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At least 217 records · Page 12

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

Exponential Backoff and Its Security Implications for Safety-Critical OT Protocols over TCP/IP Networks

The convergence of Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) networks has become increasingly prevalent with the growth of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. This shift, while enabling enhanced automation, remote monitoring, and data sharing, also introduces new challenges related to communication latency and cybersecurity. Oftentimes, legacy OT protocols were adapted to the TCP/IP stack without an extensive review of the ramifications to their robustness, performance, or safety objectives. To further accommodate the IT/OT convergence, protocol gateways were introduced to facilitate the migration from serial protocols to TCP/IP protocol stacks within modern IT/OT infrastructure. However, they often introduce additional vulnerabilities by exposing traditionally isolated protocols to external threats. This study investigates the security and reliability implications of migrating serial protocols to TCP/IP stacks and the impact of protocol gateways, utilizing two widely used OT protocols: Modbus TCP and DNP3. Our protocol analysis finds a significant safety-critical vulnerability resulting from this migration, and our subsequent tests clearly demonstrate its presence and impact. A multi-tiered testbed, consisting of both physical and emulated components, is used to evaluate protocol performance and the effects of device-specific implementation flaws. Through this analysis of specifications and behaviors during communication interruptions, we identify critical differences in fault handling and the impact on time-sensitive data delivery. The findings highlight how reliance on lower-level IT protocols can undermine OT system resilience, and they inform the development of mitigation strategies to enhance the robustness of industrial communication networks.

DNP3↗

Using Differential Evolution to Optimize Learning from Signals and Enhance Network Security

Computer and communication network attacks are commonly orchestrated through Wireless Access Points (WAPs). This paper summarizes proof-of-concept research activity aimed at developing a physical layer Radio Frequency (RF) air monitoring capability to limit unauthorizedWAP access and mprove network security. This is done using Differential Evolution (DE) to optimize the performance of a Learning from Signals (LFS) classifier implemented with RF Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints. Performance of the resultant DE-optimized LFS classifier is demonstrated using 802.11a WiFi devices under the most challenging conditions of intra-manufacturer classification, i.e., using emissions of like-model devices that only differ in serial number. Using identical classifier input features, performance of the DE-optimized LFS classifier is assessed relative to a Multiple Discriminant Analysis / Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier that has been used for previous demonstrations. The comparative assessment is made using both Time Domain (TD) and Spectral Domain (SD) fingerprint features. For all combinations of classifier type, feature type, and signal-to-noise ratio considered, results show that the DEoptimized LFS classifier with TD features is uperior and provides up to 20% improvement in classification accuracy with proper selection of DE parameters.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Multidimensional Holistic Framework for the Security of Distributed Energy and Control Systems

The digitization of smart grid distributed generation and industrial control systems has prompted utilities to deploy tools with ubiquitous communications that potentially widen the attack surface. The utilities still continue to rely on the traditional cybersecurity technologies, such as firewalls, anti-malware tools, and passwords that do not ensure security across all dimensions of the information assurance model required for a strong cybersecurity business process. This paper proposes a multidimensional holistic framework that addresses this gap through advanced technologies, intelligent algorithms, and continued assessments. To show proof, the layered defense model, a solution dimension of the framework, is integrated into the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Security and Resilience Testbed to replicate a utility's enterprise and substation networks. The model is used to evaluate the security and resilience of microgrid control systems, and, based on the insights gathered, recommend best practices for utility cybersecurity analysts for a strong business process. Here, with this baseline, the paper conceptually introduces intelligence-driven solutions comprising contextual data analysis and machine learning to respond to advanced persistent threats sponsored by campaign efforts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing Inverter Communication: Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System to Tap, Analyze, and Act

The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Recurrent Neural Network Language Models for Open Vocabulary Event-Level Cyber Anomaly Detection

