Results for “National Nuclear Security Administration” — Page 12

DOE OSTI2022

Los Alamos National Laboratory Floodplain Assessment for the West Road Post and Cable Fencing Project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing to take action at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to install post and cable or in-kind barriers along West Road at selected locations near the Los Alamos County ice-skating rink in Los Alamos Canyon (Figure 1). The proposed project is intended to improve vehicular and pedestrian safety on West Road by reducing traffic hazards associated with unsafe roadside parking and reduce wildland fire hazards associated with vehicles driving and parking on vegetation. West Road crosses approximately 0.35 miles (mi.) (1,900 feet (ft.)) of the Los Alamos Canyon floodplain at the bottom of Los Alamos Canyon. Project activities within the floodplain include blocking access to the informal roadside parking along either side of West Road in Los Alamos Canyon.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Los Alamos National Laboratory Wetland Assessment for the Replacement Water Lines from Technical Area 48 to Technical Area 55 Project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing to take action at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) near a wetland at Technical Area (TA) 48 and under a wetland at TA-55. The project proposes to install two 12-inch water lines along an alignment from TA-48 to Pecos Road on the east side of TA-55 (Figure 1). The proposed water lines will replace aging cast iron pipes that provide water for fire suppression to buildings within TA-55, and potable water to other areas in the Pajarito Corridor. NNSA has prepared this wetland assessment in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1022 Compliance with Wetland and Wetland Environmental Review Requirements (10 CFR Part 1022) (CFR 2003) which was promulgated to implement DOE requirements under Executive Order 11988 Wetland Management (EO 1977). A wetland is defined in 10 CFR 1022 as “the lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas and flood prone areas of offshore islands,” and a base wetland as “the 100-year wetland, that is, a wetland with a 1.0 percent chance of flooding in any given year (CFR 2003).” This wetland assessment evaluates potential impacts to wetland values and functions from implementation of the proposed action, identifies alternatives to the Proposed Action, and allows for meaningful public comment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report for June 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

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DOE OSTI2023

Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report for March 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

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DOE OSTI2024

Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report for February 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

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DOE OSTI2023

Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report for January 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

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DOE OSTI2023

Monthly Wastewater Report - May 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

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DOE OSTI2023

Semiannual Categorical Process Report - January Through June 2023

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (SNL/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The SNL/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the SNL/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which SNL/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from SNL/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (SNL/NM). The Monitoring and Reporting Condition 2.B of the Permit requires compliance with the semiannual reporting requirements contained in federal categorical pretreatment standards regulations (40 CFR 403.12). These regulations set numerical limits on the concentration of pollutants allowed to discharge from certain categories of industrial processes. This report is submitted to the City to satisfy this reporting requirement.

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 13: D and D Collaboration Between US DOE EM and NNSA (R6.3)

This panel focused on the interaction and collaboration between US Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) offices and sites. Panelists with presentations: NNSA and DOE EM Collaboration on Facility Disposition (Deborah Couchman-Griswold); DOE EM and NNSA D and D Collaboration at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Diane McDaniel); Working Together to Achieve Environmental Cleanup Success in Oak Ridge (Laura Wilkerson, James Daffron); DOE-EM - NNSA (Rick Demmer)

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DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗

DOE OSTI2021

Report on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the modern world has impacted nearly every application imaginable. This includes nuclear proliferation detection, which offers the potential to improve existing capabilities as well as create new ones. Proliferation detection seeks to detect and characterize attempts by state and non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons or associated technology, materials, or knowledge. Such a mission is vitally important for global stability and security but is notoriously difficult. By leveraging advances in AI, exciting opportunities exist to enhance the proliferation detection regime. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) seeks to leverage the capabilities of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) national laboratories and other partners to develop AI systems that can accomplish otherwise impossible tasks in support of proliferation detection. As part of its efforts, the portfolio has created a series of workshops on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection to help define the requirements for suitable AI systems, share successful research and best practices, and foster connection and understanding between the relevant parties including researchers and end-users. Each workshop in the series focuses on a specific and critical aspect of AI to enable it to accomplish proliferation detection objectives. The first workshop focused on explainability techniques; the second workshop and the topic of this report, covers methods for incorporating domain awareness into AI. The Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods took place virtually over two days in February 2021 and included four keynote presentations, 22 technical presentations, and a concluding panel. The presentations, discussions, and workshop findings are summarized in this report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Wetland Re-Evaluation and Delineation Report for the Los Alamos National Laboratories Wetlands Project, Los Alamos County, New Mexico

In March of 2005, the Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Los Alamos Site office (LASO) requested the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Albuquerque District (USACE) to identify and delineate wetlands at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The results of this study were intended to support the preparation of the Supplemental Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and various mitigative measures that would become part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance process for LANL. The term “wetland” will be used throughout the report to refer to the potential wetlands listed in Table 1. Many of these potential "wetlands” were not determined to be wetlands based on 2025 data.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Workshop Report for Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection: Accelerating the Development and Use of Explainability Methods to Design AI Systems Suitable for Nonproliferation Mission Applications

