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DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

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DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of the Generation-2 Dechlorination Apparatus for Treating Salt Wastes

This document satisfies the requirements for two milestones, i.e., M2FT-21PN030103021 and M3FT-21PN030103026, which are described in detail below. Also, details for the work package at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are provided below. The goal of this milestone was to demonstrate the generation-2 dechlorination apparatus (G2DA) for removing Cl from chloride-based electrochemical salt simulants. The two salts chosen for this initial study were KCl to simulate a component from the eutectic salt (LiCl is harder to detect with analytical instruments) and CsCl to simulate a fission product chloride that might be present in these types of waste streams. The overall scope of this work included receiving, installing, and testing the G2DA. This new system was designed to address several shortcomings identified with the generation-1 apparatus (G1DA), which are described in detail within this document. The G2DA was designed to address all of these shortcomings. The studies presented in here show that the G2DA worked as intended and will help provide scaled-up batches for additional testing at Argonne National Laboratory.

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DOE OSTI2025

Incorporating the latest Neutron NDA analysis techniques into INCC6

International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC6) is the IAEA’s neutron NDA software. With FY25 SGTech support we implemented self-diagnostic features into INCC6. For FY26 we propose to implement advanced analysis methods that have been splintered into custom software for one-off instruments. Incorporating these capabilities in INCC6 will make them available for any new or existing application on the ubiquitous INCC6 platform, increasing safeguards efficiency and effectiveness.

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DOE OSTI2026

Innovative Biomonitoring and Remediation of Heavy Metals Using Phytotechnologies at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Coal Combustion Product (CCP) Impoundment Sites

The Savannah River Site (SRS) contains legacy coal combustion product (CCP) impoundments that are impacted by elevated concentrations of heavy metals and radionuclides, posing long-term risks to soil health, ecosystem functioning, and environmental sustainability. Traditional environmental monitoring approaches rely primarily on chemical analyses to quantify contaminant concentrations but often provide limited information regarding biological responses or ecosystem recovery. This project addressed these limitations by integrating environmental chemistry, microbial ecology, artificial intelligence (AI), and bioremediation into a comprehensive framework for environmental diagnostics and restoration of contaminated soils. The overarching goal of this collaborative project between Florida A&M University (FAMU) and the University of Georgia's Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL) was to develop innovative biomonitoring and remediation strategies for heavy metal-contaminated CCP impoundment sites at the Savannah River Site. Specifically, the project sought to (i) characterize heavy metal contamination, (ii) determine microbial responses to contamination, (iii) isolate indigenous heavy metal-resistant microorganisms for remediation applications, (iv) develop a microbial ecological health index using machine learning, and (v) optimize fungal-mediated bioremediation using artificial intelligence.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Development of the Underwater Disc Saw Used to Segment the Internals of Taiwan Research Reactor - 20038

Taiwan Research Reactor will be dismantled in the period of 2022 to 2027 according to the approved dismantling plan. Based on the sampling and analyzing results, some internals of Taiwan Research Reactor must be segmented under the water because of their higher radiation, and the calandria is one of them. To dismantle this calandria, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research develops an underwater disc saw that is driven by a hydraulic pump and will be used to segment the shell of the calandria. In this article, Taiwan Research Reactor and the structure of the calandria are briefly depicted, and the segmentation processes of this calandria and the design of this disc saw are also included. Besides, the trial of cutting the shell of the simplified full size calandria mockup is briefly demonstrated in this article. Further tests will be performed in the near future to figure out which parts or functions of this disc saw need to be modified to get better cutting performance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Disposition of Newly Generated Transuranic Waste at ORNL - 20107

ORNL operates the High Flux Isotope Reactor, which provides a high neutron source for production of isotopes for medical, industrial, and nuclear research programs and is the US DoE's center for production, storage, and distribution for TRU isotopes (plutonium through californium). Operation of these facilities results in the generation of CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste for disposal at the WIPP. This paper describes the program ORNL is implementing in collaboration with the Carlsbad Field Office National TRU Program Difficult Waste Team to disposition newly generated TRU waste. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Innovative Approaches to the Decommissioning of a Redundant Plutonium Processing Facility - 20147

