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At least 217 records · Page 12

Updating the Dry Transfer System - 18110

The Dry Transfer System (DTS) was examined for its ability to be redesigned in order to meet needs associated with repackaging used/spent nuclear fuel (UNF/SNF) from existing storage cask systems into alternative systems, while also incorporating design advances based on some lessons learned from Orano's dry UNF handling facility (T0) located at the La Hague recycling plant. In this redesign, the DTS is envisioned to provide some flexibility through the ability to perform repackaging activities from multiple differently designed cask systems, including those with canisters that will require cutting and welding activities, and potentially with waste packages designed for disposal. The redesigned DTS is also intended to provide some operational flexibility by providing lag storage and include a means for examining UNF/SNF during repackaging, using some features implemented at the T0 facility at La Hague. This paper provides a summary of: the original DTS design, which was evaluated by the NRC and portions of which were cold-tested at Idaho National Lab; the lag storage system designed for the DTS, which is able to flexibly handle different fuel assembly designs while providing structural support for design basis events (e.g., seismic); the incorporation of lessons learned from the La Hague T0 facility into the DTS design to facilitate dry handling of UNF/SNF; and identification of other challenges towards designing a complete system. A revised DTS is envisioned to provide an important tool for the future management of UNF/SNF in preparation for transportation, re-storage, re-transportation, and/or disposal and also provides a means for repackaging UNF/SNF in case recovery from a cask/canister system is necessary (e.g., due to extended storage or a transportation event). (authors)

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Demonstrating the Safety of Long-Term Dry Storage - 13468

Commercial nuclear plants in the United States were originally designed with the expectation that used nuclear fuel would be moved directly from the reactor pools and transported off site for either reprocessing or direct geologic disposal. However, Federal programs intended to meet this expectation were never able to develop the capability to remove used fuel from reactor sites - and these programs remain stalled to this day. Therefore, in the 1980's, with reactor pools reaching capacity limits, industry began developing dry cask storage technology to provide for additional on-site storage. Use of this technology has expanded significantly since then, and has today become a standard part of plant operations at most US nuclear sites. As this expansion was underway, Federal programs remained stalled, and it became evident that dry cask systems would be in use longer than originally envisioned. In response to this challenge, a strong technical basis supporting the long term dry storage safety has been developed. However, this is not a static situation. The technical basis must be able to address future challenges. Industry is responding to one such challenge - the increasing prevalence of high burnup (HBU) used fuel and the need to provide long term storage assurance for these fuels equivalent to that which has existed for lower burnup fuels over the past 25 years. This response includes a confirmatory demonstration program designed to address the aging characteristics of HBU fuel and set a precedent for a learning approach to aging management that will have broad applicability across the used fuel storage landscape. (authors)

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Report on UQ and PCMM Analysis of Vacuum Drying for UFD S&T Gaps

This report discusses two phenomena that could affect the safety, licensing, transportation, storage, and disposition of the spent fuel storage casks and their contents (radial hydriding during drying and water retention after drying) associated with the drying of canisters for dry spent fuel storage. The report discusses modeling frameworks and evaluations that are, or have been, developed as a means to better understand these phenomena. Where applicable, the report also discusses data needs and procedures for monitoring or evaluating the condition of storage containers during and after drying. A recommendation for the manufacturing of a fully passivated fuel rod, resistant to oxidation and hydriding is outlined.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

US NRC-Sponsored Research on Stress Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility of Dry Storage Canister Materials in Marine Environments - 13344

