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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Analysis and Standardization of Spacecraft Command Generation Processes

center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.

human errors.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Command Process Modeling & Risk Analysis

Commanding Errors may be caused by a variety of root causes. It's important to understand the relative significance of each of these causes for making institutional investment decisions. One of these causes is the lack of standardized processes and procedures for command and control. We mitigate this problem by building periodic tables and models corresponding to key functions within it. These models include simulation analysis and probabilistic risk assessment models.

functional analysis↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Failure in NASA Missions: Blunders, Normal Accidents, High Reliability, Bad Luck

NASA emphasizes crew safety and system reliability but several unfortunate failures have occurred. The Apollo 1 fire was mistakenly unanticipated. After that tragedy, the Apollo program gave much more attention to safety. The Challenger accident revealed that NASA had neglected safety and that management underestimated the high risk of shuttle. Probabilistic Risk Assessment was adopted to provide more accurate failure probabilities for shuttle and other missions. NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" initiative and government procurement reform led to deliberately dismantling traditional reliability engineering. The Columbia tragedy and Mars mission failures followed. Failures can be attributed to blunders, normal accidents, or bad luck. Achieving high reliability is difficult but possible.

accidents↗
NASA NTRS2016

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pharmaceuticals Exposed to the Space Environment: Problems and Prospects

The NASA Human Research Program (HRP) Health Countermeasures Element maintains ongoing efforts to inform detailed risks, gaps, and further questions associated with the use of pharmaceuticals in space. Most recently, the Pharmacology Risk Report, released in 2010, illustrates the problems associated with maintaining pharmaceutical efficacy. Since the report, one key publication includes evaluation of pharmaceutical products stored on the International Space Station (ISS). This study shows that selected pharmaceuticals on ISS have a shorter shelf-life in space than corresponding terrestrial controls. The HRP Human Research Roadmap for planetary exploration identifies the risk of ineffective or toxic medications due to long-term storage during missions to Mars. The roadmap also identifies the need to understand and predict how pharmaceuticals will behave when exposed to radiation for long durations. Terrestrial studies of returned samples offer a start for predictive modeling. This paper shows that pharmaceuticals returned to Earth for post-flight analyses are amenable to a Weibull distribution analysis in order to support probabilistic risk assessment modeling. The paper also considers the prospect of passive payloads of key pharmaceuticals on sample return missions outside of Earth's magnetic field to gather additional statistics. Ongoing work in radiation chemistry suggests possible mitigation strategies where future work could be done at cryogenic temperatures to explore methods for preserving the strength of pharmaceuticals in the space radiation environment, perhaps one day leading to an architecture where pharmaceuticals are cached on the Martian surface and preserved cryogenically.

pharmacology↗
NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗
NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk, and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results, and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods. This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty are rendered obsolete since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper shows how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2017

And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2016

Estimating Orion Heat Shield Failure Due To Ablator Cracking During The EFT-1 Mission

The Orion EFT-1 heatshield suffered from two major certification challenges: First, the mechanical properties used in design were not evident in the flight hardware and second, the flight article itself cracked during fabrication. The combination of these events motivated the Orion Program to pursue an engineering-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as part of heatshield certification rationale. The PRA provided loss of Mission (LOM) likelihoods considering the probability of a crack occurring during the mission and the likelihood of subsequent structure over-temperature. The methods and input data for the PRA are presented along with a discussion of the test data used to anchor the results. The Orion program accepted an EFT-1 Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk of 1-in-160,000 due to in-mission Avcoat cracking based on the results of this analysis. Conservatisms in the result, along with future considerations for Exploration Missions (EM) are also addressed.

Avcoat↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risks from Solar Particle Events for Long Duration Space Missions Outside Low Earth Orbit

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) simulates the medical occurrences and mission outcomes for various mission profiles using probabilistic risk assessment techniques. As part of the work with the Integrated Medical Model (IMM), this project focuses on radiation risks from acute events during extended human missions outside low Earth orbit (LEO). Of primary importance in acute risk assessment are solar particle events (SPEs), which are low probability, high consequence events that could adversely affect mission outcomes through acute radiation damage to astronauts. SPEs can be further classified into coronal mass ejections (CMEs) and solar flares/impulsive events (Fig. 1). CMEs are an eruption of solar material and have shock enhancements that contribute to make these types of events higher in total fluence than impulsive events.

health↗
NASA NTRS2017

And the Human Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It, The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as safely as we have. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lowers the risk.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Bridging the Engineering and Medicine Gap

A primary challenge NASA faces is communication between the disparate entities of engineers and human system experts in life sciences. Clear communication is critical for exploration mission success from the perspective of both risk analysis and data handling. The engineering community uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models to inform their own risk analysis and has extensive experience managing mission data, but does not always fully consider human systems integration (HSI). The medical community, as a part of HSI, has been working 1) to develop a suite of tools to express medical risk in quantitative terms that are relatable to the engineering approaches commonly in use, and 2) to manage and integrate HSI data with engineering data. This talk will review the development of the Integrated Medical Model as an early attempt to bridge the communication gap between the medical and engineering communities in the language of PRA. This will also address data communication between the two entities in the context of data management considerations of the Medical Data Architecture. Lessons learned from these processes will help identify important elements to consider in future communication and integration of these two groups.

Walton, M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Modeling the Risk of U.S. Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration-Well Drilling, Commercial Nuclear Plants, and Human Spaceflight

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been applied in different industries for many years. Each industry and technology area presents varying challenges and priorities, and the risk models therefore need to be somewhat different. This paper compares aspects of risk modeling of offshore drilling, nuclear plant operation, and human spaceflight. Risk models in all three technology areas have certain high-level similarities: (1) they employ redundancy and diversity in their means to prevent or mitigate risk, including a mix of active and passive systems designed to respond to off-normal evolutions; (2) they are affected by human reliability; (3) their models require consideration of coupling between scenario structure and scenario phenomenology. But in examining the models in more detail, one sees important differences in methodology and emphasis. For purposes of comparison, this paper discusses aspects of a risk model of an offshore drilling operation in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, focusing on where such a development differs in important ways from models of commercial U.S. nuclear plants and models developed for human spaceflight.

Boyer, Roger L.↗