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The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request to support the Assessment of the International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Update. The NESC conducted an earlier assessment of the use of the PCU in 2009. This document contains the outcome of the assessment update.
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Flight Mechanics and Analysis Division developed an adaptive augmenting control (AAC) algorithm for launch vehicles that improves robustness and performance on an as-needed basis by adapting a classical control algorithm to unexpected environments or variations in vehicle dynamics. This was baselined as part of the Space Launch System (SLS) flight control system. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to partner with the SLS Program and the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Game Changing Development Program (GCDP) to flight test the AAC algorithm on a manned aircraft that can achieve a high level of dynamic similarity to a launch vehicle and raise the technology readiness of the algorithm early in the program. This document reports the outcome of the NESC assessment.
The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.
At the request of the Science Mission Directorate Chief Engineer, the NASA Technical Fellow for Guidance, Navigation & Control assembled and facilitated a workshop on Spacecraft Hybrid Attitude Control. This multi-Center, academic, and industry workshop, sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), was held in April 2013 to unite nationwide experts to present and discuss the various innovative solutions, techniques, and lessons learned regarding the development and implementation of the various hybrid attitude control system solutions investigated or implemented. This report attempts to document these key lessons learned with the 16 findings and 9 NESC recommendations.
The aircraft-based Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) is a platform for multiple infrared observation experiments. The experiments carry sensors cooled to liquid helium (LHe) temperatures. A question arose regarding the heat input and peak pressure that would result from a sudden loss of the dewar vacuum insulation. Owing to concerns about the adequacy of dewar pressure relief in the event of a sudden loss of the dewar vacuum insulation, the SOFIA Program engaged the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This report summarizes and assesses the experiments that have been performed to measure the heat flux into LHe dewars following a sudden vacuum insulation failure, describes the physical limits of heat input to the dewar, and provides an NESC recommendation for the wall heat flux that should be used to assess the sudden loss of vacuum insulation case. This report also assesses the methodology used by the SOFIA Program to predict the maximum pressure that would occur following a loss of vacuum event.
The Chief Engineer of the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Office requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent assessment of the ESD's integrated hazard development process. The focus of the assessment was to review the integrated hazard analysis (IHA) process and identify any gaps/improvements in the process (e.g., missed causes, cause tree completeness, missed hazards). This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.
The Chief Engineer of the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Office requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent assessment of the ESD's integrated hazard development process. The focus of the assessment was to review the integrated hazard analysis (IHA) process and identify any gaps/improvements in the process (e.g. missed causes, cause tree completeness, missed hazards). This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and Lockheed Martin (LM) performed random vibration testing on a single spring strut development unit to assess its ability to withstand qualification level random vibration environments. Failure of the strut while exposed to random vibration resulted in a follow-on failure investigation, design changes, and additional development tests. This paper focuses on the results of the failure investigations referenced in detail in the NESC final report [1] including identified lessons learned to aid in future design iterations of the spring strut and to help other mechanism developers avoid similar pitfalls.
The complex flight and ground systems for NASA human space exploration are designed, built, operated and managed as separate programs and projects. However, each system relies on one or more of the other systems in order to accomplish specific mission objectives, creating a complex, tightly coupled architecture. Thus, there is a fundamental need to understand how each system interacts with the other. To determine if a model-based system engineering approach could be utilized to assist with understanding the complex system interactions, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) sponsored a task to develop an approach for performing cross-system behavior modeling. This paper presents the results of applying Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles using the System Modeling Language (SysML) to define cross-system behaviors and how they map to crosssystem software interfaces documented in system-level Interface Control Documents (ICDs).
The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request to develop an analysis model based on both frequency response and wave propagation analyses for predicting shock response spectrum (SRS) on composite materials subjected to pyroshock loading. The model would account for near-field environment (approx. 9 inches from the source) dominated by direct wave propagation, mid-field environment (approx. 2 feet from the source) characterized by wave propagation and structural resonances, and far-field environment dominated by lower frequency bending waves in the structure. This report documents the outcome of the assessment.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request to develop an analysis model based on both frequency response and wave propagation analyses for predicting shock response spectrum (SRS) on composite materials subjected to pyroshock loading. The model would account for near-field environment (approximately 9 inches from the source) dominated by direct wave propagation, mid-field environment (approximately 2 feet from the source) characterized by wave propagation and structural resonances, and far-field environment dominated by lower frequency bending waves in the structure. This document contains appendices to the Volume I report.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request to develop an analysis model based on both frequency response and wave propagation analyses for predicting shock response spectrum (SRS) on composite materials subjected to pyroshock loading. The model would account for near-field environment (~9 inches from the source) dominated by direct wave propagation, mid-field environment (approximately 2 feet from the source) characterized by wave propagation and structural resonances, and far-field environment dominated by lower frequency bending waves in the structure. This document contains appendices to the Volume I report.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request to develop an analysis model based on both frequency response and wave propagation analyses for predicting shock response spectrum (SRS) on composite materials subjected to pyroshock loading. The model would account for near-field environment (approx. 9 inches from the source) dominated by direct wave propagation, mid-field environment (approx. 2 feet from the source) characterized by wave propagation and structural resonances, and far-field environment dominated by lower frequency bending waves in the structure. This document contains appendices to the Volume I report.
