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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Radar Measurements of Orbital Debris from the Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR): 2020 to 2022

For over three decades, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect radar data on the orbital debris (OD) environment. These radar measurements are used to statistically measure cm and sub-cm debris in low Earth orbit (LEO) that is used to define the current debris environment, monitor how the environment evolves, and support predictions of the future debris environment. Currently, the principal ground-based radar sensor used by the ODPO is the MIT/LL Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR). HUSIR provides data on OD down to approximately 5 mm in size at altitudes below 1000 km. This paper will deliver an overview of recent HUSIR measurements of the LEO debris environment for calendar years 2020 to 2022. Process improvements will be highlighted along with results of interest, including the effects of the 15 November 2021 Russian direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) test on the defunct COSMOS 1408 spacecraft.

Jessica A. Arnold↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Radar Measurements of Orbital Debris from the Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR): 2020-2021

For over three decades, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has partnered with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) to collect radar data on the orbital debris (OD) environment. These radar measurements are used to statistically measure centimeter (cm) and sub-cm debris in low Earth orbit (LEO) that is used to define the current debris environment, monitor how the environment evolves, and support predictions of the future debris environment. Currently, the principal ground-based radar sensor used by the ODPO is the MIT/LL Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR). HUSIR provides data on OD down to approximately 5 mm in size at altitudes below 1000 km. This paper will deliver an overview of recent HUSIR measurements of the LEO debris environment for calendar years 2020 to 2022. Process improvements will be highlighted along with results of interest, including the effects of the 15 November 2021 Russian direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) test on the defunct Cosmos 1408 spacecraft.

Jessica A Arnold↗
NASA NTRS1985

Proposed preliminary design criteria model environment for the 1990's

An environment must first be defined before the effects of that environment can be evaluated. The environment may later prove to be either more severe or less severe, and consequently the effects will also become either more severe or less severe. Thus, the original environment can also serve as a reference point for future updates. A model environment for orbital debris is proposed. It is recognized that much more is unknown about the environment than is known, and any model at best represents an educated guess based on a limited amount of data. The major assumptions in the proposed model environment and the uncertainty in those assumptions are discussed.

Kessler, D. J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

MMOD Protection and Degradation Effects for Thermal Control Systems

Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment overview Hypervelocity impact effects & MMOD shielding MMOD risk assessment process Requirements & protection techniques - ISS - Shuttle - Orion/Commercial Crew Vehicles MMOD effects on spacecraft systems & improving MMOD protection - Radiators Coatings - Thermal protection system (TPS) for atmospheric entry vehicles Coatings - Windows - Solar arrays - Solar array masts - EVA Handrails - Thermal Blankets Orbital Debris provided by JSC & is the predominate threat in low Earth orbit - ORDEM 3.0 is latest model (released December 2013) - http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/ - Man-made objects in orbit about Earth impacting up to 16 km/s average 9-10 km/s for ISS orbit - High-density debris (steel) is major issue Meteoroid model provided by MSFC - MEM-R2 is latest release - http://www.nasa.gov/offices/meo/home/index.html - Natural particles in orbit about sun Mg-silicates, Ni-Fe, others - Meteoroid environment (MEM): 11-72 km/s Average 22-23 km/s.

Christiansen, Eric↗
NASA NTRS2008

Controlling the Growth of Future LEO Debris Populations with Active Debris Removal

Active debris removal (ADR) was suggested as a potential means to remediate the low Earth orbit (LEO) debris environment as early as the 1980s. The reasons ADR has not become practical are due to its technical difficulties and the high cost associated with the approach. However, as the LEO debris populations continue to increase, ADR may be the only option to preserve the near-Earth environment for future generations. An initial study was completed in 2007 to demonstrate that a simple ADR target selection criterion could be developed to reduce the future debris population growth. The present paper summarizes a comprehensive study based on more realistic simulation scenarios, including fragments generated from the 2007 Fengyun-1C event, mitigation measures, and other target selection options. The simulations were based on the NASA long-term orbital debris projection model, LEGEND. A scenario, where at the end of mission lifetimes, spacecraft and upper stages were moved to 25-year decay orbits, was adopted as the baseline environment for comparison. Different annual removal rates and different ADR target selection criteria were tested, and the resulting 200-year future environment projections were compared with the baseline scenario. Results of this parametric study indicate that (1) an effective removal strategy can be developed based on the mass and collision probability of each object as the selection criterion, and (2) the LEO environment can be stabilized in the next 200 years with an ADR removal rate of five objects per year.

Liou, J.-C.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Spacecraft protective structures design optimization

The optimization of spacecraft protective structures design to defeat hypervelocity impacts of meteoroids and space debris is presented. A space debris environment model is incorporated into an overall optimization methodology employing engineering models developed to predict protective structures design requirements for hypervelocity impact loads. Several nonlinear optimization techniques are used to generate design parametrics based on environment, mission, and configuration variables for the Space Station Core Module Configuration. Results indicate that careful consideration of the spacecraft structural configuration and materials can partially offset the design consequences of dramatic increases in the orbital space debris environment. Furthermore, the use of nonlinear optimization techniques coupled with hypervelocity impact engineering models can provide significant design tradeoff insight through the use of parametric analyses.

