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NASA NTRS2019

NASA’s Space Launch System Progress Report

NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) continues to achieve assembly and testing milestones on its way to the launch of the first human-rated spacecraft to the Moon since the Apollo Program. Major flight hardware for Artemis I (see Fig. 1), formerly known as Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), is complete, including the liquid and solid main propulsion systems. The Artemis I core stage is fully assembled and engine integration and checkout is underway. Structural testing on the core stage engine and payload sections and intertank are complete. Liquid hydrogen tank structural testing is under way, and liquid oxygen tank structural testing will begin in fall 2019. Major structural components for the second and third flights are also in production; hardware has been fabricated for each element of the Artemis II vehicle. SLS and the Orion crew vehicle along with the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) launch facilities at Kennedy Space Center are critical to the nation’s plans to return to the Moon to stay in a measured, sustainable fashion. Lunar exploration will expand our understanding of Earth’s formation, serve as a proving ground for technologies for pushing deeper into the solar system, and inspire a new generation. This paper will discuss details of 2018-2019 progress and the work ahead to ready SLS for launch.

Honeycutt, John↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA’s Human Landing System: The Strategy for the 2024 Mission and Future Sustainability

In response to the 2018 White House Space Policy Directive- sustainable lunar exploration, and to the Vice President’s March 2019 direction to do so by 2024, NASA is working to establish humanity's presence on and around the Moon by: 1) sending payloads to its surface, 2) assembling the Gateway outpost in orbit and 3) demonstrating the first human lunar landings since 1972. NASA’s Artemis program is implementing a multi-faceted and coordinated agency-wide approach with a focus on the lunar South Pole. The Artemis missions will demonstrate new technologies, capabilities and business approaches needed for future exploration, including Mars. Assessing options to accelerate development of required systems, NASA is utilizing public-private engagements through the Human Exploration and Operations (HEO) Mission Directorate’s NextSTEP Broad Agency Announcements. The design, development and demonstration of the Human Landing System (HLS) is expected to be led by commercial partners. Utilizing efforts across mission directorates, the Artemis effort will benefit from programs from the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) and Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). SMD’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) initiative will procure commercial robotic lunar delivery services and the development of science instruments and technology demonstration payloads. The Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) portfolio of technology advancements relative to HLS include lunar lander components and technologies for pointing, navigation and tracking, fuel storage and transfer, autonomy and mobility, communications, propulsion and power. In addition to describing the objectives and requirements of the 2024 Artemis mission, this paper will present NASA’s approach to accessing the lunar surface with an affordable human-rated landing system, current status and the role o a sustainable lunar presence.

Chavers, Greg↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Whitman, Gerek↗
NASA NTRS2019

Design Considerations and Development Status for Atmospheric Powered Descent of High-Mass Payloads at Mars

Retropropulsion, initiated at supersonic conditions, is the only presently viable approach to the descent and landing of human-scale payloads on Mars, providing both deceleration and control authority for precision landing. Atmospheric powered descent challenges traditional processes and dependencies in system design. Changes to a design by one discipline have a greater potential to affect overall vehicle performance than in the case of powered descent with no atmosphere. The interdependence is due to the sensitivity of propulsive-aerodynamic interference effects to small changes in configuration or operational environment. The fidelity of Mars exploration architectures has increased in recent years, and the conditions and designs with the lowest aerosciences uncertainties are no longer as flight-relevant. At this time, there is no human-rated vehicle relying on retropropulsion for descent and landing in an atmospheric environment. Continued development of powered descent for atmospheric environments is enabled by progressive balanced investments in ground testing, predictive computational capabilities, and flight testing and demonstration.

EDL↗
NASA NTRS2020

Guidance for Human Error Analysis (HEA)

NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems in NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2C requires Program Managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) for all mission phases. The purpose of the HEA is to enable programs to understand and manage potential catastrophic hazards that could be caused by human error, understand the relative risks and uncertainties within the system design, and influence decisions throughout the system lifecycle. This document provides guidance to NASA civil servants and contractors on how the Agency’s HEA requirement can be fulfilled.

