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NASA NTRS2002

Risk Management for the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) is an extremely complex system, both technically and programmatically. The Space Station must support a wide range of payloads and missions. It must be launched in numerous launch packages and be safely assembled and operated in the harsh environment of space. It is being designed and manufactured by many organizations, including the prime contractor, Boeing, the NASA institutions, and international partners and their contractors. Finally, the ISS has multiple customers, (e.g., the Administration, Congress, users, public, international partners, etc.) with contrasting needs and constraints. It is the ISS Risk Management Office strategy to proactively and systematically manages risks to help ensure ISS Program success. ISS program follows integrated risk management process (both quantitative and qualitative) and is integrated into ISS project management. The process and tools are simple and seamless and permeate to the lowest levels (at a level where effective management can be realized) and follows the continuous risk management methodology. The risk process assesses continually what could go wrong (risks), determine which risks need to be managed, implement strategies to deal with those risks, and measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. The process integrates all facets of risk including cost, schedule and technical aspects. Support analysis risk tools like PRA are used to support programatic decisions and assist in analyzing risks.

Sebastian, J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X First Flight Loss of Vehicle Probability Analysis

As part of the Constellation (Cx) Program development effort, several test flights were planned to prove concepts and operational capabilities of the new vehicles being developed. The first test, involving the Eastern Test Range, is the Ares I-X launched in 2009. As part of this test, the risk to the general public was addressed to ensure it is within Air Force requirements. This paper describes the methodology used to develop first flight estimates of overall loss of vehicle (LOV) failure probability, specifically for the Ares I-X. The method described in this report starts with the Air Force s generic failure probability estimate for first flight and adjusts the value based on the complexity of the vehicle as compared to the complexity of a generic vehicle. The results estimate a 1 in 9 probability of failure. The paper also describes traditional PRA methods used in this assessment, which were then combined with the updated first flight risk methodology to generate inputs required by the malfunction turn analysis to support estimate of casualty (Ec) calculations as part of the Final Flight Data Package (FFDP) delivered to the Eastern Range for Final Flight Plan Approval.

Bigler, Mark A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Modeling the Risk of Fire/Explosion Due to Oxidizer/Fuel Leaks in the Ares I Interstage

A significant flight hazard associated with liquid propellants, such as those used in the upper stage of NASA's new Ares I launch vehicle, is the possibility of leakage of hazardous fluids resulting in a catastrophic fire/explosion. The enclosed and vented interstage of the Ares I contains numerous oxidizer and fuel supply lines as well as ignition sources. The potential for fire/explosion due to leaks during ascent depends on the relative concentrations of hazardous and inert fluids within the interstage along with other variables such as pressure, temperature, leak rates, and fluid outgasing rates. This analysis improves on previous NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) estimates of the probability of deflagration, in which many of the variables pertinent to the problem were not explicitly modeled as a function of time. This paper presents the modeling methodology developed to analyze these risks.

Ring, Robert W.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Integrated Medical Model: A Risk Assessment and Decision Support Tool for Human Space Flight Missions

This slide presentation reviews the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) and its use as a risk assessment and decision support tool for human space flight missions. The IMM is an integrated, quantified, evidence-based decision support tool useful to NASA crew health and mission planners. It is intended to assist in optimizing crew health, safety and mission success within the constraints of the space flight environment for in-flight operations. It uses ISS data to assist in planning for the Exploration Program and it is not intended to assist in post flight research. The IMM was used to update Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) for the purpose of updating forecasts for the conditions requiring evacuation (EVAC) or Loss of Crew Life (LOC) for the ISS. The IMM validation approach includes comparison with actual events and involves both qualitative and quantitaive approaches. The results of these comparisons are reviewed. Another use of the IMM is to optimize the medical kits taking into consideration the specific mission and the crew profile. An example of the use of the IMM to optimize the medical kits is reviewed.

Kerstman, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Use of the Integrated Medical Model for Forecasting and Mitigating Medical Risks for a Near-Earth Asteroid Mission

Introduction The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) is a decision support tool that is useful to space flight mission managers and medical system designers in assessing risks and optimizing medical systems. The IMM employs an evidence-based, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach within the operational constraints of space flight. Methods Stochastic computational methods are used to forecast probability distributions of medical events, crew health metrics, medical resource utilization, and probability estimates of medical evacuation and loss of crew life. The IMM can also optimize medical kits within the constraints of mass and volume for specified missions. The IMM was used to forecast medical evacuation and loss of crew life probabilities, as well as crew health metrics for a near-earth asteroid (NEA) mission. An optimized medical kit for this mission was proposed based on the IMM simulation. Discussion The IMM can provide information to the space program regarding medical risks, including crew medical impairment, medical evacuation and loss of crew life. This information is valuable to mission managers and the space medicine community in assessing risk and developing mitigation strategies. Exploration missions such as NEA missions will have significant mass and volume constraints applied to the medical system. Appropriate allocation of medical resources will be critical to mission success. The IMM capability of optimizing medical systems based on specific crew and mission profiles will be advantageous to medical system designers. Conclusion The IMM is a decision support tool that can provide estimates of the impact of medical events on human space flight missions, such as crew impairment, evacuation, and loss of crew life. It can be used to support the development of mitigation strategies and to propose optimized medical systems for specified space flight missions. Learning Objectives The audience will learn how an evidence-based decision support tool can be used to help assess risk, develop mitigation strategies, and optimize medical systems for exploration space flight missions.

Kerstman, Eric↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2012

Improving Safety on the International Space Station: Transitioning to Electronic Emergency Procedure Books on the International Space Station

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) originally designed the International Space Station (ISS) to operate until 2015, but have extended operations until at least 2020. As part of this very dynamic Program, there is an effort underway to simplify the certification of Commercial ]of ]the ]Shelf (COTS) hardware. This change in paradigm allows the ISS Program to take advantage of technologically savvy and commercially available hardware, such as the iPad. The iPad, a line of tablet computers designed and marketed by Apple Inc., was chosen to support this endeavor. The iPad is functional, portable, and could be easily accessed in an emergency situation. The iPad Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), currently approved for use in flight by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is a fraction of the cost of a traditional Class 2 EFB. In addition, the iPad fs ability to use electronic aeronautical data in lieu of paper in route charts and approach plates can cut the annual cost of paper data in half for commercial airlines. ISS may be able to benefit from this type of trade since one of the most important factors considered is information management. Emergency procedures onboard the ISS are currently available to the crew in paper form. Updates to the emergency books can either be launched on an upcoming visiting vehicle such as a Russian Soyuz flight or printed using the onboard ISS printer. In both cases, it is costly to update hardcopy procedures. A new operations concept was proposed to allow for the use of a tablet system that would provide a flexible platform to support space station crew operations. The purpose of the system would be to provide the crew the ability to view and maintain operational data, such as emergency procedures while also allowing Mission Control Houston to update the procedures. The ISS Program is currently evaluating the safety risks associated with the use of iPads versus paper. Paper products can contribute to the flammability risk and require manual updates that take time away from research tasks. The ISS program has recently purchased three iPads for the astronauts and the certification has been approved. The crew is currently using the iPads onboard. The results of this analysis could be used to discern whether the iPad is a viable option for use in emergencies by assessing the risk posture through the development of a quantitative probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).

Carter-Journet, Katrina↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (ORION)

NASA uses two HRA assessment methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is still expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a PRA model that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more problematic. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗
NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2017

And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