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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Sovereign Credit Rating Processes Adapted to Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment

United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Risk Management System

Phased‐approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks - not just risk office personnel. Each group/department is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest‐level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management.  Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity for Distance Relay Protection

This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space-based Networking Technology Developments in the Interplanetary Network Directorate Information Technology Program

Described recent development of communications protocols, services, and associated tools targeted to reduce risk, reduce cost and increase efficiency of IND infrastructure and supported mission operations. Space-based networking technologies developed were: a) Provide differentiated quality of service (QoS) that will give precedence to traffic that users have selected as having the greatest importance and/or time-criticality; b) Improve the total value of information to users through the use of QoS prioritization techniques; c) Increase operational flexibility and improve command-response turnaround; d) Enable new class of networked and collaborative science missions; e) Simplify applications interfaces to communications services; and f) Reduce risk and cost from a common object model and automated scheduling and communications protocols. Technologies are described in three general areas: communications scheduling, middleware, and protocols. Additionally developed simulation environment, which provides comprehensive, quantitative understanding of the technologies performance within overall, evolving architecture, as well as ability to refine & optimize specific components.

scheduling↗
NASA NTRS2007

RF and Optical Communications: A Comparison of High Data Rate Returns From Deep Space in the 2020 Timeframe

As NASA proceeds with plans for increased science data return and higher data transfer capacity for science missions, both RF and optical communications are viable candidates for significantly higher-rate communications from deep space to Earth. With the inherent advantages, smaller apertures and larger bandwidths, of optical communications, it is reasonable to expect that at some point in time and combination of increasing distance and data rate, the rapidly emerging optical capabilities would become more advantageous than the more mature and evolving RF techniques. This paper presents a comparison of the burden to a spacecraft by both RF and optical communications systems for data rates of 10, 100, and 1000 Mbps and large distances. Advanced technology for RF and optical communication systems have been considered for projecting capabilities in the 2020 timeframe. For the comparisons drawn, the optical and RF ground terminals were selected to be similar in cost. The RF system selected is composed of forty-five 12-meter antennas, whereas the selected optical system is equivalent to a 10-meter optical telescope. Potential differences in availability are disregarded since the focus of this study is on spacecraft mass and power burden for high-rate mission data, under the assumption that essential communications will be provided by low-rate, high availability RF. For both the RF and optical systems, the required EIRP, for a given data rate and a given distance, was achieved by a design that realized the lowest possible communications subsystem mass (power + aperture) consistent with achieving the lowest technology risk. A key conclusion of this paper is that optical communications has great potential for high data rates and distances of 2.67 AU and beyond, but requires R&D and flight demonstrations to prove out technologies.

Williams, W. Dan↗
NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2011

Simplified Architecture for Precise Aiming of a Deep-Space Communication Laser Transceiver

The simplified architecture is a minimal system for a deep-space optical communications transceiver. For a deepspace optical communications link the simplest form of the transceiver requires (1) an efficient modulated optical source, (2) a point-ahead mechanism (PAM) to compensate for two-way light travel, (3) an aperture to reduce the divergence of the transmit laser communication signal and also to collect the uplink communication signal, and (4) a receive detector to sense the uplink communication signal. Additional components are introduced to mitigate for spacecraft microvibrations and to improve the pointing accuracy. The Canonical Transceiver implements this simplified architecture (see figure). A single photon-counting smart focal plane sensor combines acquisition, tracking, and forward link data detection functionality. This improves optical efficiency by eliminating channel splits. A transmit laser blind sensor (e.g. silicon with 1,550-nm beam) provides transmit beam-pointing feedback via the two-photon absorption (TPA) process. This vastly improves the transmit/receive isolation because only the focused transmit beam is detected. A piezoelectric tiptilt actuator implements the required point-ahead angle. This point-ahead mechanism has been demonstrated to have near zero quiescent power and is flight qualified. This architecture also uses an innovative 100-mHz resonant frequency passive isolation platform to filter spacecraft vibrations with voice coil actuators for active tip-tilt correction below the resonant frequency. The canonical deep-space optical communications transceiver makes synergistic use of innovative technologies to reduce size, weight, power, and cost. This optical transceiver can be used to retire risks associated with deep-space optical communications on a planetary pathfinder mission and is complementary to ongoing lunar and access link developments.

