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At least 217 records · Page 12

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DOE OSTI2015

Requalification of historical intermediate level waste (ILW) for the repository KONRAD on basis of non destructive assay (NDA) and re-evaluated nuclide vectors - 15289

The storage facility for ILW of the HDB contains a large number of historical waste products in 200-l drum geometry, which were produced in the 1970's to the 1990's. In the next years more ILW will be treated and stored at HDB, exceeding the storage capacity of the ILW store. All waste products produced at HDB are treated according to the acceptance criteria of the repository KONRAD and are planned to final storage in this repository. In order to qualify the waste materials for final storage in KONRAD and to remove parts of the inventory from the storage chambers this project was started. The main issues of the project, which will be accompanied by the regulator, are product control measures like gas chromatographic analyses of remotely sampled gas syringes and non destructive assay techniques like?-spectrometry and neutron-analytics. The product control is followed by declaration on the basis of re-evaluated nuclide vectors and a repackaging of the drums in licensed containers. The packaging concept includes a 400-l drum as qualified over-pack, because several of the historical drums cannot be qualified as IP-II or type A package. The annual space between the two drums is filled with quartz sand for stability and additional shielding. The drum set is afterwards inserted into a qualified UBA-container provided by GNS. In the case that the product control measures and the reassessment of the declarations result in a violation of the activity limits of the relevant acceptance criteria for KONRAD, the respective drum has to be physically re-qualified after correspondence with the surveillance authorities. This program will be applied to a fraction of approx. 400 canisters, which were selected on the basis of several quality aspects like dose rate below 100 mSv/h, nuclide inventory below 100 A2 according to paragraph 201 of TS-R-1 and well-known waste composition. In the future more waste products will be treated in the same way, if approved containers exist for the inventory. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Long-term performance of engineered barriers for high-level waste repositories - 15358

The evolution of the engineered barrier system (EBS) of geological repositories for high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent fuel (SF) has been the subject of many national and international research programs during recent years. The emphasis of the research activities was on the elaboration of a detailed understanding of the complex coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical and -chemical (THM-C) processes, which are expected to evolve in the early post-closure period in the near field. From the perspective of radiological long-term safety, an in-depth understanding of these coupled processes is of great significance, because the evolution of the EBS during the early post-closure phase may have a non-negligible impact on the safety functions at later stages of the repository's lifetime. Process interactions during the re-saturation phase (heat pulse, gas generation, non-uniform water uptake from the host rock) could impair the homogeneity of the safety-relevant properties in the EBS (e.g. swelling pressure, hydraulic conductivity, diffusivity). The 7. Framework EURATOM PEBS project (long-term Performance of Engineered Barrier Systems) was initiated in 2010 and completed in March 2014. The project aimed at evaluating the sealing and barrier performance of clay-based EBS over time. The project approach included experiments, model development and consideration of the potential impact on long-term safety functions. The specific project aims were to: -deepen the understanding of the THM and THM-C evolution of the EBS system with time, - provide an enhanced quantitative basis for relating the evolutionary behavior to the safety functions, - clarify further the significance of residual uncertainties for long-term performance assessment. It can be concluded that uncertainties in process understanding occurring in the re-saturation period have been better constrained through PEBS studies, thus the uncertainties in the long-term performance of bentonite barriers have been reduced in some areas. Improvements are in the areas of evolution of materials properties and model development and testing at various scales. On-going in-situ experiments in underground research laboratories may play an important role in further confirming bentonite performance over periods of 10 - 20 years. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Licensing of the national repository for LILW waste in Bulgaria - 15609

Radioactive waste arises from the operation and decommissioning of the Bulgarian nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications and industry. The need for building the National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government, and described and justified in the Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (SL-LILW). The European Union finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund. The Bulgarian government has defined the NDF as a Project of National Importance. At the conclusion of an international tendering process, SERAW awarded the contract for development of the NDF design, including Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR), to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.U, DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, and ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency. Two Bulgarian companies also participate in the project as subcontractors;KK-Project and EQE-Bulgaria. The project 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria' is identified within SERAW as 'R-Project 5'. Since obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository design variant, R Project 5 has focused on the development of the Technical Design and on preparation of the ISAR, which demonstrates the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design. The Consortium submitted to SERAW the Technical Design for revision on March 2013. SERAW's experts immediately started the review of the design. In addition, SERAW invited independent, highly qualified Bulgarian experts and scientists to participate in the review. In November 2013, SERAW approved the Technical Design. The Consortium submitted the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report to SERAW for review following a similar process in July 2014. Both documents were meanwhile handed over to the appropriate Bulgarian licensing authorities. SERAW's goal is to receive a license for construction of the NDF in early 2015. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Design and Construction of a Loess-Cement Cushion as an Integral Component of an SL-LILW Repository - 16077

