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At least 217 records · Page 12

On Automating Failure Mode Analysis and Enforcing its Integrity

This paper reports our experience on the development of a design-for-safety (DFS) workbench called Risk Assessment and Management Environment (RAME) for microelectronic avionics systems. Our objective is to transform DFS practice from an ad-hoc, inefficient, error-prone approach to a stringent engineering process such that DFS can keep up with the rapidly growing complexity of avionics systems. In particular, RAME is built upon an information infrastructure that comprises a fault model, a knowledge base, and a failure reporting/tracking system. This infrastructure permits systematic learning from prior projects and enables the automation of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Among other unique features, the most important advantage of RAME is its capability of directly accepting design source code in hardware description languages (HDLs) for automated failure mode analysis, which enables RAME to be compatible and to evolve with most electronic-computer-aided-design systems. Through an initial experimental evaluation of the RAME prototype, we show that our approach to FMECA automation improves failure mode analysis turn-around-time, completeness, and accuracy.

design for safety↗

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

Flying Qualities Analysis and Piloted Simulation Testing of a Lift+Cruise Vehicle with Propulsion Failures in Hover and Low-Speed Conditions

The recent emergence of electric-Vertical Take-Off and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) applications has resulted in a wide variety of configurations with unique stability and control characteristics. NASA is currently conducting research to develop conceptual design tools to accelerate public acceptance of these vehicles which includes requirements for safety during failure scenarios. This paper summarizes progress toward a toolbox for predicting flying qualities of eVTOL vehicles during critical propulsion failures that could impact the allowable design of the vehicle geometry or control system. Key topics include unique vulnerabilities of eVTOL/multirotor vehicles to propulsion failures, relevant flying qualities design metrics, and simulation modeling requirements for assessing flying qualities degradation due to failures. Results of a piloted simulation study conducted in the NASA Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS) are presented. The VMS experiment was designed to assess and validate key handling qualities and safety design metrics for propulsion failures. These results show the correlation between control system design requirements and the degradation in handling qualities for various propulsion failures.

George Altamirano↗

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps/incidents are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within space exploration ground processing operations, the identification and/or classification of underlying contributors and causes of human error must be identified, in order to manage human error. This research provides a framework and methodology using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences. This research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6) NASA ground processing operations scenarios and thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data. This modifiable framework can be used and followed by other space and similar complex operations.

human error↗

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps incidents are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within space exploration ground processing operations, the identification and/or classification of underlying contributors and causes of human error must be identified, in order to manage human error. This research provides a framework and methodology using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences. This research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6) NASA ground processing operations scenarios and thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data. This modifiable framework can be used and followed by other space and similar complex operations.

mishaps↗

Get-Away tether experiment - Experimental plans

The experimental capabilities of the Get-Away Tether Experiment (GATE) are presented and a series of demonstration mission are proposed. The GATE is a free-flying tether system that will develop or demonstrate technology in the areas of tether dynamics (deployment and stabilization, retrieval, stationkeeping, and severance), tether electrodynamics, micrometeor hazards to tethers, and disturbance rejection. The system consists of two subsatellites connected by 1 km of tether. The free-flying system is ejected from the Orbiter via a Getaway Special (GAS) canister. Two dynamics missions are profiled along with a description of electrodynamic mission capabilities. The dynamic interactions of the end body and tether may be observed from the Orbiter or from an on-board video tracking system. Hence, GATE provides a unique, low cost capability to demonstrate various tether technologies, and address critical design and safety issues associated with future tether applications. An assessment of the significant measurable parameters and associated instrumentation is given. Future work and system development projection schedules are also outlined.

Greene, Michael↗

Workshop on the Role of Design Assurance in System-Wide Safety’s Safety Demonstrator Series

This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.

design assurance↗

European Workshop Industrical Computer Science Systems approach to design for safety

This paper presents guidelines on designing systems for safety, developed by the Technical Committee 7 on Reliability and Safety of the European Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems. The focus is on complementing the traditional development process by adding the following four steps: (1) overall safety analysis; (2) analysis of the functional specifications; (3) designing for safety; (4) validation of design. Quantitative assessment of safety is possible by means of a modular questionnaire covering various aspects of the major stages of system development.

Zalewski, Janusz↗

Small space reactor power systems for unmanned solar system exploration missions

A preliminary feasibility study of the application of small nuclear reactor space power systems to the Mariner Mark II Cassini spacecraft/mission was conducted. The purpose of the study was to identify and assess the technology and performance issues associated with the reactor power system/spacecraft/mission integration. The Cassini mission was selected because study of the Saturn system was identified as a high priority outer planet exploration objective. Reactor power systems applied to this mission were evaluated for two different uses. First, a very small 1 kWe reactor power system was used as an RTG replacement for the nominal spacecraft mission science payload power requirements while still retaining the spacecraft's usual bipropellant chemical propulsion system. The second use of reactor power involved the additional replacement of the chemical propulsion system with a small reactor power system and an electric propulsion system. The study also provides an examination of potential applications for the additional power available for scientific data collection. The reactor power system characteristics utilized in the study were based on a parametric mass model that was developed specifically for these low power applications. The model was generated following a neutronic safety and operational feasibility assessment of six small reactor concepts solicited from U.S. industry. This assessment provided the validation of reactor safety for all mission phases and generatad the reactor mass and dimensional data needed for the system mass model.