Ortiz, Gerard G.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Design Consideration on the ACTS T1-VSAT

The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) was developed by NASA as an experimental platform to demonstrate to industry the high risk technologies need for the next generation of communication satellites. The ACTS contains many state-of-the-art technologies including time division multiple accessing, adaptive error correction coding, multiple electronically steerable hopping beam antennas, spectrally efficient SMSK modulation, demand assignment multiple access protocol and on-board baseband circuit switching. An integral part of this testbed is the ACTS T1-very small aperture terminal (VSAT). The requirements imposed on the T1-VSAT demanded numerous design tradeoffs; balancing risk, cost, and implementation. Some of these considerations include: the method used for determining link quality, the development of a low cost and reliable Ka-band high power amplifier, the integration and testing environment for use in development and production and the low cost signal processing solution to high rate burst data. This paper discusses the tradeoffs considered in the selected implementation and the results obtained over the past two years of operation. Recommendations for improvements are also included.

Lilley, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Role of Trust and Usability in Enabling Spaceflight Crew Autonomy

Future long duration exploration missions will require an increased use of onboard automated systems as spaceflight crews venture further than before and have longer communications delays with ground support. The design of these systems must support appropriate crew trust and have sufficient usability to enable spaceflight crew autonomy or risk being misused while crews wait to communicate with ground support. We evaluated trust & usability in our self-scheduling tool, Playbook, for crew mission timelines. Data was collected in a controlled lab experiment with 31 participants. Participants in the study conducted two tasks: scheduling, where participants were responsible for scheduling a majority of a day's operational tasks, and rescheduling, where participants were provided a schedule and asked to reschedule higher priority activities. We found a significant correlation between system trust and usability, irrespective of self-scheduling tasks. We conclude that system usability may play a bigger role in how trust is learned while conducting novel crew autonomy tasks such as self-scheduling. Future research should investigate the role of usability to encourage appropriate trust in onboard automated crew systems and enable crew autonomy.

crew autonomy↗
NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper

data links↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analytical Framework for Rodent/NHP Data Set Utilization to Inform Human CNS Risk Estimation

Objectives Review and inform on tactics to analyze & communicate data from animal research (e.g., rodents, mini-pigs, NHPs, et al) exposed to single and combinations of spaceflight hazards, using NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) process for the Behavioral Medicine Risk - To quantitatively inform Behavioral Medicine Risk posture - i.e., likelihood (L) and consequence (C) - To help inform estimation of crew health standards for operational task performance (i.e., Fitness For Duty, Space Permissible Exposure Levels, Permissible Operational Limits).

Brain↗
DOE OSTI2021

Impact of DER Communication Delay in AGC: Cyber-Physical Dynamic Co-Simulation: Preprint

Distributed energy resource (DER) frequency regulations are promising technologies for future grid operation. Unlike conventional generators, DERs might require open communication networks to exchange signals with control centers, possibly through DER aggregators; therefore, the impacts of the communication variations including the latency on the system frequency stability need to be investigated. This paper develops a cyber-physical dynamic simulation (CPDS) model based on the Hierarchical Engine for Large-Scale Co-Simulation (HELICS) to evaluate the impact of the communication variations, such as delays in DER frequency regulations. The feasible delay range can be obtained under different AGC parameter settings. The results show that the risk of instability generally increases with the communication delay and that the difference of AGC provided from DER and conventional generation units should be recognized when designing frequency regulation controllers.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Personal Interventions for Reducing Exposure and Risk for Outdoor Air Pollution: An Official American Thoracic Society Workshop Report

