Summary of management and operational philosophy.
Program evaluation and review technique covering progress, cost estimates, contracts, personnel panels, management and operational philosophies
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Program evaluation and review technique covering progress, cost estimates, contracts, personnel panels, management and operational philosophies
The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) will be launched in January 2013 to continue the legacy of Landsat land imagery collection that has been on-going for the past 40 years. While the overall mission and science goals are designed to produce the SAME data over the years, the ground systems designed to support the mission objectives have evolved immensely. The LDCM Flight Dynamics System (FDS) currently being tested and deployed for operations is highly automated and well integrated with the other ground system elements. The FDS encompasses the full suite of flight dynamics functional areas, including orbit and attitude determination and prediction, orbit and attitude maneuver planning and execution, and planning product generation. The integration of the orbit, attitude, maneuver, and products functions allows a very smooth flow for daily operations support with minimal input needed from the operator. The system also provides a valuable real-time component that monitors the on-board orbit and attitude during every ground contact and will autonomously alert the Flight Operations Team (FOT) personnel when any violations are found. This paper provides an overview of the LDCM Flight Dynamics System and a detailed description of how it is used to support space operations. For the first time on a Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)-managed mission, the ground attitude and orbits systems are fully integrated into a cohesive package. The executive engine of the FDS permits three levels of automation: low, medium, and high. The high-level, which will be the standard mode for LDCM, represents nearly lights-out operations. The paper provides an in-depth look at these processes within the FDS in support of LDCM in all mission phases.
Medical systems supporting exploration-class missions to the Moon and Mars will require greater inflight medical decision-making autonomy. An understanding of current ISS training regimens for Crew Medical Officers (CMOs) as well as the role of ground support personnel in medical operations is needed to identify the starting point from which exploration medical system design must evolve in order to achieve inflight medical autonomy.
Photovoltaic power systems in remote villages in the United States and Africa are described. These projects were undertaken to demonstrate that existing photovoltaic system technology is capable of providing electrical power for basic domestic services for the millions of small, remote communities in both developed and developing countries. One system is located in the Papago Indian Village of Schuchuli in southwest Arizona (U. S.) and became operational 16 December 1978. The other system is located in Tangaye, a rural village in Upper Volta, Africa. It became operational 1 March 1979. The Schuchuli system has a 3.5 kW (peak) solar array which provides electric power for village water pumping, a refrigerator for each family, lights in the village buildings, and a community washing machine and sewing machine. The 1.8 kW (peak) Tangaye system provides power for community water pumping, flour milling and lights in the milling building. These are both stand-alone systems (i.e., no back-up power source) which are being operated and maintained by local personnel. Both systems are instrumented. Systems operations are being monitored by NASA to measure design adequacy and to refine designs for future systems.
Process analysis can identify opportunities for efficiency improvement including cost reduction, increased safety, improved quality, and decreased environmental impact. A thorough, systematic approach to materials and process selection is valuable in any analysis. New operations and facilities design offer the best opportunities for proactive cost reduction and environmental improvement, but existing operations and facilities can also benefit greatly. Materials and processes that have been used for many years may be sources of excessive resource use, waste generation, pollution, and cost burden that should be replaced. Operational and purchasing personnel may not recognize some materials and processes as problems. Reasons for materials or process replacement may include quality and efficiency improvements, excessive resource use and waste generation, materials and operational costs, safety (flammability or toxicity), pollution prevention, compatibility with new processes or materials, and new or anticipated regulations.
NASA uses two HRA assessment methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is still expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a PRA model that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more problematic. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.
The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) launch control system for the Orion capsule and Space Launch System, the next generation manned rocket currently in development. This large system requires highly trained and knowledgeable personnel. Master Console Operators (MCO) are currently working on familiarizing themselves with any possible scenario that they may encounter. An intern was recruited to help assist them with creating a tool to use for the process.
From May of 1973 to February of 1974, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration conducted a series of three manned missions to the Skylab space station, a voluminous vehicle largely descendant of Apollo hardware, and America s first space station. The crewmembers of these three manned missions spent record breaking durations of time in microgravity (28 days, 59 days and 84 days, respectively) and gave the U.S. space program its first experiences with long-duration space flight. The program overcame a number of obstacles (including a significant crippling of the Skylab vehicle) to conduct a lauded scientific program that encompassed life sciences, astronomy, solar physics, materials sciences and Earth observation. Skylab has more to offer than the results of its scientific efforts. The operations conducted by the Skylab crews and ground personnel represent a rich legacy of operational experience. As we plan for our return to the moon and the subsequent manned exploration of Mars, it is essential to utilize the experiences and insights of those involved in previous programs. Skylab and SMEAT (Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test) personnel have unique insight into operations being planned for the Constellation Program, such as umbilical extra-vehicular activity and water landing/recovery of long-duration crewmembers. Skylab was also well known for its habitability and extensive medical suite; topics which deserve further reflection as we prepare for lunar habitation and missions beyond Earth s immediate sphere of influence. The Skylab Medical Operations Summit was held in January 2008. Crewmembers and medical personnel from the Skylab missions and SMEAT were invited to participate in a two day summit with representatives from the Constellation Program medical operations community. The purpose of the summit was to discuss issues pertinent to future Constellation operations. The purpose of this document is to formally present the recommendations of the Skylab and SMEAT participants.
