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At least 217 records · Page 12

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗

Analysis of Alternative Jettison Design Concepts for Deep-space Missions

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration, deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station, which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovering resources, and to jettison it overboard. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage a nonviable option. Jettison of solid, processed waste appear, on the other hand, to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the risk of collisions with planetary bodies. This paper investigates alternative jettison design concepts for L2 libration orbit, Mars conjunction-class, and Mars opposition-class missions.

Jurek Parodi↗

A Review of Existing Policies Affecting the Jettison of Waste in Low Earth Orbit and Deep Space

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovery of resources, and to jettison it overboard in a solid form (such as a compacted tile) or in a gaseous form after torrefaction or other trash-to-gas technologies. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, human metabolic waste, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a potential health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage an inefficient and non-optimal option. However, the jettison of solid, processed waste appears to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the potential risk of contamination of planetary bodies, interfering with the search for life. This paper investigates the requirements covered by existing policies that could affect the jettison concept of operations and system design.

Jettison↗

Interoperable Services to Mitigate Lunar Position, Navigation, and Timing Challenges

Across the Earth, both civilian and government endeavors enjoy a built-in reliance on a position, navigation, and timing (PNT) infrastructure to which they are largely blind. Whether walking, driving, flying, or orbiting, Earth-centric PNT systems that have evolved over decades provide a core functionality to which we have grown accustomed for these pursuits. As NASA joins with other government space agencies and commercial partners to return humans to the Moon in a sustained manner within the current decade, expectations for PNT knowledge and timeliness at the Moon rival those on Earth. The need exists to develop a viable lunar-centric PNT infrastructure to support the planned human and robotic exploits. Navigating within the influence of the Moon presents its own set of challenges. Identification, understanding, and use of a unified reference frame and time system on which navigation is based becomes a fundamental need at the Moon. In addition to the unified foundational elements, measurement liability, dynamic conditions that require Earth-independent autonomous operations, and standards for PNT signals and message-based data exchange each represent distinct challenges to navigation in a burgeoning operational lunar environment. The PNT services planned as part of the lunar communications and navigation relay architecture known as LunaNet aid in surmounting the challenges. LunaNet interoperability specifications stipulate standards for signal parameters, messages, and lunar reference systems for PNT services. Within LunaNet’s defined interoperability resides the concept of a Reference Signal to provide communication signals specifically structured to enable measurement of pseudorange, Doppler, and time transfer by the recipient. One such signal type, the Augmented Forward Signal (AFS), functions as the mainstay for LunaNet PNT, while also serving the data needs for ubiquitous broadcast of network access and rapid unscheduled dissemination of alerts and messages. The presence of a geometrically distributed network of orbiting nodes transmitting the AFS forms the basis for the Lunar Augmented Navigation System (LANS), that delivers both radio navigation and data to multiple users in the lunar environment simultaneously. After reviewing the challenges associated with lunar navigation, this paper will describe the concepts and rationale behind the LunaNet PNT services. By borrowing techniques from Earth-centric Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS), the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards, PNT from LunaNet aids to overcome challenges faced for accurate lunar navigation.

LunaNet↗

Interoperable Services to Mitigate Lunar Position, Navigation, and Timing Challenges

Across the Earth, both civilian and government endeavors enjoy a built-in reliance on a position, navigation, and timing (PNT) infrastructure to which they are largely blind. Whether walking, driving, flying, or orbiting, Earth-centric PNT systems that have evolved over decades provide a core functionality to which we have grown accustomed for these pursuits. As NASA joins with other government space agencies and commercial partners to return humans to the Moon in a sustained manner within the current decade, expectations for PNT knowledge and timeliness at the Moon rival those on Earth. The need exists to develop a viable lunar-centric PNT infrastructure to support the planned human and robotic exploits. Navigating within the influence of the Moon presents its own set of challenges. Identification, understanding, and use of a unified reference frame and time system on which navigation is based becomes a fundamental need at the Moon. In addition to the unified foundational elements, measurement liability, dynamic conditions that require Earth-independent autonomous operations, and standards for PNT signals and message-based data exchange each represent distinct challenges to navigation in a burgeoning operational lunar environment. The PNT services planned as part of the lunar communications and navigation relay architecture known as LunaNet aid in surmounting the challenges. LunaNet interoperability specifications stipulate standards for signal parameters, messages, and lunar reference systems for PNT services. Within LunaNet’s defined interoperability resides the concept of a Reference Signal to provide communication signals specifically structured to enable measurement of pseudorange, Doppler, and time transfer by the recipient. One such signal type, the Augmented Forward Signal (AFS), functions as the mainstay for LunaNet PNT, while also serving the data needs for ubiquitous broadcast of network access and rapid unscheduled dissemination of alerts and messages. The presence of a geometrically distributed network of orbiting nodes transmitting the AFS forms the basis for the Lunar Augmented Navigation System (LANS), that delivers both radio navigation and data to multiple users in the lunar environment simultaneously. After reviewing the challenges associated with lunar navigation, this paper will describe the concepts and rationale behind the LunaNet PNT services. By borrowing techniques from Earth-centric Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS), the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards, PNT from LunaNet aids to overcome challenges faced for accurate lunar navigation.

