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At least 217 records · Page 12

Performance Testing of a Liquid Metal Pump for In-Space Power Systems

Fission surface power (FSP) systems could be used to provide power on the surface of the moon, Mars, or other planets and moons of our solar system. Fission power systems could provide excellent performance at any location, including those near the poles or other permanently shaded regions, and offer the capability to provide on demand power at any time, even at large distances from the sun. Fission-based systems also offer the potential for outposts, crew and science instruments to operate in a power-rich environment. NASA has been exploring technologies with the goal of reducing the cost and technical risk of employing FSP systems. A reference 40 kWe option has been devised that is cost-competitive with alternatives while providing more power for less mass anywhere on the lunar surface. The reference FSP system is also readily extensible for use on Mars, where it would be capable of operating through global dust storms and providing year-round power at any Martian latitude. Detailed development of the FSP concept and the reference mission are documented in various other reports. The development discussed in this paper prepares the way for testing of the Technology Demonstration Unit (TDU), which is a 10 kWe end-to-end test of FSP technologies intended to raise the entire FSP system to technology readiness level (TRL) 6. The Early Flight Fission Test Facility (EFF-TF) was established by NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to provide a capability for performing hardware-directed activities to support multiple in-space nuclear reactor concepts by using a nonnuclear test methodology. This includes fabrication and testing at both the module/component level and at near prototypic reactor components and configurations allowing for realistic thermal-hydraulic evaluations of systems. The liquid-metal pump associated with the FSP system must be compatible with the liquid NaK coolant and have adequate performance to enable a viable flight system. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was tasked with the modeling, design, and fabrication of an ALIP suitable for the FSP reference mission. A prototypic ALIP was fabricated under the direction of INL and shipped to MSFC for inclusion in the Technology Demonstration Unit (TDU), a quarter-scale end-to-end reactor simulator system that is scheduled for testing at NASA-GRC. Before inclusion in the TDU, the ALIP was tested in the ALIP test circuit (ATC), which is a rig developed and operated at MSFC for the specific purpose of providing accurate quantification of liquid metal pump performance. Data showing the pump performance curves (pressure, flowrate, and pump efficiency) are presented for various operating power levels, demonstrating the full performance envelope of the pump.

Polzin, Kurt↗

Satellite Conjunction Assessment, Risk Analysis and Collision Avoidance Best Practices: The History, Evolution and Opportunities

Since Explorer 1 was launched on January 31, 1958, the United States (U.S.) has reaped the benefits of space exploration. New markets and new technologies have spurred the economy and changed lives in many ways across the national security, civil, and commercial sectors. Space technologies and space-based capabilities now provide global communications, navigation and timing, weather forecasting, and more. Space exploration also presents challenges that impact not only the U.S. but also its allies and other partners. A significant increase in the volume and diversity of activity in space means that it is becoming increasingly congested. Emerging commercial ventures such as satellite servicing, in-space manufacturing, and tourism as well as new technologies enabling small satellites and large constellations of satellites present serious challenges for safely and responsibly using space in a stable, sustainable manner. To meet these challenges, the U.S. seeks to improve global awareness of activity in space by publicly sharing flight safety-related information and by coordinating its own on-orbit activity in a safer, more responsible manner. It seeks to bolster stability and reduce current and future operational on-orbit risks so that space is sustained for future generations. To this end, new and better Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities are needed to keep pace with the increased congestion, and the U.S. seeks to create a dynamic environment that encourages and rewards commercial providers who improve these capabilities. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook reflects how NASA currently operates, which has evolved over time. Consideration is given to important topics such as spacecraft and constellation design; spacecraft “trackability;” pre-launch preparation and early launch activities; on-orbit collision avoidance; and automated trajectory guidance and maneuvering. This talk aims to present examples of responsible practices for spacecraft Owners/Operators (O/O) to consider for lowering collision risks and operating safely in space (from LEO and beyond) in a stable and sustainable manner. As technology and innovation continues to improve upon existing capabilities, what kind of new challenges are presented in the SSA community? Can space exploration and commercial ventures thrive while keeping paramount the safety and protection of the space environment? What are the challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed and considered for space situational awareness in Cis-Lunar Space? It may prove useful for entities offering, or intending to offer, SSA or Conjunction Assessment (CA) services to consider such examples of responsible practices to protect the space environment for future use by all.

