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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling Framework for Bulk Electric Grid Impacts from HEMP E1 and E3 Effects (Tasks 3.1 Final Report)

This report presents a framework to evaluate the impact of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) event on a bulk electric power grid. This report limits itself to modeling the impact of EMP E1 and E3 components. The co-simulation of E1 and E3 is presented in detail, and the focus of the paper is on the framework rather than actual results. This approach is highly conservative as E1 and E3 are not maximized with the same event characteristics and may only slightly overlap. The actual results shown in this report are based on a synthetic grid with synthetic data and a limited exemplary EMP model. The framework presented can be leveraged and used to analyze the impact of other threat scenarios, both manmade and natural disasters. This report d escribes a Monte-Carlo based methodology to probabilistically quantify the transient response of the power grid to a HEMP event. The approach uses multiple fundamental steps to characterize the system response to HEMP events, focused on the E1 and E3 components of the event. 1) Obtain component failure data related to HEMP events testing of components and creating component failure models. Use the component failure model to create component failure conditional probability density function (PDF) that is a function of the HEMP induced terminal voltage. 2) Model HEMP scenarios and calculate the E1 coupled voltage profiles seen by all system components. Model the same HEMP scenarios and calculate the transformer reactive power consumption profiles due to E3. 3) Sample each component failure PDF to determine which grid components will fail, due to the E1 voltage spike, for each scenario. 4) Perform dynamic simulations that incorporate the predicted component failures from E1 and reactive power consumption at each transformer affected by E3. These simulations allow for secondary transients to affect the relays/protection remaining in service which can lead to cascading outages. 5) Identify the locations and amount of load lost for each scenario through grid dynamic simulation. This can be an indication of the immediate grid impacts from a HEMP event. In addition, perform more detailed analysis to determine critical nodes and system trends. 6) To help realize the longer-term impacts, a security constrained alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) is run to maximize critical load served. This report describes a modeling framework to assess the systemic grid impacts due to a HEMP event. This stochastic simulation framework generates a large amount of data for each Monte Carlo replication, including HEMP location and characteristics, relay and component failures, E3 GIC profiles, cascading dynamics including voltage and frequency over time, and final system state. This data can then be analyzed to identify trends, e.g., unique system behavior modes or critical components whose failure is more likely to cause serious systemic effects. The proposed analysis process is demonstrated on a representative system. In order to draw realistic conclusions of the impact of a HEMP event on the grid, a significant amount of work remains with respect to modeling the impact on various grid components.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Solvent Hold Tank Sample Results for MCU-20-32-33-34 (Quarterly Report, September 2020)

In late FY13, MCU implemented the Next Generation Solvent (NGS) flow sheet. Facility personnel added a non-radioactive, NGS “cocktail” containing the new Extractant (MaxCalix) and a new Suppressor (TiDG) to the SHT heel to implement the NGS flow sheet. The resulting “blend” solvent (“NGS blend solvent”) is essentially NGS with residual amounts of calix[4]arene-bis(tert-octylbenzo-crown-6) (BOBCalixC6) and trioctylamine (TOA). For process monitoring, SHT samples are sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to examine solvent composition changes over time. With the exception of Isopar™ L which is regularly added to the SHT due to its high vapor pressure, this report shows the cumulative chemical composition data, including impurities like mercury, of the September 2020 (MCU-20-32-33-34) solvent SHT sample. A summary report of the September SHT solvent sample was issued earlier. This report examines the cumulative results from these and several past monthly reports. These samples are intended to verify that the solvent is within the specified composition range. A baseline “scratch” solvent - a scratch solvent is a preparation of all 6 solvent components (this includes the old extractant BoBCalix and the old suppressor TrioctylAmine that remained when solvent was converted to Next Generation Solvent [NGS]) of the composition that approximates the blend of cocktail and heel solvent - was prepared in the lab (September 2018) and used for comparison and evaluation. The results from the analyses are presented in this document. This report is the last characterization analysis of the SHT solvent. MCU entered a lay-up state and about 128 gallons of the SHT solvent were pumped into 55 gallons drums for future disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (CY2020)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment. 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well. 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility. 4)CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater. 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits. 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

