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DOE OSTI2025

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: • 25-41-03, EMAD Facility (Building 3900) • 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV) • 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building (Train Shed) This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the conceptual site model, such as an unanticipated release, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report (CR) will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the CR will be established in consultation with NDEP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, (Rev.0, with ROTC 1)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (formerly, the Nevada Test Site): 25-41-03, EMAD Facility; 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV); and 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building. This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the SAFER Plan, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the closure report will be established at the FFACO annual meeting.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Characterizing Radium Distributions, Source Attribution and Impacts from Marcellus Produced Water

This presentation characterizes spatial trends in radium (Ra) concentrations, sources, and potential impacts generated from Marcellus Shale produced waters. Here, we combine previously published produced water data with additional Ra activity measurements extracted from residual waste reports submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection from 2012-2023. This is the largest, spatially referenced compilation of Ra activity measurements from produced water sourced from the Marcellus Shale to date. The median Marcellus Shale produced water Ra activity presented here is 6,906 pCi/L (interquartile range = 12,515 pCi/L). Radium activities in the positively skewed dataset can exceed 30,000 pCi/L in some parts of the state. The regional trends in Ra concentrations and isotopic ratios will be characterized and potential environmental and health implications discussed.

Mackey, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Overview of the Risk Assessment Information System

This technical memorandum (TM) presents an overview of the Risk Assessment Information System (RAIS), a collection of web-based tools designed to assist with the environmental risk assessment process. The objective of the RAIS is to be a single resource for the risk assessment process, providing guidance when planning and performing the steps: data assessment, exposure assessment, toxicity assessment, and risk characterization. The RAIS evolved as a result of the initial remediation efforts at various United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. The goal was to increase the efficiency and transparency of the human health and ecological assessments being performed by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, Oak Ridge Operations (ORO) office by providing a repository for toxicity information, physicochemical data, risk assessment procedures, standardized risk calculation methods, and web-based tools. Since the initial launch in 1996, the RAIS has expanded its user base outside of the federal government and now has users from over 100 countries, universities, states, and local governments. What sets the RAIS apart from other risk assessment sites are the publicly available, searchable toxicity and physicochemical databases and the wide range of chemical and radionuclide risk calculation tools. The purpose of this TM is to present the RAIS tools in order of the website menus and explain how they fit in the risk assessment process. In addition, this TM describes differences between the chemical and radionuclide tools of the RAIS. Screening level equations, chronic daily intake equations, and default exposure factors used in the chemical and radionuclide calculators are included in the appendices of this TM. This TM is not intended to be a detailed guide to risk assessment or the RAIS tools. The tools on the RAIS can be used to comply with procedures from multiple agencies, including but not limited to DOE, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and many state governments. Further information on the RAIS tools can be found in the user guides and tutorials available on the webpage.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2021

Risk-based area of review estimation in overpressured reservoirs to support injection well storage facility permit requirements for CO 2 storage projects