Navigation↗

Actions to Evaluate Tritium in ATR Complex Perched Water Well 12

On April 23, 2019, elevated tritium concentrations in monitoring well PW-12 were reported to the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex environmental manager by the Fluor Idaho Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) lead. The monitoring well is one of a series of wells located in and around the ATR Complex that are sampled on an annual basis as part of the CERCLA monitoring program. The Fluor Idaho CERCLA lead indicated the elevated concentrations had been trending upward from Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through FY 2019. The tritium levels went from 1,880 pCi/L in October 2016 to 7,890 pCi/L in October 2017 and increased to 13,000 pCi/L in October 2018. In order to identify a baseline, the safe drinking water level (e.g. 20,000 pCi/L) can be used as a reference point for comparison only, as PW-12 is a perched water well and does not penetrate the aquifer. Although well below safe drinking water levels, an investigation was initiated to identify the source of tritium.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

BETO 2021 Peer Review - Rational Design of Robust Reactor Feeding Systems for Heterogeneous Cellulosic and Agricultural Wastes Based on Biomass Quality Characteristics

Consistent and reliable preprocessing, conveyance, and reactor in-feed systems, particularly for low-cost waste feedstocks, remains a major technical challenge for the emerging Bioeconomy. By identifying critical biomass attributes and connecting them to flow and conversion behavior, science-driven system designs can address these often-overlooked solids handling challenges. The Wonderful Company (TWC) is the world's largest almond and pistachio grower, generating 250,000 dry tons/year of waste material including hulls, shells, and wood (>5 million tons/year industry wide in the U.S.). This project seeks to turn this environmental and economic liability into a sustainable and profitable resource, targeting conversion via gasification to syngas for electricity and bio-char, by addressing related material handling and feeding challenges. Based on optimized preprocessing strategies, bulk material flow, and thermal conversion properties, an overall system design will be developed. The methodology will be tested with FCIC's benchmark loblolly pine residues, to demonstrate the robustness of the overall approach and provide insight and guidance for future systems. The project will culminate in extended field trials to demonstrate an improved continuous feeding system with a commercial biomass-to-electricity gasifier vendor, and an economic analysis demonstrating a reduction in electricity production costs by maximizing on-stream time while minimizing preprocessing and CapEx costs.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Investment Tax Credit Requirements for Privately Owned Solar Photovoltaic Systems on Federal Sites

The federal investment tax credit (ITC) is an economically valuable tax incentive offered to taxable business entities that invest in certain energy technologies. The ITC is based on a percentage of the qualifying upfront capital costs of a project and directly reduces a business's tax liability (i.e., the taxes paid). This fact sheet focuses on ITC considerations for privately owned solar photovoltaic (PV) projects on federal land and buildings, although some of the considerations may be applicable to other technologies and non-federal entities.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

A National Secure-by-Design Strategy

The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NA-213 Presentation.pdf

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is one of 17 United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories. SRNL, a multi-program national laboratory, is a leading research and development institution for the Offices of Environmental Management and Legacy Management at the U.S. Department of Energy and the Weapons and Nonproliferation programs for the National Nuclear Security Administration. Battelle Savannah River Alliance, LLC (BSRA), a not-for-profit limited liability company, manages and operates SRNL for the DOE. BSRA board leadership includes Battelle Memorial Institute, Clemson University, University of South Carolina, South Carolina State University, University of Georgia, and Georgia Institute of Technology. Battelle Memorial Institute and the five universities are joined in partnership with preferred subcontractors TechSource and Longenecker & Associates with the singular purpose of maintaining SRNL as a best-in-class national laboratory. Scientists and Engineers at SRNL use leading edge science and technology to advance the Department of Energy’s critical mission outcomes.

