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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Tech Briefs, January 2012

Contents of this issue are: (1) Energy-Based Tetrahedron Sensor for High-Temperature, High-Pressure Environments (2) Handheld Universal Diagnostic Sensor (3) Large-Area Vacuum Ultraviolet Sensors (4) Fiber Bragg Grating Sensor System for Monitoring Smart Composite Aerospace Structures (5) Health-Enabled Smart Sensor Fusion Technology (6) Extended-Range Passive RFID and Sensor Tags (7) Hybrid Collaborative Learning for Classification and Clustering in Sensor Networks (8) Self-Healing, Inflatable, Rigidizable Shelter (9) Improvements in Cold-Plate Fabrication (10) Technique for Radiometer and Antenna Array Calibration - TRAAC (11) Real-Time Cognitive Computing Architecture for Data Fusion in a Dynamic Environment (12) Programmable Digital Controller (13) Use of CCSDS Packets Over SpaceWire to Control Hardware (14) Key Decision Record Creation and Approval Module (15) Enhanced Graphics for Extended Scale Range (16) Debris Examination Using Ballistic and Radar Integrated Software (17) Data Distribution System (DDS) and Solar Dynamic Observatory Ground Station (SDOGS) (18) Integration Manager (19) Eclipse-Free-Time Assessment Tool for IRIS (20) Automated and Manual Rocket Crater Measurement Software (21) MATLAB Stability and Control Toolbox Trim and Static Stability Module (22) Patched Conic Trajectory Code (23) Ring Image Analyzer (24) SureTrak Probability of Impact Display (25) Implementation of a Non-Metallic Barrier in an Electric Motor (26) Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Heat Exchangers for the Mars Science Laboratory Rover (27) Uniform Dust Distributor for Testing Radiative Emittance of Dust-Coated Surfaces (28) MicroProbe Small Unmanned Aerial System (29) Highly Stable and Active Catalyst for Sabatier Reactions (30) Better Proton-Conducting Polymers for Fuel-Cell Membranes (31) CCD Camera Lens Interface for Real-Time Theodolite Alignment (32) Peregrine 100-km Sounding Rocket Project (33) SOFIA Closed- and Open-Door Aerodynamic Analyses (34) Sonic Thermometer for High-Altitude Balloons (35) Near-Infrared Photon-Counting Camera for High-Sensitivity Observations (36) Integrated Optics Achromatic Nuller for Stellar Interferometry (37) High-Speed Digital Interferometry (38) Ultra-Miniature Lidar Scanner for Launch Range Data Collection (39) Shape and Color Features for Object Recognition Search (40) Explanation Capabilities for Behavior-Based Robot Control (41) A DNA-Inspired Encryption Methodology for Secure, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (42) Quality Control Method for a Micro-Nano-Channel Microfabricated Device (43) Corner-Cube Retroreflector Instrument for Advanced Lunar Laser Ranging (44) Electrospray Collection of Lunar Dust (45) Fabrication of a Kilopixel Array of Superconducting Microcalorimeters with Microstripline Wiring Spacecraft Attitude Tracking and Maneuver Using Combined Magnetic Actuators (46) Coherent Detector for Near-Angle Scattering and Polarization Characterization of Telescope Mirror Coatings

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2026

CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION IN A CYBER-PHYSICAL MIDSTREAM TESTBED

This thesis presents the development of a laboratory-scale cyber–physical midstream pipeline testbed designed to address this gap and support research in industrial control systems security. The platform integrates pumps, valves, sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and a human–machine interface (HMI) to emulate the monitoring and control architecture of real pipeline operations. The physical process is implemented as a closed-loop liquid circulation system designed to replicate flow behavior characteristic of midstream pipeline infrastructure. The testbed enables real-time data acquisition of key process variables, including flow rate and pressure facilitating the generation of datasets representative of normal pipeline operation. A threat model encompassing common ICS attack vectors was developed, including sensor spoofing, command injection, false data injection, denial-of-service attacks, and relay manipulation. Multiple attack scenarios were implemented and evaluated to demonstrate how cyber intrusions targeting sensors, actuators, networks, and software propagate into measurable physical consequences in pipeline flow and pressure. The developed platform serves as a practical, cost-effective environment for experimentation, education, and future cybersecurity research in midstream pipeline systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2002

Internet Voice Distribution System (IVoDS) Utilization in Remote Payload Operations