At Sellafield, in the North West of the United Kingdom (UK), there are a number of redundant plutonium processing facilities. Over the past three decades several decommissioning strategies have been deployed to clean up these redundant facilities. Whilst there have been many successes previously reported, there remain many challenges. As previously presented at WM2017 (Paper Ref 17081) some of these challenges have recently been addressed through a new approach which introduced a number of innovations. The purpose of these innovations is to seek ways to significantly reduce risks to both decommissioning personnel and the environment by minimising the extent of physical 'hands on' decommissioning activities and by simplifying the waste production process. This paper provides an update on the progress of these innovations since 2017. Additionally, the paper also provides details of the new decommissioning technologies which have been introduced over the past 2 years to enable the most challenging aspects of the redundant plutonium processing facility to be decommissioned. These new decommissioning technologies address challenges associated with the preparation of process vessels and pipework to enable their safe in-situ size reduction by remote means: - New decommissioning techniques have been introduced to allow penetrations to be remotely cut into process vessels and pipework to provide a means of accessing and controlling the venting of any potential hydrogen gas present. - Additionally, a new large scale bespoke remote diamond wire cutting machine has been designed and manufactured to enable the process vessels to be size reduced in situ. Both of these new cutting technologies have involved collaborative working with specialist equipment suppliers including extensive development, trialling demonstration and commissioning prior to bringing the equipment into operational service. Several years of work have now culminated in reaching the final stages of decommissioning of the redundant plutonium processing facility with decommissioning of the final process vessels now underway and completion expected by the end of 2019. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Study of Waste Generated by Retrieval of Fuel Debris at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station - 20178

As a member of International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), we organized information on waste generated from the fuel debris retrieval, and considered containment, transport and storage processes. An important safety function to consider for these wastes is not only the handling of ordinary high-dose waste, but also the prevention of diffusion of fuel component contamination and the countermeasures against hydrogen gas generation. In order to satisfy these safety functions, we considered guideline for waste generated from the fuel debris retrieval, and proposed an example of handling process that includes generation of waste, container storage, on-site transfer and storage in a storage building. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Zero-Valent Iron Permeable Reactive Barrier to Remediate Volatile Organic Compounds in Groundwater - 20209

