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At least 217 records · Page 12

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 106: Area 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond; (2) 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able; (3) 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area; (4) 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 106 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of clean closure was implemented at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05, while no corrective action was necessary at CASs 05-20-02 and 05-23-05. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 20, 2010, through June 1, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (mechanical displacement and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 106 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Industrial Area exposure scenario (2,250 hours of annual exposure). The only radiological dose exceeding the FAL was at CAS 05-45-05 and was associated with potential source material (PSM). It is also assumed that additional PSM in the form of depleted uranium (DU) and DU-contaminated debris at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05 exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken at these CASs that consisted of removing PSM and collecting verification samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Software Quality Assurance Plan for the Geochemist’s Workbench®

The Geochemist’s Workbench® (GWB) Release 10.0.10 is a geochemical modeling suite for simulating the reactive fate and transport of radionuclides and other metals in aqueous systems including groundwater, surface water, soil, and sediment. At the Savannah River National Laboratory, GWB plays an important role in the preparation of Performance Assessments involving cementitious materials. The software classification for GWB is Level “C.” GWB was purchased from Aqueous Solutions LLC and came into existence outside of the Software Quality Assurance procedures; therefore, it is considered “existing/acquired” software. This Software Quality Assurance Plan addresses verification techniques and the required life cycle components for Level “C” existing/acquired software (i.e., “Evaluation,”“Configuration Control,” and “Cyber Security Analysis”) with other elements optionally applied using a graded approach.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Cyber Protection of Grid-Connected Devices Through Embedded Online Security

Cybersecurity research regarding the electric power grid has primarily been focused on protecting the communication layer of grid-connected devices against cyber-attack threats. Although many developed methods have greatly reduced the effects of a cyber-attack on the vulnerabilities of grid-connected devices, discovering new vulnerabilities is inevitable and a constant threat. As a result, the overall reliability and security of network communications with regard to grid-connected devices is a concern. Here, this paper proposes a method that further secures a system by focusing on the control and hardware layer of grid-connected devices. The device’s controller firmware will be validated and authenticated using integrated device emulation resources prior to being activated to control the grid-connected device. This verification process is performed while the controller is online and actively controlling power flows related to the device. Therefore, an attack to the system through a malicious firmware patch would be detected by the online security and rejected while safely maintaining continuous and stable control of the device. This method integrates the concepts of firmware hot-patching, digital twins, and active monitoring into an overall cybersecurity protection system.

cybersecurity↗

Neutron Sensors and Their Role in Nuclear Nonproliferation

Perhaps the most familiar application of neutron detection technology to nonproliferation resides in materials accounting, where the quantification of plutonium has a rich history. With a changing dynamic in nuclear security, the application of sensor technology to further other nonproliferation objectives has received considerable attention. This fact, amplified by a dwindling supply of 3He, has stimulated considerable interest in neutron detection technology development for applications ranging from interdicting smuggled nuclear material to the verification of stockpile reductions. This manuscript briefly overviews the application of neutron sensors to nonproliferation and examines three specific examples that highlight the constraints applied to field-deployed technology.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms. Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dismantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads themselves.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Advanced Inversion Algorithms for Scientific Data Analysis [Slides]

Accurate subsurface characterization is crucial for all subsurface energy exploration. Accurate characterization of uncertain subsurface properties is also critical for monitoring storage of CO 2 , estimating pathways of subsurface contaminant transport, and monitoring potential nuclear explosions for treaty verification. This research will advance our world-leading subsurface sensing capabilities that are crucial for LANL missions in energy security (geothermal energy, oil/gas resource exploration, geologic carbon storage) and nuclear security (facility monitoring, detonation detection).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

