SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “risk levels.”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 217 records · Page 12

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Regulatory and Technical Issues Concerning the Detection and Treatment of NDMA-Contaminated Groundwater at NASA WSTF

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was established in 1963 primarily to provide rocket engine testing services for several NASA programs. The groundwater underlying the site has been contaminated as a result of historical operations. Groundwater contaminants include several volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and two semi-volatile compounds: N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) and N-nitrodimethylamine (DMN). This paper discusses some of the technical, analytical, regulatory, and health risk issues associated with the contaminant plume. The plume has moved approximately 2.5 miles downgradient of the facility industrial boundary, with evidence of continued migration. As a result, NASA has proposed a pump and treat system using air strippers and ultraviolet (UV) oxidation to stabilize future movement of the contaminant plume. The system has been designed to treat 1,076 gallons (4,073 liters) per minute, with provisions for future expansion. The UV oxidation process was selected to treat NDMA-contaminated groundwater based on successes at other NDMA-contaminated sites. Bench- and pilot-scale testing of WSTF groundwater confirmed the ability of UV oxidation to destroy NDMA and generated sufficient data to design the proposed full-scale treatment system. NDMA is acutely toxic and is a probable human carcinogen. EPA-recommended health risk criteria for the residential consumption of NDMA/DMN-contaminated groundwater was used to determine that a 1.0 x 10(exp -6) excess cancer risk corresponds to 1.7 parts per trillion (ppt). EPA analytical methods are unable to detect NDMA and DMN in the low ppt range. EPA's current Appendix IX analytical method used to screen for NDMA, Method 8270, can detect NDMA only at levels that are orders of magnitude greater than the recommended health risk level. Additionally, EPA Method 607, the most sensitive EPA approved method, has a detection limit of 150 ppt. This corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 9.0 x 10(exp -5), which exceeds the State of New Mexico's water quality standard of a cancer risk less than 1 x 10(exp -5). The treatment system has been engineered to treat contaminated groundwater to levels significantly below the New Mexico standard. However, the inability of EPA-approved analytical methods to detect NDMA and DMN at low ppt levels, and to provide verification of compliance with the 1 x 10(exp -5) cancer risk, introduces a notable risk to the long-term operation of the system. WSTF has been working with Southwest Research Institute to develop a non-EPA analytical method that can achieve a reporting limit of 1 ppt, which corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 7.6 x 10(exp -7). WSTF is currently developing a proposal to obtain approval from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) of this non-EPA method.

Wiebe, D. T.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prediction of Calcium Oxalate Stone Risk with Interventions

Introduction Mitigations intended to reduce bone mineral loss in-flight also influence the level of renal stone risk to astronauts. Extending a recent study completed by our group [1], we investigate the likely influence of combined fluid intake and Ca excretion mitigation strategies. Methods A computational biochemistry model representing CaOx crystal precipitation, growth, and agglomeration [2] is combined with a probabilistic analysis to predict the in-flight CaOx renal stone incidence risk ratio (IRR) relative to pre-flight values using 1517 astronaut 24-hour urine chemistries. The output of this simulation is used to assess the combined impact of controlling fluid intake and Ca excretion on maintaining IRR < 1.2 for > 95% of the population, a threshold determined from initial analysis of the model output compared to referent populations [1]. Results and Conclusions Figure 1 illustrates the simulated in-flight astronaut population (n=40000) with CaOx IRR > 1.2. The red lines indicate the known clinical risk boundary of each factor, and the white box is considered the area of high combined clinical risk. The simulation and identified risk threshold conform well to the expected clinical risk boundaries. The results, assuming insensible water losses equal or exceed 0.7 L/day, imply mitigations achieve risks similar to pre-flight levels when either Ca < 150 mg/day or fluid volume intake > 3.2 L/day individually, or combined Ca < 200 and fluid volume intake > 2.5 L/day. We continue to investigate similar compounded effects and look to apprise engineering trades by informing relative risk changes during mission design. References [1] D. A. Goodenow-Messman, S. A. Gokoglu, M. Kassemi, and J. Myers, Jerry G., “Characterization of Astronaut CaOx Renal Stone Incidence Rates to Quantify In-flight and Post-flight Relative Risk,” npj Microgravity, in review, 2021. [2] M. Kassemi and D. Thompson, “Prediction of renal crystalline size distributions in space using a PBE analytic model. 1. Effect of microgravity-induced biochemical alterations,” Am. J. Physiol. Physiol., vol. 311, no. 3, pp. F520–F530, Sep. 2016, doi: 10.1152/ajprenal.00401.2015.