The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is planning the construction of a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste, the National Disposal Facility (NDF), adjacent to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The NDF will be constructed as a reinforced concrete vault-type repository system, where prefabricated cubic waste packages (2 m on a side) will be emplaced in large reinforced concrete disposal cells. Waste emplacement operations will be conducted in three phases over a total of 60 years of operations. After the last waste packages have been disposed, an engineered multilayer cover will be installed over the site to further isolate the waste from the accessible environment. The Radiana Site where the NDF will be constructed is a sloping area located between the second and sixth loess terraces above the River Danube with elevations ranging from approximately +40 m to elevation +95 m. The unsaturated zone at the location selected for waste disposal ranges from 13 m to 16 m in thickness. After construction, the unsaturated zone will consist of a 5 m thick, engineered loess-cement cushion installed over naturally occurring Pliocene clays and sandy clayey sediments of the Brusarci Formation with a thickness above the top of groundwater ranging from 8 m to 11 m. The loess-cement cushion is a key component of the 'engineered fill' barrier as identified in the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report (ISAR) for the NDF. This barrier consists of engineered fill both below the disposal cells, i.e., the loess-cement cushion, and above the disposal cells, i.e. the final multilayer cover to be installed at closure of the facility. The loess-cement cushion component of this barrier will act to provide a geo-technically stable foundation for the disposal system. In addition, the barrier will raise the base of the disposal cells and increases the unsaturated zone thickness above the top of the groundwater table, as well as to serve as a chemical barrier that will act to sorb radionuclides thereby retarding their migration to the underlying groundwater. In addition to its assigned barrier functions the loess cement cushion also houses key embedded components required as part of the overall NDF safety concept, including systems necessary for operational and post-closure performance monitoring as well as the support foundation structures required for the mobile roofs, which are designed to handle and protect the waste during emplacement operations. The post-closure monitoring period, i.e., the period of institutional control, is given by as 300 years. While similar although less massive cushions have been previously constructed as foundations for various structures at the KNPP, the loess-cement cushion planned for construction at the NDF including the embedded structures will represent a first of its kind construction in terms of both its physical dimensioning as well as its requirements for long-term performance. This paper describes the design of the cushion, its functions and its construction as planned for the NDF as an integral component of the site safety concept. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Key Information File for Radioactive Waste Repositories - Preliminary Tests - 16169

The Key Information File (KIF) is a document designed to provide a summary of the existence, location and content of an engineered facility for the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes. It should be recognized as part of an internationally integrated system of records and memory. Its primary function would be to maintain awareness of the site, and long-term confidence in the effectiveness of the disposal system, so that the likelihood of unnecessary human disturbance is minimized. In order to ensure this document is accessible to a large audience, it would need to be limited in size. A draft format for the KIF has been proposed, and testing is being conducted on two cases, that of the 'Centre de stockage de la Manche', the closed French Repository (surface) and that of the planned Swedish Spent Fuel Repository (geological). Preliminary results show the potential for such a document. Comments and questions raised by the 'Records, Knowledge and Memory preservation' (RK and M) initiative, coordinated by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of OECD, are presented. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Progress of the Czech Republic Deep Geological Repository Program - 16255