Multimission Image Processing Lab (MIPL) at JPL is responsible for (among other things) the ground-based operational image processing of all the recent in-situ Mars missions: (1) Mars Pathfinder (2) Mars Polar Lander (3) Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) (4) Phoenix (5) Mars Science Lab (MSL) Mosaics are probably the most visible products from MIPL (1) Generated for virtually every rover position at which a panorama is taken (2) Provide better environmental context than single images (3) Valuable to operations and science personnel (4) Arguably the signature products for public engagement
We conducted a comprehensive literature review summarizing optimal sleep hygiene parameters for lighting, temperature, airflow, humidity, comfort, intermittent and erratic sounds, and privacy and security in the sleep environment. We reviewed the design and use of sleep environments in a wide range of cohorts including among aquanauts, expeditioners, pilots, military personnel and ship operators. We also reviewed the specifications and sleep quality data arising from every NASA spaceflight mission, beginning with Gemini. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with individuals experienced in sleeping in non-traditional spaces including oilrig workers, Navy personnel, astronauts, and expeditioners. We also interviewed the engineers responsible for the design of the sleeping quarters presently deployed on the International Space Station. We found that the optimal sleep environment is cool, dark, quiet, and is perceived as safe and private. There are wide individual differences in the preferred sleep environment; therefore modifiable sleeping compartments are necessary to ensure all crewmembers are able to select personalized configurations for optimal sleep. It is possible to utilize lessons learned from prior spaceflight missions and from other industries in order to guide the design of an optimal sleep space suitable for long-duration spaceflight.
The Johnson Space Center Engineering and Science Network (JESNET) supports the JSC Engineering and Space and Life Sciences Directorates by providing a network of interconnected ETHERNETS with a wide diversity of processing and routing nodes throughout the Johnson Space Center and off-site contractor locations. The JESNET provides the primary method of communication between the various computers that support the Directorates. Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Co. (LESC) is tasked with the operation and maintenance of certain primary portions of this network. Since maintenance of this network depends on the timely identification and subsequent repair of problems on the network, the decision was made to develop a JESNET Expert Assistant (JEA) to assist LESC personnel in the operation and maintenance of the JESNET. The JEA is being implemented in CLIPS, DEC Graphical Kernal System (GKS(TM)) and C on a DEC MicroVAX(TM) with VMS(TM).
This paper explores the use of high resolution 3D visualization tools for exploring the feasibility and advantages of future military cargo airlift concepts and evaluating compatibility with existing and future payload requirements. Realistic 3D graphic representations of future airlifters are immersed in rich, supporting environments to demonstrate concepts of operations to key personnel for evaluation, feedback, and development of critical joint support. Accurate concept visualizations are reviewed by commanders, platform developers, loadmasters, soldiers, scientists, engineers, and key principal decision makers at various stages of development. The insight gained through the review of these physically and operationally realistic visualizations is essential to refining design concepts to meet competing requirements in a fiscally conservative defense finance environment. In addition, highly accurate 3D geometric models of existing and evolving large military vehicles are loaded into existing and proposed aircraft cargo bays. In this virtual aircraft test-loading environment, materiel developers, engineers, managers, and soldiers can realistically evaluate the compatibility of current and next-generation airlifters with proposed cargo.
It is appropriate here to repeat the analogy described in the introduction to this paper which is that: The consideration of human factors requirements during the design stage of advanced, new technology systems may be seen as resting over a three-legged stool. The first leg, the equipment that a system will utilize to achieve its goals, has traditionally attracted ergonomic considerations associated with equipment design, usually centered around 'knobs and dials.' Lately, this view has expanded to include the so-called other important aspect of Human Factor's study which deals with the cognitive, behaviorial and social processes of the human operators. Study in this area must be furthered. The second leg of the stool, the procedures to operate the equipment, however, has been largely unaddressed. Procedures are not inherent to equipment, but must be developed. The importance of proper human factors consideration in the design of procedures can not be overstated. Lastly, the third leg of the stool, the certification of personnel who will operate the equipment, is very much underway, but far from being complete. The real quest now, however, is to integrate these three legs into an indivisible one. Finally, and most importantly, this workshop and its topic are extremely timely in that we are at the dawn of the most ambitious development ever undertaken in international civil aviation. This would allow us the rather unique opportunity to put theory into practice in the near future by ensuring that the concepts developed and furthered by this workshop and the follow-up are implemented in the design and certification of the ICAO future CNS/ATM systems described earlier in this paper. Now is the time to incorporate human factors requirements during the certification processes of these systems. This might act as a test to the feasibility of these ideas. Such endeavors represent a challenge for the research, engineering, training, operational and regulatory communities. But there is certainly more to be gained by attempting to meet the challenge rather than refraining from progress by decrying the difficulties involved.