Human Error Analysis; NASA Procedural Requirement;↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System Liftoff and Separation Dynamics Analysis Tool Chain

A flexible, hierarchical tool chain that is being applied to NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) for critical dynamics phenomena is described. This tool chain, called CLVTOPS, is used to investigate lateral liftoff movement of the vehicle as it departs and clears the mobile launch tower and separation of the two solid rocket boosters without collision with the core stage and payload. The toolset’s architecture was configured to take advantage of a modern software-engineering approach for maximum flexibility and utilization of open-source simulations and associated tools. As opposed to a “monolithic” approach, scripting languages were used to “bind” together a tool chain to configure and organize input data, execute and produce analysis results, and post-process these results to facilitate a rapid iterative analysis process to quickly address issues and pursue alternatives with emphasis on analysis automation. Key capabilities in the tool chain include processing and mining of very large data sets, a wide range of graphical depictions, and high-fidelity, physics-based simulations. The paper begins with a problem description and the motivation for liftoff and separation dynamics analysis followed by a historical survey of dynamics analyses for previous NASA human-rated launch vehicles. Details of the tool chain and its components are then introduced divided, first, into description of the scripting language architecture used to “bind” the simulation tools, programs, and scripts together and, second, the physics models and simulations. Representative analyses and data products are shown for liftoff and booster separation dynamics that provide in-depth insight to the tool chain’s capabilities. Supporting activities such as simulation tool chain verification, version archiving and data management, and training are addressed. The paper concludes with case examples on how the tool chain can be tailored to related aerospace dynamics analyses, both large and small. These patterns and techniques for SLS dynamics tool construction can be applied for other aerospace simulations.

6DOF↗
NASA NTRS2020

Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Office Exploration EVA System Technical Standards

The purpose of this Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Office specification is to define the types of Programmatic-level standards to be used for design, manufacturing, testing, and quality control for the Exploration EVA (xEVA) System. The xEVA system includes both space suits and EVA hardware elements (e. EVA Tools, Airlock hardware, etc.). Many of the standards referenced in this document can be substituted for similar standards used in industry; this document provides the scope of which standards need to be considered. This document is the EVA-centric implementation of Chapter 3 of NPR 7120.10, Technical Standards for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Programs and Projects: Select technical standards for use as program/project requirements. This also addresses the intent of Section 2.2.6 of NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems.

EVA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of a Human Systems Integration Plan

NASA defines Human Systems Integration (HSI) as part of the overall systems engineering and acquisition strategy for space systems. The HSI Plan defines how HSI activities will be implemented across the lifecycle of the mission, as required by NPR 7123.1C, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, and NPR 8705.2C Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems. The goal of this presentation is to share with government and industry how an HSI Plan can be implemented. The presentation will cover HSI implementation for flight systems, vehicle processing, and interfaces. These are divided into six NASA HSI Domains: human factors engineering, operations resources, safety, training, maintainability and supportability, habitability and environment. HSI activities go across the mission’s lifecycle from pre-formulation and acquisition through design, development, operations, maintenance, and decommissioning. The HSI Plan includes a description of the HSI activities and products that are essential for human rating, operability, maintainability, supportability, and affordability of the mission systems. It also describes the role of the HSI Team required as part of the Human Rating process. The HSI Plan utilizes the operational expertise within NASA to ensure designs and testing are successful, leading to acceptable human spaceflight vehicles.

Jackelynne Silva-Martinez↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System Liftoff and Separation Dynamics Analysis Tool Chain

