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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1990

Design and development of a space station hazardous material system for assessing chemical compatibility

As the Space Station nears reality in funding support from Congress, NASA plans to perform over a hundred different missions in the coming decade. Incrementally deployed, the Space Station will evolve into modules linked to an integral structure. Each module will have characteristic functions, such as logistics, habitation, and materials processing. Because the Space Station is to be user friendly for experimenters, NASA is anticipating that a variety of different chemicals will be taken on-board. Accidental release of these potentially toxic chemicals and their chemical compatibility is the focus of this discourse. The Microgravity Manufacturing Processing Facility (MMPF) will contain the various facilities within the U.S. Laboratory (USL). Each facility will have a characteristic purpose, such as alloy solidification or vapor crystal growth. By examining the proposed experiments for each facility, identifying the chemical constituents, their physical state and/or changes, byproducts and effluents, those payloads can be identified which may contain toxic, explosive, or reactive compounds that require processing or containment in mission peculiar waste management systems. Synergistic reactions from mixed effluent streams is of major concern. Each experiment will have it own data file, complete with schematic, chemical listing, physical data, etc. Chemical compatibility information from various databases will provide assistance in the analysis of alternate disposal techniques (pretreatment, separate storage, etc.). Along with data from the Risk Analysis of the Proposed USL Waste Management System, accidental release of potentially toxic and catastrophic chemicals would be eliminated or reduced.

Congo, Richard T.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Process-Based Cost Estimation for Ramjet/Scramjet Engines

Process-based cost estimation plays a key role in effecting cultural change that integrates distributed science, technology and engineering teams to rapidly create innovative and affordable products. Working together, NASA Glenn Research Center and Boeing Canoga Park have developed a methodology of process-based cost estimation bridging the methodologies of high-level parametric models and detailed bottoms-up estimation. The NASA GRC/Boeing CP process-based cost model provides a probabilistic structure of layered cost drivers. High-level inputs characterize mission requirements, system performance, and relevant economic factors. Design alternatives are extracted from a standard, product-specific work breakdown structure to pre-load lower-level cost driver inputs and generate the cost-risk analysis. As product design progresses and matures the lower level more detailed cost drivers can be re-accessed and the projected variation of input values narrowed, thereby generating a progressively more accurate estimate of cost-risk. Incorporated into the process-based cost model are techniques for decision analysis, specifically, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and functional utility analysis. Design alternatives may then be evaluated not just on cost-risk, but also user defined performance and schedule criteria. This implementation of full-trade study support contributes significantly to the realization of the integrated development environment. The process-based cost estimation model generates development and manufacturing cost estimates. The development team plans to expand the manufacturing process base from approximately 80 manufacturing processes to over 250 processes. Operation and support cost modeling is also envisioned. Process-based estimation considers the materials, resources, and processes in establishing cost-risk and rather depending on weight as an input, actually estimates weight along with cost and schedule.

Singh, Brijendra↗
NASA NTRS2000

Spacecraft Autonomy and Automation: A Comparative Analysis of Strategies for Cost Effective Mission Operations

The evolution of satellite operations over the last 40 years has drastically changed. October 4, 1957 (during the cold war) the Soviet Union launched the world's first spacecraft into orbit. The Sputnik satellite orbited Earth for three months and catapulted the United States into a race for dominance in space. A year after Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the National Space and Aeronautics Administration (NASA). With a team of scientists and engineers, NASA successfully launched Explorer 1, the first US satellite to orbit Earth. During these early years, massive amounts of ground support equipment and operators were required to successfully operate spacecraft vehicles. Today, budget reductions and technological advances have forced new approaches to spacecraft operations. These approaches require increasingly complex, on board spacecraft systems, that enable autonomous operations, resulting in more cost-effective mission operations. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, considered world class in satellite development and operations, has developed and operated over 200 satellites during its 40 years of existence. NASA Goddard is adopting several new millennium initiatives that lower operational costs through the spacecraft autonomy and automation. This paper examines NASA's approach to spacecraft autonomy and ground system automation through a comparative analysis of satellite missions for Hubble Space Telescope-HST, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous-NEAR, and Solar Heliospheric Observatory-SoHO, with emphasis on cost reduction methods, risk analysis and anomalies and strategies employed for mitigating risk.

Wright, Nathaniel, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Mission Risk Reduction Regulatory Change Management

NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.