Due to limited crew availability to support science and the large number of experiments to be operated simultaneously, telescience is key to a successful International Space Station (ISS) science program. Crew, operations personnel at NASA centers, and researchers at universities and companies around the world must work closely together to perform scientific experiments on-board ISS. NASA has initiated use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) to supplement the existing HVoDS mission voice communications system used by researchers. The Internet Voice Distribution System (IVoDS) connects researchers to mission support "loops" or conferences via Internet Protocol networks such as the high-speed Internet 2. Researchers use IVoDS software on personal computers to talk with operations personnel at NASA centers. IVoDS also has the capability, if authorized, to allow researchers to communicate with the ISS crew during experiment operations. NODS was developed by Marshall Space Flight Center with contractors A2 Technology, Inc. FVC, Lockheed- Martin, and VoIP Group. IVoDS is currently undergoing field-testing with full deployment for up to 50 simultaneous users expected in 2002. Research is currently being performed to take full advantage of the digital world - the Personal Computer and Internet Protocol networks - to qualitatively enhance communications among ISS operations personnel. In addition to the current voice capability, video and data-sharing capabilities are being investigated. Major obstacles being addressed include network bandwidth capacity and strict security requirements. Techniques being investigated to reduce and overcome these obstacles include emerging audio-video protocols and network technology including multicast and quality-of-service.

Best, Susan↗
DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Next generation experimental data access at NSLS-II

The NSLS-II network and computing infrastructure has been significantly updated recently. The re-IP process in 2020-2021 enabled the NSLS-II network to be routable to the rest of the BNL campus. Then, standardization of the operating systems and deployment procedures helped to deliver a consistent environment to workstations and servers used by all NSLS-II beamlines. In particular, the RedHat Enterprise Linux 8 was deployed to 700+ machines using the RedHat Satellite infrastructure management product, and all critical services (IOCs, databases, etc.) were migrated to the new OS. NFS users’ home directories are consistent across all of the machines, which eliminates the need for the individual configuration of the user environment on each host. The standard suite of software packages is available to the beamline staff and users, which includes the system packages (deployed via RPM) as well as the conda environments for data acquisition and analysis. Security measures were implemented to comply with the industry standards, which include multi-factor authentication (using Duo), secure screen lock for the beamline machines, and advanced access control to the experimental data that is stored in shared central storage available on all hosts. These major enhancements facilitated sharing the experimental data (currently for a number of selected beamlines, with a plan to extend it to the whole facility in the nearest future) with the users via an externally facing JupyterHub instance. The beamlines keep using the Bluesky data acquisition framework to orchestrate their experiments, and the new infrastructure enabled them to use a next-generation data access library called tiled.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Code for BALDR Study 07.05 v.1.0.0

SAND2024-01293O The Code for BALDR Study 07.05 software reproduces results from the BALDR study concerning "A Semi-Supervised Learning Method to Produce Explainable Radioisotope Proportion Estimates for NaI-based Synthetic and Measured Gamma Spectra." The code for BALDR Study 07.05 can reproduce a scientific study following the step numbers within the file names. Using synthetic and measured data to find the best model for the radioisotope proportion estimation task of interest, the study generated results for inclusion in a paper. The high-level methods involved are neural networks, semi-supervised learning, and out-of-distribution detection. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Morrow, Tyler↗
NASA NTRS2015

Analyzing Cyber Security Threats on Cyber-Physical Systems Using Model-Based Systems Engineering

The spectre of cyber attacks on aerospace systems can no longer be ignored given that many of the components and vulnerabilities that have been successfully exploited by the adversary on other infrastructures are the same as those deployed and used within the aerospace environment. An important consideration with respect to the mission/safety critical infrastructure supporting space operations is that an appropriate defensive response to an attack invariably involves the need for high precision and accuracy, because an incorrect response can trigger unacceptable losses involving lives and/or significant financial damage. A highly precise defensive response, considering the typical complexity of aerospace environments, requires a detailed and well-founded understanding of the underlying system where the goal of the defensive response is to preserve critical mission objectives in the presence of adversarial activity. In this paper, a structured approach for modeling aerospace systems is described. The approach includes physical elements, network topology, software applications, system functions, and usage scenarios. We leverage Model-Based Systems Engineering methodology by utilizing the Object Management Group's Systems Modeling Language to represent the system being analyzed and also utilize model transformations to change relevant aspects of the model into specialized analyses. A novel visualization approach is utilized to visualize the entire model as a three-dimensional graph, allowing easier interaction with subject matter experts. The model provides a unifying structure for analyzing the impact of a particular attack or a particular type of attack. Two different example analysis types are demonstrated in this paper: a graph-based propagation analysis based on edge labels, and a graph-based propagation analysis based on node labels.