New Experiments for Detecting Emissions from Fission

Ensuring that nuclear science and technology is used solely for peaceful purposes is one of the most pressing challenges facing our society. The Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification (MTV) mission is to help meet this challenge by providing advanced technology and trained talent for careers in nuclear security and nonproliferation. The study of nuclear fission is one area of interest in the MTV. We are performing new experiments for the characterization of neutron and gamma ray emissions from fission fragments. These emissions are signatures for the detection and characterization of nuclear materials. To perform these experiments, we have developed Fission Sphere (FS-3), an array of forty organic stilbene detectors operated in time-coincidence. The FS-3 is used to measure the prompt emissions of neutrons and gamma rays from Cf-252 spontaneous fission. These new data will be used to validate physics-based prediction codes, including CGMF and FREYA, and will be useful in future ENDF and ENSDF evaluations. This paper will present results from the first experiments using FS-3 and a Cf-252 spontaneous fission source. It will compare the experimental results with predictions from theory and Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, we will describe the correlations among energy, multiplicity, and angles of emitted particles. We will also discuss the application of these correlations in multiplicity counting techniques, which are widely used in nuclear safeguards.

Pozzi, S. A.↗

Rich-Text based PSA Model Transformation and Verification in RiskA

Nuclear Energy is one of the most possible alternative to fossil energy in large-scale. Nuclear safety is the lifeline of nuclear energy development, and has been an important part of national security, especially after the accident of Fukushima. On the basis of computer codes, reliability engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PSA) is effective methods to improve the safety of nuclear power plants. After many years of development, the methodologies, applications and relevant soft programs have been quite sufficient in the area of nuclear safety. However, it is still difficult for the current PSA technologies and software to meet the needs of dealing with the problems of quantitatively public risk assessment in the digital society. Especially, there are so many software that adopted different modeling and analyzing methods, which brings difficulties to the comparison, evaluation or verification for different software and models. By using its own academic advantages, the advanced nuclear energy research team, i.e., FDS Team has invested a few hundreds person-years of independent research and development of a reliability and probabilistic safety assessment software system RiskA. The system consists of three main functions: device reliability optimization management, probabilistic safety assessment and instantaneous risk monitoring, and the comprehensive public risk assessment in digital society. RiskA establishes an integrated risk evaluation system for the device reliability, nuclear power plant (NPP) risk monitoring and public risk assessment. Currently, RiskA has successfully been applied in more than 600 organizations and institutes from a variety of fields in 39 countries, involving nuclear, aerospace, defense and so on. For example, RiskA has been used in the safety analysis of International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), FDS series fusion reactor, and the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences 'the Future Advanced Nuclear Fission Energy - Accelerator Driven Sub-critical (ADS) transmutation system'. Also, RiskA has been used in public risk communication and risk assessment. Among them, Third Qinshan nuclear power plant Risk Monitor (TQRM), which is the China's first domestic nuclear safety analysis software used in the actual online operation, has been highly apprised by renowned experts in the field. Meanwhile, it has been identified as the first domestic nuclear power plant risk monitoring system with completely independent intellectual property rights, and has reached the international advanced level. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Area 25 and Area 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539, Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, as identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). A modification to the FFACOwas approved in May 2010 to transfer the two Railroad Tracks corrective action sites (CASs) from CAU 114 into CAU539. The two CASs are located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of the CAU 539 Railroad Tracks CASs using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation should support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the SAFER, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the NDEP for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on December 14, 2009, by representatives of U.S.Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Navarro Nevada Environmental Services, LLC (NNES); and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process has been used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each Railroad Tracks CAS in CAU 539. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 539: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, radiological surveys). • Collect in situ dose measurements. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., lead bricks) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. If a COC is present at a CAS, NNES will consult NDEP to determine the path forward, then either: • Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or • Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NMIS with Imaging and Gamma Ray Spectrometry for Pu, HEU, HE and Other Materials

The Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) has been under development at ORNL and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex since 1984. In the mid-1990s, what is now the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) realized that it was a useful technology for future arms control treaty applications and supported further development of the system. In 2004, fast-neutron imaging was incorporated into the system. In 2007, the ONV decided to develop a fieldable version of the system, designated as FNMIS, for potential use in future treaties. The FNMIS is being developed to be compatible with the eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier. This report addresses how and what attributes could be determined by the FNMIS system with gamma-ray spectrometry. The NMIS is a time-dependent coincidence system that incorporates tomographic imaging (including mapping of the fission sites) and gamma-ray spectrometry. It utilizes a small, lightweight (30 lb), portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron (14.1 MeV) generator (4 x 10 7 neutrons/second) for active interrogation and can also perform passive interrogation. A high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector with multichannel analysis can be utilized in conjunction with the source for active interrogation or passively. The system uses proton recoil scintillators: 32 small 2.5 x 2.5 x 10.2-cm-thick plastic scintillators for imaging and at least two 2 x 2 arrays of 27 x 27 x 10-cm-thick plastic scintillators that detect induced fission radiation. The DT generator contains an alpha detector that time and directionally tags a fan beam of some of the neutrons emitted and subdivides it into pixels. A fast (1 GHz) time correlation processor measures the time-dependent coincidence among all detectors in the system. A computer-controlled scanner moves the small detectors and the source appropriately for scanning a target object for imaging. The system is based on detection of transmitted 14.1 MeV neutrons, fission neutrons, and gamma rays from spontaneous, inherent source fission of the target, fission neutrons and gamma rays induced by the external DT source, gamma rays from natural emissions of uranium and plutonium, and induced gamma-ray emission by the interaction of the 14.1 MeV neutrons from the DT source. The NMIS can and has been used with a time-tagged californium spontaneous fission source. It has also been used with pulsed interrogation sources such as LINACs, DT, and deuterium-deuterium (DD) sources. This system is uniquely suited for detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and other special nuclear materials and detection of high explosives (HE) and chemical agents. The NMIS will be adapted to utilize a trusted processor that incorporates information barrier and authentication techniques using open software and then be useful in some international applications for materials whose characteristics may be classified. The proposed information barrier version of the NMIS system would consist of detectors and cables, the red (classified side) computer system, which processes the data, and the black (unclassified side) computer, which handles the computer interface. The system could use the 'IB wrapper' concept proposed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the software integrity (digital signatures) system proposed by Sandia. Since it is based entirely on commercially available components, the entire system, including NMIS data acquisition boards, can be built with commercial off-the-shelf components. This system is being developed into a fieldable system (FNMIS) for potential arms control treaties by the ONV. The system will be modularly constructed with the RF shielded modules connected to the processor by appropriate control and signal cable in metal conduit. The FNMIS is presently being designed for eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier to protect classified information. The system hardware and software can be configured to obtain the following: plutonium presence, plutonium mass, Pu-240/239 ratio, plutonium geometry, plutonium metal vs non-metallic (absence of metal), time (age) since processing for plutonium (or last purification), uranium presence, uranium mass, uranium enrichment, uranium geometry, uranium metal vs non-metallic compound (absence of metal), beryllium presence and mass, tritium and deuterium gas bottle presence, HE, and chemical weapons. A matrix of the quantities determined, the method of determination, whether active (external neutron source) or passive, and the measurement equipment involved is given in the Tables 1-4. Some of these attributes can be obtained by multiple data analysis methods. The gamma-ray spectrometry methods for HEU, plutonium, and HE have been developed by other laboratories, are well known, and will be incorporated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in FY 2020 by DOE/EM Nevada Program UGTA Activity at CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine at the Nevada National Security Site. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates); and verification of use restrictions, institutional controls, and water use.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Active High Assurance Authentication Protocol (AHAAP)

The AHAAP Maturation Project involves maturation and evaluation of a patented zero-trust tamper-resistant high-assurance session-less dynamic and active device authentication protocol that simultaneously authenticates identity and provides integrity verification in a single step, substantially reducing the risk of cyberattack, and eliminating the need for costly and complex conventional communication security systems requirements (i.e., cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and key management). These cybersecurity attributes of the technology must be preserved when applying the technology to different cybersecurity solutions, including Command & Control (C&C), Over-the-Air (OTA) update, Common Access Card (CAC), and distributed energy resource (DER) implementations, among others. The technology research objective is to test and verify that the cybersecurity attributes of the technology are not degraded in different cybersecurity applications. The primary technology development objective is to build minimum viable products to demonstrate the technology addresses today’s cybersecurity threats so that prospective investors, strategic partners, regulatory agencies, and commercial customers can interact with and assess the protection assured by the technology. The AHAAP Maturation Project goal is to develop, test, and validate one or more AHAAP implementations. The AHAAP Maturation Project tasks are: (i) engineer AHAAP implementation software, (ii) build a functional prototype that implements the AHAAP software for demonstration, testing, analysis, and evaluation purposes, and (iii) generate a report detailing the results of the AHAAP C&C software and hardware implementation. The final project deliverables are: (i) AHAAP software implementation and prototype, (ii) a report from Sandia National Laboratories detailing the results of the AHAAP implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Capability 9.3 Assembly and Deployment