The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent evaluation of the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) models used in the latest JPSS MMOD risk assessment. The principal focus of the assessment was to compare Orbital Debris Engineering Model version 3 (ORDEM 3.0) with the Meteoroid and Space Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference version 2009 (MASTER-2009) and Aerospace Debris Environment Projection Tool (ADEPT) and provide recommendations to the JPSS Project regarding MMOD protection. The outcome of the NESC assessment is contained in this report.
NASA spacecraft design requirements for occupant protection are a combination of the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criteria and injury assessment reference values (IARV) extracted from anthropomorphic test devices (ATD). For the ATD IARVs, the requirements specify the use of the 5th percentile female Hybrid III and the 95th percentile male Hybrid III. Each of these ATDs is required to be fitted with an articulating pelvis (also known as the aerospace pelvis) and a straight spine. The articulating pelvis is necessary for the ATD to fit into spacecraft seats, while the straight spine is required as injury metrics for vertical accelerations are better defined for this configuration. Sled testing of the Hybrid III 5th Percentile Female Anthropomorphic Test Device (ATD) was performed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WAPFB). Two 5th Percentile ATDs were tested, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) and NASA owned Hybrid III ATDs with aerospace pelvises. Testing was also conducted with a NASA-owned 95th Percentile Male Hybrid III with aerospace pelvis at WPAFB. Testing was performed using an Orion seat prototype provided by Johnson Space Center (JSC). A 5-point harness comprised of 2 inch webbing was also provided by JSC. For suited runs, a small and extra-large Advanced Crew Escape System (ACES) suit and helmet were also provided by JSC. Impact vectors were combined frontal/spinal and rear/lateral. Some pure spinal and rear axis testing was also performed for model validation. Peak accelerations ranged between 15 and 20-g. This range was targeted because the ATD responses fell close to the IARV defined in the Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR) document. Rise times varied between 70 and 110 ms to assess differences in ATD responses and model correlation for different impact energies. The purpose of the test series was to evaluate the Hybrid III ATD models in Orion-specific landing orientations both with and without a spacesuit. The results of these tests were used by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to validate the finite element model (FEM) of the Hybrid III 5th Percentile Female ATD. Physical test data was compared to analytical predictions from simulations, and modelling uncertainty factors have been determined for each injury metric. Additionally, the test data has been used to further improve the FEM, particularly in the areas of the ATD preload, harness, and suit and helmet effects.
The aircraft-based Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) is a platform for multiple infrared astronomical observation experiments. These experiments carry sensors cooled to liquid helium temperatures. The liquid helium supply is contained in large (i.e., 10 liters or more) vacuum-insulated dewars. Should the dewar vacuum insulation fail, the inrushing air will condense and freeze on the dewar wall, resulting in a large heat flux on the dewar's contents. The heat flux results in a rise in pressure and the actuation of the dewar pressure relief system. A previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) assessment provided recommendations for the wall heat flux that would be expected from a loss of vacuum and detailed an appropriate method to use in calculating the maximum pressure that would occur in a loss of vacuum event. This method involved building a detailed supercritical helium compressible flow thermal/fluid model of the vent stack and exercising the model over the appropriate range of parameters. The experimenters designing science instruments for SOFIA are not experts in compressible supercritical flows and do not generally have access to the thermal/fluid modeling packages that are required to build detailed models of the vent stacks. Therefore, the SOFIA Program engaged the NESC to develop a simplified methodology to estimate the maximum pressure in a liquid helium dewar after the loss of vacuum insulation. The method would allow the university-based science instrument development teams to conservatively determine the cryostat's vent neck sizing during preliminary design of new SOFIA Science Instruments. This report details the development of the simplified method, the method itself, and the limits of its applicability. The simplified methodology provides an estimate of the dewar pressure after a loss of vacuum insulation that can be used for the initial design of the liquid helium dewar vent stacks. However, since it is not an exact tool, final verification of the dewar pressure vessel design requires a complete, detailed real fluid compressible flow model of the vent stack. The wall heat flux resulting from a loss of vacuum insulation increases the dewar pressure, which actuates the pressure relief mechanism and results in high-speed flow through the dewar vent stack. At high pressures, the flow can be choked at the vent stack inlet, at the exit, or at an intermediate transition or restriction. During previous SOFIA analyses, it was observed that there was generally a readily identifiable section of the vent stack that would limit the flow – e.g., a small diameter entrance or an orifice. It was also found that when the supercritical helium was approximated as an ideal gas at the dewar condition, the calculated mass flow rate based on choking at the limiting entrance or transition was less than the mass flow rate calculated using the detailed real fluid model2. Using this lower mass flow rate would yield a conservative prediction of the dewar’s wall heat flux capability. The simplified method of the current work was developed by building on this observation.
The Chief of the Space Science Project Office at Glenn Research Center (GRC) requested support from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to satisfy a request from the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Associate Administrator and the Planetary Science Division Chief to obtain an independent review of the Glenn Extreme Environments Rig (GEER) and the operational controls in place for mitigating any hazard associated with its operation. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.