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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Managing Small Spacecraft Projects: Less is Not Easier

Managing small, low cost missions (class C or D) is not necessarily easier than managing a full flagship mission. Yet, small missions are typically considered easier to manage and used as a training ground for developing the next generation of project managers. While limited resources can be a problem for small missions, in reality most of the issues inherent in managing small projects are not the direct result of limited resources. Instead, problems encountered by managers of small spacecraft missions often derive from 1) the perception that managing small projects is easier if something is easier it needs less rigor and formality in execution, 2) the perception that limited resources necessitate or validate omitting standard management practices, 3) less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects, and 4) stakeholder expectations that are not consistent with the size and nature of the project. For example, the size of a project is sometimes used to justify not building a full, detailed integrated master schedule. However, while a small schedule slip may not be a problem for a large mission, it can indicate a serious problem for a small mission with a short development phase, highlighting the importance of the schedule for early identification of potential issues. Likewise, stakeholders may accept a higher risk posture early in the definition of a low-cost mission, but as launch approaches this acceptance may change. This presentation discusses these common misconceptions about managing small, low cost missions, the problems that can result, and possible solutions.

Barley, Bryan↗
DOE OSTI2022

High-Field Design Concept for Second Interaction Region of the Electron-Ion Collider

Efficient realization of the scientific potential of the Electron Ion Collider (EIC) calls for addition of a future second Interaction Region (2nd IR) and a detector in the RHIC IR8 region after the EIC project completion. The second IR and detector are needed to independently cross-check the results of the first detector, and to provide measurements with complementary acceptance. The available space in the existing RHIC IR8 and maximum fields achievable with NbTi superconducting magnet technology impose constraints on the 2nd IR performance. Since commissioning of the 2nd IR is envisioned in a few years after the first IR, such a long time frame allows for more R&D on the Nb₃Sn magnet technology. Thus, it could provide a potential alternative technology choice for the 2nd IR magnets. Presently, we are exploring its potential benefits for the 2nd IR performance, such as improvement of the luminosity and acceptance, and are also assessing the technical risks associated with use of Nb₃Sn magnets. In this paper, we present the current progress of this work.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2008

Science Goals in Radiation Protection for Exploration

Space radiation presents major challenges to future missions to the Earth s moon or Mars. Health risks of concern include cancer, degenerative and performance risks to the central nervous system, heart and lens, and the acute radiation syndromes. The galactic cosmic rays (GCR) contain high energy and charge (HZE) nuclei, which have been shown to cause qualitatively distinct biological damage compared to terresterial radiation, such as X-rays or gamma-rays, causing risk estimates to be highly uncertain. The biological effects of solar particle events (SPE) are similar to terresterial radiation except for their biological dose-rate modifiers; however the onset and size of SPEs are difficult to predict. The high energies of GCR reduce the effectiveness of shielding, while SPE s can be shielded however the current gap in radiobiological knowledge hinders optimization. Methods used to project risks on Earth must be modified because of the large uncertainties in projecting health risks from space radiation, and thus impact mission requirements and costs. We describe NASA s unique approach to radiation safety that applies probabilistic risk assessments and uncertainty based criteria within the occupational health program for astronauts and to mission design. The two terrestrial criteria of a point estimate of maximum acceptable level of risk and application of the principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) are supplemented by a third requirement that protects against risk projection uncertainties using the upper 95% confidence level (CL) in radiation risk projection models. Exploration science goals in radiation protection are centered on ground-based research to achieve the necessary biological knowledge, and in the development of new technologies to improve SPE monitoring and optimize shielding. Radiobiology research is centered on a ground based program investigating the radiobiology of high-energy protons and HZE nuclei at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) located at DoE s Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, NY. We describe recent NSRL results that are closing the knowledge gap in HZE radiobiology and improving exploration risk estimates. Linking probabilistic risk assessment to research goals makes it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, which include the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits, and probabilistic assessments of the effectiveness of design trade spaces such as material type, mass, solar cycle, crew selection criteria, and biological countermeasures. New research in SPE alert and risk assessment, individual radiation sensitivity, and biological countermeasure development are described.

