to the Common Development Environment at AFTAC, and continued writing of the planned final journal article submission (year two of this progress report), with particular emphasis on descriptions of data identified for this effort.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Deep Deception: Exemplars of Adversarial Machine Learning and Countermeasures Applicable to International Safeguards

As a follow-up to our more comprehensive report on Adversarial Machine Learning (AML), here we provide demonstrations of AML attacks against the Limbo image database of UF6 cylinders in a variety of orientations and amongst a variety of distractor images. We demonstrate the Carlini & Wagner AML attack against a subset of Limbo images, with 100% attack success rate; meaning all attacked images were misclassified by a highly accurate trained model, yet the image changes were imperceptible to the human eye. We also demonstrate successful attacks against segmented images (images with more than one targeted object). Finally, we demonstrated the Fast Fourier Transform countermeasure that can be used to detect AML attacks on images. The intent of this and our previous report is to inform the IAEA and stakeholders of both the promise of machine learning, which could greatly improve the efficiency of surveillance monitoring, but also of the real threat of AML and potential defenses.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2006

Antarctic Iceberg Tracking Based on Time Series of Aqua AMSRE Microwave Brightness Temperature Measurements

Observations of icebergs are identified as one of the requirements for the GEOSS (Global Earth Observation System of Systems) in the area of reducing loss of life and property from natural and human-induced disasters. However, iceberg observations are not included among targets in the GEOSS 10-Year Implementation Plan, and thus there is an unfulfilled need for iceberg detection and tracking in the near future. Large Antarctic icebergs have been tracked by the National Ice Center and by the academic community using a variety of satellite sensors including both passive and active microwave imagers, such as SSM/I (Special Sensor Microwave/Imager) deployed on the DMSP (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) spacecraft. Improvements provided in recent years by NASA and non-NASA satellite radars, scatterometers, and radiometers resulted in an increased number of observed icebergs and even prompted a question: Is The Number of Antarctic Icebergs Really Increasing? [D.G. Long, J. Ballantyne, and C. Bertoia, Eos, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 83 (42): 469 & 474, 15 October 2002]. AMSR-E (Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer for the Earth Observing System) represents an improvement over SSM/I, its predecessor. AMSR-E has more measurement channels and higher spatial resolution than SSM/I. For example, the instantaneous field of view of the AMSR-E s 89-GHz channels is 6 km by 4 km versus 16 km by 14 km for SSM/I s comparable 85-GHz channels. AMSR-E, deployed on the Aqua satellite, scans across a 1450-km swath and provides brightness temperature measurements with nearglobal coverage every one or two days. In polar regions, overlapping swaths generate coverage up to multiple times per day and allow for creation of image time series with high temporal resolution. Despite these advantages, only incidental usage of AMSR-E data for iceberg tracking has been reported so far, none in an operational environment. Therefore, an experiment was undertaken in the RPC (Rapid Prototyping Capability) of NASA s (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Applied Science Program to demonstrate that passive microwave brightness temperature measurements acquired by AMSR-E can be effectively used to track iceberg movement around Antarctica. The RPC s robust computation environment enabled processing of terabytes of data products available from the NASA Distributed Active Archive Center at the National Snow and Ice Data Center. Iceberg tracking based on the AMSR-E Level 2A data product was compared with records from the National Ice Center for currently existing icebergs. Some icebergs as small as roughly 10 km in size were easily observed, but tracking of many others, even larger ones, was obscured by presence of sea ice surrounding the icebergs. The best results, such as for the large iceberg A22A, were achieved when an iceberg was in open ocean.