Collision Avoidance↗

Maximum Oxygen Uptake During and After Long-Duration Space Flight

Decreased maximum oxygen consumption (VO2max) during and after space flight may impair a crewmember s ability to perform mission-critical work that is high intensity and/or long duration in nature (Human Research Program Integrated Research Plan Risk 2.1.2: Risk of Reduced Physical Performance Capabilities Due to Reduced Aerobic Capacity). When VO2max was measured in Space Shuttle experiments, investigators reported that it did not change during short-duration space flight but decreased immediately after flight. Similar conclusions, based on the heart rate (HR) response of Skylab crewmembers, were made previously concerning long-duration space flight. Specifically, no change in the in-flight exercise HR response in 8 of 9 Skylab crewmembers indicated that VO2max was maintained during flight, but the elevated exercise HR after flight indicated that VO2max was decreased after landing. More recently, a different pattern of in-flight exercise HR response, and assumed changes in VO2max, emerged from routine testing of International Space Station (ISS) crewmembers. Most ISS crewmembers experience an elevated in-flight exercise HR response early in their mission, with a gradual return toward preflight levels as the mission progresses. Similar to previous reports, exercise HR is elevated after ISS missions and returns to preflight levels by 30 days after landing. VO2max has not been measured either during or after long-duration space flight. The purposes of the ISS VO2max experiment are (1) to measure VO2max during and after long-duration spaceflight, and (2) to determine if submaximal exercise test results can be used to accurately estimate VO 2max.

Moore, Alan D., Jr.↗

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS In this study, we will examine operational piloting tasks following International Space Station (ISS) missions in a simulated lunar landing using a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base. The motion-based simulation will be implemented in our laboratory at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and will be available within hours following the return from commercial crew landings. The primary goals of this study are (1) to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override tasks, (2) to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency, and (3) compare performance during late “just-in-time” on-board training with early post-flight crew performance. The impact of spaceflight on piloting capability will be assessed from pre- versus post-flight changes in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Individual differences in post-flight vestibular and cognitive changes include motion sickness reports, measures of tilt motion perception accuracy and precision, and dual-task tracking. During the 6DOF lunar simulation, the crew will manually takeover attitude and rate-of-descent to the nominal or re-designated landing aim point during the approach phase. The outcome measures for the lunar crew override tasks will be the percent time maintaining actual vehicle states, e.g., attitude and rate-of-descent, within recommended guidance during the landing approach, number and maximum deviation outside limits, and root mean square error (RMSE). Given that “just-in-time” (JIT) training is an operational expectation for the Human Landing System (HLS) program, all participants will perform late inflight JIT training for each manual crew override task in which they will participate. Crew proficiency will be captured inflight during JIT training that will be implemented on a laptop with hand controllers to allow the crewmember to practice the landing task procedures like the approach implemented for JIT training with Shuttle landing and ISS telerobotic tasks. COUNTERMEASURE UPDATES The lunar lander simulation has been implemented onto a two-laptop display system where subjects select from alternative landing points, based upon avoiding hazards that the on-board system identifies during the landing. The subject makes inputs using a rotational hand controller (i.e., joystick) and a translational hand controller, which are processed by simulated vehicle dynamics to update the vehicle attitude and rate of descent. Subjects will utilize a combination of flight, situation, and status displays to monitor the state of the simulated vehicle. The simulation exports tilt and translation movements to a 6DOF motion base synced to visual movements and provides representative vestibular cues to the subject while performing the task inside an enclosed cabin featuring a simulated lunar out-the-window view and a heads-down lander cockpit view. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew override capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew override performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. The inclusion of “just-in-time” on-board training will ensure we are characterizing changes in override proficiency with this expected countermeasure in place. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, HLS Joint Test Panel, Crew HLS Interfaces for Piloting Working Group, and Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab toward the development of the lunar landing simulation. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Austin M Bollinger↗

