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Barriers to Industrial Energy Efficiency - Study (Appendix A), June 2015

This study examines barriers that impede the adoption of energy efficient technologies and practices in the industrial sector, and identifies successful examples and opportunities to overcome these barriers. Three groups of energy efficiency technologies and measures were examined: industrial end-use energy efficiency, industrial demand response, and industrial combined heat and power. This study also includes the estimated economic benefits from hypothetical Federal energy efficiency matching grants, as directed by the Act.

AMO, CHP, industrial energy efficiency, industrial↗

Appendix for the Final Technical Report - DE FE0009284

Carbon capture utilization storage (CCUS) is a potential technology to store anthropogenic emissions for CO 2 . Utilization often refers to CO 2 -enhanced oil recovery (CO 2 -EOR). An important factor in the success of CO 2 storage in saline formations or CO 2 -EOR reservoirs is ensuring that the storage occurs safely and is long-term. Assessment of well integrity has become more important for CCS and CO 2 -EOR as it has become apparent that wells represent the most likely migration pathway for CO 2 to leave a CCS storage unit or a CO 2 -EOR reservoir. Although wells represent a migration pathway they are also the best vehicle for employing technology monitoring CO 2 injection and storage. This contradiction of being a potential migration path and key monitoring technology leads to a need to understand how monitoring wells may be similar or different in comparison to other types of wells with respect to migration risk. The maturation and completion US Department of Energy sponsored research projects presents an opportunity to assess the integrity of monitoring wells that have been exposed to injected CO 2 . This paper discusses an integrity assessment of two monitoring wells in an operating CO 2 -EOR flood in Mississippi, USA. The CFU31F-2 and CFU31F-3 monitoring wells were constructed to test monitoring technologies in and above a commercial CO 2 -EOR project. The materials selected and the design of the well were optimized for monitoring. Carbonation in CFU31-F2 was seen as high as 7900 ft, above what was considered top of cement based on the logs. Time-lapse comparison of cement bond amplitude data and acoustic impedance maps show a deterioration of signal that implies a deterioration of cement bond or cement along much of the cemented annulus in the long-string section. Analysis of sidewall cores using XRD and LA-ICP-MS validated the log interpretation by confirming the degradation of cement (carbonation) along the casing-cement interface. The ultrasonic image maps also clearly identify the control lines and monitoring technology attached to the outside of the of the long-string casing on each well studied. The control lines appear as microdebonded or fluid filled vertical features implying that they could act as leakage pathways. The sidewall core through the control line at 10380 ft confirms that CO 2 is migrating along the control line with heavily carbonated cement at the control line interface. LA-ICP-MS and XRD on formation interface of the sidewall cores collected in both wells indicates that CO 2 is also moving of the cement-formation interface. LA-ICP-MS and XRD indicate that the amount carbonation in the center of the cores was less than the carbonation at the interfaces. Indicating that CO 2 is reaching the center of the cores by diffusing in from the interfaces and not migrating up from the reservoir though the porous matrix of the cement. This agrees with Duguid et al. [5] and Carey et al. [1] who have found that the interfaces in the well are more conductive than the porous network of the cement. Both the materials used to construct the well and the decision to attach monitoring technology to the outside of the well may have contributed to the migration of CO 2 along the interfaces. Careful consideration should be given to material selection to ensure that it does not degrade when in contact with the fluids in the reservoir and overlying strata. The addition of the control line on the outside of the casing complicated the cement placement and likely caused no cement to bond to the casing adjacent to the control line leading out of the reservoir. Further study of other wells with external lines should be conducted to see of the results of the construction of CFU31-F2 and -F3 is normal or an exception.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Dover Light & Power 10 MWe Coal Direct Chemical Looping Plant - Topical Report - Appendix A Environmental Information Volume

An environmental information volume was generated to support the installation of a 10 MWe coal direct chemical looping power plant at the City of Dover's municipal power plant. The coal direct chemical looping process utilizes Ohio State University's iron oxide based oxygen carrier in a moving bed reducer coupled with a circulating fluidized bed combustor.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Dover Light & Power 10 MWe Coal Direct Chemical Looping Plant: Final Technical Report - Appendix A Environmental Information Volume

