Results for “Engineering Risk Assessment” — Page 12

NASA NTRS2020

Reliability Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.

Reliability prediction↗

NASA NTRS1992

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

The implementation of the HST system safety program is detailed. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. Attention is given to the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used, i.e., hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis, and to how they are coupled with engineering and test analysis for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, are presented as examples of this safety process.

Bahr, N. J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk Informed Design as Part of the Systems Engineering Process

This slide presentation reviews the importance of Risk Informed Design (RID) as an important feature of the systems engineering process. RID is based on the principle that risk is a design commodity such as mass, volume, cost or power. It also reviews Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as it is used in the product life cycle in the development of NASA's Constellation Program.

Deckert, George↗

NASA NTRS2013

Independent Assessment of Instrumentation for ISS On-Orbit NDE

International Space Station (ISS) Structural and Mechanical Systems Manager, requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provide a quantitative assessment of commercially available nondestructive evaluation (NDE) instruments for potential application to the ISS. This work supports risk mitigation as outlined in the ISS Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) Watch Item #4669, which addresses the requirement for structural integrity after an ISS pressure wall leak in the event of a penetration due to micrometeoroid or debris (MMOD) impact. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Madaras, Eric I↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Standard Component Commodity Usage Guides (CUGs) for Charge-Coupled Devices (CCDs)

Communicating risk and reliability information within NASA Goddard’s missions is crucial to continuing the development of new technology and ensuring GSFC missions achieve their science objectives. The Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch (Code 371) within the SMA directorate is one of GSFC’s leaders in communicating this information to missions, and one tool 371 engineers use to provide this information is the Commodity Usage Guides (CUGs). CUGs are helpful in compiling various critical parameters and heritage information for standard payload components, ensuring project personnel inherit the lessons learned from previous experiences. The purpose of this project was to create CUGs for CCDs used within GSFC missions. To formulate a CUG applicable data was aggregated into the CUG template for Charge-Coupled Devices (CCDs)--electro-optical components used to convert photons into digital images and data. CCDs can easily be adapted to a variety of mission requirements making them widely used at GSFC, and therefore suitable for CUGs. Once the CUGs for CCDs are completed the information can be distributed to engineers, scientists and other project members to ensure the lessons learned are passed on to the next mission.

Christman, Jerika H.↗

NASA NTRS2011

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2017

Compatibility Tests Between the Mars Vehicle System Test Bed and RIMFAX Radar Antenna Prototype for the Mars 2020 Mission

NASA's Mars 2020 rover will carry a wideband (150 megahertz to 1200 megahertz) ground penetrating radar—RIMFAX (Radar Imager for Mars’ subsurFace eXperiment ), contributed by FFI (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt) of Norway—to survey the subsurface geology of Mars. RIMFAX will take radar soundings while the rover drives across the Martian terrain, which presents possible compatibility issues between rover and radar operations. In order to study this risk, a prototype RIMFAX antenna was attached to the flight-analogous rover Vehicle System Test Bed (VSTB) in a mechanically representative location. The prototype antenna collected spectral and time-domain data across a variety of driving operations in order to assess the radar sensitivity to rover-generated noise. Conversely, the prototype antenna was driven while an engineering-model UHF (Ultra High Frequency) antenna used for rover telecom measured received in-band power to ensure that the rover hardware was not at risk of damage. Evaluation of the data by the instrument science team showed that while rover noise was apparent to the receiver, data post-processing would yield greater than 40 decibels margin to the science requirements. Similarly, power levels received by the UHF antenna were well below damage thresholds.

Gonzales, Edward↗

NASA NTRS2008

Problem Reporting System

The Problem Reporting System (PRS) is a Web application, running on two Web servers (load-balanced) and two database servers (RAID-5), which establishes a system for submission, editing, and sharing of reports to manage risk assessment of anomalies identified in NASA's flight projects. PRS consolidates diverse anomaly-reporting systems, maintains a rich database set, and incorporates a robust engine, which allows tracking of any hardware, software, or paper process by configuring an appropriate life cycle. Global and specific project administration and setup tools allow lifecycle tailoring, along with customizable controls for user, e-mail, notifications, and more. PRS is accessible via the World Wide Web for authorized user at most any location. Upon successful log-in, the user receives a customizable window, which displays time-critical 'To Do' items (anomalies requiring the user s input before the system moves the anomaly to the next phase of the lifecycle), anomalies originated by the user, anomalies the user has addressed, and custom queries that can be saved for future use. Access controls exist depending on a user's role as system administrator, project administrator, user, or developer, and then, further by association with user, project, subsystem, company, or item with provisions for business-to-business exclusions, limitations on access according to the covert or overt nature of a given project, all with multiple layers of filtration, as needed. Reporting of metrics is built in. There is a provision for proxy access (in which the user may choose to grant one or more other users to view screens and perform actions as though they were the user, during any part of a tracking life cycle - especially useful during tight build schedules and vacations to keep things moving). The system also provides users the ability to have an anomaly link to or notify other systems, including QA Inspection Reports, Safety, GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program) Alert, Corrective Actions, and Lessons Learned. The PRS tracking engine was designed as a very extensible and scalable system, able to support additional applications, with future development possibilities already discussed, including Incident Surprise Anomalies (for anomalies occurring during Operations phases of NASA Flight projects), GIDEP and NASA Alerts, and others.

