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At least 217 records · Page 12

Launch Processing System - A system to support the Space Shuttle

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is designing and acquiring a Launch Processing System (LPS), an important part of Ground Support Equipment (GSE), to Support launch site operations in a more efficient way than was done on previous programs. LPS will provide (1) automatic control of GSE and Shuttle systems for test and operations, (2) real time data analysis and information display, and (3) efficient recall of test data and engineering files to support Shuttle ground operations. Modern automation techniques, off-the-shelf components, and modular design are being employed to the maximum to achieve these goals. The cost of acquisition, operations, and maintenance of LPS is of great importance and is considered with each engineering trade.

Paul, H. C.↗

Space Shuttle aerothermodynamic data report, phase C

Space shuttle aerothermodynamic data, collected from a continuing series of wind tunnel tests, are permanently stored with the Data Management Services (DMS) system. Information pertaining to current baseline configuration definition is also stored. Documentation of DMS processed data arranged sequentially and by space shuttle configuration are included. An up-to-date record of all applicable aerothermodynamic data collected, processed, or summarized during the space shuttle program is provided. Tables are designed to provide suvery information to the various space shuttle managerial and technical levels.

Source record↗

Space Shuttle Program - An overview

The Space Shuttle's unique design features include multiple re-uses of its major elements, large cargo carrying capacity, and the capability of deploying, servicing, and retrieving a variety of payloads. These design features, i.e., reusability and cargo flexibility, were incorporated to satisfy the objective of providing a transportation system which will lower the cost of delivering a variety of payloads to the earth orbit. The Space Shuttle System consists of a reusable manned Orbiter containing three main engines, two reusable Solid Rocket Boosters, and an expendable External Tank containing propellant for the Orbiter main engines. On a typical Space Shuttle mission, the Orbiter will remain in orbit for up to 7 days conducting on-orbit observations and operations, return to earth with personnel and payload, land horizontally on a runway, and be readied for another flight in as few as 14 days. Another mission class includes deploying, servicing, and recovering satellites.

Kloves, T. R.↗

Designing the Space Shuttle Propulsion System

The major elements of the Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System include two reusable solid rocket motors integrated into recoverable solid rocket boosters, an expendable external fuel and oxidizer tank, and three reusable Space Shuttle Main Engines. Both the solid rocket motors and space shuttle main engines ignite prior to liftoff, with the solid rocket boosters separating about two minutes into flight. The external tank separates after main engine shutdown and is safely expended in the ocean. The SSME's, integrated into the Space Shuttle Orbiter aft structure, are reused after post landing inspections. Both the solid rocket motors and the space shuttle main engine throttle during early ascent flight to limit aerodynamic loads on the structure. The configuration is called a stage and a half as all the propulsion elements are active during the boost phase, and the SSME's continue operation to achieve orbital velocity approximately eight and a half minutes after liftoff. Design and performance challenges were numerous, beginning with development work in the 1970 s. The solid rocket motors were large, and this technology had never been used for human space flight. The SSME s were both reusable and very high performance staged combustion cycle engines, also unique to the Space Shuttle. The multi body side mount configuration was unique and posed numerous integration and interface challenges across the elements. Operation of the system was complex and time consuming. This paper discusses a number of the system level technical challenges including development and operations.

Owen, James↗

Computed Flow About The Integrated Space Shuttle, Revisited

Report discusses numerical simulations of flow of air about integrated space shuttle (complete space shuttle assembly including orbiter, solid rocket boosters, and external tank) in ascent. Updated version of report described in "Computed Flow About The Integrated Space Shuttle" (ARC-12685). Goal of studies to improve understanding of, and ability to predict how integrated space shuttle performs during both nominal and aborted ascent under various conditions.

Buning, P. G.↗

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 5: Auxiliary shuttle risk analyses

Volume 5 is Appendix C, Auxiliary Shuttle Risk Analyses, and contains the following reports: Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Space Shuttle Phase 1 - Space Shuttle Catastrophic Failure Frequency Final Report; Risk Analysis Applied to the Space Shuttle Main Engine - Demonstration Project for the Main Combustion Chamber Risk Assessment; An Investigation of the Risk Implications of Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Chamber Pressure Excursions; Safety of the Thermal Protection System of the Space Shuttle Orbiter - Quantitative Analysis and Organizational Factors; Space Shuttle Main Propulsion Pressurization System Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Final Report; and Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Proof-of-Concept Study - Auxiliary Power Unit and Hydraulic Power Unit Analysis Report.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

EVA 2010: Preparing for International Space Station EVA Operations Post-Space Shuttle Retirement

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the OneEVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history.