MBSE↗
NASA NTRS2001

Making Sense of Remotely Sensed Ultra-Spectral Infrared Data

NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Pasadena, California, Earth Observing System (EOS) programs, the Deep Space Network (DSN), and various Department of Defense (DOD) technology demonstration programs, combined their technical expertise to develop SEASCRAPE, a software program that obtains data when thermal infrared radiation passes through the Earth's atmosphere and reaches a sensor. Licensed by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), SEASCRAPE automatically inverts complex infrared data and makes it possible to obtain estimates of the state of the atmosphere along the ray path. Former JPL staff members created a small entrepreneurial firm, Remote Sensing Analysis Systems, Inc., of Altadena, California, to commercialize the product. The founders believed that a commercial version of the software was needed for future U.S. government missions and the commercial monitoring of pollution. With the inversion capability of this software and remote sensing instrumentation, it is possible to monitor pollution sources from safe and secure distances on a noninterfering, noncooperative basis. The software, now know as SEASCRAPE_Plus, allows the user to determine the presence of pollution products, their location and their abundance along the ray path. The technology has been cleared by the Department of Commerce for export, and is currently used by numerous research and engineering organizations around the world.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Platform and Certification Framework Development for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC)-Integrated Charging Ecosystem (Final Project Report)

This report summarizes a pioneering effort in Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure ecosystem cybersecurity requirements, assessment methodologies, functional verification, as well as embodiment of the key technologies in the form of hardware and software tools being made available to the public. EPRI led a team of experts, as well as a stakeholder coalition encompassing all key actors in the EV charging infrastructure ecosystem that includes eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) equipment (defined as 200kW or above). EV charging infrastructure in the United States is a patchwork of networks that have continued to grow organically and have been designed to serve the charging needs of the EV owners, who are their customers. In doing so, each network provider, as well as their connected entities such as the cloud Electric Vehicle Service Providers or EVSPs, utility back office, utility AMI networks, payment networks, as well as Original Equipment Manufacturer (EV manufacturer) telematics networks, have designed systems that may work well individually, but no single entity is responsible for the entire ecosystem to be secure in terms of data exchange. Furthermore, there is no uniformity in how each actor has implemented the cybersecurity requirements since no system-wide cybersecurity requirements existed prior to this project. The final project report describes the technical approach guided by the EV charging infrastructure cybersecurity working group, convened specifically for this project. The technical approach included definition of requirements at the ecosystem level, treated as a ‘system of systems’, and then passed down to individual systems (EVSE, EV, cloud EVSP, utility, and the payment networks), followed by developing the cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessment methods, that were later applied to real-world cyber-physical systems at EPRI, ANL, and NREL laboratories, to validate both the process and the results. Finally, in a spotlight over the most vulnerable equipment, which is the EV charge station (AC or DC), the team developed a multi-layer cybersecurity implementation in the embedded domain embodied by the open-source Secure Network Interface Card (SNIC) demonstrating the various ways in which the infrastructure can be secured protecting against the identified attack surfaces. Finally, the entire process of EV infrastructure cybersecurity assessment was encapsulated in the Electric Vehicle Charging Cybersecurity Management (EVC2M) online GUI-based tool, that is expected to be released to the public. The report presents the objectives, the technical approach, the key results, and recommendations for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS1993

The Database Query Support Processor (QSP)

The number and diversity of databases available to users continues to increase dramatically. Currently, the trend is towards decentralized, client server architectures that (on the surface) are less expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain than information architectures based on centralized, monolithic mainframes. The database query support processor (QSP) effort evaluates the performance of a network level, heterogeneous database access capability. Air Force Material Command's Rome Laboratory has developed an approach, based on ANSI standard X3.138 - 1988, 'The Information Resource Dictionary System (IRDS)' to seamless access to heterogeneous databases based on extensions to data dictionary technology. To successfully query a decentralized information system, users must know what data are available from which source, or have the knowledge and system privileges necessary to find out this information. Privacy and security considerations prohibit free and open access to every information system in every network. Even in completely open systems, time required to locate relevant data (in systems of any appreciable size) would be better spent analyzing the data, assuming the original question was not forgotten. Extensions to data dictionary technology have the potential to more fully automate the search and retrieval for relevant data in a decentralized environment. Substantial amounts of time and money could be saved by not having to teach users what data resides in which systems and how to access each of those systems. Information describing data and how to get it could be removed from the application and placed in a dedicated repository where it belongs. The result simplified applications that are less brittle and less expensive to build and maintain. Software technology providing the required functionality is off the shelf. The key difficulty is in defining the metadata required to support the process. The database query support processor effort will provide quantitative data on the amount of effort required to implement an extended data dictionary at the network level, add new systems, adapt to changing user needs, and provide sound estimates on operations and maintenance costs and savings.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2024