At a number of locations in the U.S., spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is maintained at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). These ISFSIs, which include operating and decommissioned reactor sites, Department of Energy facilities in Idaho, and others, are licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72. The SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems, which most commonly consist of a welded austenitic stainless steel canister within a larger concrete vault or overpack vented to the external atmosphere to allow airflow for cooling. Some ISFSIs are located in marine environments where there may be high concentrations of airborne chloride salts. If salts were to deposit on the canisters via the external vents, a chloride-rich brine could form by deliquescence. Austenitic stainless steels are susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC), particularly in the presence of residual tensile stresses from welding or other fabrication processes. SCC could allow helium to leak out of a canister if the wall is breached or otherwise compromise its structural integrity. There is currently limited understanding of the conditions that will affect the SCC susceptibility of austenitic stainless steel exposed to marine salts. NRC previously conducted a scoping study of this phenomenon, reported in NUREG/CR-7030 in 2010. Given apparent conservatisms and limitations in this study, NRC has sponsored a follow-on research program to more systematically investigate various factors that may affect SCC including temperature, humidity, salt concentration, and stress level. The activities within this research program include: (1) measurement of relative humidity (RH) for deliquescence of sea salt, (2) SCC testing within the range of natural absolute humidity, (3) SCC testing at elevated temperatures, (4) SCC testing at high humidity conditions, and (5) SCC testing with various applied stresses. Results to date indicate that the deliquescence RH for sea salt is close to that of MgCl{sub 2} pure salt. SCC is observed between 35 and 80 deg. C when the ambient (RH) is close to or higher than this level, even for a low surface salt concentration. (authors)

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Antineutrino Monitoring of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Military and civilian applications of nuclear energy have left a significant amount of spent nuclear fuel over the past 70 years. Currently, in many countries worldwide, the use of nuclear energy is on the rise. Therefore, the management of highly radioactive nuclear waste is a pressing issue. In this work, we explore antineutrino detectors as a tool for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear-waste material. We compute the flux and spectrum of antineutrinos emitted by spent nuclear fuel elements as a function of time, and we illustrate the usefulness of antineutrino detectors in several benchmark scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate how a measurement of the antineutrino flux can help to reverify the contents of a dry storage cask in case the monitoring chain by conventional means gets disrupted. We then comment on the usefulness of antineutrino detectors at long-term storage facilities such as Yucca mountain. Finally, we put forward antineutrino detection as a tool in locating underground “hot spots” in contaminated areas such as the Hanford site in Washington state.

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Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations. A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This study describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. Finally, the results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Update: Structural Uncertainty of Used Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage Canisters

The Structural Uncertainty research task uses numerical modeling to help close knowledge gaps associated with extended dry storage of used nuclear fuel. Modeling helps to predict the expected range of mechanical loading on used nuclear fuel and dry storage system components, which is needed to help guide materials research. Knowledge of expected loads helps the materials researchers prioritize their research and focus only on the relevant material degradation phenomena that can have an effect on the ability of dry storage systems to function. The primary loading conditions considered in this task are dry storage cask (DSC) tip-over, handling drops of the multipurpose fuel canister, and seismic loading of DSC systems while situated on the concrete pad of a storage facility. Loads related to normal conditions

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Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

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Update on Investigations of Viability of Cold Spray and FSW as a Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Canister Mitigation Tool