Hasty, Timothy C.↗

Integrating Commercial Ready Autonomous Robotic Platforms to Enhance Worker Safety and Efficiency - 20053

This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and the supporting technology for the waste management industry. Deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms are new to the radioactive waste management industry and have been slow to implement across the complex. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground-based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operation of autonomous instrumented robots, followed by a scaling up of capabilities for the platform to meet any additional requests of internal stakeholders. Autonomous robotics platforms offer a fantastic range of capabilities that will aid in decreasing long-term liability of radioactive waste management industry by enhancing clean-up efforts and worker safety. Over the past five years, deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms have come a long way. Autonomous robotic platforms are increasingly available to purchase from many vendors, often for prices under $100,000. Additionally, the vendors who produce these products are efficient in accommodating customized solutions to unique challenges, such as those often found in the radioactive waste management industry. However, the newness of this technology to the radioactive waste management industry and has resulted in a slow implementation across the complex. This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and supporting technology for the waste management industry. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. While the company has utilized robots in many parts of the tank farms mission, this was first attempted in the deployment of an autonomous platform that required no operator with only minor maintenance and created challenges not yet encountered. These challenges included stakeholder buy-in, operational safety, procurement uncertainties, adaption of 'off the shelf products, overcoming the 'Fukushima complexity' perception, security concerns, and the initial criteria down select. Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's management identified the need for a workforce protecting low cost robotics solution in the fall of 2017. The project scope generated was part of the response to the Tank Vapor Assessment Team recommendation to enhance the safety of the workforce by utilizing new technology. Since the projects inception, it has been incorporated into the Tank Stewardship Plan. This project was unique to Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, as the company does not frequently incorporate advanced technology for field deployment quickly. The project was also progressive to the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor as it functions as a partnership project with a local university. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operations of autonomous instrumented robotics, monitoring and collecting data, and the wireless transmission of data to a central computing system. Following the completion of this first objective, the project will scale up capabilities of the platform to meet the requests of additional internal stakeholders throughout the tank farms - including completion of specific in-field tasks. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

USACE FUSRAP Records Management Challenges in the Digital Age - 20242

In late 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) implemented a Headquarters-supported nationwide records management initiative managed by the USACE-New England District to address the digitization and organization of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) project files. This initiative will prepare USACE FUSRAP for moving toward a fully electronic system of records management. Additionally, the records management initiative streamlines the process and prepares the Administrative Record (AR) and Permanent Record (PR) file for transfer from USACE to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-Office of Legacy Management (LM) following project closeout. Over the past couple of years, USACE and DOE-LM have been working to finalize a joint guidance document to assist in the FUSRAP records transition process. However, there remain key records management topics that require further discussion and development. Specifically, these topics include the implementation, process, and procedure for the capture of social media records and compliance with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC 794d), as amended. Due to advances in technology and the ease of communication it provides, USACE is using social media more often to interface with the public than 5, 10 or 15 years ago. The identification and capture of these records are challenging because it requires each USACE district or producer of a record to track what has been released through social media so that it can be captured as part of the AR or PR. USACE is currently evaluating processes and procedures for social media records capture. This paper explores how social media is being used by USACE across FUSRAP projects and best practices for the capture of social media records. Public accessibility to the project AR is required under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which USACE FUSRAP must follow. As USACE FUSRAP ARs are converted to a digital format, greater accessibility to the files can be provided through web sites or other electronic media. However, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act must be considered when releasing electronic files to the public. Under Section 508, government agencies must ensure that information is made available to the public in a format that provides equal access to persons with disabilities. This paper discusses the electronic records requirements under Section 508 and addresses broad implementation of compliance across large digital records sets. Records management challenges are presented in the context of the FUSRAP records management program; however, these records management considerations and best practices are applicable across all Federal agency records management programs. Examples presented will further aid in understanding electronic records requirements that may be included on new USACE FUSRAP contracts as well as upcoming National Archives Records Administration requirements that will move us toward an electronic government. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Stakeholder-Engaged Structured Decision Making for the Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Mission - 20501