TrustDER: Trusted, Private and Scalable Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources

In this project, the Stanford and SLAC Teams have developed a Trusted, Private and Scalable platform for coordinating Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources (TrustDER). This is a layered system that ensures private, trusted and scalable coordination and monitoring of DERs. It accommodates a variety of resources, such as solar generation, gensets and loads, with a particular focus on battery systems-based resources, as they are a transformational technology experiencing fast growth in adoption by large critical facilities. The platform can be used as standalone or added to existing aggregation systems to enable trust, privacy and resilience. TrustDER consists of layers that address each of the shortcomings of the existing state of the art. Each layer in the platform can operate independently but provides information to the layers above it to enable a novel form of overall coordination architecture. The project consists of several tasks, with each task dedicated to the design of each layer. Task 2 Resource Virtualization defined a software abstraction layer for distributed energy resources (DERs). The goal of this abstraction was to simplify the implementation of algorithms utilizing cooperation of DERs resources in a variety of use cases. Task 3 is on Secure ID for Asset Authentication. Identity Management Systems (IDMS) are a foundational infrastructure for interactions between entities (organizations, users, devices, and services). Secure ID is blockchain-based a distributed identity management system allowing (1) identity provisioning, (2) authentication, (3) authorization, and (4) identity data sharing for IoT-enabled assets on the electricity grid. In this project, the SLAC team focused on designing and testing Keymaker, a protocol for authenticating device identity managed by Secure ID. Task 5 Private and Safe Integration is focused on the design and evaluation of a DER cooperation scheme which allows for the aggregation of DERs without impacting network reliability. The approach is designed based on realistic assumptions regarding data availability, communication infrastructure limitations, and privacy. Task 6 Scalable Distributed Privacy for Information explored how virtualized batteries could be managed privately. Specifically, it examined the case in which a principal provides a partitioned battery to multiple clients. Task 7 Use Cases was to ensure that this technology was applied in relevant situations and scenarios. Primarily, this means that virtualization needed to be employed in a manner that either improved flexibility, bolstered security or privacy, or decreased costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Radiation Detection System Integration Using Multiple-Input Multiple-Output Radios

This study describes the application development of multiple-input multiple-output radios to provide persistent mobile ad hoc network (MANET) for the Department of Homeland Security. By using Man Portable Unit (MPU5) fifth generation radios (manufactured by Persistent Systems) with the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), an Android smartphone geospatial infrastructure and military situational awareness application, the Remote Sensing Laboratory has developed a MANET connectivity to monitor deployed nuclear/radiological search operation assets.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS2022

A Central Asia Hydrologic Monitoring Dataset for Food and Water Security Applications in Afghanistan

From the Hindu Kush mountains to the Registan Desert, Afghanistan is a diverse landscape where droughts, floods, conflict, and economic market accessibility pose challenges for agricultural livelihoods and food security. The ability to remotely monitor environmental conditions is critical to support decision making for humanitarian assistance. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Land Data Assimilation System (FLDAS) global and Central Asia data streams provide information on hydrologic states for routine integrated food security analysis. While developed for a specific project, these data are publicly available and useful for other applications that require hydrologic estimates of the water and energy balance. These two data streams are unique because of their suitability for routine monitoring, as well as for being a historical record for computing relative indicators of water availability. The global stream is available at ∼ 1-month latency, and monthly average outputs are on a 10 km grid from 1982–present. The second data stream, Central Asia (21–56°N, 30–100°E), at ∼ 1 d latency, provides daily average outputs on a 1 km grid from 2000–present. This paper describes the configuration of the two FLDAS data streams, background on the software modeling framework, selected meteorological inputs and parameters, and results from previous evaluation studies. We also provide additional analysis of precipitation and snow cover over Afghanistan. We conclude with an example of how these data are used in integrated food security analysis. For use in new and innovative studies that will improve understanding of this region, these data are hosted by U.S. Geological Survey data portals and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Central Asia data described in this paper can be accessed via the NASA repository at https://doi.org/10.5067/VQ4CD3Y9YC0R (Jacob and Slinski, 2021), and the global data described in this paper can be accessed via the NASA repository at https://doi.org/10.5067/5NHC22T9375G (McNally, 2018).