The Czech Republic operates two NPPs with 6 pressurized water reactors. Czech state is fully responsible for the disposal of all radioactive waste including spent nuclear fuel and it provides the Radioactive Waste Repository Authority (SURAO) established in 1997. According to the RWM Policy a deep geological repository (DGR) considered to be the only feasible option for the final disposal of spent fuel. The State Policy set out important milestones for DGR development - the selection of candidate sites by 2020 and the selection of a final site by 2025. The final commissioning of a DGR is planned for 2065. The initial stages of DGR development involved the screening of geological conditions of the whole territory. Granites would provide the most suitable rock environment for DGR siting purposes. By the end of 2012 SURAO will have proposed 7 sites for the potential geological surveys and the first stage of site characterization work. Licenses for geological survey for this stage are in the force since October 2015. Main goal of RD and D programme is to support the siting programme for the selection of the candidate sites, to adapt a DGR design on suitable sites and to support the safety case. SURAO decided to enhance the extent of in-situ RD and D at a depth corresponding to that of the future DGR. In 2013 SURAO commenced the construction of the Bukov Underground Research Facility in the southern section of the Rozna uranium mine at a depth of 600 m below the surface in crystalline rock environment. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Integrated Systems Analysis for a Regional Deep Borehole Repository for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel - 16291

Some nuclear waste stakeholders have suggested private interim storage facilities (ISF), but little work has been done to consider the cost or logistics for nuclear waste management or disposal facilities smaller than the national scale. This paper performs an integrated system analysis for a deep borehole repository system which would accept waste from a regional subset of the national commercial reactor fleet. The regional subset is comprised of a centrally-located host state with a large SNF inventory surrounded by states with small SNF inventories. The chosen region will contain between one-fifth and one-quarter of the national commercial SNF inventory. Using best estimates of past and future SNF discharges in the sample region, the SNF inventory in the chosen region is characterized by reactor of origin. Basic parameters are then chosen for the regional repository, such as the annual rate of waste emplacement and the time necessary to process borehole-specific waste canisters. Scenarios chosen for analysis test the sensitivity of a variety of system parameters, including the annual rate of waste acceptance, the division of annual waste acceptance among sites, the use of bare fuel transportation canisters, and the size of the regional subset of reactors. Estimated costs for the facility are $13 billion for around 27,000 MT of SNF and $16 billion for around 35,000 MT. This translates to $490,000 per MT and $466,000 per MT, respectively. These unit costs are comparable to the $370,000 per MT estimate for the full 140,000 MT national inventory. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Experience with the Quality Control of Radioactive Waste Packages for the German Repository Konrad - 16493

The German repository Konrad for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation is designed to accept 303,000 m{sup 3} of waste packages in total. Based on the Konrad licensing conditions, any treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste should be planned and carried out in accordance with the waste acceptance requirements of the repository Konrad in order to produce waste packages suitable for disposal. The qualification of the waste treatment processes and the resulting products are achieved by interaction of different parties involved. On behalf of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection - the competent German authority for disposal of radioactive waste - TUV NORD EnSys Hannover GmbH and Co. KG acts as one of the independent expert organizations for more than twenty years in the field of qualification of waste treatment campaigns and review of waste packages documentations. The permitted amount of nuclide activity in the radioactive waste packages depends on the characteristics of the radioactive waste products. Projecting a suitable strategy for loading the waste containers contributes to determine in advance, what requirements the radioactive waste products have to fulfill as well as what properties of the waste products need to be verified and documented during conditioning or treatment process. On the basis of various examples, it is being demonstrated how appropriate advance process planning can ensure that radioactive waste packages are generated to comply with the waste acceptance requirements. In consequence, technical measures due to requalification can be avoided even in case of unpredictable difficulties. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Operational Aspects of an International Sub-seabed HLW Repository - 18450

The advantages of and the need for an internationally available repository for SNF and other HLW has been recognized since the 1980's. Various proposals have been pursued over the years but none have been able to overcome the hurdle of the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome. Sub-seabed disposal has no NIMBY concerns because the disposal facilities are located in sediments below approximately 4000 meters of international waters. This simple approach precisely emplaces HLW canisters using penetrators released from a ship and driven by gravity ∼50 meters into the sub-seabed ooze. The concept was actively studied and demonstrated by 200+ researchers from 10 different countries for over 12 years. Although it was found to be technically feasible and cost effective, social pressures to keep the oceans off-limits to most disposal activities resulted in termination of the coordinated international effort. By 1994 an International Maritime Organization (IMO) treaty, commonly referred to as the 'London Convention/ London Protocol' was in place banning all such activities. However, the list of banned activities has been amended as recently as 2006. The sub-seabed repository effort has been conducted on three fronts. First, previous research was evaluated to confirm the technical feasibility and identify areas requiring additional research or development. Secondly, the probability of successfully amending the London Convention/London Protocol was assessed. Third, an operational and business model was developed to ensure the private enterprise endeavor was worth pursuing from a business standpoint. The latter is the focus of this paper. (author)