Blonski, Slawomir↗
NASA NTRS2011

Why Atens Enjoy Enhanced Accessibility For Human Space Flight

In the context of human space flight (HSF), the concept of near-Earth object (NEO) accessibility is highly subjective. Whether or not a particular NEO is accessible critically depends on mass, performance, and reliability of interplanetary HSF systems yet to be designed. Such systems would certainly include propulsion and crew life support with adequate shielding from both solar flares and galactic cosmic radiation. Equally critical architecture options are relevant to NEO accessibility. These options are also far from being determined and include the number of launches supporting an HSF mission, together with whether or not consumables are to be pre-emplaced at the destination. Until the unknowns of HSF to NEOs come into clearer focus, the notion of relative accessibility is of great utility. Imagine a group of NEOs, each with nearly equal HSF merit determined from their individual characteristics relating to crew safety, scientific return, resource utilization, and planetary defense. The more accessible members of this group are more likely to be explored first. A highly accessible NEO could conceivably be deferred in favor of a less accessible HSF destination because the latter is more accessible during a programmatically desirable launch compliant mission trajectory solutions detected in association with a specific NEO. The known NEO population is then surveyed to illustrate in which regions of heliocentric semi-major axis, eccentricity, and inclination (a, e, i) space NEOs with large n values are mapped. The (a, e, i) mapping is also formatted such that membership in each of four NEO orbit classifications, as defined below, is evident. Amors have orbits everywhere superior to (outside of) Earth's. An Amor is therefore defined to have perihelion between 1.017 astronomical units (AU) and the maximum NEO value of 1.3 AU. As of 0 hrs Universal Time on 1 January 2011 (UT epoch 2011.0), Amors numbered 2855 in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Small-Body Database (SBDB), comprising 37.7% of known NEOs. Apollos have orbits crossing Earth's with periods greater than Earth's. An Apollo is therefore defined to have perihelion less than 1.017 AU and a greater than 1.0 AU. As of 2011.0 UT, Apollos numbered 4080 in the SBDB, comprising 53.9% of known NEOs. Atens have orbits crossing Earth's with periods less than Earth's. An Aten is therefore defined to have aphelion greater than 0.983 AU and a less than 1.0 AU. As of 2011.0 UT, Atens numbered 618 in the SBDB, comprising 8.2% of known NEOs. Atiras have orbits everywhere inferior to (inside of) Earth's. An Atira is therefore defined to have aphelion less than 0.983 AU. As of 2011.0 UT, Atiras numbered 11 in the SBDB, comprising 0.1% of known NEOs. It is no surprise that the largest n values are chiefly associated with Apollos and Atens. Because these orbits cross Earth's, distance to be covered in a given round trip mission time delta-t can be far less than is possible for Amors or Atiras . This delta-t or the sum of mission propulsive impulse magnitudes delta-v can more frequently be minimized to enhance NHATS compliance for Apollos and Atens than is generally the case for Amors and Atiras. A less intuitive trend in NHATS results is that Atens nearly outnumber the more numerous Apollos among the most compliant NEOs as measured by n. This trend is completely out of proportion to the degree Atens are represented among the known NEO population. A theory based on geocentric NEO dynamics is presented by this paper to explain why Atens enjoy inherently greater accessibility than do Apollos. Another trend evident from mapping into (a, e, i) space is the dearth of known NEOs at low e when a < 1 AU. Underrepresentation of Atens and Atiras in the NEO catalog is at least in part attributable to observing exclusively from a perspective near Earth. Generally inferior Aten and Atira orbits are rarely, if ever, in Earth's night sky. Until a comprehensive NEO survey is conducted from an appropriateegion remote from Earth, the theory developed in this paper indicates a substantial fraction of the most accessible NEOs will remain unknown. season. Such a season is really yet another undetermined HSF architecture option. A launch season's duration will likely be measured in weeks, and it will be utilized at an indeterminate point almost certainly more than a decade in the future when HSF programmatic maturity is sufficient. Furthermore, current knowledge of the NEO population relevant to HSF is far from complete. In the 100-m-diameter class of greatest interest, only a few percent of the estimated NEO population is known [2, Figure 2.4]. Therefore, any known, lost, or fictitious NEO in a highly accessible orbit is a potential HSF destination of merit. Even if lost, fictitious, small, or hazardous, such a potential target (or another in a similar orbit) may ultimately prove to be an early HSF destination when the pertinent NEO population is more thoroughly catalogued and NEO orbits are more thoroughly maintained at high accuracy. This paper first reviews methodology and pertinent results from NASA-sponsored research performed in late 2010 and dubbed NEO HSF Accessible Targets Study (NHATS, pronounced as "gnats"). A useful accessibility metric developed during this study is n, the tally of NHATS-

Barbee, Brent↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cleanroom Microbes Survive Drying, Vacuum, and Proton Irradiation