VIPER: Systems Integration Status

NASA’s Artemis Program plans to return humans to the Moon for an extended stay. To do so will require substantial resources to sustain that continued human presence, including continuous supplies delivered from the Earth. Given the expense and complexity of resource deliveries from Earth, if some resources were indigenously available, substantial logistical savings could be available by “living off the land”, wherever possible. The LCROSS[1] , LRO and other missions have confirmed the presence of resources such as water-ice and other volatiles in lunar polar regions, so the next step is to understand the scientific nature and physical distribution of those candidate resources. Those local volatiles could be processed into propellants and human life-supporting needs, reducing risk of maintaining a permanent human presence on the Moon. The Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Resource (VIPER) is a surface mobility scientific platform, designed to spend ~100 days mapping and surveying four different Ice Stability Regions to understand the scientific nature and distribution of water and other volatiles. VIPER will also provide scientific mineralogical context of the lunar regolith, such as the presence of silicon and light metals in lunar regolith, providing a composite picture of resource availability and sustainment. This paper will discuss the latest systems-level integration activities by the VIPER team, following our initial introduction to this mission at IAC2021[2] . The VIPER team successfully passed its Systems Integration Review (SIR) in late-2022, and in early 2023, began system-level surface segment (rover) flight hardware assembly. VIPER is managed within NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD), utilizing the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) lunar delivery model with partner, Astrobotic, Inc.

VIPER↗

Achieving Operability via the Mission System Paradigm

In the past, flight and ground systems have been developed largely-independently, with the flight system taking the lead, and dominating the development process. Operability issues have been addressed poorly in planning, requirements, design, I&T, and system-contracting activities. In many cases, as documented in lessons-learned, this has resulted in significant avoidable increases in cost and risk. With complex missions and systems, operability is being recognized as an important end-to-end design issue. Never-the-less, lessons-learned and operability concepts remain, in many cases, poorly understood and sporadically applied. A key to effective application of operability concepts is adopting a 'mission system' paradigm. In this paradigm, flight and ground systems are treated, from an engineering and management perspective, as inter-related elements of a larger mission system. The mission system consists of flight hardware, flight software, telecom services, ground data system, testbeds, flight teams, science teams, flight operations processes, procedures, and facilities. The system is designed in functional layers, which span flight and ground. It is designed in response to project-level requirements, mission design and an operations concept, and is developed incrementally, with early and frequent integration of flight and ground components.

ground systems↗

PEM-INST-001: Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit (PEM) Selection, Screening, and Qualification

Potential users of plastic encapsulated microcircuits (PEMs) need to be reminded that unlike the military system of producing robust high-reliability microcircuits that are designed to perform acceptably in a variety of harsh environments, PEMs are primarily designed for use in benign environments where equipment is easily accessed for repair or replacement. The methods of analysis applied to military products to demonstrate high reliability cannot always be applied to PEMs. This makes it difficult for users to characterize PEMs for two reasons: 1. Due to the major differences in design and construction, the standard test practices used to ensure that military devices are robust and have high reliability often cannot be applied to PEMs that have a smaller operating temperature range and are typically more frail and susceptible to moisture absorption. In contrast, high-reliability military microcircuits usually utilize large, robust, high-temperature packages that are hermetically sealed. 2. Unlike the military high-reliability system, users of PEMs have little visibility into commercial manufacturers proprietary design, materials, die traceability, and production processes and procedures. There is no central authority that monitors PEM commercial product for quality, and there are no controls in place that can be imposed across all commercial manufacturers to provide confidence to high-reliability users that a common acceptable level of quality exists for all PEMs manufacturers. Consequently, there is no guaranteed control over the type of reliability that is built into commercial product, and there is no guarantee that different lots from the same manufacturer are equally acceptable. And regarding application, there is no guarantee that commercial products intended for use in benign environments will provide acceptable performance and reliability in harsh space environments. The qualification and screening processes contained in this document are intended to detect poor-quality lots and screen out early random failures from use in space flight hardware. However, since it cannot be guaranteed that quality was designed and built into PEMs that are appropriate for space applications, users cannot screen in quality that may not exist. It must be understood that due to the variety of materials, processes, and technologies used to design and produce PEMs, this test process may not accelerate and detect all failure mechanisms. While the tests herein will increase user confidence that PEMs with otherwise unknown reliability can be used in space environments, such testing may not guarantee the same level of reliability offered by military microcircuits. PEMs should only be used where due to performance needs there are no alternatives in the military high-reliability market, and projects are willing to accept higher risk.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