Debra A Goodenow↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗

NASA NTRS1993

Thermal performance testing of the Explorer Platform

The Explorer Platform (EP) has been designed to accommodate on-orbit payload and bus module changeout via Space Transportation System (STS) servicing. Such a versatile spacecraft platform designed to experience widely different environmental exposures and operational conditions, coupled with program constraints on schedule and budget, presented a challenge to implementing a technically sound thermal vacuum/thermal balance test program. This paper discusses thermal performance tests implemented at the subsystem and system levels, and the risks accepted resulting from test sequence, configuration. and tests omitted from the program. No thermal cycling or thermal balance tests were performed on the integrated spacecraft level, although both the Payload (EUVE) and Platform (EP) received independent testing. The decision to take this approach is discussed with respect to the thermal design and the associated risks taken to maintain budget and schedule.

Wasson, David↗

NASA NTRS2015

Internal NASA Study: NASAs Protoflight Research Initiative

The NASA Protoflight Research Initiative is an internal NASA study conducted within the Office of the Chief Engineer to better understand the use of Protoflight within NASA. Extensive literature reviews and interviews with key NASA members with experience in both robotic and human spaceflight missions has resulted in three main conclusions and two observations. The first conclusion is that NASA's Protoflight method is not considered to be "prescriptive." The current policies and guidance allows each Program/Project to tailor the Protoflight approach to better meet their needs, goals and objectives. Second, Risk Management plays a key role in implementation of the Protoflight approach. Any deviations from full qualification will be based on the level of acceptable risk with guidance found in NPR 8705.4. Finally, over the past decade (2004 - 2014) only 6% of NASA's Protoflight missions and 6% of NASA's Full qualification missions experienced a publicly disclosed mission failure. In other words, the data indicates that the Protoflight approach, in and of it itself, does not increase the mission risk of in-flight failure. The first observation is that it would be beneficial to document the decision making process on the implementation and use of Protoflight. The second observation is that If a Project/Program chooses to use the Protoflight approach with relevant heritage, it is extremely important that the Program/Project Manager ensures that the current project's requirements falls within the heritage design, component, instrument and/or subsystem's requirements for both the planned and operational use, and that the documentation of the relevant heritage is comprehensive, sufficient and the decision well documented. To further benefit/inform this study, a recommendation to perform a deep dive into 30 missions with accessible data on their testing/verification methodology and decision process to research the differences between Protoflight and Full Qualification missions' Design Requirements and Verification & Validation (V&V) (without any impact or special request directly to the project).

Protoflight↗

NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management Issues - An Aerospace Perspective

Phased-approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks--risk office personnel. Each group is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest-level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk reporting and communication is an essential element of risk management and will combine both qualitative and quantitative elements.. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management. Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner, Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Risk Management System

Leadership is key to success. Phased-approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks -- risk office personnel. Each group is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest-level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk reporting and communication is an essential element of risk management and will combine both qualitative and quantitative elements. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management. Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗

NASA NTRS1999

An Evidenced-Based Approach for Estimating Decompression Sickness Risk in Aircraft Operations