The purpose of this work is to investigate the use of cold spray and friction stir welding or processing (FSW/P) for repair and mitigation of chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) in dry cask storage system (DCSS) canisters to ensure integrity far beyond their original license period. This report provides a viability analysis of cold spray and friction stir welding for repair and fabrication of DCSS canisters. This report presents experimental work and a research strategy to optimize and evaluate cold spray and FSW/P for CISCC resistance. The literature reports that the following three conditions must exist for CISCC to occur: tensile stress, corrosive environment, and susceptible material. These conditions must be understood and accounted for while evaluating CISCC susceptibility. Furthermore, non-obvious factors, such as surface conditions and geometric confinement, can dramatically increase the intensity of one or more of the three listed conditions for CISCC. Arc welding should be considered for either temporary or permanent repair when combined with a mitigation technology. It is known that alloys used in the existing inventory of spent nuclear fuel storage canisters become sensitized in areas around fusion welds. Technologies, such as cold spray or FSW, can mitigate the sensitization caused by fusion welds. FSW/P and cold spray, potential alternatives for fabrication and repair, are solid-phase processes. No melting occurs and the energy input can be controlled such that no harm is done to the base metal during these processes. FSW/P should be considered for use in new fabrication of canisters and repair of existing canisters. Low heat input and grain refinement result in material with improved mechanical properties and comparable generalized corrosion performance relative to base metal. FSW/P offers the potential of through-thickness CISCC resistance. Cold spray should be considered for production, mitigation, and repair of canisters. Cold spray has demonstrated the ability to deposit stainless steel, Inconel alloys, and other alloys on stainless steel 304L such that galvanic potential is matched and resistance to pitting is improved. The technical basis for cold spray mitigation and repair within the overpack using remote robotic equipment is established. A non-obvious application to the research community is the sealing of crevices. All reported instances of CISCC in the fielded nuclear applications were associated with crevice corrosion. This can be avoided by cold spraying to seal crevices. The bulk of the work planned for FY 2020 will be generating coupons for CISCC testing by collaborative projects at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories. First an exploratory study will be executed that will include screening studies and process optimization. This task will identify the effect of process parameters on microstructure and CISCC resistance. Optimized parameters will be used to produce a smaller number of coupons for full testing and evaluation. Test methods for evaluating CISCC resistance must meet the following criteria: (1) normalized surface geometry and exposed process microstructure, (2) account for residual stresses, (3) be in a controlled and appropriate test environment, and (4) be numerically quantifiable and repeatable. Failure to meet these criteria could lead to results that cannot be used for comparative analysis of processes and materials.

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A Low-Tech, Low-Budget Storage Solution for High Level Radioactive Sources

The need for safe, secure, and economical storage of radioactive material becomes increasingly important as beneficial uses of radioactive material expand (increases inventory), as political instability rises (increases threat), and as final disposal and treatment facilities are delayed (increases inventory and storage duration). Several vendor-produced storage casks are available for this purpose but are often costly — due to the required design, analyses, and licensing costs. Thus the relatively high costs of currently accepted storage solutions may inhibit substantial improvements in safety and security that might otherwise be achieved. This is particularly true in areas of the world where the economic and/or the regulatory infrastructure may not provide the means and/or the justification for such an expense. This paper considers a relatively low-cost, low-technology radioactive material storage solution. The basic concept consists of a simple shielded storage container that can be fabricated locally using a steel pipe and a corrugated steel culvert as forms enclosing a concrete annulus. Benefits of such a system include 1) a low-tech solution that utilizes materials and skills available virtually anywhere in the world, 2) a readily scalable design that easily adapts to specific needs such as the geometry and radioactivity of the source term material), 3) flexible placement allows for free-standing above-ground or in-ground (i.e., below grade or bermed) installation, 4) the ability for future relocation without direct handling of sources, and 5) a long operational lifetime . ‘Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien’ (translated: The best is the enemy of good) applies to the management of radioactive materials – particularly where the economic and/or regulatory justification for additional investment is lacking. Development of a low-cost alternative that considerably enhances safety and security may lead to a greater overall risk reduction than insisting on solutions that remain economically and/or politically ‘out of reach’.

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TRANSIENT THERMAL MODELING OF THE HIGH BURNUP DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH PROJECT CASK USING STAR-CCM+ AND COBRA-SFS

The Department of Energy in collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute is in the process of conducting the High Burnup Demonstration Project. Where the objective is to characterize the performance of high-burnup fuel in long term storage. As part of this demonstration, a TN-32B dry storage cask was instrumented and loaded with spent nuclear fuel at North Anna Nuclear Generating Station in November 2017. The project cask provides a unique opportunity to gain information on spent fuel and cask performance from an in-service operational system. The cask was instrumented with thermocouples inside of the fuel assemblies, then loaded and dried using normal procedures. After the drying process a thermal soak period where the cask was left indoors was used to obtain steady temperatures for model comparison along with surface temperatures. This paper details thermal modeling validation work that was done to model both the steady state and transient cases. Two modeling tools were used to predict temperatures in the cask. The general purpose CFD and heat transfer code STAR-CCM+ was used with both a detailed pin-by-pin model was used along with a more efficient k-effective simplification. The other code is COBRA-SFS, a purpose-built detailed thermal modeling tool developed and maintained at PNNL. Results from all the modeling tools were compared blind to the test data. Each model utilized general design information and compared reasonably well to the blind steady state data using convection and surface temperature boundary conditions. Post-test adjustments were later made to better reflect the “as built” conditions of the cask. Based on lessons learned from the steady state analysis the vacuum drying process was modeled in both codes. Utilizing the measured loading conditions the transient models were able to compare very well with the measured data. Overall the project showed an ability to model spent fuel storage conditions very well and future work is planned to generalize the methodology used for vacuum drying.

