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The presentation at the 34th Annual Conference of the Produced Water Society centers on the PARETO project, offering an overview tailored for new attendees. It emphasizes the latest advancements in the project's capabilities, particularly in the areas of treatment and beneficial reuse of produced water.
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Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The existing fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) are an important asset in the nation’s portfolio of electrical generating resources. Their continued safe and reliable operation are critical to providing a large source of carbon-free electricity to power the nation’s economy. The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program develops the scientific bases, methods, and tools, for the continued safe and economical operation of the nation's commercial NPPs. The Plant Modernization Pathway within LWRS Program focuses on providing guidance to industry on the full-scale implementation of modernization solutions for NPPs that significantly reduce the technical and financial risks associated with modernization. This research is focused on helping the nuclear industry understand how to digitize and digitalize their NPPs so that they can design their modernization solutions to be scalable, sustainable, and integrated both laterally and horizontally within their organization. That is, this research creates a digital transformation in NPPs by reshaping cultural mindsets and by identifying business efficiencies. In partnership with industry, and using four previously established guiding principles for digitalization, this research supported NPP modernization through assessing readiness for digitalization as a means to achieve integrated operations for nuclear. Specifically, this research created an assessment to review an entire organization’s work processes to gather information about the digitalization health of the plant. The assessment tools were administered to plant employees, and the results were used to develop a digitalization plan. The survey assessment identified the optimal candidate processes that would most benefit from a digitalization initiative which were revealed through analytical frameworks. One analysis calculated mean digitalization health indicator scores for all endorsed activities which allowed the researchers to rank and color code the results for easy identification. Individual health indicator scores are also provided, should our industry partner wish to understand these findings according to their own organizational priorities, business considerations and desired end-state. The results were also analyzed from the perspective that organizations are comprised of different types of innovators (e.g., generators, optimizers, conceptualizers, and implementers), which differentially affects the organization’s ability to comprehend and adapt to change (i.e., opportunities to innovate). Understanding the relative composition of innovator types at an NPP allows them to gather insights into the strengths and weaknesses they have in innovating how work is performed. For the utility that partnered with this research team, the results showed that implementers make up the largest portion of respondents and conceptualizers the smallest portion. Knowing the proportion of innovator types gave this organization insights on how they can effectively implement their innovation solutions. Additionally, the results were analyzed from a technical, economic, and risk perspective to identify and quantify work reduction opportunities (WROs). Recognizing that not all cost-saving opportunities are the same, a Technical, Economic and Risk Assessment (TERA) was performed to evaluate WROs to identify areas of greatest potential and lowest risk. The key results from TERA included a digitalization opportunity score for each activity, and a calculation of potential cost savings. These two outputs formed the bases for calculating a priority index and rank for the activities/processes assessed. From the prioritization calculations, TERA can then help the utility 1) decide what digitalization priorities to invest money in implementing and then 2) calculates how much should be invested in the digitalization initiatives selected to achieve cost savings and/or an acceptable return on investment. Last, onsite interviews revealed several inefficiencies in the standard work processes that occur cross-departmentally that are due to the absence of digitized and digitalized processes. Examples of these include time spent scanning paper documents and then uploading the documents electronically, obtaining signatures, and searching for desired information. This represents a digital but not digitalized process. Over 15 opportunities to improve work processes were identified through this multi-method digitalization assessment. The various analytical assessments used (e.g., TERA, digitalization health indicator scores), as well as discussions with the utility partner, corroborated that all the opportunities identified had a strong potential to make work processes more efficient and to improve overall performance of the NPP.
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A comprehensive summary of DOE’s role in the nationwide effort to deploy 30 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind energy in the United States.
PARETO 0.8.0 Release. Highlights: Model Updates - Applied unified sets for pipeline and trucking arcs in strategic model - Apply unified sets for pipeline and trucking arcs in operational model - Added new config argument for removal efficiency calculation method - Standardized bidirectional capacity constraint - Added dependencies removed in IDAES 2.1 - Created bounding functions & utilities - Added Hydraulics module to the strategic model - Add additional arc types to strategic model Documentation and Tutorial Updates - Improved PARETO treatment document - Introduced general tutorial and treatment module Jupyter notebooks for Strategic Model - Update docs with correct support email list address - Consolidate and deduplicate Getting Started and resources for developers - Enable Black formatting for Jupyter notebooks - Add Binder configuration files and README Bug Fixes - Fix strategic model documentation typos - Removed duplicated units from output file header UI Updates - Added view for comparing different scenarios - Added functionality for manually overriding PARETO decisions
Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS Prioritization Process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. The worldwide compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform, first reported in December 2020, through malicious interference with the digital patching cycle was a watershed event in cyber supply chain security. The SolarWinds compromised demonstrated the strategic importance of certain types of ubiquitous software, and the ability to generate widespread cybersecurity effects. To address this challenge and as a part of the Department of Energy’s response to the SolarWinds compromise, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) directed the National Laboratories to evolve the CyTRICS Prioritization Process methodology to encompass additional factors related to the strategic importance of digital components. CESER directed CyTRICS researchers to identify, characterize, and append strategic factors to the CyTRICS Prioritization Process to provide additional weight to these characteristics. National Laboratory expert researchers identified functionality, distribution, and platform characteristics for digital components in ICS and OT that they assessed would be likely targeted in strategic initial-access cyber attack. CyTRICS has termed these factors “ICS Beachhead Systems,” leveraging a definition first advanced by Schneider Electric, which is intended as a blanket term to encompass digital components, products, and systems in OT. This paper describes the ICS Beachhead Systems identified and the rationale for inclusion. As a next step in the research and refinement process, the National Laboratories will validate this initial set of characteristics against digital components evaluated by the CyTRICS program and current implementation of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process. After validation, CyTRICS researchers will then develop a scoring methodology to generate a quantitative score to assess the degree to which a digital component is characterized as an ICS Beachhead System. Finally, the National Laboratories will append this scoring to the existing CyTRICS Prioritization Process algorithm.