Automated analysis methods are crucial aids for monitoring and defending a network to protect the sensitive or confidential data it hosts. This work introduces a flexible, powerful, and unsupervised approach to detecting anomalous behavior in computer and network logs; one that largely eliminates domain-dependent feature engineering employed by existing methods. By treating system logs as threads of interleaved ``sentences'' (event log lines) to train online unsupervised neural network language models, our approach provides an adaptive model of normal network behavior. We compare the effectiveness of both standard and bidirectional recurrent neural network language models at detecting malicious activity within network log data. Extending these models, we introduce a tiered recurrent architecture, which provides context by modeling sequences of users' actions over time. Compared to isolation forests and Principal Components Analysis (PCA), two popular anomaly detection algorithms, we observe superior performance on the Los Alamos National Laboratory Cyber Security dataset. For log-line-level predictions, our best performing character-based model provides test set anomaly scores ranking red team events in the 98th percentile on average, and yields 0.97 area under the receiver operator characteristic curve, demonstrating the strong fine-grained anomaly detection performance of this approach on open vocabulary logging sources.

Cyber Analysis, Deep Learning, language analysis, ↗

EV Everywhere Sandia Appendix

Sandia National Laboratories has a large cybersecurity research program supporting the Department of Energy as well as other federal departments and agencies. Fundamental research helps us stay ahead of threats. Sandia’s research efforts in cybersecurity are focused in three broad areas: 1. Trusted hardware, software, and systems 2. Networks and systems architectures and analysis 3. Effective cyber defense systems Research is conducted in state-of-the-art facilities with extensive computing and information science capabilities, which range from architectures and algorithms to advanced modeling and simulation. Three areas of active research most applicable to connected vehicle security are: Red Team Assessments, Emulytics™, and Supply Chain Risk Management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Assessment in DER-rich Distribution Operations: Criticality Levels and Impact Analysis

The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution networks has become a pivotal strategy for achieving decarbonization, enhancing grid resilience, and optimizing grid efficiency. Remote monitoring and control op- erations of such resources rely on a network of sensors and communication infrastructure, exposing the system to potential cyber threats. Therefore, as the deployment of DERs increases, ensuring secure monitoring and control becomes an imperative challenge. This paper utilizes real-time feeder models, which are instrumental in developing cybersecurity testbeds tailored for hardware-in-loop (HIL) systems. These models enable users to simulate cyber attacks in a real-world environment and analyze the power distribution operations during vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discuss several practical sets of grid parameters to identify critical levels of DERs and evaluate various scenarios that simulate cyber threats on sensitive DERs. The modified IEEE 123-bus model is used as the test case for demonstrating the proposed scenarios. The findings from this study provide valuable insights into the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of cyber attacks on DERs, allowing for better mitigation strategies and improved cyber resilience in future distribution networks.

Maharjan, Manisha↗

Pattern Discovery in Internet Background Radiation

Internet Background Radiation (IBR) is observed in empty network address spaces. No traffic should arrive there, but it does in overwhelming quantities, gathering evidences of attacks, malwares and misconfigurations. The study of IBR helps to detect spreading network problems, common vulnerabilities and attack trends. However, network traffic data evolves quickly and is of high volume and diversity, i.e., an outstanding big data challenge. When used to assist network security, it also requires the online classification of dynamic streaming data. In this paper, we introduce an AGgregation & Mode (AGM) vector to represent network traffic. The AGM format characterizes IP hosts by extracting aggregated and mode values of IP header fields, and without inspecting payloads. We performed clustering and statistical analysis to explore six months of IBR from 2012 with the AGM mapping. The discovered patterns allow building a classification of IBR, which identifies phenomena that have been actively polluting the Internet for years. The AGM representation is light and tailored for monitoring and pattern discovery. We show that AGM vectors are suitable to analyze large volumes of network traffic: they capture permanent operations, such as long term scanning, as well as bursty events from targeted attacks and short term incidents.