FY21 Report on Activities for EBS International

This report summarizes the FY21 Activities for EBS International Collaborations Work Package. The international collaborations work packages aim to leverage knowledge, expertise, and tools from the international nuclear waste community, as deemed relevant according to SFWST “roadmap” priorities. This report describes research and development (R&D) activities conducted during fiscal year 2021(FY21) specifically related to the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) R&D Work Package in the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign supported by the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE). It fulfills the SFWST Campaign deliverable M4SF- 21SN010308062. The R&D activities described in this report focus on understanding EBS component evolution and interactions within the EBS, as well as interactions between the host media and the EBS. A primary goal is to advance the development of process models that can be implemented directly within the Generic Disposal System Analysis (GDSA) platform or that can contribute to the safety case in some manner such as building confidence, providing further insight into the processes being modeled, establishing better constraints on barrier performance, etc. Sandia National Laboratories is participating in THM modeling in the international projects EBS Task Force and DECOVALEX 2023. EBS Task Force, Task 11 is on modeling of laboratory-scale High Temperature Column Test conducted at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. DECOVALEX 2023, Task C is on THM modeling of the full-scale emplacement experiment (FE experiment) at the Mont Terri Underground Rock Laboratory, Switzerland. This report summarizes Sandia’s progress in the modeling studies of DECOVALEX 2023, Task C. Modeling studies related to the High Temperature Column Test will be documented in future reports.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

STEP Report on Advanced ODS FeCrAl Alloys for Fission Applications

Oak Ridge National Laboratory is developing advanced low-Cr oxide dispersion strengthened (ODS) FeCrAl alloys for accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding. This report presents the characterization of two new ODS FeCrAl tubes by using powder commercially mechanically alloyed by Zoz GmbH, which underwent high-precision tube rolling with two different annealing schedules. This work shows that the ODS FeCrAl tube without recrystallization exhibits consistent mechanical behavior in comparison with a previously produced tube. The second tube, which underwent a full recrystallization step before the final tube rolling step, showed some circumferential cracking and exhibited limited ductility in the axial tube tensile tests. Based on current and prior work on the ODS FeCrAl alloy system, this report compares the current state of the scientific literature on the alloy class with that of wrought FeCrAl without oxide additions. Then, this report makes recommendations for future research directions that should be undertaken to increase the technology readiness level for ODS FeCrAl as a viable ATF candidate material. This report has been submitted as fulfillment of milestone M3FT-20OR020202064 titled, “STEP Report on Advanced ODS FeCrAl Alloys for Fission Applications” for the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Fuel Campaign of the Fuel Cycle R&D program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Software-defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS): An Architectural Blueprint (Final Report)

This is the initial version of a reference for suppliers and energy companies of all sizes to deploy networks based on software-defined networking technology (SDN) to improve reliability, reduce cyber security attack surface, and facilitate mitigation of adversarial behavior. It is a living document and will progress over the life cycle of the Software-Defined Networking for Energy Delivery Systems (SDN4EDS) project. Version 2 of this report provides information on the Red Team tabletop assessment performed against the initial reference architecture. Version 3 of this report updates the reference architecture with lessons learned from the Red Team tabletop assessment, as well as provides additional details for the use cases. It also provides information on the decision process that could be used by an organization when considering deploying SDN in their environment. The final version of this report consolidates all the interim reports generated by the project into a final report. It also draws from PNNL’s experience in deploying SDN to make recommendations on how SDN could be deployed in a utility environment, and provides rationale for those decisions allowing individual utilities to make risk-based and knowledge-based decisions on how to best deploy SDN in their own environment

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Report on High Energy Arcing Fault Experiments

This report documents an experimental program designed to investigate High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) phenomena for medium voltage electrical switchgear containing aluminum conductors. This report covers full-scale laboratory experiments using representative nuclear power plant (NPP) three-phase electrical equipment. Electrical, thermal, and pressure data were recorded for each experiment and documented in this report. This report covers four of the fourteen planned medium voltage electrical enclosure experiments. Subsequent reports will document the additional experiments performed in the future. The experiments were performed at KEMA Labs located in Chalfont, Pennsylvania. The experimental design, setup, and execution were completed by staff from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and KEMA. In addition, representatives from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) observed some of the experimental setups and execution. The HEAF experiments were performed on four near-identical units of General Electric metal-clad medium voltage switchgear. The three-phase arcing fault was initiated on the primary cable connection bus. All four experiments used the same system voltage (6.9 kV) but varied the current and duration. Real-time electrical operating conditions, including voltage, current and frequency, were measured during the experiments. Heat fluxes and incident energies were measured with plate thermometers and slug calorimeters at various locations around the electrical enclosures. Internal enclosure pressures were measured during the experiments. The experiments were documented with normal and high-speed videography, infrared imaging, and photography. Insights from the experimental series included timing information related to enclosure breach, event progression, mass loss measurements for electrodes and steel enclosures, peak pressure rise, particle analysis, along with visual and thermal imaging data to better understand and characterize the hazard. These results will be used in subsequent efforts to advance the state of knowledge related to HEAF.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Environmental Monitoring Report, Calendar year 2020. Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site