The US DOE-SRS, the US EPA, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control determined it was appropriate to perform a non-time critical removal action at the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit at the SRS to reduce the mass and downgradient transport of trichloroethylene in the P-Area groundwater plume. Contaminated groundwater discharges to a nearby stream, Steel Creek, within the SRS boundaries, resulting in trichloroethylene concentrations above the maximum contaminant level. Impact to surface water is limited in areal extent and supported by recently collected characterization data. The P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit encompasses the groundwater beneath an industrial area within SRS, P Area, where the P-Reactor once operated. The boundaries of the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit extend northwest to Steel Creek, northeast toward PAR Pond, and southeast to Meyers Branch. Groundwater in the Upper Three Runs Aquifer of the P-Area Groundwater Operable Unit has been impacted by reactor and facility operations between 1954 and 1991, including tritium and volatile organic compounds. The P-Area surface units contributing to groundwater contamination were remediated as part of the P-Area Operable Unit in 2011. The P-Reactor closure is one of the first of its kind in the DOE Complex and is one of only a few full-sized production reactors in the US to undergo completion of final closure activities. The nature and extent of groundwater contamination was determined using a variety of investigative approaches such as groundwater monitoring wells, direct-push technology, and surface water samples. Groundwater contamination associated with trichloroethylene is primarily exhibited in a narrow plume that extends from the source area at P-Reactor and west to Steel Creek. Maximum contaminant level exceedances in groundwater occur over an area of ∼6.9 hectares for trichloroethylene with concentrations as high as 7.7 milligrams per liter. To the west of the P-Area facility area, the trichloroethylene groundwater plume is controlled by a buried geologic feature, assumed to be an old stream bed, that further narrows the groundwater plume in what has been designated as the 'neck area.' This narrowing of the groundwater plume provides an ideal location for a treatment barrier. The non-time critical removal action alternative chosen is to install a zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier within the neck area of the trichloroethylene groundwater plume, perpendicular to groundwater flow direction. This technology will provide a treatment barrier that will reduce trichloroethylene groundwater concentrations by 90% and has an anticipated useful life of at least 25 years. A pre-design investigation was performed in the neck area to confirm site lithology, hydrogeology, geochemistry, and extent of trichloroethylene contamination prior to a final design. A treatability study, conducted as part of the pre-design investigation, indicated that the subsurface and groundwater in the PArea Groundwater Operable Unit is compatible with the zero-valent iron and will not lead to excessive buildup from mineralization/precipitation or biofouling. Probabilistic modeling was conducted using field and laboratory data to determine the expected performance of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier. The model simulations indicated that a 3.81-centimeter thick barrier would provide greater than 90% reduction of trichloroethylene groundwater concentration. The final design of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier is a barrier that will extend 80.5 linear meters in a 'zigzag' orientation to best transect the trichloroethylene plume and account for varying groundwater flow. The barrier will be installed from 13.7 meters below ground surface to 41.1 meters below ground surface for 65.8 linear meters and from 13.7 meters below ground surface to 36.6 meters below ground surface for 14.6 linear meters, the base of which is 'keyed' into a low permeability zone. The barrier is designed to a thickness of 10.2 centimeters, which was determined to reduce the trichloroethylene groundwater concentrations by greater than 90% with a safety factor of 2.67. A total of approximately 689 metric tons of zero-valent iron will be injected through 22 injection wells spaced 3.66 meters apart, using guar to suspend the zero-valent iron. Zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier construction will be monitored through 23 installed resistivity receivers offset 7.32 meters from the zerovalent iron permeable reactive barrier. The zero-valent iron will be energized with a low-voltage 100 Hertz signal during injection and will be monitored using the resistivity receivers to ensure complete coalescence of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier. The zero-valent iron was sized to have a hydraulic conductivity greater than the natural subsurface, thus promoting groundwater flow through the barrier. As contaminated groundwater contacts the zero-valent iron, volatile organic compounds, including trichloroethylene, are immediately degraded to harmless compounds such as ethylene. The performance of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier will be monitored using three upgradient monitoring well clusters, six downgradient monitoring well clusters, and four in-wall monitoring wells. The in-wall monitoring wells will indicate immediate reduction of trichloroethylene mass in the groundwater and allow analyses of the zero-valent iron permeable reactive barrier health. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} for Fukushima Daiichi Water Treatment Secondary Wastes - 20212

The Japanese government is supporting development work implemented jointly by Veolia subsidiaries Kurion Japan, K.K., Veolia Nuclear Solutions (VNS), Inc., and Veolia Nuclear Solutions Federal Services, LLC for treating radioactive waste generated from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) water treatment using the GeoMelt{sup TM} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} technology. The initial work consisted of glass formulation and engineering-scale testing which was completed in 2018, in the frame of an IRID (International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning) program as part of a project subsidized by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The Fukushima Daiichi NPS Mid- and Long-Term Road-map requires investigation of methods to stabilize solid wastes (and to immobilize radioisotopes in the wastes) generated as a result of emergency response and decommissioning activities. Cooling water treatment has resulted in a significant amount of solid and slurry secondary wastes (mostly adsorbents and ion-exchange materials) which will require processing at some point. GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} is a joule-heated melter technology which uses a refractory-lined single-use container combining the melter and disposal container. There is no pouring required nor concerns with refractory corrosion which allows the process to accommodate a wide range of waste chemistries and high waste loadings. The testing described here consisted of three engineering-scale melts, each processing between 212 kg and 240 kg of waste simulants, glass formers, and non-radioactive cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) tracers. Continuous isokinetic stack sampling of off-gas emissions was performed for each test in order to calculate Cs and Sr retention in the glass wasteform. Single-pass retention of Cs in the final glass wasteform ranged from 91.46 to 99.30%, and single-pass retention of Sr ranged from 99.76 to 100%. Planned particulate recycle will increase these retention levels. Melt 1 processed a mixture of KUR-EH (a zeolite-based ion-exchange material), simulated Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) Carbonate and Iron Slurries, and glass additives. Melt 2 processed a mixture of KUR-EH, KUR-TSG (a titanate-based adsorbent), and glass additives. Melt 3 processed a mixture of KUR-EH, simulated barium sulfate/iron ferrocyanide sludge (AREVA sludge), and glass additives. Waste loadings for these melts ranged from 70 weight percent (wt%) to 82 wt%. Vitrification produces a waste form much denser than the stored water treatment secondary waste wastes, resulting in significant volume reduction. Volume reductions for the three tests ranged from 74 to 79 vol%. Vitrification produces a chemically durable wasteform. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) tested three glass samples from each engineering-scale melt) by the Materials Characterization Center 1 (MCC-1) test, an international standard leach test of the chemical durability of nuclear waste glasses. PNNL also obtained one U.S. reference glass (EA Glass) and two Japan reference glasses P0798) and tested these under the same MCC-1 conditions (90 deg. C, 10 m-1, DIW, and 7, 14, 28-day) as the GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} glasses. The GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} glasses exhibited lower total normalized releases and 14- to 28-day normalized release rates than the three reference glasses. These results suggest that the GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} glasses have durabilities on par with high-level waste glasses under standard test conditions. Post-melt process sampling and analysis indicated no Cs migration into the melter refractory materials and very little deposition of Cs or Sr onto the melter hood or off-gas piping internals. The results of the testing indicated good Cs retention in the glass, high volume reduction and waste loadings, and excellent chemical durability. These factors are important to minimize treatment costs and to protect workers and the environment. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Contaminant Migration Modeling to Support the In Situ Decommissioning of Hardened Nuclear Facilities - 20215