Iglesias, Felix↗

An Advanced Geomechanics Simulation Framework to Connect Induced Microseismic Events to their Sources. CRADA TC02193 Final Report

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and ION Geophysical. The main goal of the proposed effort was to develop industry-leading state of the art modeling and analysis capabilities to address an important aspect of hydraulic fracturing operations -- the evolution of the fracture network in the subsurface and the associated generation of the microseismic signals associated with the creation of the fracture network. The proposed effort leveraged on-going code development activities at LLNL. The codes used to execute the proposed research were to be transitioned to ION Geophysical through a visitor exchange program whereby ION Geophysical employees would visit LLNL and interact with the code developers and subject matter experts enabling them to develop the technical understanding and the expertise needed to independently perform simulations and analyze results.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Centralized Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment - (CRADA Final Report)

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Emulation and Adversarial Analysis of EV Charging Networks

In the effort of decarbonization and evolution of the modern electrical grid, electric vehicles (EVs) play a key part to transform the grid. However, due to the rapid adoption of EVs and the demand of the charging infrastructure required to power said EVs, risk of a cyber-attack may impose serious consequences. There is a need to analyze and protect the charging ecosystem infrastructure from cyber threats before it reaches wide-scale deployment. In an effort to secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications, standardization is necessary for continued reliable system operation. The protocol ISO 15118 outlines controls and practices that should be implemented for secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications. The standard is gaining momentum for American markets as the demand for EV infrastructure grows. The adoption of ISO 15118 in American markets poses several challenges: the deployment of a public key infrastructure (PKI) as outlined within the standard, interoperability of charging different EVs with chargers from different manufactures using the PKI, and scaling the ecosystem to meet the demand while managing risks. This project was created to understand potential cyber and scaling challenges of PKI for EV infrastructure through utilizing a series of emulated components mapping to what exists in the EV ecosystem today, and the components of the PKI that are under development. The key nodes within the emulation that are under development are: electric vehicle (EV), electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), charge network operator (CNO), certificate authority (CA), and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) that must all interact using secure and trusted communications. With these emulated components and utilizing orchestration methods to rapidly deploy and scale the components, the ability to analyze risks of the ecosystem and address gaps before the PKI ecosystem is fully deployed to production should yield a more robust and mature production charging infrastructure. Our approach will use a modular architecture of virtual machines within an orchestration platform and will target scales of 100s, 1000s, and 10,000s of entities interacting. The core research questions trying to be answered with this scope of work are: what are the impacts of a rogue CA, what are the risks of certificate revocation list (CRL) management, what is the value of OCSP stapling, what components are vulnerable to DOS attacks, and what test effective payloads may impact the components.

charging ecosystem↗

The Application of Formal Software Engineering Methods to the Unattended and Remote Monitoring Software Suite at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system is a collection of specialized hardware and software used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to institute nuclear safeguards at many nuclear facilities around the world. The hardware consists of detectors, instruments, and networked computers for acquiring various forms of data, including but not limited to radiation data, global position coordinates, camera images, isotopic data, and operator declarations. The software provides two primary functions: the secure and reliable collection of this data from the instruments and the ability to perform an integrated review and analysis of the disparate data sources. Several years ago, the team responsible for maintaining the software portion of the UNARM system began the process of formalizing its operations. These formal operations include a configuration management system, a change control board, an issue tracking system, and extensive formal testing, for both functionality and reliability. Functionality is tested with formal test cases chosen to fully represent the data types and methods of analysis that will be commonly encountered. Reliability is tested with iterative, concurrent testing where up to five analyses are executed simultaneously for thousands of cycles. Iterative concurrent testing helps ensure that there are no resource conflicts or leaks when multiple system components are in use simultaneously. The goal of this work is to provide a high quality, reliable product, commensurate with the criticality of the application. Testing results will be presented that demonstrate that this goal has been achieved and the impact of the introduction of a formal software engineering framework to the UNARM product will be presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Power grid reliability and security