Amy McNally↗
NASA NTRS1994

Re-Engineering the Multimission Command System at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

This paper will discuss the design and implementation of the command software, especially trade-offs and lessons learned from practical operational use in JPL's Advanced Multimission Operations System.The command system provides an advanced multimission environment for secure, concurrent commanding of multiple spacecraft. The lessons learned have resulted in a re-engineering of the command system, especially in its user interface and new automation capabilities. This paper will also discuss new development work including a multimission command database toolkit, a universal command translator for sequencing and real-time commands, and incorporation of telecommand capabilities for new missions.

re-engineering↗
DOE OSTI2023

Logical Activation Functions v.1.1

SAND2024-01501O Logical Activation Functions software is a PyTorch implementation from the paper, "Logical Activation Functions for Training Arbitrary Probabilistic Boolean Logic." The activation functions approximate logit-space marginalization of probabilistic truth tables from probabilistic interpretations of inputs. They also provide a general methodology to approximate logical relationships between abstract antecedents and consequents for machine learning architectures. They do not target any specific application or use-case. By training probabilistic truth tables, these activation functions can capture more expressive relationships in a neural network than typical elementwise activation functions. This code is only designed for a single compute node with a GPU and is limited to machine learning architectures than can fit within the memory of a single GPU. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Duersch, Jed↗
NASA NTRS2014

Virtualization - A Key Cost Saver in NASA Multi-Mission Ground System Architecture

With science team budgets being slashed, and a lack of adequate facilities for science payload teams to operate their instruments, there is a strong need for innovative new ground systems that are able to provide necessary levels of capability processing power, system availability and redundancy while maintaining a small footprint in terms of physical space, power utilization and cooling.The ground system architecture being presented is based off of heritage from several other projects currently in development or operations at Goddard, but was designed and built specifically to meet the needs of the Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) as a low-cost payload command, control, planning and analysis operations center. However, this SPOCC architecture was designed to be generic enough to be re-used partially or in whole by other labs and missions (since its inception that has already happened in several cases!)The SPOCC architecture leverages a highly available VMware-based virtualization cluster with shared SAS Direct-Attached Storage (DAS) to provide an extremely high-performing, low-power-utilization and small-footprint compute environment that provides Virtual Machine resources shared among the various tenant missions in the SPOCC. The storage is also expandable, allowing future missions to chain up to 7 additional 2U chassis of storage at an extremely competitive cost if they require additional archive or virtual machine storage space.The software architecture provides a fully-redundant GMSEC-based message bus architecture based on the ActiveMQ middleware to track all health and safety status within the SPOCC ground system. All virtual machines utilize the GMSEC system agents to report system host health over the GMSEC bus, and spacecraft payload health is monitored using the Hammers Integrated Test and Operations System (ITOS) Galaxy Telemetry and Command (TC) system, which performs near-real-time limit checking and data processing on the downlinked data stream and injects messages into the GMSEC bus that are monitored to automatically page the on-call operator or Systems Administrator (SA) when an off-nominal condition is detected. This architecture, like the LTSP thin clients, are shared across all tenant missions.Other required IT security controls are implemented at the ground system level, including physical access controls, logical system-level authentication authorization management, auditing and reporting, network management and a NIST 800-53 FISMA-Moderate IT Security plan Risk Assessment Contingency Plan, helping multiple missions share the cost of compliance with agency-mandated directives.The SPOCC architecture provides science payload control centers and backup mission operations centers with a cost-effective, standardized approach to virtualizing and monitoring resources that were traditionally multiple racks full of physical machines. The increased agility in deploying new virtual systems and thin client workstations can provide significant savings in personnel costs for maintaining the ground system. The cost savings in procurement, power, rack footprint and cooling as well as the shared multi-mission design greatly reduces upfront cost for missions moving into the facility. Overall, the authors hope that this architecture will become a model for how future NASA operations centers are constructed!

Ground System Architecture↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA IV&V's Cyber Range for Space Systems

A cyber range is a virtual environment that is used for cyberwarfare training and cyber technology development. It provides tools that help strengthen the stability, security and performance of cyber infrastructures and IT systems. NASA IV&V has created an adaptable virtual environment that is representative of a typical NASA mission system of systems environment that serves multiple purposes: Training of network defenders. Ability to perform simulated red vs blue training events. Ability to deploy mission specific technologies in a cyber contested environment. Ability to demonstrate vulnerabilities and their impact to ground and space systemsThe overall system is comprised of more than 70 virtual machines and physical infrastructure to demonstrate real-world cyber attacks against: email users, wireless networks, and physically implanted devices with command and control call-back. The cyber range was built to emulate a NASA precipitation satellite infrastructure.This presentation will give an overview of the virtual cyber range and how it was used to conduct a simulate red vs blue exercise with the goal of compromising the simulated spacecraft that utilizes real NASA flight software.

test and evaluation DT&E↗