This paper by the Energy & Environmental Research Center presents a workflow and modeling approach for delineating a risk-based area of review (AOR) to support a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Class VI permit for a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) storage project. The approach combines semianalytical solutions for estimating formation fluid leakage through a hypothetical leaky wellbore with the results of numerical reservoir simulations to define the AOR. The modeling utilizes 1) semianalytical solutions from the peer-reviewed literature for formation fluid leakage through abandoned wellbores by Raven (1990) and Avci (1994), 2) a FORTRAN model compiled and described in Cihan et al. (2011, 2012) called ASLMA (Analytical Solution for Leakage in Multilayered Aquifers), and 3) a computational framework for estimating a risk-based AOR first proposed by Oldenburg et al. (2014, 2016). Therefore, the approach builds upon well-established research and underlying hydrogeological principles that have been upheld for nearly three decades. Moreover, the ASLMA model has been broadly applied to an array of storage projects. The work presented herein extends these earlier works using a custom wrapper written in the software environment, R (R Core Team, 2020), which was developed to perform multiple runs of the ASLMA model using given ranges for one or more input parameters. In addition, the current work simulates the pressure buildup within the storage reservoir in response to CO 2 injection using a compositional simulator to better accommodate the temporospatial evolution of pressure buildup within the storage reservoir that is more accurately modeled using a heterogeneous geologic model and a compositional simulator that accounts for the multiphase interactions. The workflow is demonstrated using a case study for a 180,000-metric-ton-per-year storage project located in the PCOR (Plains CO 2 Reduction) Partnership region. For the storage project evaluated here, under the scenario where the leaky wellbore is open to a saline aquifer (thief zone) between the overlying seal (cap rock) and the underground sources of drinking water (USDW), the risk-based AOR essentially collapses to the areal extent of the CO 2 plume in the storage reservoir because the pressure buildup in the storage reservoir beyond the CO 2 plume is insufficient to drive formation fluids up a hypothetical leaky wellbore into the USDW. However, even under the conservative assumption that the leaky wellbore is not open to a thief zone, beyond the areal extent of the CO 2 plume, the incremental leakage is less than 400 m 3 over 20 years, which represents ~0.0001% or less of the total volume of water contained within the USDW rock volume. As discussed in the text, the threshold criterion for defining the risk-based AOR is site-specific and should be informed by the results of the sensitivity analysis and available site characterization data. The approach outlined in this paper is designed to be protective of USDWs and, therefore, comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act requirements and provisions for the U.S. EPA Class VI Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program (Class VI Rule) and North Dakota Administrative Code Chapter 43-05-01.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) is for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” which is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). CAU 577 includes five low-level waste cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. To resolve issues related to this alleged violation of hazardous waste regulations, a Settlement Agreement was executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019, which identified agreed-upon mitigation measures. The Settlement Agreement required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Code Standard Evaluation for ASME AG-1-2019, Section FL

ASME AG-1 Section FL Deep Bed Sand Filters includes a requirement to use Special Test Sections to provide a representative assessment of the filter efficiency. The SRPPF project design basis is to test the entire filter bed (versus a representative sample) following the same basis methodology to test the existing filters at the Savannah River Site. Using a combination of: 1) the filter testing experience at SRS since the early 1970’s, 2) the methodology found in ASME AG-1 for testing high capacity HEPA filter housings and 3) requirements for stack or duct sampling systems published by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Special Test Sections methodology for Deep Bed Sand (DBS) filters in ASME AG-1 Section FL has been replaced with a methodology to test the entire DBS filter system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sensing Techniques for Organochlorides through Intermolecular Interaction with Bicyclic Amidines

Toxic organochloride molecules are widely used in industry for various purposes. With their high volatility, the direct detection of organochlorides in environmental samples is challenging. Here, a new organochloride detection mechanism using 1,5-diazabicyclo[4.3.0]non-5-ene (DBN) is introduced to simplify a sensing method with higher detection sensitivity. Three types of organochloride compounds-trichloroethylene (TCE), dichloromethane (DCM), and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT)—were targeted to understand DCM conjugation chemistry by using nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and liquid chromatography with a mass spectrometer (LC-MS). 13C-NMR spectra and LC-MS data indicated that DBN can be labeled on these organochloride compounds by chlorine–nitrogen interaction. Furthermore, to demonstrate the organochloride sensing capability, the labeling yield and limit of detection were determined by a colorimetric assay as well as micellar electrokinetic chromatography (MEKC). The interaction with DBN was most appreciable for TCE, among other organochlorides. TCE was detected at picomolar levels, which is two orders of magnitude lower than the maximum contaminant level set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. MEKC, in conjunction with this DBN-labeling method, enables us to develop a field-deployable sensing platform for detecting toxic organochlorides with high sensitivity.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2025

Consideration of Decabromodiphenyl Ether Flame Retardant in Thermal and Radiation Aging of Crosslinked Polyethylene Cable Insulation