A 10 MWe coal direct chemical looping plant was designed for the City of Dover Municipal Power Plant. The system consisted of a moving bed reducer and circulating fluidized bed combustor. An iron-oxide oxygen carrier was used. The steam cycle included in bed surface in the combustor and conventional convection pass surface. A thorough environmental information volume was generated to support the installation of the system at the plant.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Powder Metallurgy of Uranium Alloy Fuels for TRU-Burning Reactors Final Technical Report

Overview Fast reactors were evaluated to enable the transmutation of transuranic isotopes generated by nuclear energy systems. The motivation for this was that TRU isotopes have high radiotoxicity and relatively long half-lives, making them unattractive for disposal in a long-term geologic repository. Fast reactors provide an efficient means to utilize the energy content of the TRUs while destroying them. An enabling technology that requires research and development is the fabrication metallic fuel containing TRU isotopes using powder metallurgy methods. This project focused upon developing a powder metallurgical fabrication method to produce U-Zr-transuranic (TRU) alloys at relatively low processing temperatures (500ºC to 600ºC) using either hot extrusion or alpha-phase sintering for charecterization. Researchers quantified the fundamental aspects of both processing methods using surrogate metals to simulate the TRU elements. The process produced novel solutions to some of the issues relating to metallic fuels, such as fuel-cladding chemical interactions, fuel swelling, volatility losses during casting, and casting mold material losses. Workscope There were two primary tasks associated with this project: 1. Hot working fabrication using mechanical alloying and extrusion • Design, fabricate, and assemble extrusion equipment • Extrusion database on DU metal • Extrusion database on U-10Zr alloys • Extrusion database on U-20xx-10Zr alloys • Evaluation and testing of tube sheath metals 2. Low-temperature sintering of U alloys • Design, fabricate, and assemble equipment • Sintering database on DU metal • Sintering database on U-10Zr alloys • Liquid assisted phase sintering on U-20xx-10Zr alloys Appendices Outline Appendix A contains a Fuel Cycle Research & Development (FCR&D) poster and contact presentation where TAMU made primary contributions. Appendix B contains MSNE theses and final defense presentations by David Garnetti and Grant Helmreich outlining the beginning of the materials processing setup. Also included within this section is a thesis proposal by Jeff Hausaman. Appendix C contains the public papers and presentations introduced at the 2010 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting. Appendix A—MSNE theses of David Garnetti and Grant Helmreich and proposal by Jeff Hausaman A.1 December 2009 Thesis by David Garnetti entitled “Uranium Powder Production Via Hydride Formation and Alpha Phase Sintering of Uranium and Uranium-Zirconium Alloys for Advanced Nuclear Fuel Applications” A.2 September 2009 Presentation by David Garnetti (same title as document in Appendix B.1) A.3 December 2010 Thesis by Grant Helmreich entitled “Characterization of Alpha-Phase Sintering of Uranium and Uranium-Zirconium Alloys for Advanced Nuclear Fuel Applications” A.4 October 2010 Presentation by Grant Helmreich (same title as document in Appendix B.3) A.5 Thesis Proposal by Jeffrey Hausaman entitled “Hot Extrusion of Alpha Phase Uranium-Zirconium Alloys for TRU Burning Fast Reactors” Appendix B—External presentations introduced at the 2010 ANS Winter Meeting B.1 J.S. Hausaman, D.J. Garnetti, and S.M. McDeavitt, “Powder Metallurgy of Alpha Phase Uranium Alloys for TRU Burning Fast Reactors,” Proceedings of 2010 ANS Winter Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, November 7-10, 2010 B.2 PowerPoint Presentation Slides from C.1 B.3 G.W. Helmreich, W.J. Sames, D.J. Garnetti, and S.M. McDeavitt, “Uranium Powder Production Using a Hydride-Dehydride Process,” Proceedings of 2010 ANS Winter Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, November 7-10, 2010 B.4. PowerPoint Presentation Slides from C.3 B.5 Poster Presentation from C.3 Appendix C—Fuel cycle research and development undergraduate materials and poster presentation C.1 Poster entitled “Characterization of Alpha-Phase Sintering of Uranium and Uranium-Zirconium Alloys” presented at the Fuel Cycle Technologies Program Annual Meeting C.2 April 2011 Honors Undergraduate Thesis by William Sames, Research Fellow, entitled “Uranium Metal Powder Production, Particle Distribution Analysis, and Reaction Rate Studies of a Hydride-Dehydride Process"