The decommissioning of hardened nuclear facilities provides a unique challenge in balancing current worker dose with exposure to future receptors and media. In situ decommissioning (ISD) is a cost-effective and safe option for the closure of such facilities but requires a detailed understanding of the threat that radioactive and hazardous constituents remaining in the facilities pose to groundwater and surrounding surface water. The Savannah River Site (SRS) extensively employs contaminant migration models within the decommissioning process to develop site-specific removal, grouting, and monitoring strategies in support of safe and effective final end states of nuclear facilities. This work discusses the use of contaminant migration modeling in the ISD process at SRS, including specific examples from the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor, Building 235-F, F-Canyon and F/H Laboratory Complex. Migration models developed during the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor were divided into four source areas: the reactor vessel, the process area, the disassembly basin, and the purification wing. Each source area was assigned a specific inventory and migration pathway and was then subject to varying hypothetical removal, capping, and grouting schemes. Modeling indicated that groundwater Maximum Concentration Limits (MCLs) might be exceeded if no action was taken for eleven and ten constituents of concern (COCs) at P-Reactor and R-Reactor, respectively. These exceedances could occur in as few as 200 to 500 years. Alternatively, the migration modeling demonstrated that the selected ISD actions reduced contaminant mobility which allowed for significant radioactive decay and resulted in fewer predicted exceedances of groundwater MCLs (five COCs for P-Reactor; eight COCs for R-Reactor). In response to the modeling results for P-Reactor and R-Reactor, effectiveness monitoring programs were developed to target contaminants, specific to each reactor, that may migrate to groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling also revealed that roof collapse was a large factor in the release of COCs to the environment, giving rise to roof improvements, and an inspection and vegetation control program to ensure roof stability over time. Contaminant migration modeling is also aiding in the closure planning for hardened facilities in F Area. Building 235-F housed the Actinide Billet Line, which produced Np-237 billets for irradiation in SRS reactors, and the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility that produced Pu-238 heat sources for the space program. As a result of these missions, areas within Building 235-F contain considerable residual amounts of both Pu-238 and Np-237. Contaminant migration modeling of Building 235-F was originally performed in 2012 to identify the feasibility of ISD and the amount of radioactive material removal required to prevent the exceedance of groundwater MCLs. The original model indicated that a 60% reduction in the PuFF facility Pu-238 inventory could keep groundwater concentrations below standards, while Np-237 did not pose a threat to groundwater. However, updates to the model with an emphasis on source impact pathways revealed that, due to the orientation of the source areas relative to groundwater flow, no amount of reasonable removal of Pu-238 would keep groundwater concentrations below MCLs and that Np-237 could be a large contributor to localized MCL exceedances. With this insight, the refined 2019 model is being used to assist in the development of grouting plans specific to each facility source area, where bentonite may be utilized to slow the migration of Pu-238 and its daughter products from the PuFF facility and a reducing grout may decrease Np-237 transport by ensuring the nuclide remains in the less mobile +IV oxidation state. The beginning phases of contaminant migration modeling are underway for F-Canyon and associated facilities using lessons learned from the Reactors and Building 235-F. A contaminant migration pathway, similar to the pathway used for the reactor vessels, is being developed for the hot and warm canyons. The F-Canyon inventories are being spatially refined to identify specific and localized source zones, comparable to Building 235-F, that may impact groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling provides vital input within the ISD process, from facility investigation to post closure effectiveness monitoring, making it a valuable tool in the development of safe and effective end states for hardened nuclear facilities at SRS. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Reactor Activation Modelling with Physical Characterization Data and the Impact on Long Term Assessments - 20303