Decabromodiphenyl ether (decaBDE) has been used as a flame-retardant additive in nuclear-grade electrical cable insulation. However, decaBDE has been identified as a persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT) substance, leading to regulatory scrutiny. On January 6, 2021, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a final rule to phase out decaBDE. The 2021 rule set a two-year compliance deadline for “processing and distribution in commerce of decaBDE for use in wire and cable insulation in nuclear power generation facilities.” In recognition of industry concerns following a sudden discontinuation of decaBDE-containing Class 1E wire and cable essential for nuclear power operations and the time needed for qualifying the individual components using the alternative insulation technology, an extended compliance deadline was set in the finalized amendments to the 2021 rule as published by the Environmental Appeals Board on November 12, 2024. The 2024 rule set the compliance deadline for processing and distributing decaBDE-containing wire and cable insulation until the end of the service life of these materials. Since decaBDE has long been relied upon as the flame retardant in one of the most common cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) nuclear cable insulation formulations, RSCC Firewall III insulation, questions have naturally arisen regarding whether changes in cable performance might be expected for XLPE containing a decaBDE alternative, especially for safety-related cables that must perform their safety function in a design basis event such as a loss of coolant accident.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) 2024 annual meeting: advanced and small modular nuclear power reactors

On 25–26 March 2023, the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) held its 2024 annual meeting in Bethesda, Maryland, USA. The NCRP dates from 1929, and this meeting celebrated the 60th anniversary of receiving a U.S. Congressional Charter. For this annual meeting the NCRP felt it was essential to provide a briefing about advanced and small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). The Journal of Radiological Protection is delighted to publish the following synopsis of material presented at the U.S. NCRP meeting. This synopsis is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of the whole meeting together with summaries of two context setting overview papers. The following four sessions of this synopsis are specific to advanced and small modular nuclear power reactors. The meeting also included keynote presentations by three of NCRP annual award recipients. The meeting topical areas were Technology Overview and Critical Issues. The individual papers laid the groundwork to understanding reactor technologies, terminology, and the fundamental concepts and processes for electrical generation. The perspectives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and states, through the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors were provided. The papers included a discussion of diverse topics including potential emergency preparedness considerations, radiological survey requirements, an evaluation of the future of nuclear power, the economics of reactors (both large and small), and the critical issues identified by the recent National Academies of Sciences’ study on advanced reactors. Here, the summary papers were developed to briefly document the major points and concepts presented during the oral papers presented at the 2024 NCRP Annual Meeting. The meeting heralded the dawn of a new era for commercial nuclear power.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) Plan - Meeting EPA Guidelines for GHGRP and Subpart RR

The Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership (MRCSP) was founded in 2003 as part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership initiative. Since its founding, MRCSP has made significant strides toward making CCUS a viable option for states in the region. The public/private consortium, funded through the DOE Regional Carbon Sequestration Initiative, brings together nearly 40 industry partners and 10 states. Battelle, as the project lead, oversees research, development and operations and coordinates activities among the partners. The incremental, phased approach has built a valuable knowledge base for the industry and paved the way for commercial-scale adoption of CCUS technologies. From 2008 to 2020, MRCSP Phase III focused on the development of large-scale injection projects. This report is part of a series of reports prepared under the Midwestern Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership (MRCSP) Phase III (Development Phase). These reports summarize and detail the findings of the work conducted under the Phase III project. This report summarizes the steps for successfully submitting a Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) plan to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This work used the lessons learned from various MRCSP tasks to demonstrate the geologic understanding of the reefs in Northern Niagaran Pinnacle Reef Trend (NNPRT), successful monitoring and accounting methodologies, understanding of potential risks and leakage pathways, and mass balance of CO2 baseline and net storage. The plan encompasses ten reefs and provides a reporting plan for future reef development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Potential impacts of mercury released from thawing permafrost

Abstract Mercury (Hg) is a naturally occurring element that bonds with organic matter and, when converted to methylmercury, is a potent neurotoxicant. Here we estimate potential future releases of Hg from thawing permafrost for low and high greenhouse gas emissions scenarios using a mechanistic model. By 2200, the high emissions scenario shows annual permafrost Hg emissions to the atmosphere comparable to current global anthropogenic emissions. By 2100, simulated Hg concentrations in the Yukon River increase by 14% for the low emissions scenario, but double for the high emissions scenario. Fish Hg concentrations do not exceed United States Environmental Protection Agency guidelines for the low emissions scenario by 2300, but for the high emissions scenario, fish in the Yukon River exceed EPA guidelines by 2050. Our results indicate minimal impacts to Hg concentrations in water and fish for the low emissions scenario and high impacts for the high emissions scenario.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Review: PFAS Adsorption, Sensing, and Remediation with Engineered Nanoporous Materials