The results of the effluent and environmental monitoring programs at the Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site are summarized and assessed in this report. Tables 1 - 4 summarize the major elements of the environmental monitoring programs at each site. Information regarding the U.S. Department of Energy – Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) Disposition Project (SPRU DP), is also included in this report; however, the project was completed in 2020 and will no longer be reported in subsequent reports. DOE-EM will be continuing to perform other Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) work at Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site, which may require environmental monitoring, and will be included in this report, as warranted. Operations at the Knolls Laboratory, which includes SPRU and other DOE-EM activities, and the Kesselring Site continue to have no adverse effect on human health and the quality of the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Feedstock-Conversion Interface Consortium: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Summary Report (FY2022)

This report provides an overview of the development of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and its implementation as a systematic criticality and risk assessment tool supporting a quality by design (QbD) approach for FCIC research. This report also provides a high-level overview of the results for the FMEA evaluation of two feedstock preprocessing system configurations: (1) generation of pine residue materials for high-temperature pyrolysis conversion and (2) generation of corn stover materials for low-temperature conversion using deacetylation and disc mechanical refining pretreatment for fermentation to hydrocarbons. For the results presented in this report, our FMEA interviews included two approaches. The first approach was to perform FMEA interviews for the entire system of unit operations giving a wholistic system level view. The second approach consisted of detailed interviews for each individual unit operation within the system allowing for a “deep dive” into the specific failures for the individual components within the configuration. These two approaches provide different resolutions of information. The FMEA results of this report were focused on failures associated with meeting critical quality attributes (CQAs) identified for the target conversion processes for each processed feedstock type. The information gathered through the FMEA interviews include estimations of risk scores for meeting each given CQA specification, identification of the impacts for not meeting a CQA specification, capturing causes associated with material attributes and process parameters for each failure, identification of current detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing a failure’s risk score. The complete results of all FMEA interviews are provided in the Appendices of this report.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of Data Fusion Between Waveform Events and Radionuclide Detections Reported in 2021 by the International Data Centre

During this project, we assessed the percentage of events reported by the International Data Centre (IDC) that are candidates for evaluation using data fusion methods. We calculated the percentage of waveform (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, SHI) events that may be associated with radionuclide (RN) detections and vice versa. For this task, data fusion means identifying RN detections that may be associated with SHI events. The task of producing a fused SHI and RN bulletin is included in the IDC operational manual. As of 2022, the production of a fused event bulletin remains incomplete, largely because methods for producing the bulletin are under development. Nonetheless, simple methods for data fusion have been developed and preliminary software tools are available at the IDC to associate SHI events and RN detections. This report is a first look at the percentage of SHI events that may be candidates for fusion with RN detections or bulletins. One year of IDC bulletin data (2021) is considered in this report. It is important to note that there were no known nuclear explosions during this time period. Hence, we expect that events during this time period would generate SHI and RN signals. If many SHI events are candidates for fusion with RN data, greater priority should be placed on establishing screening procedures before and/or during the fusion process. By contrast, if the number of candidate events is diminishingly small, then data fusion is not a driver for further development of event or detection screening at the IDC. LLNL reviewed the events reported in the Standard Event Bulletin (SEB) and determined which events are candidates for fusion with the Reviewed Radionuclide Reports (RRR). Much of the work involves establishing a metric or metrics for determining whether a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) event is a candidate for data fusion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 0)

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure use restriction (UR) inspections at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers post-closure UR inspections for calendar year 2020, and includes visual inspections and repair activities completed at the following corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424, Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453, Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487, Thunderwell Site (TTR). Note: CAU 400, Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) (CASs TA-19-001-05PT, Ordnance Disposal Pit; and TA-55-00-TAB2, Ordnance Disposal Pit) no longer requires inspection and reporting, as described in the Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2019. Site figures are included in Appendix A. The Post-Closure Inspection Plans and Record of Technical Change modifying the requirements for each UR are included in Appendix B. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are included in Appendix C. Field Notes are included in Appendix D. Appendix E, Inspection Photographs, does not include photographs because none were taken during the 2020 post-closure inspections. Appendix F, Post-Closure Vegetation Monitoring Report, does not include any data because vegetation monitoring was not conducted or required at any CAU in 2020. Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure requirements outlined in specific CAU and CAS URs, and approved by NDEP. The annual post-closure inspections for CASs associated with CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 were conducted on May 20, 2020. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAUs 487, or at CASs associated with CAU 424 (except CASs 03-08-002-A304 and 03-08-002-A308). Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407, CAS TA-23-001-TARC (Roller Coaster RadSafe Area): A UR sign was loose and was rehung during the inspection. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): The northeast monument needed a UR sign. The UR sign was attached to the monument on August 11, 2020. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): The southeast monument needed additional lava rock. The lava rock was added during the inspection. • CAU 453, CAS 09-55-001-0952 (Area 9 Landfill): Two animal burrows were noted in the western portion of the northern and southern trenches (one burrow per trench). The animal burrows were repaired on August 11, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Coupon synthesis status report