Poor air quality affects the health and wellbeing of large populations around the globe. Although source controls are the most effective approaches for improving air quality and reducing health risks, individuals can also take actions to reduce their personal exposure by staying indoors, reducing physical activity, altering modes of transportation, filtering indoor air, and using respirators and other types of face masks. A synthesis of available evidence on the efficacy, effectiveness, and potential adverse effects or unintended consequences of personal interventions for air pollution is needed by clinicians to assist patients and the public in making informed decisions about use of these interventions. To address this need, the American Thoracic Society convened a workshop in May of 2018 to bring together a multidisciplinary group of international experts to review the current state of knowledge about personal interventions for air pollution and important considerations when helping patients and the general public to make decisions about how best to protect themselves. From these discussions, recommendations were made regarding when, where, how, and for whom to consider personal interventions. In addition to the efficacy and safety of the various interventions, the committee considered evidence regarding the identification of patients at greatest risk, the reliability of air quality indices, the communication challenges, and the ethical and equity considerations that arise when discussing personal interventions to reduce exposure and risk from outdoor air pollution.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Elevated CO2 Could Undermine an Exploration Crew's Ability to Independently Respond to Unanticipated, Time- and Safety-Critical Anomalies

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve some time- and safety-critical anomalies on their own. The HRP, HFBP, Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk refers to the possibility that, during communication blackouts and thus the absence of vast ground expertise, a small crew may not be able to independently respond to unanticipated, time-critical malfunctions or to detect safety critical procedure errors.

carbon dioxide↗
NASA NTRS2004

The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process

As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.

Pokorny, Frank M.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Ground-Based Capabilities for Lunar Infrastructure Testing

A focus of NASA’s Moon-to-Mars objectives is the development of the infrastructure on the lunar surface that will be needed to support broader lunar surface operations. This infrastructure is intended to support both United States and international partners to expand human presence on the lunar surface. As this lunar infrastructure is designed and established, it will be critical to ensure that the various hardware elements work together to both enable the capabilities and to avoid unintended actions. NASA’s Glenn Research Center (GRC) is establishing ground-based testing and emulation facilities to mimic the lunar environment that the surface power and communications infrastructure will operate in. These facilities are intended to represent power and communications providers, users, and interfaces to ensure that systems operate as intended to support the lunar economy. They will empower industry to rapidly evaluate new technologies under realistic conditions. In 2023 GRC is opening a new, state-of-the-art, Aerospace Communications Facility featuring hardware-in-the-loop and ground-to-orbit testbeds. The Multiple Asset Testbed for Research in Innovative Communications Systems (MATRICS) capability will emulate the lunar communications environment, enabling validation of mission concepts and technologies to reduce risk through performance and operations testing, training, and uncover potential issues in compatibility among communication systems providers and users. In addition to the communications testbed, GRC is also developing a full-scale power grid to reduce lunar mission risk. The Adaptable Surface Power Integration and Research (ASPIRE) project aims to reduce mission and hardware risk via high-fidelity integrated testing and pave the way for commercially supplied utility power on the lunar surface. The facility will be scalable and highly adaptable and will be available to NASA, Industry, Academia, and International Partners. ASPIRE will allow developers to integrate and demonstrate their power solutions in a relevant environment, and it will be able to characterize the lunar power performance in representative mission contexts.

ground-based testing↗
NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗
DOE OSTI2021

Potential ecological impacts of climate intervention by reflecting sunlight to cool Earth

As the effects of anthropogenic climate change become more severe, several approaches for deliberate climate intervention to reduce or stabilize Earth’s surface temperature have been proposed. Solar radiation modification (SRM) is one potential approach to partially counteract anthropogenic warming by reflecting a small proportion of the incoming solar radiation to increase Earth’s albedo. While climate science research has focused on the predicted climate effects of SRM, almost no studies have investigated the impacts that SRM would have on ecological systems. The impacts and risks posed by SRM would vary by implementation scenario, anthropogenic climate effects, geographic region, and by ecosystem, community, population, and organism. Complex interactions among Earth’s climate system and living systems would further affect SRM impacts and risks. We focus here on stratospheric aerosol intervention (SAI), a well-studied and relatively feasible SRM scheme that is likely to have a large impact on Earth’s surface temperature. We outline current gaps in knowledge about both helpful and harmful predicted effects of SAI on ecological systems. Desired ecological outcomes might also inform development of future SAI implementation scenarios. In addition to filling these knowledge gaps, increased collaboration between ecologists and climate scientists would identify a common set of SAI research goals and improve the communication about potential SAI impacts and risks with the public. Without this collaboration, forecasts of SAI impacts will overlook potential effects on biodiversity and ecosystem services for humanity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