Estimating the risk of decompression Sickness (DCS) in aircraft operations remains a challenge, making the reduction of this risk through the development of operationally acceptable denitrogenation schedules difficult. In addition, the medical recommendations which are promulgated are often not supported by rigorous evaluation of the available data, but are instead arrived at by negotiation with the aircraft operations community, are adapted from other similar aircraft operations, or are based upon the opinion of the local medical community. We present a systematic approach for defining DCS risk in aircraft operations by analyzing the data available for a specific aircraft, flight profile, and aviator population. Once the risk of DCS in a particular aircraft operation is known, appropriate steps can be taken to reduce this risk to a level acceptable to the applicable aviation community. Using this technique will allow any aviation medical community to arrive at the best estimate of DCS risk for its specific mission and aviator population and will allow systematic reevaluation of the decisions regarding DCS risk reduction when additional data are available.

Robinson, Ronald R.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management at NASA

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting CFS to CubeSat Missions

Expanding capabilities and mission objectives for SmallSats and CubeSats is driving the need for reliable, reusable, and robust flight software. While missions are becoming more complicated and the scientific goals more ambitious, the level of acceptable risk has decreased. Design challenges are further compounded by budget and schedule constraints that have not kept pace. NASA's Core Flight Software System (cFS) is an open source solution which enables teams to build flagship satellite level flight software within a CubeSat schedule and budget. NASA originally developed cFS to reduce mission and schedule risk for flagship satellite missions by increasing code reuse and reliability. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, which launched in 2009, was the first of a growing list of Class B rated missions to use cFS. Large parts of cFS are now open source, which has spurred adoption outside of NASA. This paper reports on the experiences of two teams using cFS for current CubeSat missions. The performance overheads of cFS are quantified, and the reusability of code between missions is discussed. The analysis shows that cFS is well suited to use on CubeSats and demonstrates the portability and modularity of cFS code.

Open Source↗

NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting cFS to CubeSat Missions

Flight Software↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Climate change reshapes the drivers of false spring risk across European trees

Temperate and boreal forests are shaped by late spring freezing events after budburst, which are also known as false springs. Research has generated conflicting results on whether or not these events will change with climate change, potentially because---to date---no study has compared the myriad climatic and geographic factors that contribute to a plant's risk of a false spring. We assessed and compared the strength of the effects of mean spring temperature, distance from the coast, elevation and the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) using PEP725 leafout data for six temperate, decidious tree species across 11,648 sites in Central Europe and how these predictors shifted with climate change. Across species before recent warming, mean spring temperature and distance from the coast were the strongest predictors, with higher mean spring temperatures associated with decreased risk in false springs (–7.64% per 2°C increase) and sites further from the coast experiencing an increased risk (5.32% per 150km from the coast). Elevation (2.23% per 200m increase in elevation) and NAO index (1.91% per 0.3 increase) also increased false spring risk. With climate change, elevation and distance from coast---i.e., the geographic factors---remain relatively stable, while climatic factors shifted in magnitude for mean spring temperature (down to -2.84% in risk per 2°C), and in direction, with positive NAO phases leading to lower risk (-9.15% per 0.3). The residual effects of climate change---unexplained by the climatic and geographic factors already included in the model---magnified the species-level variation in risk, with risk increasing among early-leafout species (i.e., Aesculus hippocastanum, Alnus glutinosa and Betula pendula) but a decline or no change in risk among late-leafout species (i.e., Fagus sylvatica, Fraxinus excelsior and Quercus robur). Our results show that climate change has reshaped the major drivers of false spring risk and highlight how considering multiple factors can yield a better understanding of the complexities of climate change.