Bloomfield, Harvey S.↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

The ICARE Method

The ICARE method is a flexible, widely applicable method for systems engineers to solve problems and resolve issues in a complete and comprehensive manner. The method can be tailored by diverse users for direct application to their function (e.g. system integrators, design engineers, technical discipline leads, analysts, etc.). The clever acronym, ICARE, instills the attitude of accountability, safety, technical rigor and engagement in the problem resolution: Identify, Communicate, Assess, Report, Execute (ICARE). This method was developed through observation of Space Shuttle Propulsion Systems Engineering and Integration (PSE&I) office personnel approach in an attempt to succinctly describe the actions of an effective systems engineer. Additionally it evolved from an effort to make a broadly-defined checklist for a PSE&I worker to perform their responsibilities in an iterative and recursive manner. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Systems Engineering Handbook states, engineering of NASA systems requires a systematic and disciplined set of processes that are applied recursively and iteratively for the design, development, operation, maintenance, and closeout of systems throughout the life cycle of the programs and projects. ICARE is a method that can be applied within the boundaries and requirements of NASA s systems engineering set of processes to provide an elevated sense of duty and responsibility to crew and vehicle safety. The importance of a disciplined set of processes and a safety-conscious mindset increases with the complexity of the system. Moreover, the larger the system and the larger the workforce, the more important it is to encourage the usage of the ICARE method as widely as possible. According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, elements of a system can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies and documents; all things required to produce system-level results, qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, behavior and performance. The ICARE method can be used to improve all elements of a system and, consequently, the system-level functional, physical and operational performance. Even though ICARE was specifically designed for a systems engineer, any person whose job is to examine another person, product, or process can use the ICARE method to improve effectiveness, implementation, usefulness, value, capability, efficiency, integration, design, and/or marketability. This paper provides the details of the ICARE method, emphasizing the method s application to systems engineering. In addition, a sample of other, non-systems engineering applications are briefly discussed to demonstrate how ICARE can be tailored to a variety of diverse jobs (from project management to parenting).

Henke, Luke↗

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗

An Approach for the Assessment of System Upset Resilience

This report describes an approach for the assessment of upset resilience that is applicable to systems in general, including safety-critical, real-time systems. For this work, resilience is defined as the ability to preserve and restore service availability and integrity under stated conditions of configuration, functional inputs and environmental conditions. To enable a quantitative approach, we define novel system service degradation metrics and propose a new mathematical definition of resilience. These behavioral-level metrics are based on the fundamental service classification criteria of correctness, detectability, symmetry and persistence. This approach consists of a Monte-Carlo-based stimulus injection experiment, on a physical implementation or an error-propagation model of a system, to generate a system response set that can be characterized in terms of dimensional error metrics and integrated to form an overall measure of resilience. We expect this approach to be helpful in gaining insight into the error containment and repair capabilities of systems for a wide range of conditions.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗

Spinoff 2012

Topics covered include: Water Treatment Technologies Inspire Healthy Beverages; Dietary Formulas Fortify Antioxidant Supplements; Rovers Pave the Way for Hospital Robots; Dry Electrodes Facilitate Remote Health Monitoring; Telescope Innovations Improve Speed, Accuracy of Eye Surgery; Superconductors Enable Lower Cost MRI Systems; Anti-Icing Formulas Prevent Train Delays; Shuttle Repair Tools Automate Vehicle Maintenance; Pressure-Sensitive Paints Advance Rotorcraft Design Testing; Speech Recognition Interfaces Improve Flight Safety; Polymers Advance Heat Management Materials for Vehicles; Wireless Sensors Pinpoint Rotorcraft Troubles; Ultrasonic Detectors Safely Identify Dangerous, Costly Leaks; Detectors Ensure Function, Safety of Aircraft Wiring; Emergency Systems Save Tens of Thousands of Lives; Oxygen Assessments Ensure Safer Medical Devices; Collaborative Platforms Aid Emergency Decision Making; Space-Inspired Trailers Encourage Exploration on Earth; Ultra-Thin Coatings Beautify Art; Spacesuit Materials Add Comfort to Undergarments; Gigapixel Images Connect Sports Teams with Fans; Satellite Maps Deliver More Realistic Gaming; Elemental Scanning Devices Authenticate Works of Art; Microradiometers Reveal Ocean Health, Climate Change; Sensors Enable Plants to Text Message Farmers; Efficient Cells Cut the Cost of Solar Power; Shuttle Topography Data Inform Solar Power Analysis; Photocatalytic Solutions Create Self-Cleaning Surfaces; Concentrators Enhance Solar Power Systems; Innovative Coatings Potentially Lower Facility Maintenance Costs; Simulation Packages Expand Aircraft Design Options; Web Solutions Inspire Cloud Computing Software; Behavior Prediction Tools Strengthen Nanoelectronics; Power Converters Secure Electronics in Harsh Environments; Diagnostics Tools Identify Faults Prior to Failure; Archiving Innovations Preserve Essential Historical Records; Meter Designs Reduce Operation Costs for Industry; Commercial Platforms Allow Affordable Space Research; Fiber Optics Deliver Real-Time Structural Monitoring; Camera Systems Rapidly Scan Large Structures; Terahertz Lasers Reveal Information for 3D Images; Thin Films Protect Electronics from Heat and Radiation; Interferometers Sharpen Measurements for Better Telescopes; and Vision Systems Illuminate Industrial Processes.