Irregular operations involve disruption of scheduled airline operations. They ate of concern to the carriers because they cost money, require personnel effort, and may harm customer good will. Irregular operations may result from aircraft system malfunctions that take planes out of service or result in cancellations, Might system problems or passenger medical emergencies that require diversions, local airport problems that may close down a runway, or weather systems that restrict flow into airports or regions. At the heart of responding to irregular operations is distributed decision making by members of airline operations centers, pilots, and the air traffic control system. Six U.S. carriers participated in a study in which we observed strategies used by operations center personnel to handle various classes of irregular operations. We focused on situations that are most disruptive to regular operations and are most difficult to cope with. We also sought to identify classes of events that would be most affected by changes in the air traffic management system. How a carrier deals with disruptions to its schedule reflects its philosophy and primary goals, as well as its resources. Size and type of operations (short or long-haul) determine which problems have priority. Each airline has different technological support tools to aid in flight planning and replanning, and some carriers have established contingency procedures for coping with various situations. We also examined differences in extent and type of interaction between ABC personnel and various elements of the air traffic system as they managed various problems: who interacts with AM what situations prompt interaction, how often these occur, and the outcomes and Perceived benefits. Use of the expanded NRP program was also studied, along with its advantages to the individual companies. We also examined the implications of the proposed change to a free flight environment on airline strategies for coping with irregular operations.
A detailed discussion is presented of the Apollo 15 mission, which conducted exploration of the moon over longer periods, greater ranges, and with more instruments of scientific data acquisition than previous missions. The topics include trajectory, lunar surface science, inflight science and photography, command and service module performance, lunar module performance, lunar surface operational equipment, pilot's report, biomedical evaluation, mission support performance, assessment of mission objectives, launch phase summary, anomaly summary, and vehicle and equipment descriptions. The capability of transporting larger payloads and extending time on the moon were demonstrated. The ground-controlled TV camera allowed greater real-time participation by earth-bound personnel. The crew operated more as scientists and relied more on ground support team for systems monitoring. The modified pressure garment and portable life support system provided better mobility and extended EVA time. The lunar roving vehicle and the lunar communications relay unit were also demonstrated.
Current evidence demonstrates that astronauts experience sleep loss and circadian desynchronization during spaceflight. Ground-based evidence demonstrates that these conditions lead to reduced performance, increased risk of injuries and accidents, and short and long-term health consequences. Many of the factors contributing to these conditions relate to the habitability of the sleep environment. Noise, inadequate temperature and airflow, and inappropriate lighting and light pollution have each been associated with sleep loss and circadian misalignment during spaceflight operations and on Earth. As NASA prepares to send astronauts on long-duration, deep space missions, it is critical that the habitability of the sleep environment provide adequate mitigations for potential sleep disruptors. We conducted a comprehensive literature review summarizing optimal sleep hygiene parameters for lighting, temperature, airflow, humidity, comfort, intermittent and erratic sounds, and privacy and security in the sleep environment. We reviewed the design and use of sleep environments in a wide range of cohorts including among aquanauts, expeditioners, pilots, military personnel and ship operators. We also reviewed the specifications and sleep quality data arising from every NASA spaceflight mission, beginning with Gemini. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with individuals experienced sleeping in non-traditional spaces including oil rig workers, Navy personnel, astronauts, and expeditioners. We also interviewed the engineers responsible for the design of the sleeping quarters presently deployed on the International Space Station. We found that the optimal sleep environment is cool, dark, quiet, and is perceived as safe and private. There are wide individual differences in the preferred sleep environment; therefore modifiable sleeping compartments are necessary to ensure all crewmembers are able to select personalized configurations for optimal sleep. A sub-optimal sleep environment is tolerable for only a limited time, therefore individual sleeping quarters should be designed for long-duration missions. In a confined space, the sleep environment serves a dual purpose as a place to sleep, but also as a place for storing personal items and as a place for privacy during non-sleep times. This need for privacy during sleep and wake appears to be critically important to the psychological well-being of crewmembers on long-duration missions.