Dividing the Concentrator Target From the Genesis Mission

The Genesis spacecraft, launched in 2001, traveled to a Lagrangian point between the Earth and Sun to collect particles from the solar wind and return them to Earth. However, during the return of the spacecraft in 2004, the parachute failed to open during descent, and the Genesis spacecraft crashed into the Utah desert. Many of the solar wind collectors were broken into smaller pieces, and the field team rapidly collected the capsule and collector pieces for later assessment. On each of the next few days, the team discovered that various collectors had survived intact, including three of four concentrator targets. Within a month, the team had imaged more than 10,000 fragments and packed them for transport to the Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office within the ARES Directorate at JSC. Currently, the Genesis samples are curated along with the other extraterrestrial sample collections within ARES. Although they were broken and dirty, the Genesis solar wind collectors still offered the science community the opportunity to better understand our Sun and the solar system as a whole. One of the more highly prized concentrator collectors survived the crash almost completely intact. The Genesis Concentrator was designed to concentrate the solar wind by a factor of at least 20 so that solar oxygen and nitrogen isotopes could be measured. One of these materials was the Diamond-on-Silicon (DoS) concentrator target. Unfortunately, the DoS concentrator broke on impact. Nevertheless, the scientific value of the DoS concentrator target was high. The Genesis Allocation Committee received a request for approximately 1 cm(sup 2) of the DoS specimen taken near the focal point of the concentrator for the analysis of solar wind nitrogen isotopes. The largest fragment, Genesis sample 60000, was designated for this allocation and needed to be precisely cut. The requirement was to subdivide the designated sample in a manner that prevented contamination of the sample and minimized the risk of losing or breaking the precious requested sample fragment. The Genesis curator determined that the use of laser scribing techniques to "cut" a precise line and subsequently cleave the sample (in a controlled break of the sample along that line) was the best method for accomplishing the sample subdivision. However, there were risks, including excess heating of the sample, that could cause some of the implanted solar wind to be lost via thermal diffusion. Accidentally breaking the sample during the handling and cleaving process was an additional risk. Early in fiscal year 2013, to address this delicate, complicated task, the ARES Directorate assembled its top scientists to develop a cutting plan that would ensure success when applied to the actual concentrator target wafer; i.e., to produce an approximately 1 cm(sup 2) piece from the requested area of the wafer. The team, subsequently referred to as the JSC Genesis Tiger Team, spent months researching and testing parameters and techniques related to scribing, cleaving, transporting, handling, and holding (i.e., mounting) the specimen. The investigation required considerable "thinking outside the box," and many, many trials using nonflight wafer analogs. After all preliminary testing, the following method was adopted as the final cutting plan. It was used in two final end-to-end practice runs before being used on the actual flight target wafer. The wafer was oriented on the laser cutting stage with the 100 and 010 directions of the wafer parallel to the corresponding X and Y directions of the cutting stage. The laser was programed to scribe 31 lines of the appropriate length along the Y stage direction. The programed scribe lines were separated by 5 micron in the X direction. The laser parameters were set as follows: (1) The laser power was 0.5 watts; (2) each line consisted of 50 passes, with the Z position being advanced 5 micron per pass; and (3) 30 s would elapse before the next line was scribed to allow for wafer cool down from any possible heating via the laser. The ablated material that "stuck" in the "scribe-cut" was removed from the "cut" using an ultrasonic micro-tool. After all the ablated silicon was removed from the wafer, the wafer was repositioned in exactly the same orientation on the laser stage. The laser was focused using the bottom of the wafer channel, and the 31-line scribing pattern described above was reprogrammed using the Z position of the groove bottom as the starting Z value instead of the top wafer surface, which was used previously. Upon completion of the second set of scribes, the ultrasonic micro-tool was again used to clean out the cut. The wafer was remounted on the stage in exactly the same orientation as before. The laser was again focused on the bottom of the groove. This time, however, the laser was.programed to scribe only one line down the exact center of the channel. The final scribe line consisted of 100 passes with a Z advance of 5 micron per pass and with the laser power set at 0.5 watts. As mentioned above, the final cutting plan was practiced in two end-to-end trials using non-flight, triangular-shaped silicon wafers similar in size and orientation to the actual DOS 60000 target sample. The actual scribing of the triangular-shaped wafers required scribing two lines and cleaving (i.e. scribe-cleave, then scribe-cleave) to obtain the piece requested for allocation. Early in December 2012, after many months of experiments and practicing and perfecting the techniques and procedures, the team successfully subdivided the Genesis DoS 60000 target sample, one of the most scientifically important samples from the Genesis mission (figure 2). On December 17, 2012, the allocated piece of concentrator target sample was delivered to the requesting principal investigator.The cutting plan developed for the subdivision of this sample will be used as the model for subdividing future requested Genesis flight wafers (appropriately modified for different wafer types).