Thermal Analysis, Spent Fuel, Dry Storage↗

Going for complete defueling - A comprehensive solution for damaged spent fuel

The complete defueling of a NPP is a prerequisite for decommissioning and dismantling. In particular the defueling of damaged spent fuel and the following dry storage remains a challenge. It is the aim of the Quiver project to develop a one-fits-it-all solution for all different kinds of damaged spent fuel and to develop in addition comprehensive handling equipment to ensure a thoroughly dispatch of the damaged spent fuel inside the Quiver. As a comprehensive solution, GNS developed a Quiver System which complies with the requirements of the transport and storage cask CASTOR V. This paper details, first, the loading of damaged fuel rods into the Quivers including the necessary equipment, secondly, the dispatch of the Quivers including an illustration of the required equipment and facilities, and thirdly, the loading and dispatch of Quivers in the CASTOR V casks.

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Criticality Safety and Fuel Performance Considerations for Enrichment Above 5 Weight Percent in the Uranium Dioxide Fuel Cycle

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is preparing for anticipated licensing applications requesting fuel enrichments of UO 2 ceramic fuels enriched in excess of 5 weight percent (w/o) 235 U for commercial light-water reactors (LWRs). PNNL has been tasked with providing technical assistance to the NRC related to the review and approval of requests for enrichment increases above the current 5 w/o 235 U enrichment limit. This report will provide the agency with technical assistance to enhance the staff’s knowledge base and to identify developmental needs required to support the licensing of greater than 5 w/o UO 2 ceramic fuels. This report provides a background on increasing enrichment of UO 2 LWR fuel beyond 5 w/o 235 U. The primary concern of increasing enrichment is the impacts to criticality safety. This report will focus on criticality safety as it relates to enrichment, conversion of uranium hexafluoride to UO 2 , fuel assembly fabrication, transportation of fresh/spent fuel assemblies, reactor operations, and storage of fresh/spent fuel assemblies. The report provides a general summary of each of the steps in the UO 2 fuel cycle starting from transportation of enriched UF 6 through dry cask storage of spent fuel assemblies. This report also discusses other impacts of increased enrichment during reactor operation and the surrounding fuel cycle activities. Current needs regarding both data and analytical codes to support the increase above 5 w/o 235 U are identified and discussed.

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NRC Technical Research Program to Evaluate Extended Storage and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel - 12547

Any new direction proposed for the back-end of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cycle will require storage of SNF beyond the current licensing periods. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established a technical research program to determine if any changes in the 10 CFR part 71, and 72 requirements, and associated guidance might be necessary to regulate the safety of anticipated extended storage, and subsequent transport of SNF. This three part program of: 1) analysis of knowledge gaps in the potential degradation of materials, 2) short-term research and modeling, and 3) long-term demonstration of systems, will allow the NRC to make informed regulatory changes, and determine when and if additional monitoring and inspection of the systems is necessary. The NRC has started a research program to obtain data necessary to determine if the current regulatory guidance is sufficient if interim dry storage has to be extended beyond the currently approved licensing periods. The three-phased approach consists of: - the identification and prioritization of potential degradation of the components related to the safe operation of a dry cask storage system, - short-term research to determine if the initial analysis was correct, and - a long-term prototypic demonstration project to confirm the models and results obtained in the short-term research. The gap analysis has identified issues with the SCC of the stainless steel canisters, and SNF behavior. Issues impacting the SNF and canister internal performance such as high and low temperature distributions, and drying have also been identified. Research to evaluate these issues is underway. Evaluations have been conducted to determine the relative values that various types of long-term demonstration projects might provide. These projects or follow-on work is expected to continue over the next five years. (authors)

