SCIFLI Artemis II Reentry Airborne Operations
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
We present spectroscopic data of strong lenses and their source galaxies using the Keck Near-Infrared Echellette Spectrometer (NIRES) and the Dark Energy Spectroscopic Instrument (DESI), providing redshifts necessary for nearly all strong-lensing applications with these systems, especially the extraction of physical parameters from lensing modeling. These strong lenses were found in the DESI Legacy Imaging Surveys using residual neural networks and followed up by our Hubble Space Telescope program, with all systems displaying unambiguous lensed arcs. With NIRES, we target eight lensed sources at redshifts difficult to measure in the optical range and determine the source redshifts for six, between z s = 1.675 and 3.332. DESI observed one of the remaining source redshifts, as well as an additional source redshift within the six systems. The two systems with nondetections by NIRES were observed for a considerably shorter 600 s at high airmass. Combining NIRES infrared spectroscopy with optical spectroscopy from our DESI Strong Lensing Secondary Target Program, these results provide the complete lens and source redshifts for six systems, a resource for refining automated strong lens searches in future deep- and wide-field imaging surveys and addressing a range of questions in astrophysics and cosmology.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Questions concerning the state of Venus' volcanological activity are currently under investigation. These questions were raised by the imaging radar and altimetric data obtained by the Magellan spacecraft, which began mapping Venus in Sept. 1990. Clues about the answers to these questions are provided by the nature and distribution of impact craters on the surface of Venus. Statistical tests show that the distribution of craters on Venus cannot be distinguished from a completely spatially random population. Further, the majority of craters look relatively pristine; only about 5 percent of the observed craters appear to be embayed or flooded by lavas. The simplest interpretation of these observations is a model in which the impact craters lie on a surface that has been undisturbed by volcanological and tectonic processes since the time the surface was formed. Counting up the number of craters and estimating the rate at which meteoroids strike the surface then gives an age for the venusian surface of 500 million years; in this model the volcanic activity since that time has been essentially nil. This scenario is described as a 'production' model, or perhaps more appropriately, a 'catastrophic' model.
Simulation of spacecraft battery operation is implemented. Robust design experiment to obtain optimum battery operational parameters is performed. It is found that short term tests using robust design of experiments can provide guidelines for optimum battery operation. It is decided to use robust design approach to provide guidelines for battery operation on current spacecraft in orbit as batteries age (GRO, UARS, EUVE, TOPEX).
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The battery was a three ampere hour nickel cadmium prismatic cell. The battery consists of 20 cells connected in series and there were two batteries per spacecraft. The battery operations (voltage and temperature) that the spacecraft sees during a normal operational day are discussed.
Recent advances in deformable mirrors based on monolithic piezoelectric substrates, such as lithium niobate, have the potential to improve the image quality of X-ray optical systems on synchrotron and free-electron laser beamlines and microscopes. However, the quantitative relationship between design parameters and the deformed shape has not been readily available in the literature. We present an analytical model, validated through finite element analysis, enabling calculation of tangential and sagittal curvatures based on mirror dimensions, crystallographic orientation, and applied voltage. We demonstrate that through the selection of material orientation, it is possible to achieve different deformed shapes (sphere, cylinder, or hyperbolic paraboloid). This methodology can be generalized to other piezoelectric materials and substrate-integrated actuator systems.
Not provided.
Not provided.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
In recent years following several spacecraft battery anomalies, it was determined that managing the operational factors of NASA flight NiCd rechargeable battery was very important in order to maintain space flight battery nominal performance. The optimization of existing flight battery operational performance was viewed as something new for a Taguchi Methods application.
This presentation discusses use of Core Flight Systems in NASA Langley Research Center's drone flight test environment for autonomy algorithms research.
The author summarizes and links together a number of papers that were presented at the Propulsion and Energetics (PEP) symposium on low temperature environment operation of turbojet engines that was held October 8 to 12, 1990. Topics covered include operational experience of ice ingestion in the turboprop engine in the 2,000 hp class, icing on helicopter turbo engines, icing test facilities, ice relevant cloud physical parameters, and low temperature and fuel problems.