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) environmental legacy cleanup program requires decisions to be made for environmental remediation, decommissioning and disposal or management of radioactive waste. This legacy cleanup program was established to address groundwater contamination, material disposal areas (MDAs) that have been used to dispose of radioactive and other waste material, and 'aggregate areas' that might produce radioactive or other chemical waste as a result of remediation activities. The LANL site is regulated for environmental concerns under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). However, some parts of LANL, such as material disposal area G (MDA G), have disposed of radioactive waste under DOE Order 435.1, and are subject to other regulations. For example, decommissioning the remote-handled TRU material stored in 33 shafts at MDA G falls under EPA's 40 CFR 191. Collectively, the regulations are all aimed in the same direction of finding the best solution, either through constructs such as 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA), considering balancing factors as opposed to only cost and human health risk, and, under EPA regulations such as RCRA and NEPA, evaluating impact from all chemicals and both human health and ecological endpoints. Despite the basic goals and objectives of the regulations or their guidance, the main challenge is in their implementation. Arguably perhaps, but really in principle, all of these (and similar) regulations are asking for a decision analysis to be performed. Implementation challenges encountered have included lack of understanding of decision analysis in the industry, lack of effective stakeholder engagement in the decision analysis process, and lack of appreciation of the need to separate value judgments from science, the latter leading to developing conservative, or protective, science-based models. Conservative models lead to poor solutions, lack of effective stakeholder engagement leads to long drawn out protracted approaches to finding a solution (which also might never be found with this approach), and lack of understanding of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics causes poor models to be built, which creates unfortunate situations of 'garbage in, garbage out' becoming the basis for decision making. Stakeholder-engaged structured decision making (SDM) is an approach to solving problems that relies on the theory of decision science to involve stakeholders in the decision-making process. This approach incorporates stakeholder values using a scientifically rigorous methodology that separates value judgments from science in a way that helps avoid the pitfalls of biased, protective, or conservative modeling. This approach has its foundation in Keeney's 1992 treatise on value-focused thinking [1]. Keeney advocated a paradigm shift in decision making based on the idea that the standard way of thinking about decisions is backwards. The standard approach of focusing first on identifying alternatives rather than on articulating values results in a reactive approach with the emphasis on mechanics and fixed choices instead of the core values that have meaning to stakeholders. This paradigm shift effectively engages all stakeholders in the decision-making process while using a values focused thinking approach that can lead to the identification of decision opportunities and the creation of better alternatives. The intent is to be proactive and generate solutions that are related directly to values and objectives as identified by stakeholders. There are, perhaps, two overarching reasons why SDM can be used to benefit LANL's environmental legacy cleanup. Some of LANL's remaining waste management and environmental management problems are challenging and complex (for example, the Cr and RDX plumes, and MDAs) and while the traditional approach has, arguably, worked well for relatively simple risk-based problems, it cannot, or should not, be applied to more complex problems if the most effective and efficient solutions are desired. The second reason is cost. This has perhaps become more critical since publication of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that DoE's environmental liability is considered a high-risk concern for the nation [2]. The focus of SDM is on structuring solutions to decision risk problems by first addressing stakeholder and decision maker values and subsequently developing decision objectives and ways to measure those objectives, preference weighting across objectives, identifying decision alternatives that best achieve those values, and characterizing uncertainty in predictions of the measures. Because a complete decision model is created using SDM, it can be evaluated to find the main elements of the model that drive, or predict, the best solution. This approach creates complete decision models that are transparent, traceable, reproducible and technically defensible. The science behind SDM, or decision analysis, is well founded, yet it is not unusual to see ad hoc approaches to decision making implemented under various environmental regulations that are pertinent to the LANL site, including NEPA, RCRA and DOE Order 435.1. Such ad hoc approaches are often not transparent or traceable, and lack reproducibility and technical defensibility. The LANL legacy cleanup program has embarked on using SDM to address the complex problems that remain. Stakeholder meetings have been held, and a prototype version of the stakeholder value system has been developed. Further meetings are expected in the future to address specific project needs. This is a long-term endeavor considering the complex environmental problems faced by DOE EM in Los Alamos (EM-LA), and careful planning, consideration of stakeholder value systems, and engagement with stakeholders throughout the SDM process is expected to lead to a successful endpoint. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The HRA/Solarium Project: Feedback Based on 20 Years of Experience in Treatment of Medium Level Waste - 20185