A flexible, hierarchical tool chain that is being applied to NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) for critical dynamics phenomena is described. This tool chain, called CLVTOPS, is used to investigate lateral liftoff movement of the vehicle as it departs and clears the mobile launch tower and separation of the two solid rocket boosters without collision with the core stage and payload. The toolset’s architecture was configured to take advantage of a modern software engineering approach for maximum flexibility and utilization of open-source simulations and associated tools. As opposed to a “monolithic” approach, scripting languages were used to “bind” together a tool chain to configure and organize input data, execute and produce analysis results, and post-process these results to facilitate a rapid, iterative analysis process to quickly address issues and pursue alternatives with emphasis on analysis automation. Key capabilities in the tool chain include processing and mining of very large data sets, a wide range of graphical depictions, and high-fidelity, physics-based simulations. The paper begins with a problem description and the motivation for liftoff and separation dynamics analysis followed by a historical survey of dynamics analyses for previous NASA human-rated launch vehicles. Details of the tool chain and its components are then introduced and divided, first, into description of the scripting language architecture used to “bind” the simulation tools, programs, and scripts together and, second, the physics models and simulations. Representative analyses and data products for liftoff and booster separation dynamics are shown in order to provide in-depth insight into the tool chain’s capabilities. Supporting activities such as simulation tool chain verification, version archiving and data management, and training are addressed. The paper concludes with case examples on how the tool chain can be tailored to related aerospace dynamics analyses, both large and small. The flexibility and versatility of this tool chain in supporting analyses of such a diverse range of aerospace applications demonstrates the feasibility of applying these patterns and techniques for tool construction to other aerospace simulations.

6DOF↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Affordable Development Strategy for NEP Nuclear Systems

One nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) reactor systems under consideration is a hydride moderated thermal spectrum reactor fueled by high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU). While such a reactor is expected to yield the lightest HALEU reactor design, its development challenges grow exponentially with increasing mission demands, most notably power output, specific weight of the overall system (which may require operation at temperatures exceeding 1200 K), service lifetime, and human-rated reliability. Two of the greatest cost drivers are full-powered nuclear demonstrations and extensive material development campaigns, so it is important to consider options that can minimize the need for or complexity of such tasks. This paper discusses a structured framework being developed for assessing how NEP design choices, such as materials selection, neutronic features, and heat-removal technologies, can translate into project risk and how project performance goals can be traded with development cost.Reactors operating at high temperatures often require cutting-edge heat transfer technologies and creep-resistant materials. Use of new materials in high temperature reactors brings additional complication beyond those common to any new space materials development campaign. For example, such materials may not possess necessary neutronic cross-sectional or neutronic irradiation data. Similarly, use of new materials may significantly influence core neutronics; in some extreme cases, neutronic reactivity feed-back of certain new materials can vary during their service life as radiation damage impacts the scattering cross-section. In an affordable development approach, high fidelity modeling and simulation tools are used to identify and characterize potential ‘knees-in-the-curves’ in the relationship that exists between the mission characteristics and the project risk. Of particular significance is use of modern uncertainty management and variance reduction methods to perform gap analyses that feed into phenomena identification and ranking tables (PIRT) commonly used to communicate nuclear readiness levels. Model-based measurements techniques are used to design sub-scale experiments as a substitute to minimize orcompletely eliminate the need for nuclear demonstrations.This paper will describe the approach and present preliminary results. It will lay the groundwork for developing a set of metrics that can be broadly characterized as system nuclear readiness levels and advancement degree of difficulty for nuclear systems. Equally importantly, a goal of this paper is to initiate a dialogue among stakeholders on what is the sufficient level of maturity that is required for launching a demonstration unit.

Dasari V Rao↗
NASA NTRS2018

Recommendations Emerging from an Analysis of NASA's Deep Space Communications Capacity