Climate change↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

NASA NTRS2011

Crew Health and Performance Improvements with Reduced Carbon Dioxide Levels and the Resource Impact to Accomplish Those Reductions

Carbon dioxide (CO2) removal is one of the primary functions of the International Space Station (ISS) atmosphere revitalization systems. Primary CO2 removal is via the ISS s two Carbon Dioxide Removal Assemblies (CDRAs) and the Russian carbon dioxide removal assembly (Vozdukh); both of these systems are regenerable, meaning that their CO2 removal capacity theoretically remains constant as long as the system is operating. Contingency CO2 removal capability is provided by lithium hydroxide (LiOH) canisters, which are consumable, meaning that their CO2 removal capability disappears once the resource is used. With the advent of 6 crew ISS operations, experience showing that CDRA failures are not uncommon, and anecdotal association of crew symptoms with CO2 values just above 4 mmHg, the question arises: How much lower do we keep CO2 levels to minimize the risk to crew health and performance, and what will the operational cost to the CDRAs be to do it? The primary crew health concerns center on the interaction of increased intracranial pressure from fluid shifts and the increased intracranial blood flow induced by CO2. Typical acute symptoms include headache, minor visual disturbances, and subtle behavioral changes. The historical database of CO2 exposures since the beginning of ISS operations has been compared to the incidence of crew symptoms reported in private medical conferences. We have used this database in an attempt to establish an association between the CO2 levels and the risk of crew symptoms. This comparison will answer the question of the level needed to protect the crew from acute effects. As for the second part of the question, operation of the ISS s regenerable CO2 removal capability reduces the limited life of constituent parts. It also consumes limited electrical power and thermal control resources. Operation of consumable CO2 removal capability (LiOH) uses finite consumable materials, which must be replenished in the long term. Therefore, increased CO2 removal means increased resource use, with increased logistical capability to maintain necessary resources on board ISS. We must strike a balance between sufficiently low CO2 levels to maintain crew health and CO2 levels which are operationally feasible for the ISS program

James, John T.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Public Risk Assessment Program

The Public Entry Risk Assessment (PERA) program addresses risk to the public from shuttle or other spacecraft re-entry trajectories. Managing public risk to acceptable levels is a major component of safe spacecraft operation. PERA is given scenario inputs of vehicle trajectory, probability of failure along that trajectory, the resulting debris characteristics, and field size and distribution, and returns risk metrics that quantify the individual and collective risk posed by that scenario. Due to the large volume of data required to perform such a risk analysis, PERA was designed to streamline the analysis process by using innovative mathematical analysis of the risk assessment equations. Real-time analysis in the event of a shuttle contingency operation, such as damage to the Orbiter, is possible because PERA allows for a change to the probability of failure models, therefore providing a much quicker estimation of public risk. PERA also provides the ability to generate movie files showing how the entry risk changes as the entry develops. PERA was designed to streamline the computation of the enormous amounts of data needed for this type of risk assessment by using an average distribution of debris on the ground, rather than pinpointing the impact point of every piece of debris. This has reduced the amount of computational time significantly without reducing the accuracy of the results. PERA was written in MATLAB; a compiled version can run from a DOS or UNIX prompt.

Mendeck, Gavin↗

NASA NTRS2006

Visual Risk Assessment of Space Radiation Exposure for Future Space Exploration Missions

Protecting astronauts from space radiation exposure during an interplanetary mission is an important challenge for mission design and operations. If sufficient protection is not provided near solar maximum, the risk can be significant due to exposure to sporadic solar particle events (SPEs) as well as to the continuous galactic cosmic radiation (GCR). Polyethylene shielded "storm shelters" inside spacecraft have been shown to limit total exposure from a large SPE to a permissible level, preventing acute risks and providing a potential approach to fulfill the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) requirement. For accurate predictions of radiation dose to astronauts involved in future space exploration missions, detailed variations of radiation shielding properties are required. Radiation fluences and doses vary considerably across both the spacecraft geometry and the body-shielding distribution. A model using a modern CAD tool ProE(TradeMark), which is the leading engineering design platform at NASA, has been developed to account for these local variations in the radiation distribution. Visual assessment of radiation distribution at different points inside a spacecraft module and in the human body for a given radiation environment are described. Results will ultimately guide in developing requirements for maximal protection for astronauts from space radiation.

Hussein, Hesham F.↗