Whiteshell Laboratories, located in Manitoba, Canada, provided research facilities for the Canadian nuclear industry since the early 1960's. The facility was centered on Whiteshell Reactor 1 (WR-1), an organically cooled, heavy water moderated nuclear reactor. WR-1 was safely shut down in 1985, defueled and drained, and has been in a safe Storage with Surveillance (Deferred Decommissioning) state until present day. In support of an Environmental Assessment for proposed in-situ disposal of WR-1, detailed characterization information regarding the reactor core components (calandria, calandria tubes, and pressure tubes) was necessary to provide confidence that the long-term impacts of the facility can be assessed adequately. A simplified estimate of the total activation of core components was completed in 1992 using conservative assumptions, expected reactor configuration and computer models built with WIMS-CRNL, ONEDANT and ORIGEN-S. Due to the simplification, and age of the work, there was considerable doubt that the modelled inventory estimate of the core components was sufficient to support long-term performance modeling of the planned in-situ decommissioning. Additional data would be required to provide this confidence. Several options were considered for characterizing the WR-1 core components, but it was decided to collect only a limited number of samples in an effort to validate the 1992 simplified estimate as bounding. The limited number of samples reduced risks to workers, both radiological and non-radiological, and significantly reduced the costs required to confidently define and bound the radiological inventory of activation products in the core. The results of the sampling were compared to the simplified activation estimation. There was good agreement between the modelled and sampled results, with all major contributors to total activity showing similar relative quantities. The samples were generally lower than predicted by the models, with few exceptions. Notable exceptions included Nb-94, which were higher in the sample results than the model. This was determined to be caused by the use of Niobium containing steel alloys in the stainless steel pressure tube that were not accounted for in the models. The comparison of results provided confidence that the original inventory estimates produced through the simplified model are conservative and bounding, and therefore suitable for use in the long-term assessment of in situ disposal of the WR-1 reactor. This paper provides details of the simplified computer model results, their comparison to results of the sampling, and the changes adopted in the assessment of the in-situ decommissioning of WR-1 as a result. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Advanced Retrieval and Disposition Techniques for Remote Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste - 20319

Legacy waste generated by the sodium-cooled fast reactor, EBR-II, program at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) is challenging to treat and disposition using conventional methods. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions is under contract with the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate an integrated retrieval and disposition solution for Remote-Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste currently stored in underground liners at INL. Delivery of the integrated solution builds on the expertise and successes of Veolia Nuclear Solutions under its Problematic Waste Treatment Initiative with INL. This initiative focuses solely on the treatment of problematic (reactive metal containing) waste streams using the Veolia Nuclear Solutions GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) technology. Under the contract, Veolia Nuclear Solutions will provide a fully commissioned prototype remote retrieval system to semi-remotely retrieve and size-reduce problematic waste liners into a safe and consolidated package for transport. The consolidated package will be shipped to Richland, Washington for demonstration treatment using the robust GeoMelt Richland system at Perma-Fix Northwest. The treated waste will ultimately be disposed of as a vitrified Low-Level Waste glass monolith. Veolia Nuclear Solutions has delivered countless remotely operated systems globally to solve some of the industry's most challenging problems. To ensure risk is mitigated in the best possible manner, a methodical phased approach is being utilized to validate the integrated solution. This contract focuses on the delivery and deployment of the prototype retrieval system onsite and the treatment of a single liner. Following successful demonstration treatment using GeoMelt ICV, the project is planning to make prototype enhancements before retrieving and treating another liner. Establishing a new integrated approach for retrieval and disposition of waste offers many benefits to INL and the U.S. Department of Energy. It is anticipated that the integrated solution will provide significant cost and schedule savings by increasing the number of liners dispositioned per year. In addition, the complexity of the overall waste disposition process will be reduced. Remotely retrieving and size-reducing waste in the field will provide additional safety to operational personnel and allow critical resources, such as hot cells, to focus on the primary missions at hand. Vitrification (using the GeoMelt ICV technology) allows for the direct processing of metal clad waste thereby significantly reducing pretreatment steps while providing a robust waste form for long-term disposal. The results from this ongoing contract are presented in this paper. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Savannah River Site H-Canyon Advancing Technologies for Remote Inspections - 20345