Potter, Don↗

NASA NTRS2009

Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis

This document, Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis, is intended to provide guidelines for the collection and evaluation of risk and reliability-related data. It is aimed at scientists and engineers familiar with risk and reliability methods and provides a hands-on approach to the investigation and application of a variety of risk and reliability data assessment methods, tools, and techniques. This document provides both: A broad perspective on data analysis collection and evaluation issues. A narrow focus on the methods to implement a comprehensive information repository. The topics addressed herein cover the fundamentals of how data and information are to be used in risk and reliability analysis models and their potential role in decision making. Understanding these topics is essential to attaining a risk informed decision making environment that is being sought by NASA requirements and procedures such as 8000.4 (Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements), NPR 8705.05 (Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures for NASA Programs and Projects), and the System Safety requirements of NPR 8715.3 (NASA General Safety Program Requirements).

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2009

The Lunar Quest Program and the International Lunar Network (ILN)

The Lunar and Planetary Science group at Marshall provides core capabilities to support the Agency's lunar exploration goals. ILN Anchor Nodes are currently in development by MSFC and APL under the Lunar Quest Program at MSFC. The Science objectives of the network are to understand the interior structure and composition of the moon. Pre-phase A engineering assessments are complete, showing a design that can achieve the science requirements, either on their own (if 4 launched) or in concert with international partners. Risk reduction activities are ongoing. The Lunar Quest Program is a Science-based program with the following goals: a) Fly small/medium science missions to accomplish key science goals; b) Build a strong lunar science community; c) Provide opportunities to demonstrate new technologies; and d) Where possible, help ESMD and SOMG goals and enhance presence of science in the implementation of the VSE. The Lunar Quest Program will be guided by recommendations from community reports.

Cohen, Barbara A.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Exploration Medical Capability IMPACT Medical Database – Medical Item Database (MedID) Content Development Methods

The Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces (IMPACT) project encompasses a suite of computational tools that are used to inform systematic trade study evaluations and research prioritizations regarding the optimization of spaceflight medical systems, including the provision of risk assessment metrics, for a given design reference mission (DRM). The IMPACT Medical Database (IMPACT-MD) is the component that virtually houses the clinical and engineering data for medical conditions, capabilities, and resources used to support these analyses. In addition, IMPACT-MD also provides data to the associated SysML model to support the Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4 requirements development needed for IMPACT. IMPACT-MD contains an internal Evidence Library (EL) sub-component that hosts the clinical evidence, treatment and outcome metric data, and incidence data for each medical condition identified for exploration-class missions. Furthermore, a separate Medical Item Database (MedID) sub-component hosts the engineering data and physical attributes (e.g., mass, volume, power, etc.) associated with each medical resource item identified to address the requisite medical conditions. The IMPACT project is conducted under the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of the Human Research Program (HRP) within NASA's Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD). The reader is referred to the documents in Appendix A for a more complete overview of the IMPACT tool suite and functionality as well as further detail on any associated aspects of the project. The primary purpose of this document is to describe the methods utilized in the collection and verification of engineering data content during the project development phase for the MedID sub-component of the IMPACT-MD project. Engineering content data (both existing and new/future) will be stored in IMPACT-MD for use by the IMPACT project. This document will detail the content development and data credibility for the engineering data housed within the MedID subcomponent of IMPACT-MD, which is used to inform the IMPACT 1.0 project deliverables.

Exploration Medical Capability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

NASA NTRS2015

Skylon Aerodynamics and SABRE Plumes

An independent partial assessment is provided of the technical viability of the Skylon aerospace plane concept, developed by Reaction Engines Limited (REL). The objectives are to verify REL's engineering estimates of airframe aerodynamics during powered flight and to assess the impact of Synergetic Air-Breathing Rocket Engine (SABRE) plumes on the aft fuselage. Pressure lift and drag coefficients derived from simulations conducted with Euler equations for unpowered flight compare very well with those REL computed with engineering methods. The REL coefficients for powered flight are increasingly less acceptable as the freestream Mach number is increased beyond 8.5, because the engineering estimates did not account for the increasing favorable (in terms of drag and lift coefficients) effect of underexpanded rocket engine plumes on the aft fuselage. At Mach numbers greater than 8.5, the thermal environment around the aft fuselage is a known unknown−a potential design and/or performance risk issue. The adverse effects of shock waves on the aft fuselage and plumeinduced flow separation are other potential risks. The development of an operational reusable launcher from the Skylon concept necessitates the judicious use of a combination of engineering methods, advanced methods based on required physics or analytical fidelity, test data, and independent assessments.

Mehta, Unmeel↗

NASA NTRS2009

Orbital Debris Research in the United States

The presentation includes information about growth of the satellite population, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, tracking and catalog maintenance, Haystack and HAX radar observation, Goldstone radar, the Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST), spacecraft surface examinations and sample of space shuttle impacts. GEO/LEO observations from Kwajalein Atoll, NASA s Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008), a LEO-to-GEO Environment Debris Model (LEGEND), Debris Assessment Software (DAS) 2.0, the NASA/JSC BUMPER-II meteoroid/debris threat assessment code, satellite reentry risk assessment, optical size and shape determination, work on more complicated fragments, and spectral studies.

Stansbery, Gene↗

NASA NTRS1992

Failure risk assessment by analysis and testing

The sources of information on which to base an evaluation of reliability or failure risk of an aerospace flight system are (1) experience from tests and flights and (2) engineering analysis. It is rarely feasible to establish high reliability at high confidence by testing aerospace systems or components. Moreover, failure prediction by conventional, deterministic methods of engineering analysis can become arbitrary and subject to serious misinterpretation when uncertain or approximate information is used to establish analysis parameter values and to calibrate the accuracy of engineering models. The limitations of testing to evaluate failure risk are discussed, and a statistical approach which incorporates both engineering analysis and testing is presented.

Moore, N.↗