Lauer, H. V., Jr.↗

The analysis of rapidly developing fog at the Kennedy Space Center

This report documents fog precursors and fog climatology at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Florida from 1986 to 1990. The major emphasis of this report focuses on rapidly developing fog events that would affect the less than 7-statute mile visibility rule for End-Of-Mission (EOM) Shuttle landing at KSC (Rule 4-64(A)). The Applied Meteorology Unit's (AMU's) work is to: develop a data base for study of fog associated weather conditions relating to violations of this landing constraint; develop forecast techniques or rules-of-thumb to determine whether or not current conditions are likely to result in an acceptable condition at landing; validate the forecast techniques; and transition techniques to operational use. As part of the analysis the fog events were categorized as either advection, pre-frontal or radiation. As a result of these analyses, the AMU developed a fog climatological data base, identified fog precursors and developed forecaster tools and decision trees. The fog climatological analysis indicates that during the fog season (October to April) there is a higher risk for a visibility violation at KSC during the early morning hours (0700 to 1200 UTC), while 95 percent of all fog events have dissipated by 1600 UTC. A high number of fog events are characterized by a westerly component to the surface wind at KSC (92 percent) and 83 percent of the fog events had fog develop west of KSC first (up to 2 hours). The AMU developed fog decision trees and forecaster tools that would help the forecaster identify fog precursors up to 12 hours in advance. Using the decision trees as process tools ensures the important meteorological data are not overlooked in the forecast process. With these tools and a better understanding of fog formation in the local KSC area, the Shuttle weather support forecaster should be able to give the Launch and Flight Directors a better KSC fog forecast with more confidence.

Wheeler, Mark M.↗

Development Status of the CECE Cryogenic Deep Throttling Demonstrator Engine

As one of the first technology development programs awarded by NASA under the U.S. Space Exploration Policy (USSEP), the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR) Deep Throttling, Common Extensible Cryogenic Engine (CECE) program was selected by NASA in November 2004 to begin technology development and demonstration toward a deep throttling, cryogenic engine supporting ongoing trade studies for NASA's Lunar Lander descent stage. The CECE program leverages the maturity and previous investment of a flight-proven hydrogen/oxygen expander cycle engine, the PWR RLI0, to develop and demonstrate an unprecedented combination of reliability, safety, durability, throttlability, and restart capabilities in a high-energy, cryogenic engine. The testbed selected for the deep throttling demonstration phases of this program was a minimally modified RL10 engine, allowing for maximum current production engine commonality and extensibility with minimum program cost. Two series of demonstrator engine tests, the first in April-May 2006 and the second in March-April 2007, have demonstrated in excess of 10:1 throttling of the hydrogen/oxygen expander cycle engine. Both test series have explored a combustion instability ("chug") environment at low throttled power levels. These tests have provided an early demonstration of an enabling cryogenic propulsion concept with invaluable system-level technology data acquisition toward design and development risk mitigation for future CECE Demonstrator engine tests.