In 2017, the DOE Environmental Management Office of Technology Development (DOE-EM TD) sponsored the H-Canyon Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) to demonstrate to DOE facilities the value of using new commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and near-ready technologies to solve difficult problems and enhance worker safety. The DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) H-Canyon Air Exhaust Tunnel (HCAEX) inspection task was identified as representative of the hazardous, human denied environments which could benefit from advanced technologies. The HCAEX underground concrete tunnel is visually inspected biannually using a camera mounted on a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) designed and built by SRNL. While tunnel images have provided valuable visual information, it is desirable to have a higher order of understanding of the environment to support a more thorough structural integrity (SI) analysis and for long term planning purposes. As part of the ATD, the Concrete Integrated Product Team (CIPT) was formed to identify and evaluate available sensors and methods mature enough to remotely obtain tunnel concrete characterization data of high value and with a high probability of success. The team included SMEs and H-Canyon stakeholders in the field of concrete, nondestructive examination (NDE), structural integrity, sensors and remote systems from SRNL, SRNS, LANL, DOE-SR and the Army Corps of Engineering. The CIPT completed an in-depth identification of customer concrete inspection needs and potential technology solutions. Sensors and methods were evaluated on performance, data usefulness, cost and the feasibility of a successful deployment given the unique tunnel access challenges and environment. Two technologies were identified as promising by the CIPT for near term demonstration and evaluation: Lidar (Light Detection and Ranging) 3-dimensional (3D) mapping and remote robotic deployment of NDE instrumentation. Laser spectroscopy to characterize tunnel surface chemical changes was also of interest, but presently cost prohibitive. This paper will include a discussion of the two efforts underway to evaluate and implement the CIPT recommendations. First, the status of the November 2019 deployment of Lidar at a single location into the tunnel is presented. This initial deployment provided the team a learning curve and lessons learned on the challenges of tunnel deployment to include remote operation and data collection, stabilization of the sensor in high air flow (∼30 mph), ability to achieve a tolerance accuracy of 0.25-inches, and the probability to identify change in tunnel dimensions over time. Secondly, a discussion on the development of the Robotic Arm Concrete Inspection Test Bed capable of deploying NDE instruments to examine custom concrete forms will be presented. Concrete forms simulating the rough concrete surfaces, strength, composition and potential structural defects that can be found at our DOE EM facilities have been designed and built for the test bed. Two state-of-the art concrete NDE instruments have been identified as having potential to work on rough concrete walls, they are being tested and characterized as to their ability to provide desired structural integrity data to include wall thickness and defect identification on the developed test beams. Lastly, lessons learned, and the path forward will be presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Study on the Strategy for Final Disposal and Reuse of Decontamination Wastes after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident - 20426

After the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, a large area of East Japan was contaminated by radio-Cs. To discuss the final disposal of the contaminated wastes off-site and the required development of related technologies, it is important to understand the volume and radiation concentration of the wastes after various treatments. For a scientific investigation purpose, a research committee has been formed by the Society for the Remediation of Radioactive Contamination in the Environment, which is independent from the Ministry of Environment. This committee's work is focused on discussing various scenarios for the final disposal considering a mass balance evaluation of the entire process, economic evaluations, and stakeholder consultation for final consensus. The current discussions of this committee are herein reported. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