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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗
DOE OSTI2021

Considerations regarding the Use of Computer Vision Machine Learning in Safety-Related or Risk-Significant Applications in Nuclear Power Plants

With the advancements made to date in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), significant potential exists to utilize AI capabilities for nuclear power plant (NPP) applications. AI can replicate human decision making and it is usually faster and more accurate than humans. For implementations that impact critical NPP applications (e.g., safety-related or non-safety systems that potentially affect overall plant risk), a deeper safety analysis of the AI methods is necessary. AI applied to NPP operations could resemble the use of digital I&C (DI&C) because such applications involve digital computer hardware and custom-designed software that input plant data, execute complex software algorithms, and output the results to a system or licensed human operator to potentially provoke an action. For AI methods to be compliant with current safety requirements for DI&C, AI compatibility must be evaluated, and AI-related gaps may exist that prevent the prompt deployment of AI in NPPs. This effort aims to evaluate how example AI technologies align with the DI&C safety framework, and discusses how they could be analyzed, modeled, tested, and validated in a manner similar to typical DI&C technologies. Because AI is a broad field that encompasses areas such as machine learning (ML), natural language processing, and computer vision, this research focused on a subset of methods categorized as the computer vision ML (CVML) methods. This report explores two CVML use cases, gauge reading and fire watch, considered relevant to the DI&C standards, as they could play a safety-critical role. For the gauge reading use case, a CVML-enabled technology that can read gauges at oblique angles is utilized. For the fire watch use case, a CVML-enabled technology is utilized that migrates fire watch from a manual (human) approach to automated fire detection. These use cases are mainly intended to give context to the CVML system discussion. This effort assumes the worst-case scenario, with the CVML system being used to replace a safety-related or risk-significant system, thus requiring evaluation. Evaluating CVML against most of the relevant safety requirements for DI&C yielded several CVML-specific considerations due to the uniqueness of its characteristics in comparison with typical DI&C systems. For example, CVML models often employ commonly used (open-source) datasets, and it is not always possible to determine the level of overlap among open-source datasets. Therefore, the independence of the developed CVML models when demonstrating diversity is questionable, therefore creating vulnerability to common cause failure (CCF). The design verification process is also impacted since the data overlap could result in overestimation of the software validation and verification (V&V) performance results. Section 2 of this report evaluates a list of the identified CVML-specific characteristics and discusses the resulting considerations and potential solutions in the context of each referenced requirement. A summation is provided in Section 3. This report is not to be used as a guideline. It was developed to identify and consider issues in the implementation of ML technologies used to augment activities that may have a bearing on plant operation. The report draws parallels to the use of DI&C technologies, for which many standards are available to guide their use in nuclear plant operation. It considers the technologies and some of the potential implications of their use in safety-related applications but is not intended to address regulatory or licensing related issues.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗
NASA NTRS2013

2013 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

Welcome to the 2013 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA Headquarters, this report provides an Agency overview for current and potential range users. This report contains articles which cover a variety of subject areas, summaries of various activities performed during the past year, links to past reports, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be conducted in the future. Specific topics discussed in the 2013 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program overview and 2013 highlights, Range Safety Training, Independent Assessments, support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch/flight operations, a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies, and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. As is the case each year, we had a wide variety of contributors to this report from across our NASA Centers and the national range safety community at large, and I wish to thank them all. On a sad note, we lost one of our close colleagues, Dr. Jim Simpson, due to his sudden passing in December. His work advancing the envelope of autonomous flight safety systems software/hardware development leaves a lasting impression on our community. Such systems are being flight tested today and may one day be considered routine in the range safety business. The NASA family has lost a pioneer in our field, and he will surely be missed. In conclusion, it has been a very busy and productive year, and I look forward to working with all of you in NASA Centers/Programs/Projects and with the national Range Safety community in making Flight/Space activities as safe as they can be in the upcoming year.

Center Status↗
NASA NTRS2017

Qualitative Future Safety Risk Identification an Update

The purpose of this report is to document the results of a high-level qualitative study that was conducted to identify future aviation safety risks and to assess the potential impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS) of NASA Aviation Safety research on these risks. Multiple external sources (for example, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Flight Safety Foundation, the National Research Council, and the Joint Planning and Development Office) were used to develop a compilation of future safety issues risks, also referred to as future tall poles. The primary criterion used to identify the most critical future safety risk issues was that the issue must be cited in several of these sources as a safety area of concern. The tall poles in future safety risk, in no particular order of importance, are as follows: Runway Safety, Loss of Control In Flight, Icing Ice Detection, Loss of Separation, Near Midair Collision Human Fatigue, Increasing Complexity and Reliance on Automation, Vulnerability Discovery, Data Sharing and Dissemination, and Enhanced Survivability in the Event of an Accident.

future aviation safety risk↗
NASA NTRS2021

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle. In this report we describe an extension to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) that supports modeling of system behavior under failure conditions. This Safety Annex enables the independent modeling of component failures and allows safety engineers to weave various types of fault behavior into the nominal system model. The accompanying tool support uses model checking to propagate errors from their source to their effect on safety properties without the need to add separate propagation specifications. The tool also captures all minimal set of fault combinations that can cause violation of the safety properties, that can be compared to qualitative and quantitative objectives as part of the safety assessment process. We describe the Safety Annex, illustrate its use with a representative example, and discuss and demonstrate the tool support enabling an analyst to investigate the system behavior under failure conditions.