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calendar Year 2009 Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2009 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2009 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2009 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12) and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2009 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent QA/QC or DQO evaluation information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2009 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1A (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for the wells in each regime that were sampled during CY 2009 by either the Y-12 GWPP or BJC. Field measurements recorded during collection of the groundwater and surface water samples and results of laboratory analyses of the samples are in Appendix D (Bear Creek Regime), Appendix E (East Fork Regime and surrounding areas), and Appendix F (Chestnut Ridge Regime). Appendix G contains data for the QA/QC samples associated with monitoring performed in each regime by the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2020 natural gas LCA data appendices

This collection is the data-centric appendices for the report Life Cycle Analysis of Natural Gas Extraction and Power Generation: U.S. 2020 Emissions Profile. It consists of Appendix A: Additional Modeling Parameters [spreadsheet]; Appendix B: Water Burdens [spreadsheet]; Appendix D: Simulation of Liquids Unloading [python script and spreadsheet]; Appendix E: Detailed GHG Results for All Scenarios [spreadsheet]; Appendix F: Full Inventory Results [spreadsheet]; and Appendix I: Stage-Level Natural Gas Loss and Consumption Rates [spreadsheet].

Appendices↗

2020 natural gas LCA appendices Rev1

This collection is the data-centric appendices for the report Life Cycle Analysis of Natural Gas Extraction and Power Generation: U.S. 2020 Emissions Profile. It consists of Appendix A: Additional Modeling Parameters [spreadsheet]; Appendix B: Water Burdens [spreadsheet]; Appendix D: Simulation of Liquids Unloading [python script and spreadsheet]; Appendix E: Detailed GHG Results for All Scenarios [spreadsheet]; Appendix F: Full Inventory Results [spreadsheet]; and Appendix I: Stage-Level Natural Gas Loss and Consumption Rates [spreadsheet]. These results have been updated from the previous version (https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/2020-natural-gas-lca-data-appendices) to correct a modeling error where the same post-processing natural gas composition was used instead of the intended regional compositions.

Appendices↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2011

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2011 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2011 will be in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 540.1A and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2011 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2011 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2011 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2011) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2012

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2012 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2012 is in accordance with the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2012 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2012 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2012) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling and Analysis Plan (CY 2021)

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2021 at the U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring is performed by the GWPP. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12. Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2021 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2021) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F. Modifications to the CY 2021 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 0)

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure use restriction (UR) inspections at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers post-closure UR inspections for calendar year 2020, and includes visual inspections and repair activities completed at the following corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424, Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453, Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487, Thunderwell Site (TTR). Note: CAU 400, Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) (CASs TA-19-001-05PT, Ordnance Disposal Pit; and TA-55-00-TAB2, Ordnance Disposal Pit) no longer requires inspection and reporting, as described in the Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2019. Site figures are included in Appendix A. The Post-Closure Inspection Plans and Record of Technical Change modifying the requirements for each UR are included in Appendix B. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are included in Appendix C. Field Notes are included in Appendix D. Appendix E, Inspection Photographs, does not include photographs because none were taken during the 2020 post-closure inspections. Appendix F, Post-Closure Vegetation Monitoring Report, does not include any data because vegetation monitoring was not conducted or required at any CAU in 2020. Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure requirements outlined in specific CAU and CAS URs, and approved by NDEP. The annual post-closure inspections for CASs associated with CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 were conducted on May 20, 2020. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAUs 487, or at CASs associated with CAU 424 (except CASs 03-08-002-A304 and 03-08-002-A308). Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407, CAS TA-23-001-TARC (Roller Coaster RadSafe Area): A UR sign was loose and was rehung during the inspection. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): The northeast monument needed a UR sign. The UR sign was attached to the monument on August 11, 2020. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): The southeast monument needed additional lava rock. The lava rock was added during the inspection. • CAU 453, CAS 09-55-001-0952 (Area 9 Landfill): Two animal burrows were noted in the western portion of the northern and southern trenches (one burrow per trench). The animal burrows were repaired on August 11, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