Chullen, Cinda↗

The space shuttle program from challenge to achievement: Space exploration rolling on tires

The Space Shuttle Transportation System is the first space program to employ the pneumatic tire as a part of space exploration. For aircraft tires, this program establishes new expectations as to what constitutes acceptable performance within a set of tough environmental and operational conditions. Tire design, stresses the usual low weight, high load, high speed, and excellent air retention features but at extremes well outside industry standards. Tires will continue to be an integral part of the Shuttle's landing phase in the immediate future since they afford a unique combination of directional control, braking traction, flotation and shock absorption not available by other systems.

Felder, G. L.↗

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Debris Assessment

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. Prior to the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or mission success. When the accident investigation determined that a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - ice and foam, were not fully understood. There was no clear understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might impact or the damage the impact might cause. In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development and fiscal accountability.

Kendall, Kristin↗

System level verification applying the Space Shuttle experience to the Space Station

The applicability of the verification process for the Shuttle guidance, navigation and control (GNC) and data management system (DMS) for the development of the Space Station are described. Shuttle avionics hardware/software integration was delayed to finalize the hardware design before detailed definition and testing of the software. A block diagram is provided of the flight simulation laboratory used to test the GNC programs before flight data were available. The Station will have distributed computers, unlike the Orbiter, and will only be assembled fully in space. Standardized integration simulation test equipment are being defined to guide the development of hardware and software. The simulation capability may become part of nominal in-flight operations to initiate new capabilities as they are added to the Station. The Station GNC and DMS systems development will be somewhat simplified relative to those of the Shuttle because ascent and reentry will not be considered for the Station.

Gilbert, David W.↗

Space Shuttle Orbiter Approach and Landing Test

The Space Shuttle Orbiter Approach and Landing Test is part of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project development testing that will precede the first Space Shuttle Orbital Flight Test. The approach and landing test will be accomplished during a 1-year period beginning in early 1977. The first Space Shuttle Orbiter to be assembled will be used to perform the approach and landing tests. A modified Boeing 747 aircraft will be used as a carrier for in-flight testing and launching of the Orbiter. The primary objectives of the approach and landing test are to verify the Orbiter/Shuttle Carrier Aircraft test configuration, to verify Orbiter manual approach and landing in the first Orbital Flight Test configuration, and to demonstrate an Orbiter Automatic Terminal Area Energy Management/Autoland capability.

Oglesby, T. L.↗

STS-121: Discovery Space Shuttle Safety Improvements Briefing

Steve Poulos, Space Shuttle Orbiter Projects Office Manager, and John Chapman, Space Shuttle External Tank Project Manager is shown in this STS-121 Space Shuttle Discovery safety improvements briefing. A graphic presentation of the gap filler installation is shown. The graphics include: 1) Protruding gap fillers during STS-114 mission; 2) STS-114 gap fillers removed on orbiter; 3) Gap filler installation prior to STS-114; 4) Post-STS-114 installation techniques; 5) Gap filler installation post STS-114; 6) Gap filler priority areas; 7) Discovery gap filler installation table and status for STS-121; 8) Damaged blanket on STS-114; 9) On-orbit photography and post-landing photography on STS-114; and 10) STS-114 insulation tiles. Poulos presents imagery that was obtained on STS-114. The imagery includes: 1) The Enhanced Launch Vehicle Imaging System (ELVIS); 2) Liquid oxygen external tank view; 3) Hand-held imagery of the external tank falling into the ocean; 4) ELVIS on STS-121, short, medium and long range camera configurations; 5) Radar capability on the ground at Kennedy Space Center, and 6) STS-121 aft external tank door tiles. Poulos says that STS-121 will have even more imagery than STS-114. John Chapman presents video animation of the external tank where modifications were made along with the ice frost ramps with extensions. Chapman explains these areas using an external tank model. Questions are then answered from the media.