Large space systems are required for a range of operational, commercial and scientific missions objectives however, current launch vehicle capacities substantially limit the size of space systems (on-orbit or planetary). Assembly and Deployment is the process of constructing a spacecraft or system from modules which may in turn have been constructed from sub-modules in a hierarchical fashion. In-situ assembly of space exploration vehicles and systems will require a broad range of operational capabilities, including: Component transfer and storage, fluid handling, construction and assembly, test and verification. Efficient execution of these functions will require supporting infrastructure, that can: Receive, store and protect (materials, components, etc.); hold and secure; position, align and control; deploy; connect/disconnect; construct; join; assemble/disassemble; dock/undock; and mate/demate.

Dorsey, John↗

Payload and Components Real-Time Automated Test System (PACRATS), Data Acquisition of Leak Rate and Pressure Data Test Procedure

The purpose of this activity is to provide the Mechanical Components Test Facility (MCTF) with the capability to obtain electronic leak test and proof pressure data, Payload and Components Real-time Automated Test System (PACRATS) data acquisition software will be utilized to display real-time data. It will record leak rates and pressure/vacuum level(s) simultaneously. This added functionality will provide electronic leak test and pressure data at specified sampling frequencies. Electronically stored data will provide ES61 with increased data security, analysis, and accuracy. The tasks performed in this procedure are to verify PACRATS only, and are not intended to provide verifications for MCTF equipment.

Rinehart, Maegan L.↗

Understanding and Verifying Neural Networks

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have gained immense popularity in recent times and have widespread use in applications such as image classification, sentiment analysis, speech recognition and also in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving. However, they suffer limitations such as lack of explainability and robustness which raise safety and security concerns in their usage. Further, the complex structure and large input spaces of DNNs act as an impediment to thorough verification and testing. The SafeDNN project at the Robust Software Engineering (RSE) group at NASA aims at exploring techniques to ensure that systems that use deep neural networks are safe, robust and interpretable. In this talk, I will be presenting our technique Prophecy that automatically infers formal properties of deep neural network models. The tool extracts patterns based on neuron activations as preconditions that imply certain desirable output properties of the model. I would be highlighting case studies that use Prophecy in obtaining explanations for network decisions, understanding correct and incorrect behavior, providing formal guarantees wrt safety and robustness, and debugging neural network models. We have applied the tool on image classification networks, neural network controllers providing turn advisories in unmanned aircrafts, regression models used for autonomous center-line tracking in aircrafts and neural network object detectors

Deep Neural Networks↗

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A review of human-system interface design issues observed during analog-to-digital and digital-to-digital migrations in U.S. nuclear power plants - 312

The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is developing a scientific basis through targeted research and development (R and D) to support the U.S. nuclear power plant (NPP) fleet in extending their existing licensing period and ensuring their long-term reliability, productivity, safety, and security. Over the last several years, human factors engineering (HFE) professionals at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have supported the LWRS Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II and C) System Technologies pathway across several U.S. commercial NPPs in analog-to-digital migrations (i.e., turbine control systems) and digital-to-digital migrations (i.e., Safety Parameter Display System). These efforts have included in-depth human factors evaluation of proposed human-system interface (HSI) design concepts against established U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) design guidelines from NUREG-0700, Rev 2 to inform subsequent HSI design prior to transitioning into Verification and Validation. This paper discusses some of the overarching design issues observed from these past HFE evaluations. In addition, this work presents some observed challenges such as common tradeoffs utilities are likely to face when introducing new HSI technologies into NPP hybrid control rooms. The primary purpose of this work is to distill these observed design issues into general HSI design guidance that industry can use in early stages of HSI design. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