Since the 1980's the management of the historical site of Mol has been transferred to the National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS). Belgoprocess is entrusted by ONDRAF/NIRAS with the operational waste management and site remediation. One of the major challenges has been the characterization, treatment and conditioning of approximately 200 m{sup 3} of medium level waste. These waste packages were stored in poor conditions in storage vaults ('HRA') or concrete containers ('Solarium'). They have been produced in various research programs and reactor operations at the Belgian nuclear energy research centre SCK.CEN, isotope production, decontamination and dismantling operations from the 1960's up to the 1980's. Despite the limited volume, this historical waste consists of a great variation of waste characteristics and waste configurations. To tackle these liabilities, a new processing facility was built in the 1990's to allow safe transfers, handling, characterization and treatment of these packages. Also some auxiliary facilities have been built to deal with the by-products, like emptied concrete containers. The engineering of the installation, safety procedures and (characterization) methodology that has been developed generically have been proved to be successful. Nevertheless, the specific nature of some items made it necessary to organize a step-by-step treatment in distinct campaigns in which some relevant extra (safety) measures had to be taken into account. This dynamic approach made it possible to process a great variety of waste types in order to to ensure that this legacy is no longer left for subsequent generations. After about 20 years of operations, there has been a great build-up of experience and feed-back concerning the waste management of these specific waste streams. Some cases will be highlighted to specify the approach followed for treatment of e.g.: - Na/NaK containing equipment; - spent radioactive sources; - fuel element residues; - medium level waste originating from activation experiments; - radium bearing medium level waste originating from Ac-227 production research. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Middlesex South FUSRAP Site: Collaboration Towards Beneficial Reuse - 20338

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) manages DoE's post-closure responsibilities and ensures the future protection of human health and the environment with respect to sites that have no continuing DOE mission after undergoing remediation. LM's beneficial reuse program promotes the LM strategic goal to sustainably manage and optimize use of public lands. The beneficial reuse program aims to repurpose former contaminated sites to restore the environment, protect the public health, revitalize communities, and spur economic growth. Benefits from the reuse of a site may increase the local tax base, facilitate job growth, utilize existing infrastructure, and enhance or protect natural resources. Beneficial reuse also promotes protectiveness by ensuring activities are compatible with long-term maintenance and protection of public health and the environment, as well as by retaining good stewardship of natural resources. LM actively participates in promoting the economic development vision of the surrounding communities by collaborating with local communities to promote regional or municipal initiatives. The Borough of Middlesex, New Jersey, has prepared the Lincoln Boulevard Redevelopment Plan, which will reinvent a once-viable downtown and enhance the quality of life for the community. The Middlesex South, New Jersey, Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site lies within the boundaries of this redevelopment area. In support of this development plan, the Borough is interested in acquiring the site for its Department of Public Works and to increase street access in the future commercial district to be built near adjacent properties. The opportunity to put the FUSRAP site into productive use aligns with LM's mission and strategic goals. In support of beneficial reuse activities, DOE can dispose of excess real property using several mechanisms. The two disposal options applicable to the Middlesex south site include (1) utilizing the US General Services Administration (GSA) or (2) using the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Section 770, 'Transfer of Real Property at Defense Nuclear Facilities for Economic Development' (known as a '770 transfer') process. Using the 770 transfer requires economic development as the primary driver, and a specific redevelopment proposal must be submitted. If there is no interest in specific economic development, the GSA option becomes the default mechanism for disposal of the property. In the case of the Middlesex south site, the 770 transfer process is being utilized and the Borough has submitted its economic development proposal to LM. Although LM is encouraged by the opportunity to put the site into productive use, the Middlesex south site is currently on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Priorities List and remediation is being performed by the US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Consequently, any property transfer must meet the requirements under CERCLA Section 120(h), 'Property Transferred by Federal Agencies.' As the groundwater remedy will not be in place for several years, approval would be required from the US EPA administrator and the governor of the state of New Jersey to perform an early transfer of the site (before all response actions have been completed). The time frame for these approvals to occur under the normal process conflicts with the proposed redevelopment schedule; therefore, various options for expedited sale, transfer, or lease of portions of the site to the Borough were evaluated. The subsequent decision on a mutually beneficial path forward was the result of a collaborative effort between LM, USACE, the Borough and its redevelopment team, EPA, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Investigation of Radiological Contamination at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area - 20350

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of the Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 280 acres of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 15.1 million cubic yards of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain radium-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium impregnated switch board buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service has several other Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area that were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations, including Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay. Over the last year, the National Park Service has performed additional radiological investigations at Great Kills Park as part of the ongoing Remedial Investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. In addition, preliminary radiological investigations were performed at Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These investigation activities identified gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area support an association between radiological contamination and historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

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