Scroggins, Sharon↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk Assessment of EIC Central Detector (ePIC) Solenoid Magnet (MARCO)

As part of the BNL-JLab-CEA Electron Ion Collider (EIC) collaboration, the design of a 2 T, 2.8 m bore diameter, 3.8 m long conduction cooled superconducting detector magnet design is completed. Such magnet will be employed at the interaction region of ePIC for physics experiment. The magnet is a passive shielded solenoidal magnet system consisting of 3 coils wound with specially designed conductor using NbTi Rutherford type cable in copper stabilized channel. This paper describes the risk analysis as the part of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that was carried out as a team to identify their various failure modes and risks associated with the magnets system. In conclusion, this FMEA is intended to become the content of the designed document as an integral part of the engineering assessment and the statement of work for the potential vendors towards design and built.

Ghoshal, Probir K. [Thomas Jefferson National Acce↗
NASA NTRS1999

Reliability/Risk Methods and Design Tools for Application in Space Programs

Since 1984 NASA has funded several major programs to develop Reliability/Risk Methods and tools for engineers to apply in the design and assessment of aerospace hardware. Two probabilistic software tools that show great promise for practical application are the finite element code NESSUS and the system risk analysis code QRAS. This paper examines NASA's past, present, and future directions in reliability and risk engineering applications, Both the NESSUS and QRAS software tools are detailed.

Townsend, John S.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Bibliography

Probabilistic risk analysis is an integration of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis and other techniques to assess the potential for failure and to find ways to reduce risk. This bibliography references 160 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, probabilistic risk assessment, risk and probability theory, in the basic index or major subject terms, An abstract is included with most citations, followed by the applicable subject terms.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Case for Developing a Ground Based Replication of the Earth, Moon and Mars Spaceflight Infrastructure

When the systems are developed and in place to provide the services needed to operate en route and on the Lunar and Martian surfaces, an Earth based replication will need to be in place for the safety and protection of mission success. The replication will entail all aspects of the flight configuration end to end but will not include any closed loop systems. This would replicate the infrastructure from Lunar and Martian robots, manned surface excursions, through man and unmanned terrestrial bases, through the various types of communication systems and technologies, manned and un-manned space vehicles (large and small), to Earth based systems and control centers. An Earth based replicated infrastructure will enable checkout and test of new technologies, hardware, software updates and upgrades and procedures without putting humans and missions at risk. Analysis of events, what ifs and trouble resolution could be played out on the ground to remove as much risk as possible from any type of proposed change to flight operational systems. With adequate detail, it is possible that failures could be predicted with a high probability and action taken to eliminate failures. A major factor in any mission to the Moon and to Mars is the complexity of systems, interfaces, processes, their limitations, associated risks and the factor of the unknown including the development by many contractors and NASA centers. The need to be able to introduce new technologies over the life of the program requires an end to end test bed to analyze and evaluate these technologies and what will happen when they are introduced into the flight system. The ability to analyze system behaviors end to end under varying conditions would enhance safety e.g. fault tolerances. This analysis along with the ability to mine data from the development environment (e.g. test data), flight ops and modeling/simulations data would provide a level of information not currently available to operations and astronauts. In this paper we will analyze the beginnings of such a replication and what it could do in terms of reducing risk in the near term for development. We will analyze the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) test lab which has to a large extent accomplished this replication for the SSME and has been highly successful in analyzing hardware and software problems and changes. The cost of replicating the flight system as proposed here could be very high if attempted as an afterthought. We will describe the initial steps for the development of a replication of this infrastructure starting with the communication infrastructure. The Constellation of Labs (CofL) under the Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) project for the NASA Exploration Initiative will provide the initial foundation upon which to base this replication. Simply put, there is very little margin for error in high latency situations e.g. en-route to/from Mars or in an autonomous process on the Lunar far side. Any thought out approach to reduce risk and increase safety needs to be accomplished end to end with the actual systems configuration.

Bradford, Robert N.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Risk and value analysis of SETI

This paper attempts to apply a traditional risk and value analysis to the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence--SETI. In view of the difficulties of assessing the probability of success, a comparison is made between SETI and a previous search for extraterrestrial life, the biological component of Project Viking. Our application of simple Utility Theory, given some reasonable assumptions, suggests that SETI is at least as worthwhile as the biological experiment on Viking.