Source record↗

Which Way is Up? Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle Sensorimotor Research

The Space Shuttle Program provided the opportunity to examine sensorimotor adaptation to space flight in unprecedented numbers of astronauts, including many over multiple missions. Space motion sickness (SMS) severity was highly variable across crewmembers. SMS generally lasted 2-3 days in-flight with approximately 1/3 of crewmembers experiencing moderate to severe symptoms, and decreased incidence in repeat flyers. While SMS has proven difficult to predict from susceptibility to terrestrial analogs, symptoms were alleviated by medications, restriction of early activities, maintaining familiar orientation with respect to the visual environment and maintaining contact cues. Adaptive changes were also reflected by the oculomotor and perceptual disturbances experienced early inflight and by the perceptual and motor coordination problems experienced during re-entry and landing. According to crew self-reports, systematic head movements performed during reentry, as long as paced within one's threshold for motion tolerance, facilitated the early readaptation process. The Shuttle provided early postflight crew access to document the initial performance decrements and time course of recovery. These early postflight measurements were critical to inform the program of risks associated with extending the duration of Shuttle missions. Neurological postflight deficits were documented using a standardized subjective rating by flight surgeons. Computerized dynamic posturography was also implemented as a quantitative means of assessing sensorimotor function to support crew return-to-duty assessments. Towards the end of the Shuttle Program, more emphasis has been placed on mapping physiological changes to functional performance. Future commercial flights will benefit from pre-mission training including exposures to launch and entry G transitions and sensorimotor adaptability assessments. While SMS medication usage will continue to be refined, non-pharmacological countermeasures (e.g., sensory aids) will have both space and Earth-based applications. Early postflight field tests are recommended to provide the evidence base for best practices for future commercial flight programs. Learning Objective: Overview of the Space Shuttle Program regarding adaptive changes in sensorimotor function, including what was learned from research, what was implemented for medical operations, and what is recommended for commercial flights.

Wood, S. J.↗

Space Shuttle Projects Overview to Columbia Air Forces War College

This paper presents, in viewgraph form, a general overview of space shuttle projects. Some of the topics include: 1) Space Shuttle Projects; 2) Marshall Space Flight Center Space Shuttle Projects Office; 3) Space Shuttle Propulsion systems; 4) Space Shuttle Program Major Sites; 5) NASA Office of Space flight (OSF) Center Roles in Space Shuttle Program; 6) Space Shuttle Hardware Flow; and 7) Shuttle Flights To Date.

Singer, Jody↗

Space Shuttle Communications Coverage Analysis for Thermal Tile Inspection

The space shuttle ultra-high frequency Space-to-Space Communication System has to provide adequate communication coverage for astronauts who are performing thermal tile inspection and repair on the underside of the space shuttle orbiter (SSO). Careful planning and quantitative assessment are necessary to ensure successful system operations and mission safety in this work environment. This study assesses communication systems performance for astronauts who are working in the underside, non-line-of-sight shadow region on the space shuttle. All of the space shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) transmitting antennas are blocked by the SSO structure. To ensure communication coverage at planned inspection worksites, the signal strength and link margin between the SSO/ISS antennas and the extravehicular activity astronauts, whose line-of-sight is blocked by vehicle structure, was analyzed. Investigations were performed using rigorous computational electromagnetic modeling techniques. Signal strength was obtained by computing the reflected and diffracted fields along the signal propagation paths between transmitting and receiving antennas. Radio frequency (RF) coverage was determined for thermal tile inspection and repair missions using the results of this computation. Analysis results from this paper are important in formulating the limits on reliable communication range and RF coverage at planned underside inspection and repair worksites.

Kroll, Quin D.↗

A History of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Redline Limits Management

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has several "redlines", which are operational limits designated to preclude a catastrophic shutdown of the SSME. The Space Shuttle Orbiter utilizes a combination of hardware and software to enable or disable the automated redline shutdown capability. The Space Shuttle is launched with the automated SSME redline limits enabled, but there are many scenarios which may result in the manual disabling of the software by the onboard crew. The operational philosophy for manually enabling and disabling the redline limits software has evolved continuously throughout the history of the Space Shuttle Program, due to events such as SSME hardware changes and updates to Space Shuttle contingency abort software. In this paper, the evolution of SSME redline limits management will be fully reviewed, including the operational scenarios which call for manual intervention, and the events that triggered changes to the philosophy. Following this review, improvements to the management of redline limits for future spacecraft will be proposed.

Arnold, Thomas M.↗

Quantification of hydrochloric acid and particulate deposition resulting from Space Shuttle launches at John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, U.S.A.

Results are presented from studies designed to identify deposition patterns and quantify the ecosystem loading rates of exhaust constituents (which are primarily Al2O3 and HCl) from the Space Shuttle solid rocket motors in the area of the Kennedy Space Center launch pad. Results of measurements indicate that, under certain meteorological conditions, as much as 7.1 x 10 exp 3 kg of particulates and 3.4 x 10 exp 3 kg HCL can be deposited to the near-field environment beyond the launch pad perimeter fence during one STS launch.

Dreschel, Thomas W.↗