During 2016-2017, NASA’s Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Office chartered a study of Deep Space Network (DSN) communications capacity relative to projected future-mission demand over the next 30 years. In this paper, we briefly describe the methodology used to analyze capacity vs. demand over such a broad timeframe, summarize key findings emerging from the analysis, and discuss the associated recommendations. Performing the analysis entailed: identifying key factors shaping the anticipated future mission set, identifying several alternative future mission set scenarios consistent with these factors, and then analyzing each mission set scenario in terms of required antenna capacity, downlink and uplink capabilities, and spectrum as a function of time. On the basis of these aggregate requirements, DSN loading simulations were then conducted that examined how well each of the postulated mission sets could load up onto the the DSN’s “in-plan” architecture. To the extent that capacity shortfalls emerged during these baseline simulations, architectural solutions to the shortfalls were then postulated and tested via additional simulations. In general, the trend analyses and baseline loading simulations indicated a significant progression in challenges over the next three decades. In the current decade, the DSN appeared to be operating very close to capacity. The first human exploration mission and its secondary payload launch opportunities for cubesats traveling beyond GEO contributed to this loading. As a consequence, the main challenge appeared to be managing peak assetcontention periods. In the next decade, the DSN continued to operate close to capacity but also began transitioning to more frequent human mission support. Upgrading for, and operating, a human-rated system while continuing to meet robotic mission customer requirements emerged as the key challenge. In the 2030’s and beyond, simulations suggested a need for fundamentally new capability and capacity. The high data rates and long link distances characteristic of human Mars exploration drove requirements far beyond what is currently “in plan.” The key challenge then became determining the most cost-effective combination of RF and optical assets for communicating with the postulated human Mars assets while still providing for the needs of all the other missions across the solar system. Various link budget, visibility, and loading analyses ultimately suggested that the human Mars exploration demands of the 2030’s could best be addressed with two cross-linked RF-optical areostationary relays (or an areostationary relay and deep space habitat) providing a dual “trunk link” to an array of 2-to-3 additional 34m beam waveguide antennas and an ~8.5m optical antenna at each DSN Complex. The dual “trunk link” would enable the same amount of total data return to Earth as a single trunk link at twice the data rate, but with only half the required array size on the ground, assuming use of Multiple Spacecraft Per Antenna (MSPA) techniques. MSPA techniques, including a Multiple Uplink Per Antenna (MUPA) technique currently under investigation, also showed promise for reducing asset contention in the decades prior to human Mars exploration.

Lee, Carlyn-Ann↗
NASA NTRS2021

Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems

Environmental control and life support (ECLS)systems provide the conditions necessary to maintain astronaut's health during a mission. They have been a part of every human-rated vehicle from Mercury onward, from carbon dioxide scrubbers and drink bags, to sophisticated air and water recovery technologies. In order to enable human exploration beyond low Earth orbit for an extended time, such as a mission to Mars, closed-loop life support, the continuous use, reuse, and recycling of air, water, and waste will be necessary. This chapter provides a brief history of air revitalization, wastewater, and solid waste recovery systems from the early spaceflight era to the present, potential technologies in development to facilitate further loop closure, and considerations for future life support system development in support of exploration

Life support↗
NASA NTRS2021

Hydrocarbon Cold-Flow Simulation of LOX/LH2 Rocket Aerodynamics

In FY19, this project developed a test method which employed heated ethane in the physical simulation of rocket plume aerodynamics. Based on this work, EUS partnered with significant leveraged funding. A portable, self-contained test bed was also fabricated to support validation of the new method. In FY20, this project focused on the formal validation of ethane’s performance as an aerodynamic simulant as well as the development of the analytical and hardware infrastructure required to carry out that task. The test bed was activated, a series of heated-ethane tests on one or more rocket/diffuser configurations were conducted, and characterizations of the performance of the ethane simulation compared to hot-fire were performed. A series of 127 tests were conducted on 13 aerodynamic configurations to evaluate ethane’s performance as a simulant. It was found that the new methodology can reproduce rocket plume flow fields with +/- 0.5% pressure error at ~3% physical scale. The result is a cost-per-test reduction of ~99% compared to the hot-fire subscale testing typically used to obtain equivalent data. Some initial efforts have taken place, and future efforts are being planned with LaRC supersonic retro propulsion and MSFC SLS aerodynamics teams, which are interested in using the ethane system to wind-tunnel test human-rated Mars lander retrorockets and SLS Booster. Details of the prototypical experiments were published as NASA TM 2020-5009122,and have been presented in JANNAF Virtual Conference paper, "New Developments in Retro propulsion Testing for Mars Entry, Descent and Landing".

Daniel Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ideas for Infusing In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing Concepts into Nuclear Electric Propulsion Architectures