Source record↗

Is Model-Based Development a Favorable Approach for Complex and Safety-Critical Computer Systems on Commercial Aircraft?

A system is safety-critical if its failure can endanger human life or cause significant damage to property or the environment. State-of-the-art computer systems on commercial aircraft are highly complex, software-intensive, functionally integrated, and network-centric systems of systems. Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing safety regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality. A significant degree of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems is required to ensure adequate coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety. Model-based development methodologies, methods, tools, and techniques facilitate collaboration and enable the use of common design artifacts among groups dealing with different aspects of the development of a system. This paper examines the application of model-based development to complex and safety-critical aircraft computer systems. Benefits and detriments are identified and an overall assessment of the approach is given.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗

Feasibility Study of a Rotorcraft Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS): Results of Operator's Evaluation

The objective was to evaluate the feasibility of a state-of-the-art health and usage monitoring system (HUMS) to provide monitoring of critical mechanical systems on the helicopter, including motors, drive train, engines, and life-limited components. The implementation of HUMS and cost integration with current maintenance procedures was assessed from the operator's viewpoint in order to achieve expected benefits from these systems, such as enhanced safety, reduced maintenance cost, and increased availability. An operational HUMS that was installed and operated under an independent flight trial program was used as a basis for this study. The HUMS equipment and software were commercially available. Based on the results of the feasibility study, the HUMS used in the flight trial program generally demonstrated a high level of reliability in monitoring the rotor system, engines, drive train, and life-limited components. The system acted as a sentinel to warn of impending failures. A worn tail rotor pitch bearing was detected by HUMS, which had the capability for self testing to diagnose system and sensor faults. Examples of potential payback to the operator with HUMS were identified, including reduced insurance cost through enhanced safety, lower operating costs derived from maintenance credits, increased aircraft availability, and improved operating efficiency. The interfacing of HUMS with current operational procedures was assessed to require only minimal revisions to the operator's maintenance manuals. Finally the success in realizing the potential benefits from HUMS technology was found to depend on the operator, helicopter manufacturer, regulator (FAA), and HUMS supplier working together.

Romero, Raylund↗

Autonomous guidance, navigation and control bridging program plan

A four-center NASA team has undertaken to develop and demonstrate mature technologies applicable to autonomous guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) systems for application to the National Space Transportation System in full cognizance of its operational, safety, and performance requirements, as well as its cost constraints. Attention is to be given to GNC launch/landing weather assessment, ascent guidance, ascent load relief, and system failure during ascent. Preliminary results indicate that a ground-computed atmospheric steering profile can achieve near-optimum performance as well as high cost effectiveness.

Mcswain, G. G.↗

Market Assessment of Forward-Looking Turbulence Sensing Systems

In recognition of the importance of turbulence mitigation as a tool to improve aviation safety, NASA's Aviation Safety Program developed a Turbulence Detection and Mitigation Sub-element. The objective of this effort is to develop highly reliable turbulence detection technologies for commercial transport aircraft to sense dangerous turbulence with sufficient time warning so that defensive measures can be implemented and prevent passenger and crew injuries. Current research involves three forward sensing products to improve the cockpit awareness of possible turbulence hazards. X-band radar enhancements will improve the capabilities of current weather radar to detect turbulence associated with convective activity. LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a laser-based technology that is capable of detecting turbulence in clear air. Finally, a possible Radar-LIDAR hybrid sensor is envisioned to detect the full range of convective and clear air turbulence. To support decisions relating to the development of these three forward-looking turbulence sensor technologies, the objective of this study was defined as examination of cost and implementation metrics. Tasks performed included the identification of cost factors and certification issues, the development and application of an implementation model, and the development of cost budget/targets for installing the turbulence sensor and associated software devices into the commercial transport fleet.

Kauffmann, Paul↗