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises powerful new capabilities in an expansive array of applications. One area is proliferation detection, where AI can provide transformative tools to achieve objectives currently inaccessible using conventional methods. In particular, AI affords the opportunity to use new indicators and process massive amounts of heterogeneous data that can increase sensitivity to proliferant activities and push proliferation detection to the earliest possible stages. However, existing AI tools are not ready to achieve such potential, falling short in regard to some important considerations involved in proliferation detection. One crucial aspect that requires improvement is the explainability of the most powerful AI algorithms (i.e., understanding how the algorithms actually arrive at their conclusions)-the lack of which prevents widespread adoption in national security missions. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development is driving the development of next-generation AI for proliferation detection through the expertise and work of the national laboratories and partners in academia. The "Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection: Accelerating the Development and Use of Explainability Methods to Design AI Systems Suitable for Nonproliferation Mission Applications" workshop aimed to further this objective. The meeting was held virtually on Sept. 15-16, 2020 and included more than 170 participants, primarily from the national laboratories with additional contributions from university researchers and mission partners. Each day included a keynote presentation, four technical presentations about cutting-edge research in explainability, and a panel to explore considerations in applying explainability and developing AI systems that can accelerate the transition of emerging AI technologies among partners and end users to solve critical mission questions. This report summarizes the Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection workshop's content and findings.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2021

Los Alamos National Laboratory Floodplain Assessment for Fire Risk Mitigations at the Lower Slobbovia Testing Site in (TA-36)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing to take fire pre-suppression actions at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area (TA) 36. Constructing a fire break and a fuel break surrounding the Lower Slobbovia explosives testing site in addition to the current vegetation mowing practices would establish a safety perimeter to help prevent fires from spreading away from the firing point. NNSA has prepared this floodplain assessment in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1022 Compliance with Floodplain and Wetland Environmental Review Requirements (10 CFR 1022), which was promulgated to implement DOE requirements under Executive Order 11988 Floodplain Management (EO 1977). A floodplain is defined in 10 CFR 1022 as “the lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas and flood prone areas of offshore islands,” and a base floodplain as “the 100-year floodplain, that is, a floodplain with a 1.0 percent chance of flooding in any given year (CFR 2003).” This floodplain assessment evaluates potential impacts to floodplain values and functions from implementation of the proposed action, identifies alternatives to the Proposed Action, and allows for meaningful public comment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

The Vault National Security Then & Now (2021 Annual)

Looking back, I can say with certainty that we rose to the challenge. Like other entities all around the globe, the National Security Research Center was tested by the COVID-19 pandemic. As a young organization (we celebrated our second anniversary in June 2021) and one that is critical to Los Alamos National Laboratory’s national security charge, we faced the difficult task of continuing our mission-essential work while keeping our staff safe. The NSRC is one of the largest libraries in the United States, and it houses the country’s most-comprehensive collections of nuclear weapons-related national security material. The NSRC contains millions of documents, films, photos, and other materials on the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. These are accessed on a daily basis by scientists, engineers, and researchers at Los Alamos and other National Nuclear Security Administration’s labs and sites, as well as partners in the Department of Defense. It was not an option for us to close our doors - our nation’s security depended on us not to. Not only did we continue operating under new safety protocols, we successfully accomplished many pre-pandemic goals. Thanks to the NSRC’s dedicated staff, our accomplishments during our second year are too numerous to list, though two in particular come to mind.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Partnership for Radiation Studies (PaRS): A Consortium for Advancing Radiation Science among Underrepresented STEM Students

The Partnership for Radiation Studies (PaRS) consortium was recently awarded by U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The five-year grant aims to increase the number of underrepresented students in STEM disciplines, with simultaneous advancement of nuclear radiation science. The goal is to hire more underrepresented minorities at national laboratories. The consortium’s progress will be tracked/reported annually. This paper and subsequent presentation cover details of the consortium, highlighting the key activities of participating national laboratories in assisting the minority-serving institutions.

Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program,↗

DOE OSTI2023

July 2023 Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report

The Sandia National Laboratories, in California (Sandia/CA) is a research and development facility, owned by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration agency (DOE/NNSA). The laboratory is located in the City of Livermore (the City) and is comprised of approximately 410 acres. The Sandia/CA facility is operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) under a contract with the DOE/NNSA. The DOE/ NNSA’s Sandia Field Office (SFO) oversees the operations of the site. North of the Sandia/CA facility is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in which Sandia/CA’s sewer system combines with before discharging to the City’s Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for final treatment and processing. The City’s POTW authorizes the wastewater discharge from Sandia/CA via the assigned Wastewater Discharge Permit #1251 (the Permit), which is issued to the DOE/NNSA’s main office for Sandia National Laboratories, located in New Mexico (Sandia/NM). The Permit requires the submittal of this Monthly Sewer Monitoring Report to the City by the twenty-fifth day of each month.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2021

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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