This letter report is in submission of completion of the Level 4 milestone number M4AT-23OR1101023 “Coupon synthesis status report” for the AT-23OR110102 “Beryllium Carbide as moderator for MSRs – ORNL” WBS number 2.04.11.01 within the larger Advanced Reactor Technologies program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This effort is an initial study of the viability of beryllium carbide as a future neutron moderator for molten salt reactors and other high temperature reactors. The research was awarded funding in September 2022 and this effort will be completed and reported on as a Level 2 milestone by the end of August 2023. This work is a collaboration between Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the University of Michigan. This report will discuss the status of this effort and planed work before the final reporting.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2022, extending from October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), approximately 8.52E+04 metric tons (9.39E+04 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2022, approximately 17.0 million metric tons (18.7 million U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 89.1% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operations within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the groundwater pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 5.50E-04 and 3.30E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

2023 Annual Report of Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

DOE maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns at the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPR’s ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. This report covers impacts on drawdown availability due to SPR operations during Calendar Year 2022. A cavern has an available drawdown if, after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent red flags for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a pillar-to-diameter ratio of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for oil sales, purchases, or exchanges authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the cavern’s drawdown capacity may be continued. A methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern is reiterated. This report is the latest in a series of annual reports, and it includes the baseline available drawdowns for each cavern, and the most recent assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditures. A total of 222 million barrels of oil were released in calendar-year 2022. A nearly-equal amount of raw water was injected, resulting in an estimated 34 million barrels of cavern leaching. Twenty caverns have now expended a full drawdown. Cavern BC 18 has expended all its baseline available drawdowns, and has no drawdowns remaining. Cavern BM 103 has expended one of its two baseline drawdowns, and is now a single-drawdown cavern. All other caverns with an expenditure went from at-least-5 to at-least-4 remaining drawdowns.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2022

Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Annual Status Report FY 2021)

DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2021, extending from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2021), approximately 9.14E+04 metric tons (1.01E+05 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2021, approximately 16.9 million metric tons (18.9 U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed of at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 88.7% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operation within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the all pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 7.63E-03 and 1.49E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site (Figure 1) surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada (NNSA/NV 2001), hereafter called the CAU 417 Closure Report. The site closure process was completed in 2001 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. Responsibility for environmental site restoration was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from September 2018 through August 2020. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2020 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

COVID-19 Lead Time: Evaluating the timeliness and reliability of reported COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations as leading indicators of hospitalizations and death in the US

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted a reliance on real-time data sources to understand the global spread and impact of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Reported cases were presumed leading indicators for hospitalizations, while hospitalizations were considered predictive of deaths. However, studies have questioned the consistency of reported cases as leading indicators. This study systematically assesses the reliability of United States (US) reported cases and hospitalizations as leading indicators for hospitalizations and deaths respectively, examining the first 2.5 years of the pandemic (January 2020 - June 2022) across different phases of the pandemic and states. Using correlation analysis, population data, and forecasting accuracy measures, we investigate the temporal relationships and identify possible determinants of lead time variability. Notably, we found that the average lead time between reported cases and hospitalizations across US states is relatively short at 1.76 days, implying that reported cases might not be as effective a leading indicator for hospitalizations as previously believed. Populations with higher comorbidity burdens, such as proportion of smokers, are expected on average to have shorter lead times, possibly due to shorter time to hospitalization among these vulnerable populations.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 Annual Site Environment Report, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

This report provides the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2022 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2022. PPPL’s on-site operations started to be restored in 2022, following curtailments in 2020 and 2021 for the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951 and at its current locations since 1958. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the U.S. and the world, and to develop the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2022. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable the operation of this international magnetic fusion user facility. In 2022, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for non-radiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2022, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