Cucinotta, Francs A.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
NASA NTRS2009

Microbial Risk Assessment

Historically, microbiological spaceflight requirements have been established in a subjective manner based upon expert opinion of both environmental and clinical monitoring results and the incidence of disease. The limited amount of data, especially from long-duration missions, has created very conservative requirements based primarily on the concentration of microorganisms. Periodic reevaluations of new data from later missions have allowed some relaxation of these stringent requirements. However, the requirements remain very conservative and subjective in nature, and the risk of crew illness due to infectious microorganisms is not well defined. The use of modeling techniques for microbial risk has been applied in the food and potable water industries and has exceptional potential for spaceflight applications. From a productivity standpoint, this type of modeling can (1) decrease unnecessary costs and resource usage and (2) prevent inadequate or inappropriate data for health assessment. In addition, a quantitative model has several advantages for risk management and communication. By identifying the variable components of the model and the knowledge associated with each component, this type of modeling can: (1) Systematically identify and close knowledge gaps, (2) Systematically identify acceptable and unacceptable risks, (3) Improve communication with stakeholders as to the reasons for resource use, and (4) Facilitate external scientific approval of the NASA requirements. The modeling of microbial risk involves the evaluation of several key factors including hazard identification, crew exposure assessment, dose-response assessment, and risk characterization. Many of these factors are similar to conditions found on Earth; however, the spaceflight environment is very specialized as the inhabitants live in a small, semi-closed environment that is often dependent on regenerative life support systems. To further complicate modeling efforts, microbial dose-response characteristics may be affected by a potentially dysfunctional crew immune system during a mission. In addition, microbial virulence has been shown to change under certain conditions during spaceflight, further complicating dose-response characterization. An initial study of the applicability of microbial risk assessment techniques was performed using Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) operational data from the International Space Station potable water systems. The risk of infection from potable water was selected as the flight systems and microbial ecology are well defined. This initial study confirmed the feasibility of using microbial risk assessment modeling for spaceflight systems. While no immediate threat was detected, the study identified several medically significant microorganisms that could pose a health risk if uncontrolled. The study also identified several specific knowledge gaps in making a risk assessment and noted that filling these knowledge gaps is essential as the risk estimates may change by orders of magnitude depending on the answers. The current phase of the microbial risk assessment studies focuses on the dose-response relationship of specific infectious agents, focusing on Salmonella enterica Typhimurium, Pseudomonas spp., and Escherichia coli, as their evaluation will provide a better baseline for determining the overall hazard characterization. The organisms were chosen as they either have been isolated on spacecraft or have an identified route of infection during a mission. The characterization will utilize dose-response models selected either from the peer-reviewed literature and/or by using statistical approaches. Development of these modeling and risk assessment techniques will help to optimize flight requirements and to protect the safety, health, and performance of the crew.

Ott, C. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRS1991

A reliability and mass perspective of SP-100 Stirling cycle lunar-base powerplant designs

The purpose was to obtain reliability and mass perspectives on selection of space power system conceptual designs based on SP-100 reactor and Stirling cycle power-generation subsystems. The approach taken was to: (1) develop a criterion for an acceptable overall reliability risk as a function of the expected range of emerging technology subsystem unit reliabilities; (2) conduct reliability and mass analyses for a diverse matrix of 800-kWe lunar-base design configurations employing single and multiple powerplants with both full and partial subsystem redundancy combinations; and (3) derive reliability and mass perspectives on selection of conceptual design configurations that meet an acceptable reliability criterion with the minimum system mass increase relative to reference powerplant design. The developed perspectives provided valuable insight into the considerations required to identify and characterize high-reliability and low-mass lunar-base powerplant conceptual design.