Introduction : The goal of planetary protection at NASA is to mitigate the risk of contaminating sensitive target bodies with biological life. While many cleaning procedures have been put in place to reduce bioburden on spacecraft, microbes are experts at evolving to survive harsh conditions. Specifically, the dry, low-nutrient environment of a cleanroom (commonly used for assembly of spacecraft) can represent an environment where extremophiles can survive. Methods : Scientists at NASA MSFC wished to gather a snapshot of the microbial population within a variety of cleanrooms on site. A study was undertaken to collect air, surface, and floor samples from clean-rooms and isolate unique morphologies. From this study, 95 isolates were collected and saved in a microbial library. About 86% of these were identified at least to a genus level. Following identification, 24 microbes were selected, based on a literature review, as potential extremophiles. These were grown in liquid cultures, diluted to a set optical density, washed with water, and then applied to a sterilized Kapton coupon. Droplets were allowed to dry overnight in a biosafety cabinet. Coupons were then installed in a pelletron and pumped down to high vacuum (~1E-6 Torr). Samples were then subjected 100 keV protons at a fluence of 2x10 15 p+/cm 2 up to 4x10 15 p+/cm 2 . Following exposure, samples were returned to the microbiology lab where they were pro-cessed by submerging in water, vortexing, and then plating either droplets or spread plates. Recovery data collected was qualitative with a ranking or +, minor, or – for growth. Some selected radiotolerant strains were sequenced using the Illumina sequencing platform. The resulting genomes were annotated with the Rapid Annotations using Subsystems Technology (RAST) server and analyzed for conserved and unique stress response relevant genomic signatures to identify clues related to specific tolerances. Results and Discussion : After five rounds of proton radiation, we narrowed our isolates to five, non-spore forming bacteria that demonstrated survival: Arthrobacter koreensis, Paenarthrobacter nitroguajacolicus, Mycetocola manganoxydans , and an Erwinia sp. Furthermore, we exposed these four microbes to 254 nm wavelength light at an intensity of 80 W/m 2 at a distance of ~18 cm for 10 minutes. Only A. koreensis demonstrated survival following UV exposure. Finally, we performed whole genome sequencing on the four strains to look for genetic markers of stress resistance. When we compared the genomes of the four strains, we found that genes coding for GGDEF and EAL domains with PAS/PAC sensors were only found in A. koreensis . These domains, modulated by PAS/PAC sensors, are hypothesized to facilitate survival under drying, desiccation, and proton irradiation. Drying and Desiccation : PAS domains sense hydration changes and modulate GGDEF and EAL domain activity to adjust c-di-GMP levels, enhancing resistance to desiccation. For instance, in Pseudomonas aeruginosa , the PAS domain of RbdA modulates activity under varying hydration conditions, affecting stress responses [1]. Proton Irradiation : Proton irradiation causes oxidative stress, leading to ROS generation. PAS domains detect this stress and modulate GGDEF and EAL domains to manage oxidative stress responses. In Shewanella , EAL domain proteins modulated by PAS sensors help bacteria adapt to extreme conditions [2]. These genes upregulate other stress response genes, protecting membrane function, protein stability, DNA repair, and antioxidant defenses. The modulation of c-di-GMP by PAS domains is crucial for bacterial adaptation to stress conditions, enabling dynamic physio-logical adjustments [3]. Understanding these mechanisms provides insights into bacterial stress responses and strategies for controlling bacterial growth [4]. Conclusions : These findings indicate that clean-rooms harbor extremophile microbes that may be able to survive conditions in deep space. Furthermore, while we identified certain stress-response genes that may be at least partly responsible for the phenotypes observed in this study, there are likely unidentified genes or characteristics about A. koreensis , and other bacteria, that may allow them to survive in harsh environments. Future studies will focus on identifying these unknown genes and characteristics, further elucidating the mechanisms of extremophile survival and potentially informing the development of new biotechnologies for space exploration and other extreme environments.