This project has led to the development of a real-time simulation platform for electric power grids called Grid Simulator or GridSim for simulating the dynamic and information network interactions of large- scale power systems. The platform consists of physical models of power system components including synchronous generators, loads and control, which are simulated using a modified commercial power simulator namely Transient Stability Analysis Tool (TSAT) [1] together with data cleanup components, as well as an emulated substation level and wide-area power analysis components. The platform also includes realistic representations of communication network middleware that can emulate the real-time information flow back and forth between substations and control centers in wide-area power systems. The platform has been validated on a realistic 6000-bus model of the western American power system. The simulator GridSim developed in this project is the first of its kind in its ability to simulate real-time response of large-scale power grids, and serves as a cost effective real-time stability and control simulation platform for power industry.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Identifying Vulnerabilities and Hardening Attack Graphs for Networked Systems

We investigate efficient security control methods for protecting against vulnerabilities in networked systems. A large number of interdependent vulnerabilities typically exist in the computing nodes of a cyber-system; as vulnerabilities get exploited, starting from low level ones, they open up the doors to more critical vulnerabilities. These cannot be understood just by a topological analysis of the network, and we use the attack graph abstraction of Dewri et al. to study these problems. In contrast to earlier approaches based on heuristics and evolutionary algorithms, we study rigorous methods for quantifying the inherent vulnerability and hardening cost for the system. We develop algorithms with provable approximation guarantees, and evaluate them for real and synthetic attack graphs.

attack graphs↗

Real-Time SCADA Cyber Protection Using Compression Techniques

The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) has a critical mission to secure the energy infrastructure from cyber attack. Through DOE-OE’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a method to detect malicious traffic on Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network using a data compression technique. SCADA network traffic is often repetitive with only minor differences between packets. Research performed at the INL showed that SCADA network traffic has traits desirable for using compression analysis to identify abnormal network traffic. An open source implementation of a Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) lossless data compression algorithm was used to compress and analyze surrogate SCADA traffic. Infected SCADA traffic was found to have statistically significant differences in compression when compared against normal SCADA traffic at the packet level. The initial analyses and results are clearly able to identify malicious network traffic from normal traffic at the packet level with a very high confidence level across multiple ports and traffic streams. Statistical differentiation between infected and normal traffic level was possible using a modified data compression technique at the 99% probability level for all data analyzed. However, the conditions tested were rather limited in scope and need to be expanded into more realistic simulations of hacking events using techniques and approaches that are better representative of a real-world attack on a SCADA system. Nonetheless, the use of compression techniques to identify malicious traffic on SCADA networks in real time appears to have significant merit for infrastructure protection.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Network algorithms for information analysis using the Titan Toolkit.

The analysis of networked activities is dramatically more challenging than many traditional kinds of analysis. A network is defined by a set of entities (people, organizations, banks, computers, etc.) linked by various types of relationships. These entities and relationships are often uninteresting alone, and only become significant in aggregate. The analysis and visualization of these networks is one of the driving factors behind the creation of the Titan Toolkit. Given the broad set of problem domains and the wide ranging databases in use by the information analysis community, the Titan Toolkit's flexible, component based pipeline provides an excellent platform for constructing specific combinations of network algorithms and visualizations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Security Analysis of Smart Grid Cyber Physical Infrastructures Using Modeling and Game Theoretic Simulation

Cyber physical computing infrastructures typically consist of a number of sites are interconnected. Its operation critically depends both on cyber components and physical components. Both types of components are subject to attacks of different kinds and frequencies, which must be accounted for the initial provisioning and subsequent operation of the infrastructure via information security analysis. Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. We concentrated our analysis on the electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses by the NESCOR Working Group Study, From the Section 5 electric sector representative failure scenarios; we extracted the four generic failure scenarios and grouped them into three specific threat categories (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) to the system. These specific failure scenarios serve as a demonstration of our simulation. The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrates how to model the electric sector functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the cyber physical infrastructure network with respect to CIA.

Availability↗