NASA Program Exobiology↗
NASA NTRS2006

STS-121/Discovery: Imagery Quick-Look Briefing

Kyle Herring (NASA Public Affairs) introduced Wayne Hale (Space Shuttle Program Manager) who stated that the imagery for the Space shuttle external tank showed the tank performed very well. Image analysis showed small pieces of foam falling off the rocket booster and external tank. There was no risk involved in these minor incidents. Statistical models were built to assist in risk analysis. The orbiter performed excellently. Wayne also provided some close-up pictures of small pieces of foam separating from the external tank during launching. He said the crew will also perform a 100% inspection of the heat shield. This flight showed great improvement over previous flights.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Overview of NASA Langley's Systems Analysis Capabilities

The Systems Analysis and Concepts Directorate (SACD) has been in the systems analysis business line supporting National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) aeronautics, exploration, space operations and science since the 1960 s. Our current organization structure is shown in Figure 1. SACD mission can be summed up in the following statements: 1. We conduct advanced concepts for Agency decision makers and programs. 2. We provide aerospace systems analysis products such as mission architectures, advanced system concepts, system and technology trades, life cycle cost and risk analysis, system integration and pre-decisional sensitive information. 3. Our work enables informed technical, programmatic and budgetary decisions. SACD has a complement of 114 government employees and approximately 50 on-site contractors which is equally split between supporting aeronautics and exploration. SACD strives for technical excellence and creditability of the systems analysis products delivered to its customers. The Directorate office is continuously building market intelligence and working with other NASA centers and external partners to expand our business base. The Branches strive for technical excellence and credibility of our systems analysis products by seeking out existing and new partnerships that are critical for successful systems analysis. The Directorates long term goal is to grow the amount of science systems analysis business base.

Cavanaugh, Stephen↗
NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗
NASA NTRS2002

Space Radiation Cancer Risk Projections for Exploration Missions: Uncertainty Reduction and Mitigation

In this paper we discuss expected lifetime excess cancer risks for astronauts returning from exploration class missions. For the first time we make a quantitative assessment of uncertainties in cancer risk projections for space radiation exposures. Late effects from the high charge and energy (HZE) ions present in the galactic cosmic rays including cancer and the poorly understood risks to the central nervous system constitute the major risks. Methods used to project risk in low Earth orbit are seen as highly uncertain for projecting risks on exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data available for estimating HZE ion risks. Cancer risk projections are described as a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective error distributions represents the lack of knowledge in each factor to quantify risk projection overall uncertainty. Cancer risk analysis is applied to several exploration mission scenarios. At solar minimum, the number of days in space where career risk of less than the limiting 3% excess cancer mortality can be assured at a 95% confidence level is found to be only of the order of 100 days.

Cucinotta, Francis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing A New Medical Condition List for Exploration Spaceflight

For the last decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has utilized a probabilistic risk analysis tool called the Integrated Medical Model (IMM), which contains 100 medical conditions, to conduct medical trade-space analyses and risk assessments for International Space Station (ISS) operations. Planning for future missions to the Moon and Mars will require updated tools and evidence that consider the unique features of exploration missions. To address this need, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element of the NASA Human Research Program is developing an advanced trade-space analysis tool suite, IMPACT. As a part of this effort, ExMC has produced the IMPACT version 1 Condition List (ICL 1.0) which expands the scope and definition of medical conditions.

Amy Jean Kreykes↗
NASA NTRS1998

RH1020 Single Event Clock Upset Summary Report

This report summarizes the testing and analysis of "single event clock upset' in the RH1020. Also included are SEU-rate predictions and design recommendations for risk analysis and reduction. The subject of "upsets" in the RH1020 is best understood by using a model consisting of a global clock buffer and a D-type flip-flop as the basic memory unit. The RH1020 is built on the ACT 1 family architecture. As such, it has one low-skew global clock buffer with a TTL-level input threshold that is accessed via a single dedicated pin. The clock signal is driven to full CMOS levels, buffered, and sent to individual row buffers with one buffer per channel. For low-skew performance, the outputs of all of the RH1020 row buffers are shorted together via metal lines, as is done in the A1020B. All storage in the RH1020 consists of routed flip-flops, constructed with multiplexors and feedback through the routing segments. A simple latch can be constructed from a single (combinatorial or C) module; an edge-triggered flip-flop is constructed using two concatenated latches. There is no storage in the I/O modules. The front end of the clock buffering circuitry, at a common point relative to the row buffer, is a sub-circuit that was determined to be the most susceptible to heavy ions. This is due, in part, to its smaller transistors compared to the rest of the circuitry. This conclusion is also supported by SPICE simulations and an analysis of the heavy ion data, described in this report. The edge triggered D flip-flop has two single-event-upset modes. Mode one, called C-module upset, is caused by a heavy ion striking the C-module's sensitive area on the silicon and produces a soft single bit error at the output of the flip-flop. Mode two, called clock upset, is caused by a heavy ion strike on the clock buffer, generating a runt pulse interpreted as a false clock signal and consequently producing errors at the flip-flop outputs. C-module upset sensitivity in the RH1020 is essentially the same as that of its ACT 1 siblings (A1020, A1020A and A1020B), which were well tested, analyzed, and documented in the literature.

Katz, Richard B.↗