NASA is currently investigating nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) for human Mars transport within the space nuclear propulsion portfolio. NEP spacecraft have the following characteristics, they: 1) include very large structures (~100-meter length); 2) are comprised of many components/modules; and 3) have very long lifetimes (e.g., 50 years for fuel rods). Thus, NEP spacecraft can be classified as a “persistent asset,” which is any zero-g or planetary surface system that benefits from in-space assembly (ISA) or multiple visits for servicing, repairs, and upgrades. NEP spacecraft will benefit from taking advantage of, and incorporating, In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) capabilities in the spacecraft architecture from the onset, enabling system maintenance, repair, and evolution. ISA has a long history of being proposed for, and studied as, a means for achieving large systems in space. More recently, the benefits of ISA have been recognized by NASA, the Department of Defense (DOD), other government agencies, and commercial space companies, and thus, ISAM is being actively pursued at a national level. Past and current strategies for achieving large structures in space have relied largely on two strategies; the first is to launch monolithic structures (designed to meet launch vehicle requirements for payload size and mass) that are docked or berthed to other monolithic structures on-orbit to form a larger structure (e.g., the International Space Station [ISS]); the second is folding and packaging large structures to fit inside a payload fairing and deploying the full-sized structure (unaided) once on-orbit (e.g., the James Webb Space Telescope [JWST]). To date, conceptual architecture studies performed for NEP spacecraft capable of human-rated Mars transport have only included a combination of the two previously mentioned strategies. This paper will propose ideas for infusing ISAM strategies into NEP vehicle architectures that leverage existing and near future technologies and enable the resulting NEP systems to be realized in a more time- and cost-efficient manner.

in-space assembly↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Enabling Reliable, Fault-Tolerant Autonomous Lunar Habitats with High-Performance Spaceflight Computing

The lunar surface presents unfavorable constraints and harsh living conditions. To address these challenges, autonomous habitats will require complex integrated systems that combine advanced software, high-performance hardware, and cutting-edge sensors to ensure sustainability, safety, and operational efficiency. Consequently, maintaining a sustainable presence on the Moon requires reliable infrastructure and efficient development, precise monitoring, and utilization of resources within a lunar installation. These elements are essential not only to ensure that lunar settlement can be long-term, self-sustaining, and resource-efficient, but also to serve as a foundation for future missions and eventual human habitation on Mars. Humans are not native to the Moon; therefore, our survival and ability to thrive will depend on autonomous systems that can foster safety and resilience through high-availability architectures, graceful degradation, and highly fault-tolerant spaceflight hardware capable of continuing operation during failures. This requires advanced human-rated distributed systems architectures with specialized electronics, scalable capabilities, and an integrated design approach. Unlike current practices focused on short-term missions and regularly maintained components, permanent lunar compute systems must be designed for extended operations beyond mission durations. This paper explores the necessity of transitioning toward fault- tolerant, highly autonomous hardware systems designed for multi-year missions. It also identifies critical subsystems that require high levels of autonomy, supported by radiation-hardened processors and extreme thermal loads, which are essential to mitigate long-term degradation and ensure sustainable lunar habitation. Finally, the paper aligns with NASA’s identified Civil Space Shortfalls, particularly in high-performance onboard computing, advanced data acquisition, extreme-environment avionics, radiation monitoring and countermeasures, and autonomous health management. It proposes NASA’s new High-Performance Spaceflight Computing (HPSC) processor as a turnkey solution, delivering 100 times the performance-per-watt of legacy rad-hard CPUs and enabling onboard AI, edge computing, and fault-tolerant features essential for sustained lunar autonomy and beyond.

Sarkis S Mikaelian↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS2026

Overview of Past and Future EVA Suit Testing and Training in Chamber B at NASA JSC

The Crew and Thermal System Division’s Chamber B has received an increase in demand for next generation suit testing. Chamber B is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center’s only human-rated thermal vacuum (TVAC) chamber. Historically it was used in Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Shuttle, and the International Space Station (ISS) suit tests. Recently, the chamber has been returned to service with new capabilities for suit testing. In 2023, The Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) underwent a 5-day, extensive thermal vacuum test that included both a full-bodied Exploration Pressure Garment Suit (xPGS) as well as a high fidelity Short xEMU. SpaceX has also used the chamber for human-in-the-loop (HITL) qualification and acceptance testing on their flight Polaris Dawn suits for the first-ever commercial extravehicular activity (EVA). Current chamber Manlock B2 upgrades include the support of two test subjects at the same time with updated chamber interface and support systems for the next generation of suits. This paper will discuss the history of spacesuit testing in the chamber, the recent testing for commercial and NASA suits, and upgrades to accommodate new test requirements.

Polaris Dawn↗