Source record↗

Human Research Program Integrated Research Plan: December 20, 2007, Interim Baseline

The Human Research Program (HRP) delivers human health and performance countermeasures, knowledge, technologies, and tools to enable safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration. This Integrated Research Plan (IRP) describes the program s research activities that are intended to address the needs of human space exploration and serve HRP customers. The timescale of human space exploration is envisioned to take many decades. The IRP illustrates the program s research plan through the timescale of early lunar missions of extended duration. The document serves several purposes for the Human Research Program: The IRP provides a means to assure that the most significant risks to human space explorers are being adequately mitigated and/or addressed, The IRP shows the relationship of research activities to expected outcomes and need dates, The IRP shows the interrelationships among research activities that may interact to produce products that are integrative or cross defined research disciplines, The IRP illustrates the non-deterministic nature of research and technology activities by showing expected decision points and potential follow-on activities, The IRP shows the assignments of responsibility within the program organization and, as practical, the intended solicitation approach, The IRP shows the intended use of research platforms such as the International Space Station, NASA Space Radiation Laboratory, and various space flight analogs. The IRP does not show all budgeted activities of the Human research program, as some of these are enabling functions, such as management, facilities and infrastructure

Source record↗

Small Projects Rapid Integration and Test Environment (SPRITE): Application for Increasing Robustness

Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Small Projects Rapid Integration and Test Environment (SPRITE) is a Hardware-In-The-Loop (HWIL) facility that provides rapid development, integration, and testing capabilities for small projects (CubeSats, payloads, spacecraft, and launch vehicles). This facility environment focuses on efficient processes and modular design to support rapid prototyping, integration, testing and verification of small projects at an affordable cost, especially compared to larger type HWIL facilities. SPRITE (Figure 1) consists of a "core" capability or "plant" simulation platform utilizing a graphical programming environment capable of being rapidly re-configured for any potential test article's space environments, as well as a standard set of interfaces (i.e. Mil-Std 1553, Serial, Analog, Digital, etc.). SPRITE also allows this level of interface testing of components and subsystems very early in a program, thereby reducing program risk.

Rakoczy, John↗

Risk Of Early Onset Osteoporosis Due To Spaceflight

Bone minerals decline in microgravity, and bone mineral density (BMD) losses of approximately -1 to -1.5% per month were calculated for astronauts serving on long-duration missions prior to 2009. It is unclear whether BMD losses will stabilize with time in space, or continue to diminish with time. In addition, it is unknown if fractional gravity, present on the moon and Mars, will mitigate the mineral loss. Clinicians diagnose osteoporosis in premenopausal females and males younger than 50 years on the basis of BMD T-scores < -2.5 (hip and lumbar spine) accompanied by clinical evidence of a fragility fracture. If mission-related changes to the skeleton cannot be corrected by rehabilitation after the mission, crewmembers could be at risk for premature osteoporosis-related fractures in later life. To mitigate this risk it is necessary to understand the dynamics underlying the BMD changes that occur in microgravity, to monitor for the persistence of changes after space flight, and to evaluate if and how current and future osteoporosis treatments might be used to mitigate the risk of long-term skeletal problems in astronauts.

Sibonga, Jean↗

Why an Eye Limiting Display Resolution Matters and How to Achieve It

Many factors affect the suitability of an out-the-window simulator visual system. Contrast, brightness, resolution, field-of-view, update rate, scene content and a number of other criteria are common factors often used to define requirements for simulator visual systems. Since 2008, NASA has worked with the USAF on the Operational Based Vision Assessment Program. The purpose of this program has been to provide the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine with a scientific testing laboratory to study human vision and testing standards in an operationally relevant environment. It was determined early in the design that current commercial and military training systems weren't well suited for the available budget as well as the highly research oriented requirements. During various design review meetings, it was determined the OBVA requirements were best met by using commercial-off-the-shelf equipment to minimize technical risk and costs. In this paper we will describe how the simulator specifications were developed in order to meet the research objectives and the resulting architecture and design considerations. In particular we will discuss the image generator architecture, database developments to meet eye limited resolution, and future reusablity in other projects.

flight simulator↗

Spacecraft Autonomy and Automation: A Comparative Analysis of Strategies for Cost Effective Mission Operations