FTA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
DOE OSTI1989

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 325 Safety of Framatome Advanced Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designs by J. A. Charles and D. Lange, 333 Book Review of Nuclear Accidents: Intervention Levels for the Protection of the Public by H. B. Piper; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 335 Living PRA Computer Systems by S. C. Dinsmore and H.-P. Balfanz, 343 Summary of ICAP Assessments of RELAP5/MOD2 by W. E. Driskell and R. G. Hanson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 352 Thermal Performance Monitoring System at Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant by H.-J. Chao, Y.-P. Lin, G.-H. Jou, L.-Y. Liao, and Y.-B. Chen; DESIGN FEATURES: 358 Warning Systems for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies by J. H. Sorensen and D. S. Mileti; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 371 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 382 Steam Generator Tube Performance: Experience with Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors During 1985 by O. S. Tatone and R. L. Tapping, 400 Systems Interaction Analyses: Concepts and Techniques (Part II) by M. D. Muhlheim and G. A. Murphy, 413 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 416 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 440 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 460 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 466 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 470 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31, 1989; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 334 Proceedings Published, 351 CEC Seminar on Methods and Codes for Assessing the Off-Site Consequences of Nuclear Accidents, 357 Short Course on Multiphase Flow and Heat Transfer: Bases and Applications in A: The Nuclear Power Industry B: The Process Industries, 357 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, 478 International Topical Meeting on the Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, 475 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1993

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 1, January-March 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 A Decision Support System for Maintenance Management of a Boiling-Water Reactor Power Plant, J. H. Shen, A. Ray, and S. Levine; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 12 On Prediction of the Ignition Potential of Uranium Metal and Hydride, M. Epstein, W. Luangdilok, M. G. Plys, and H. K. Fauske; 26 An Overview of the Primary Parameters and Methods for Determining Condensation Heat Transfer to Containment Structures, J. Green and K. Almenas; DESIGN FEATURES: 49 Modem Tornado Design of Nuclear and Other Potentially Hazardous Facilities, J. D. Stevenson and Y. Zaho; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 73 1994 Accident Sequence Precursor Program Results, R. J. Belles, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, B. W. Dolan, J. W. Minarick, and P. D. O'Reilly; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 93 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AlChE) Spring 1997 National Meeting; 94 European Safety and Reliability Association International Conference on Safety and Reliability ESREL ’97; 95 Criticality Safety Challenges in the Next Decade; 96 21st International Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 84 The Authors; 88 Letter to the Editor; 90 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Modeling and Simulation Technical Gaps in Safety Analysis of High Burnup Accident-Tolerant Fuels

The United States nuclear industry is facing a strong challenge to maintain regulatory-required levels of safety while ensuring economic competitiveness to stay in business. Safety remains a key parameter for all aspects related to the operation of light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants (NPPs), and it can be achieved more economically by using a risk-informed ecosystem, such as that being developed by the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program. The LWRS Program is promoting a wide range of research and development activities to maximize both the safety and economically efficient performance of NPPs through improved scientific understanding, especially given that many plants are considering second license renewal. The RISA Pathway has two main goals: The deployment of methodologies and technologies that enable better representation of safety margins and the factors that contribute to cost and safety, and; The development of advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. As part of the RISA Pathway, the Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) project refers to an NPP where safety is improved by implementing various measures, such as accident-tolerant fuels (ATF), diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, and utilization of advanced battery technologies. The objective of the ERP research is to use novel methods and computational tools to enhance existing reactors’ safety while reducing operational costs. Many U.S. utilities are targeting implementation of ATFs instead of traditional fuel in the near future since ATFs offer benefits in terms of improved performance and cost savings. The robust properties of ATF make it possible to extend the refueling cycle from 18 to 24 months in addition to the opportunity to use less of fuel. Extensive safety assessments are required to support regulatory requirements and obtain the approvals to use ATFs and the ERP project support the industry by developing novel effective methodologies for safety evaluations. In this project, the technical gaps in the modeling and simulation of the high burnup (HBU) ATF were assessed in terms of the fuel cladding behavior during the postulated accident events. The issues were identified in modeling the cladding deformation, the hydrodynamic change due to cladding deformation and the critical heat flux (CHF). The RELAP5-3D cladding deformation model was assessed by multiple verification tests and validation with the instrumented fuel assembly (IFA) experiment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