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DOE OSTI2019

Emplacement Room Mock-up Structure for Testing the Placement of Nuclear Waste Within a Deep Geologic Repository - 19271

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) has conceptualized a unique method of long-term storage for spent nuclear waste. The concept encompasses all aspects of the end-of-life process from the point the spent fuel is no longer in-service; including handling, shipping, containing, storing, monitoring, and finally decommissioning. The equipment developed for each process is unique and designed specifically for each operation. Since these methods have not been implemented before, it is required to prove each process and the related equipment through simulations and eventually practical tests to evaluate performance and to confirm effective and safe operation. The spent fuel will be stored in an underground repository several hundred meters below the surface using autonomous machinery. Considering the significant investment and labour involved in creating full-scale tests underground, it would be impractical at this project stage to attempt tests of the newly developed machinery and methods in other than a surface setting. Therefore, our scope was to provide a customizable mock-up structure to simulate the conditions and constraints an underground repository would present. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 109: US HLW Repository: Status and Next Steps

This panel focused on the technical, institutional and broader political issues associated with advancing a US HLW Repository program including programmatic, regulatory, legislative and funding challenges. Panelist with presentations: WM 2020 HLW Repository Status and Next Steps (Leo Blundo)

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DOE OSTI2020

Ten-Year Review of US/German Collaboration in Salt Repository Research - 20069

A multinational collaboration on salt repository research, design and operation has enjoyed remarkable success since reinvigorating efforts in 2010. Nations now engaged in the shared salt repository research agenda include Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Poland. The scientific basis for safe and permanent disposal of nuclear waste in salt formations has been strengthened by annual workshops that recognize and address contemporary research, including breakout sessions to stimulate open discussion and focus planning for ongoing investigations. Collaboration not only identifies pertinent technical issues, but facilitates timely, expert, and cost-effective consideration. Contemporary workshops have been held annually since 2010 and are documented in yearly state-of-the-art Proceedings, which summarize content and conclusions. The Proceedings help preserve scientific understanding and provide timely source references. These workshops often produce valuable joint publications coordinated with the Nuclear Energy Agency and other suitable external forums for dissemination. Nuclear waste management programs face growing challenges, while permanent disposal in salt formations provides a robust, safe option for several nations. Workshop format and publications provide a cost-effective insurance against loss of scientific expertise and institutional memory. This paper summarizes ten US/German workshops since formal reinitiation, reexamines key technical issues, discusses the evolving research agenda, and highlights successes and challenges. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Declaration of the Chemical Composition of Waste-products for the German Repository Konrad Using Substance Vectors - 20500

The waste acceptance criteria of the German repository Konrad require beside a radiological declaration a compositional declaration to be able to avoid negative impact on the groundwater by a presumed leakage into the groundwater after complete corrosion of the containers in the future. The declaration of the composition has to specify compounds and substances not element analyses, because the chemical behavior and toxicity especially of organic compounds varies strongly The relevant compounds have to be described and quantified using defined substance codes provided by the operator. For simple waste types like pure concrete or steel components, the definition of the composition is rather simple. The composition of more complex waste streams is generally declared using producer specific material vectors, which can be derived for defined waste types (e.g. grouted fluids, ash from combustion, super-compacted mixed waste etc.). Additional substance vectors exist for containers, drums and grout, which together with the waste composition yield the total composition of the waste packages. The substance vectors for homogeneous waste streams like cementitious demolition waste, solidified fluids and ash are mostly based on analyses provided by the waste owner. In some cases, analyses from non-radioactive analogues or data sheets can also be used to demonstrate the composition. For each qualified treatment of radioactive waste streams the material composition is described and balanced on the basis of specific material vectors, which are composed of material codes from the material and cask list provided by the Federal company for radioactive waste disposal. For mixed waste streams like super-compacted or grouted mixed waste or materials simply packed in containers an analyses cannot be used. In these cases, the compositional information from the bookkeeping can be used for the entire waste stream to calculate a mean composition including a compositional range (min / max composition). Only waste packages with an approved material description can be delivered to Konrad. Therefore, the material declaration of all waste streams and the resulting waste products is crucial for all waste owners in Germany to be able to have enough waste packages ready, when the repository is going to open in 2027. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Use of tsunami in the validation of scale 6.1 for the Swedish spent fuel repository - 14381