The evolution of satellite operations over the last 40 years has drastically changed. October 4, 1957 (during the cold war) the Soviet Union launched the world's first spacecraft into orbit. The Sputnik satellite orbited Earth for three months and catapulted the United States into a race for dominance in space. A year after Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the National Space and Aeronautics Administration (NASA). With a team of scientists and engineers, NASA successfully launched Explorer 1, the first US satellite to orbit Earth. During these early years, massive amounts of ground support equipment and operators were required to successfully operate spacecraft vehicles. Today, budget reductions and technological advances have forced new approaches to spacecraft operations. These approaches require increasingly complex, on board spacecraft systems, that enable autonomous operations, resulting in more cost-effective mission operations. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, considered world class in satellite development and operations, has developed and operated over 200 satellites during its 40 years of existence. NASA Goddard is adopting several new millennium initiatives that lower operational costs through the spacecraft autonomy and automation. This paper examines NASA's approach to spacecraft autonomy and ground system automation through a comparative analysis of satellite missions for Hubble Space Telescope-HST, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous-NEAR, and Solar Heliospheric Observatory-SoHO, with emphasis on cost reduction methods, risk analysis and anomalies and strategies employed for mitigating risk.

Wright, Nathaniel, Jr.↗

Planned Environmental Microbiology Aspects of Future Lunar and Mars Missions

With the establishment of the Constellation Program, NASA has initiated efforts designed similar to the Apollo Program to return to the moon and subsequently travel to Mars. Early lunar sorties will take 4 crewmembers to the moon for 4 to 7 days. Later missions will increase in duration up to 6 months as a lunar habitat is constructed. These missions and vehicle designs are the forerunners of further missions destined for human exploration of Mars. Throughout the planning and design process, lessons learned from the International Space Station (ISS) and past programs will be implemented toward future exploration goals. The standards and requirements for these missions will vary depending on life support systems, mission duration, crew activities, and payloads. From a microbiological perspective, preventative measures will remain the primary techniques to mitigate microbial risk. Thus, most of the effort will focus on stringent preflight monitoring requirements and engineering controls designed into the vehicle, such as HEPA air filters. Due to volume constraints in the CEV, in-flight monitoring will be limited for short-duration missions to the measurement of biocide concentration for water potability. Once long-duration habitation begins on the lunar surface, a more extensive environmental monitoring plan will be initiated. However, limited in-flight volume constraints and the inability to return samples to Earth will increase the need for crew capabilities in determining the nature of contamination problems and method of remediation. In addition, limited shelf life of current monitoring hardware consumables and limited capabilities to dispose of biohazardous trash will drive flight hardware toward non-culture based methodologies, such as hardware that rapidly distinguishes biotic versus abiotic surface contamination. As missions progress to Mars, environmental systems will depend heavily on regeneration of air and water and biological waste remediation and regeneration systems, increasing the need for environmental monitoring. Almost complete crew autonomy will be needed for assessment and remediation of contamination problems. Cabin capacity will be limited; thus, current methods of microbial monitoring will be inadequate. Future methodology must limit consumables, and these consumables must have a shelf life of over three years. In summary, missions to the moon and Mars will require a practical design that prudently uses available resources to mitigate microbial risk to the crew.

Ott, C. Mark↗

Space radiation and cataracts in astronauts

For over 30 years, astronauts in Earth orbit or on missions to the moon have been exposed to space radiation comprised of high-energy protons and heavy ions and secondary particles produced in collisions with spacecraft and tissue. Large uncertainties exist in the projection of risks of late effects from space radiation such as cancer and cataracts due to the paucity [corrected] of epidemiological data. Here we present epidemiological [corrected] data linking an increased risk of cataracts for astronauts with higher lens doses (>8 mSv) of space radiation relative to other astronauts with lower lens doses (<8 mSv). Our study uses historical data for cataract incidence in the 295 astronauts participating in NASA's Longitudinal Study of Astronaut Health (LSAH) and individual occupational radiation exposure data. These results, while preliminary because of the use of subjective scoring methods, suggest that relatively low doses of space radiation may predispose crew to [corrected] an increased incidence and early appearance of cataracts.

NASA Center JSC↗