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are among the most abundant environmental contaminant species. They are widespread due to uncontrolled industrial and commercial use and have been linked to health risks such as cancer. With rising global concerns about the public health effects of PFAS, there is an incentive to develop strategies for reliable monitoring and effective PFAS removal, particularly in drinking water. Traditional PFAS sensing techniques are inefficient due to long measurement times, high labor input, high costs, and limitations to ex situ analysis. Current commercially available sorbents for PFAS removal generally lack the ability to capture PFAS components rapidly and quantitatively. Furthermore, existing sorbents are notably inefficient in removing the more toxic, smaller PFAS chemical chains. Large-scale applications of these methods tend to be costly and resource-intensive. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed unique strategies for PFAS sensing and removal with capture probe technology that has an affinity for fluorocarbons, including PFAS. For both sensing and removal, the customizable capture probes can target specific PFAS compounds since they used a metal-organic framework (MOF)-based technology that can be fine-tuned and molecularly tailored. This tailoring of the materials enables high PFAS sensitivity, selectivity, and faster uptake. PNNL’s capture probe materials have been developed into a sensing technique based on the interactions of the capture probes with PFAS at the molecular level and further transduced that to a quantifiable electrochemical response. The materials have been integrated into a sensor platform developed by New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT). Tunable capture probes with a range of detection sensitivities allow for faster and more sensitive PFAS detection limits as low as what appears to be 0.5 ng/L (compared to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency health advisory level of 70 ng/L). Customization of the capture probe results in improved sorption capacities (fast kinetics and high capacities) compared to commercial granular activated carbons. This research applied various experimental and modeling tools to improve understanding the molecular level interactions between the sorbents towards PFAS adsorption properties.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2021

pH-Mediated Colorimetric and Luminescent Sensing of Aqueous Nitrate Anions by a Platinum(II) Luminophore@Mesoporous Silica Composite

Increased levels of nitrate (NO 3 – ) in the environment can be detrimental to human health. Herein, we report a robust, cost-effective, and scalable, hybrid material-based colorimetric/luminescent sensor technology for rapid, selective, sensitive, and interference-free in situ NO 3 – detection. These hybrid materials are based on a square-planar platinum(II) salt [Pt(tpy)Cl]PF6 (tpy = 2,2';6',2''-terpyridine) supported on mesoporous silica. The platinum salt undergoes a vivid change in color and luminescence upon exposure to aqueous NO 3 – anions at pH ≤ 0 caused by substitution of the PF6– anions by aqueous NO 3 – . This change in photophysics of the platinum salt is induced by a rearrangement of its crystal lattice that leads to an extended Pt···Pt···Pt interaction, along with a concomitant change in its electronic structure. Furthermore, incorporating the material into mesoporous silica enhances the surface area and increases the detection sensitivity. A NO 3 – detection limit of 0.05 mM (3.1 ppm) is achieved, which is sufficiently lower than the ambient water quality limit of 0.16 mM (10 ppm) set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The colorimetric/luminescence of the hybrid material is highly selective to aqueous NO 3 – anions in the presence of other interfering anions, suggesting that this material is a promising candidate for the rapid NO 3 – detection and quantification in practical samples without separation, concentration, or other pretreatment steps.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2023

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 577 AREA 5 CHROMIUM CONTAINING WASTE DISPOSAL CELLS

Report will be submitted to the state of Nevada Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019. The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste cells and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents (NDEP 2019). As stipulated in Paragraph 5C of the SA, a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) was prepared that identified and evaluated risks and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 577, provided the plan for implementing the recommended CAA, and presented the post-closure plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