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Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

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In-Field Performance Testing of the Fork Detector for Quantitative Spent Fuel Verification

Expanding spent fuel dry storage activities worldwide are increasing demands on safeguards authorities that perform inspections. The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) require measurements to verify declarations when spent fuel is transferred to difficult-to-access locations, such as dry storage casks and the repositories planned in Finland and Sweden. EURATOM makes routine use of the Fork detector to obtain gross gamma and total neutron measurements during spent fuel inspections. Data analysis is performed by modules in the integrated Review and Analysis Program (iRAP) software, developed jointly by EURATOM and the IAEA. Under the framework of the US Department of Energy–EURATOM cooperation agreement, a module for automated Fork detector data analysis has been developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) using the ORIGEN code from the SCALE code system and implemented in iRAP. EURATOM and ORNL recently performed measurements on 30 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), operated by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). The measured assemblies represent a broad range of fuel characteristics. Neutron count rates for 15 measured pressurized water reactor assemblies are predicted with an average relative standard deviation of 4.6%, and gamma signals are predicted on average within 2.6% of the measurement. The 15 measured boiling water reactor assemblies exhibit slightly larger deviations of 5.2% for the gamma signals and 5.7% for the neutron count rates, compared to measurements. These findings suggest that with improved analysis of the measurement data, existing instruments can provide increased verification of operator declarations of the spent fuel and thereby also provide greater ability to confirm integrity of an assembly. These results support the application of the Fork detector as a fully quantitative spent fuel verification technique.

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Evaluation of Nondestructive Examination Responses from Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracks: Fabrication of Base Metal Test Specimens

This report documents efforts to create actual chloride-induced stress corrosion cracks (CISCCs) in stainless-steel specimens for evaluating application of nondestructive examination (NDE) technologies for detection and sizing of CISCC in stainless-steel canisters in dry storage systems (DSSs) for spent nuclear fuel. In the United States, several DSSs for commercial spent nuclear fuel are approaching the end of their initial licensed or certified term. Many of these systems were originally licensed or certified for 20 years, after which the licensing or certification may be renewed for periods up to 40 years, according to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste.” Guidance for review of renewal applications is provided in NUREG-1927, Standard Review Plan for Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licenses and Certificates of Compliance. A review of aging effects that could affect important-to-safety structures, systems, and components is required in renewal applications and applicants are required to address aging effects using either a time-limited aging analysis or an aging management program. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NUREG-2214, Managing Aging Processes In Storage (MAPS) Report, which provides guidance on the evaluation of known aging degradation mechanisms to determine if they could affect the ability of dry storage system components to fulfill their safety functions in the 20- to 60-year period of extended operation.

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Structural Sensitivity of Dry Storage Canisters

This LS-DYNA modeling study evaluated a generic used nuclear fuel vertical dry storage cask system under tip-over, handling drop, and seismic load cases to determine the sensitivity of the canister containment boundary to these loads. The goal was to quantify the expected failure margins to gain insight into what material changes over the extended long-term storage lifetime could have the most influence on the security of the containment boundary. It was determined that the tip-over case offers a strong challenge to the containment boundary, and identifies one significant material knowledge gap, the behavior of welded stainless steel joints under high-strain-rate conditions. High strain rates are expected to increase the material’s effective yield strength and ultimate strength, and may decrease its ductility. Determining and accounting for this behavior could potentially reverse the model prediction of a containment boundary failure at the canister lid weld. It must be emphasized that this predicted containment failure is an artifact of the generic system modeled. Vendor specific designs analyze for cask tip-over and these analyses are reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