Mog, Robert A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon Spacecraft Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

The SpaceX Dragon spacecraft performed 20 resupply flights to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team led by the NASA Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group inspected each Dragon vehicle exterior for hypervelocity impact damage. A general description of the inspected vehicle areas is provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. This paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected in addition to the spectroscopic analysis results of intact samples collected to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environments are also presented. Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides details of each of these variables.

orbital debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗
NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA attempts to determine the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks (and their corresponding uncertainties, if known) to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the mircro-meteoroid & orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. With so many uncertainties believed to be present in the models used within BUMPER II, providing uncertainty bounds with BUMPER II results would appear to be essential to properly evaluating its predictions of MMOD risk. The uncertainties in BUMPER II come primarily from three areas: damage prediction/ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure criteria definitions. In order to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the uncertainties in these three areas must be identified. In this paper, possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the shuttle and station versions of BUMPER II are presented and discussed. We begin the paper with a review of the current approaches used by NASA to perform a PRA for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, followed by a review of the results of a recent sensitivity analysis performed by NASA using the shuttle version of the BUMPER II code. Following a discussion of the various equations that are encoded in BUMPER II, we propose several possible approaches for establishing uncertainty bounds for the equations within BUMPER II. We conclude with an evaluation of these approaches and present a recommendation regarding which of them would be the most appropriate to follow.

Schonberg, W. P.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA determines the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the ISS. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. In this paper, we present possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the Shuttle and Station versions of BUMPER II.

Schonberg, W. P.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Status of the Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign for the SpaceX Cargo Dragon

The SpaceX Cargo Dragon has been flying supply missions for NASA to the International Space Station (ISS) since 2012. At the time of this writing, SpaceX has completed 14 missions to ISS with each returning to Earth via water landing. After each mission, a team from the NASA Johnson Space Center performs an inspection of the exterior surfaces of the Cargo Dragon spacecraft for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are pro-vided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Conversion of ORDEM 3.X & MEM 3 Into STENVI File Format

To perform Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analyses, NASA describes the orbital debris particle environment using the ORDEM 3 tool and the micrometeoroid environment using the MEM 3 tool. Both output files that detail the flux of particles as a function of several parameters. European MMOD analyses use different tools to perform similar functions, including the Meteoroid And Space debris Terrestrial Environment Reference (MASTER) environment model, which outputs flux data in the Standard Environment Interface (STENVI) format. The NASA Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group was asked to create a converter to translate flux data from the output file formats used by ORDEM 3.x and MEM 3 into the STENVI file format. Validation was performed to ensure that the converter was reproducing the input data correctly. The Bumper 3 MMOD risk assessment tool has a capability for reading ORDEM 3.x, MEM 3, and STENVI environment file formats and was used to compare MMOD risk results generated using the converter’s output STENVI files to the risk results generated using the input ORDEM 3.x and MEM 3 igloo files. Specific point comparisons validated that the converter translated the environment data correctly, producing the intended output. However, realistic risk assessments showed that the bin methodology employed by Bumper for determining particle flux as a function of particle size when reading files in STENVI format produces much higher MMOD risk than the point-interpolation methodology used in Bumper risk assessments using ORDEM and MEM. Modifications to how Bumper 3 reads STENVI files during analyses are considered to improve Bumper’s ability to perform useful analyses with environment files in this format.

STENVI↗
NASA NTRS2010

A Parametric Study on Using Active Debris Removal to Stabilize the Future LEO Debris Environment

Recent analyses of the instability of the orbital debris population in the low Earth orbit (LEO) region and the collision between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 have reignited the interest in using active debris removal (ADR) to remediate the environment. There are; however, monumental technical, resources, operational, legal, and political challenges in making economically viable ADR a reality. Before a consensus on the need for ADR can be reached, a careful analysis of the effectiveness of ADR must be conducted. The goal is to demonstrate the feasibility of using ADR to preserve the future environment and to guide its implementation to maximize the benefit-cost ratio. This paper describes a comprehensive sensitivity study on using ADR to stabilize the future LEO debris environment. The NASA long-term, orbital debris evolutionary model, LEGEND, is used to quantify the effects of many key parameters. These parameters include (1) the starting epoch of ADR implementation, (2) various target selection criteria, (3) the benefits of collision avoidance maneuvers, (4) the consequence of targeting specific inclination or altitude regimes, (5) the consequence of targeting specific classes of vehicles, and (6) the timescale of removal. Additional analyses on the importance of postmission disposal and how future launches might affect the requirements to stabilize the environment are also included.

Liou, J.C.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Impact penetration experiments in teflon targets of variable thickness

Approximately 20.4 sq m of Teflon thermal blankets on the nonspinning Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) were exposed to the orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment in low-Earth orbit (LEO) for approximately 5.7 years. Each blanket consisted of an outer layer (approximately 125 micron thick) of FEP Teflon that was backed by a vapor-deposited metal mirror (Inconel; less than 1 micron thick). The inner surface consisted of organic binders and Chemglaze thermal protective paint (approximately 50 micron thick) resulting in a somewhat variable, total blanket thickness of approximately 180 to 200 microns. There was at least one of these blankets, each exposing approximately 1.2 sq m of surface area, on nine of LDEF's 12 principal pointing directions, the exceptions being Rows 3, 9, and 12. As a consequence, these blankets represent a significant opportunity for micrometeoroid and debris studies, in general, and specifically they provide an opportunity to address those issues that require information about pointing direction (i.e., spatial density of impact events as a function of instrument orientation). During deintegration of the LDEF spacecraft at KSC, all penetration holes greater than or equal to 300 micron in diameter were documented and were recently synthesized in terms of spatial density as a function of LDEF viewing direction by. The present report describes ongoing cratering and penetration experiments in pure Teflon targets, which are intended to establish the relationships between crater or penetration-hole diameters and the associated projectile dimensions at laboratory velocities (i.e., 6 km/s). The ultimate objective of these efforts is to extract reliable mass-frequencies and associated fluxes of hypervelocity particles in LEO.

Hoerz, F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