In March 2011 SKB applied to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for a permit to build a final repository for spent Fuel and an encapsulation plant (Clink). The application contained a criticality safety analysis for the canisters to be used in Clink and the copper canister to be used in the final repository. In 2012 SSM requested several updates to the application. One of SSM's concerns was the validation of the codes. SSM emphasized that SKB must improve the method to select critical experiments to the validation suite. To satisfy this demand, SKB used the tool Tsunami in the Scale 6.1 code package to select experiments from the handbook of criticality experiment (IHECSBE). With help of sensitivity files SKB evaluated almost 700 experiments from the LEU-COMP-THERM library. SKB then picked the experiments that most resembled our safety cases. The sensitivity coefficient, ck, from Tsunami has been used to evaluate the similarity between the experiments and the applications. It has been considered that a ck over 0.8 provides a 'good enough' similarity between the experiment and our evaluated safety cases. For the different safety cases between 50-600 experiments satisfied the 0.8 criteria giving a good base of data for statistical analysis. It is worth noticing that PWR-fuel generally receives a higher ck than BWR fuel. Initial analysis shows that the differences in results between BWR and PWR can be explained by a larger sensitivity for the U{sup 238} n,n' part of the cross section in the PWR cases. To make sure the validation covers all materials and required physical parameters a gap analysis was made using engineering judgement by criticality safety experts. From this exercise additional experiments were added to the suite. This paper will discuss the Tsunami results for different safety cases and the reasons for differences between them. It will also present the final results of the validation and discuss experiments that were excluded from the validation suite. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2021

(Poster) TRIPWIRE: Multi-modal Distributed Sensing For Repository Verification

Poster submission. This project is developing and demonstrating a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation, electromagnetic fields and vibration in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2022

Progress of Tripwire: Multi-Modal Distributed Sensing for Repository Verification

This project is developing and demonstrating a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation and electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station. The system will use long-length scintillating fiber bundles (SFBs) to perform area radiation monitoring; these will be coupled to kilometer-scale multimodal optical communication fibers – all light sensors and electronic components used with this system will be located above ground. Electromagnetic fields, and changes in local dielectric conditions caused by intrusion and soil movement, will be monitored using commercial grade, ported "leaky" coaxial cables (PCCs), with control electronics also located above ground. This paper documents the results of the simulations and modeling efforts that have helped identify the optimal placement of the SFBs. Additionally, the paper includes the current progress on the multi-modal SFB-PCC system, including the fabrication of long-length (>3-m) fibers and their coupling to optical fibers.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2022

Progress of Tripwire: Multi-modal Distributed Sensing for Repository Verification

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2026

Corrosion of 316 SS in direct contact with Zircaloy-4 in repository relevant conditions

The effects of interfacial contact between 316 stainless steel (316 SS) waste canister and spent fuel cladding material (Zircaloy-4) in case of water intrusion into a deep geological repository are investigated. Hydrothermal corrosion experiments of 316 SS and Zircaloy-4 in direct contact were performed at elevated temperatures in MilliQ water and simulated Mont Terri groundwater. Hematite, magnetite, chromite, and baddeleyite form as secondary phases. pH of the Mont Terri solution increases with corrosion duration and magnetite forms preferentially instead of hematite. Thermodynamic modeling shows that iron oxidation in 316 SS controls the pH and redox potential of the aqueous environment and is in good agreement with experimental Mont Terri results, showing that experimental Mont Terri results trend to equilibrium. All oxides except hematite are predicted to exist at thermodynamic equilibrium based on calculations, implying that experimentally formed hematite will be reduced or transformed to magnetite at equilibrium. The thermodynamically predicted chromite was observed to form only at the interface where 316 SS was in contact with Zircaloy-4 at 250°C, showing that contact with Zircaloy-4 seems to accelerate the 316 SS corrosion to thermodynamic equilibrium. Finally, Mont Terri groundwater readily trends towards thermodynamic equilibrium, leading to a pH and redox buffered system that is dominated by iron in solution coming from the accelerated corrosion of 316 SS caused by Zircaloy-4 contact.

316 stainless steel↗