Bloomfield, Harvey S.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Maintaining Skeletal Health During the Mission to Mars

Understanding how the effects of long-duration spaceflight (~6-months) might increase fracture risk in the younger-aged, physically-fit astronaut is challenging. Most of our skeletal data have been acquired from long-duration astronauts, crewmembers who typically serve on 120-180 day missions aboard the International Space Station (ISS). Astronaut biomedical data are predominantly 2-d measurements from DXA scans because this is a required clinical test at Johnson Space Center. Data from these clinical tests, and some data from research studies, are what NASA evaluates to define a risk for fracture in astronauts, both during a mission and long-term health. To date, the agency considers the risk for fracture during spaceflight to be of high (severe) consequence but of low probability (<0.1%) while the risk for fracture in during long-term health to be of medium consequence (interventions available) and medium probability (<1%). These risks are considered acceptable. Notably, there are minimal data to suggest that postflight fractures in long-duration astronauts are directly due to spaceflight exposure. Analyses by NASA epidemiologists and by biomedical engineers suggest that postflight fracture incidence in astronauts is consistent with a physically-active terrestrial population with no exposure to spaceflight. The epidemiological data to-date may be considered insufficient (low # and younger-aged subjects, limited follow-up time) to assess a fracture risk with reliability. In the absence of fracture evidence to substantiate a risk, it may be more useful to maintain astronauts at baseline (preflight) level of skeletal health during a mission. This lecture will present data from astronauts that affirms that 1) the maintenance of skeletal health during the future 3-year Mars mission will require an anti-resorptive therapy and 2) the risk for fracture during long-term health cannot be defined by the DXA clinical test alone.

Sibonga, Jean↗
NASA NTRS1990

Space Projects: Improvements Needed in Selecting Future Projects for Private Financing

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and NASA jointly selected seven projects for commercialization to reduce NASA's fiscal year 1990 budget request and to help achieve the goal of increasing private sector involvement in space. However, the efforts to privately finance these seven projects did not increase the commercial sector's involvement in space to the extent desired. The General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that the projects selected were not a fair test of the potential of increasing commercial investment in space at an acceptable cost to the government, primarily because the projects were not properly screened. That is, neither their suitability for commercialization nor the economic consequences of seeking private financing for them were adequately evaluated before selection. Evaluations and market tests done after selection showed that most of the projects were not viable candidates for private financing. GAO concluded that projects should not be removed from NASA's budget for commercial development until after careful screening has been done to determine whether adequate commercial demand exists, development risks are commercially acceptable and private financing is found or judged to be highly likely, and the cost effectiveness of such a decision is acceptable. Premature removal of projects from NASA's budget ultimately can cause project delays and increased costs when unsuccessful commercialization candidates must be returned to the budget. NASA also needs to ensure appropriate comparisons of government and private financing options for future commercialization projects.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1996

Cassini tour cost reductions

The original design of the Cassini tour violated the cost constraint for the mission operations and data analysis by more than 30 percent. This challenge was addressed by performing tradeoffs in order to establish a modified risk and performance posture for the operations organization. This new posture accepted more data acquisition risk with minimal impact to the mission objectives, and brought the operation costs to within the program's constraints. The methodology employed within the Cassini program in order to address the tour cost, risk and performance parameters is presented.

Duxbury, J. H.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Developing and Implementing Risk-Based Research Safety at Argonne National Laboratory

Facilities operated by the US Department of Energy (DOE) are required to have extensive worker safety and health programs by regulation. Here we describe how Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has implemented the DOE requirements to bring the Laboratory’s multidisciplinary research risk to an acceptable level to safely execute ANL’s mission to perform cutting-edge research.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS2014

Integrated Medical Model Verification, Validation, and Credibility

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) was designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic (stochastic process) model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A probabilistic approach is taken since exact (deterministic) results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation. METHODS: In 2008, the IMM team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) was published, the IMM team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. RESULTS: IMM VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices, IMM VV Plan status, and a synopsis of any changes or updates to the IMM during the reporting period. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including Operations, Science and Technology Planning, and Exploration Planning. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM project of combining the IMM VV Plan with 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2015

Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project Verification, Validation, and Credibility (VVandC)

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project supports end user requests by employing the Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) and IMM tools as well as subject matter expertise within the Project. The iMED houses data used by the IMM. The IMM is designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A stochastic approach is taken because deterministic results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation, as well as lay the foundation for external review and application. METHODS: In 2008, the Project team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was published, the Project team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. Construction of these tools included meeting documentation and evidence requirements sufficient to meet external review success criteria. RESULTS: IMM Project VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include updates to the 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM Project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the HRP NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document working group and the NASA-HDBK-7009 [2]. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including operations, science and technology planning, and exploration planning. IMM v4.0 is slated for operational release in the FY015 and current VVC assessments illustrate the expected VVC status prior to the completion of customer lead external review efforts. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM Project of incorporating Project-specific recommended practices and guidelines for implementing the 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM Project represented a critical communication tool in providing clear and concise suitability assessments to IMM customers. These processes have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Walton, M.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Wood-to-Fuel Demonstration Project for California's Transportation Sector using Autothermal Pyrolysis (Non-Proprietary Summary Process Hazard Assessment)

Frontline has prioritized personnel safety, equipment preservation, and environmental protection throughout the design process of the autothermal pyrolysis unit. To facilitate a safe design, Frontline completed an informal hazards and operability (HAZOP) study and a formal HAZOP study, and employ management of change procedures. The result of these safety procedures is a plant that will function in a safe manner with a limited and acceptable amount of risk. Frontline took an approach it used in previous projects to execute a preliminary, internally facilitated hazards and operability (HAZOP) study. While this HAZOP study was performed without any subsequent change tracking, it enables a group of well-trained engineers to consider the safety implications of each part of the plant in a thorough and methodical manner. Frontline chose to bring in a pyrolysis consultant (Daren Daugaard of Burning Oak Energy) to participate in the review. Following the preliminary HAZOP and once the detailed design work was nearing completion, Frontline performed a formal HAZOP with a third-party facilitator, Jason Stittleburg of Novetus Engineering. Although the plant is not subject to process safety management (PSM) requirements, this formal HAZOP was performed in accordance with OSHA regulations deemed reasonable for PSM. Finally, after the formal HAZOP was conducted, Frontline maintained a safe system by implementing and following management of change procedures on each substantial change to the process. Frontline has kept a record of each subsequent change made to the formal HAZOP P&IDs. The process hazard assessment process allowed Frontline to find and correct several unacceptable configurations within the plant.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
NASA NTRS1979

Numerical aerodynamic simulation facility feasibility study, executive summary

There were three major issues examined in the feasibility study. First, the ability of the proposed system architecture to support the anticipated workload was evaluated. Second, the throughput of the computational engine (the flow model processor) was studied using real application programs. Third, the availability, reliability, and maintainability of the system were modeled. The evaluations were based on the baseline systems. The results show that the implementation of the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Facility, in the form considered, would indeed be a feasible project with an acceptable level of risk. The technology required (both hardware and software) either already exists or, in the case of a few parts, is expected to be announced this year.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1979

Numerical aerodynamic simulation facility feasibility study

There were three major issues examined in the feasibility study. First, the ability of the proposed system architecture to support the anticipated workload was evaluated. Second, the throughput of the computational engine (the flow model processor) was studied using real application programs. Third, the availability reliability, and maintainability of the system were modeled. The evaluations were based on the baseline systems. The results show that the implementation of the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Facility, in the form considered, would indeed be a feasible project with an acceptable level of risk. The technology required (both hardware and software) either already exists or, in the case of a few parts, is expected to be announced this year. Facets of the work described include the hardware configuration, software, user language, and fault tolerance.

Source record↗