Chelsi Cassilly↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sequim Bay Underwater UXO (SBU2) Prototype Demonstration Site: Field Operations Summary, 2019

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has identified more than 400 underwater sites that are potentially contaminated with munitions. Many of these sites are in shallow water (0–35 m deep) where the munitions pose a threat to human health and the environmental. To address this challenge, the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) held a workshop in 2018 to establish the requirements and framework for developing a series of underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) Standardized Demonstration sites (“test beds”) to support the evaluation of sensors, equipment, and technologies to detect UXO. Sequim Bay in Washington State was evaluated as a potential test bed and was determined to meet initial qualifying criteria with respect to environmental setting, and operational, logistical, and facilities support provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2022

Near-Earth Object Surveyor Overview

The Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor is designed to detect, categorize and characterize Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) using infrared imaging. The project was approved to enter the preliminary design phase (Phase B) in FY21 after an extended Concept Development Phase (Phase A). The NEO Surveyor project responds to US Public Law 109-155[1], National Research Council’s report “Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth Object Surveys & Hazard Mitigation Strategies (2010)”[2], the U. S. National Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan (June 2018)[3], and the objectives of NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO). The goals of the NEO Surveyor project are to: (1) identify impact hazards to the Earth posed by NEOs (defined as asteroids and comets that come within 1.3 AU of the Sun) by performing a comprehensive survey of the NEO population; (2) obtain detailed physical characterization data for individual objects that are likely to pose an impact hazard; (3) characterize the entire population of potentially hazardous NEOs to inform potential mitigation strategies. The mission will make significant progress toward the George E. Brown, Jr. NEO Survey Program objective defined by the U. S. Congress of detecting, tracking, cataloging, and characterizing at least 90% of NEOs equal to or larger than 140 m in diameter. The project is a collaboration between NASA-JPL, the University of Arizona (UA) and industry, with Ball Aerospace notably providing the spacecraft and key instrument elements. This paper will describe the overall NEO Surveyor Project objectives, initial spacecraft and instrument design and development plans and mission concept.

Veto, Michael↗
NASA NTRS1999

Detecting 1mm/Year Signals in Altimetric Global Sea Level: Effect of Atmospheric Water Vapor and Precipitation

Several research efforts exist to use Topography Experiment (TOPEX)/ Projet d'Observatorie de Surveillance et d'Etudes Integrees de la Dynamique des Oceans (Poseidon) (T/P) to detect changes in global sea level possibly associated with climate change. This requires much better than 1 mm/yr accuracy, something that none of the instruments in T/P [or the European Remote Sensing (ERS-2) satellite, or the U.S. Navy's Geosat Follow-On (GFO) satellite] were designed for. This work focuses on the ability of the T/P microwave radiometer (TMR) to retrieve the path delay due to atmospheric water vapor along the altimeter's path with accuracy in the time changes below 1 mm/yr on global average. In collaboration with Stephen Keihm of JPL and Christopher Ruf of Pennsylvania State University, we compared TMR path delay (PD) estimates with atmospheric precipitable water (PW) from the Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSMI) aboard the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) series of satellites for 1992-1998 to selected radiosondes, and we also looked at the brightness temperatures measured by TMR in the lowest 1% of the histogram. The conclusion is that TMR had a slow instrumental drift, associated with the 18-GHz channel, which causes an approximate underestimation of water vapor at a rate equivalent to 1.2 mm/yr in path delay between 1992 and 1996; this effect stopped and no drift is detected in 1997. The same study concluded that there is no detectable scale error (one which is proportional to measured vapor) in TMR. In related work, carried out with graduate student Damien Cailliau, we investigated the relative abilities of TMR, SSMI and the UP dual-frequency radar altimeter to detect rain, relative to a climatology of shipborne observations. Rain is a crucial but poorly measured variable in studies of the climate system, and a dedicated mission, Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), was recently launched to measure it. However, the climatologies built over the past 10 years used passive radiometers, such as SSMI, or infrared observation from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) geostationary satellites. We concluded that the dual-frequency altimeter does an excellent job at retrieving rain on scales much smaller than the passive radiometer, and a better job at retrieving total precipitation (rain as well as snow) at high latitudes. This work improves the sea level observations by allowing better flagging of observations contaminated by rain, and more importantly, provides an alternative way to measure rainfall over the oceans.

Zlotnicki, Victor↗
DOE OSTI2023

Solving National Security Challenges [Slides]

In 1943, Los Alamos National Laboratory was founded with a single, urgent purpose: to build an atomic bomb. Today, LANL focuses on maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent, developing technology, and using science and engineering to protect the nation's security. Our workers, facilities, and instruments detect nuclear weapons, facilities, and instruments; promote cooperation and diplomacy; and limit nuclear arms and the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