This grant facilitated the APS-DPP Community Planning Process (DPP-CPP) which was a strategic planning process with the goals of identifying scientific and technological opportunities in the fields of Plasma Physics and Fusion Energy Science, and making consensus recommendations for a strategy to address these opportunities to the DOE Office of Fusion Energy Science Advisory Committee (FESAC). The DPP-CPP was initiated by the APS-DPP executive committee in order to help FESAC fulfill a charge from DOE to develop a strategic plan for the DOE Office of Fusion Energy Science (FES). In this charge, the DOE Deputy Director for Science, Dr. Stephen Binkley, requests “that the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) undertake a new long-range strategic planning activity for the Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) program. The strategic planning activity - to encompass the entire FES research portfolio (namely, burning plasma science and discovery plasma science) - should identify and prioritize the research required to advance both the scientific foundation needed to develop a fusion energy source, as well as the broader FES mission to steward plasma science.” The process as set out in the proposal (and below) was successful in meeting all of its stated goals culminating in the final report to the FESAC subcommittee given the charge.
Background: Over the past three decades of tobacco control, Thailand has gained international recognition as a middle-income country with sustained achievement of declining smoking prevalence. However, the number of key FCTC measures implementation is still far away from the highest-level implementation. As a result, we aim to explore explanatory factors for the paradoxical phenomenon of sustainability in tobacco control in Thailand, to understand what the paradox means, why it happens, and how to take further steps in minimizing the paradox. Methods: We used a mixed-method approach comprising qualitative (review of literature and documents plus Program Sustainability Assessment Tool (PSAT) guided key informant interviews) and semi-quantitative methods (PSAT scoring, Theory of change (TOC), and causal-loop diagram (CLD)) to synthesize all the findings from the qualitative data. Results: Across all eight domains, sustainability scores at the local level are lower than the national level. The highest total score was in three domains: political support, partnership, and organizational capacity. The lowest total score was for the strategic planning domain. We propose a set of key strategic elements and drivers for future strategic planning. Discussion: Using CLD, we capture a high-level view of tobacco control with dynamic interactions between contexts, mechanisms, interventions, and outcomes. Finally, we believe the deep understanding of tobacco control and the proposed strategy to counteract transnational tobacco companies in Thailand will guide future sustainable actions to reduce the prevalence of smoking, especially in the strategic planning domain that has the lowest PSAT score.
Argonne National Laboratory’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program encourages the development of novel technical concepts, enhances the Laboratory’s research and development (R&D) capabilities, and enables pursuit of strategic laboratory goals. Argonne’s LDRD projects are proposal based and peer reviewed, supporting ideas that require advanced exploration so they can be sufficiently developed to pursue support through normal programmatic channels. Among the aims of the projects supported by the LDRD program are the establishment of engineering proofs of principle, assessment of design feasibility for prospective facilities, development of instrumentation or computational methods or systems, and discoveries in fundamental science and exploratory development. All LDRD projects have demonstrable ties to one or more of the science, energy, environment, and national security missions of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and many are also relevant to the missions of other federal agencies that sponsor work at Argonne. A natural consequence of the more “applied” type projects is their concurrent relevance to industry. The LDRD program is managed in overarching portfolios, each containing multiple projects each fiscal year. The LDRD Prime portfolio is further divided into strategic focus areas aligned with Argonne’s strategic plan. The largest component of Argonne’s program is LDRD Prime, which emphasizes R&D explicitly aligned with Laboratory major initiatives in support of Argonne’s strategic plan. The choice of Focus Areas under the LDRD Prime component reflects the major initiatives; the state of development of relevant technical fields; the potential value of advancing those fields to DOE/NNSA and the nation; and the compatibility of the fields with existing facilities, capabilities, and staff expertise at Argonne. Focus Areas with projects that ended in FY18 are: Advanced Computing, Biological and Environmental Science Capability Development, Energy Manufacturing Science and Engineering, Hard X-ray Sciences, Materials and Chemistry, Securing Energy and Critical Resources, and The Universe as Our Laboratory (ULab).
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.
The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program yields foundational scientific research and development (R&D) essential to growing SRNL’s core competencies, in alignment with SRNL’s Strategic Plan to provide long-term benefits to the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other customers and stakeholders. Five strategic goals are outlined in SRNL’s strategic plan: 1) Provide applied science and engineering for EM’s active clean-up sites and LM’s post closure management sites; 2) Provide science-based solutions for gaps identified in nonproliferation strategic vision and support the government in actives impacting national security; 3) Lead ST&E as the central technical authority for processing tritium loaded reservoirs and support production of plutonium pits; 4) Align science and energy security programs by focusing modern modeling, simulation, and data analytics tools on materials engineering and performance applications; 5) Build a workforce for the future.
Laboratory Directed Research & Development (LDRD) projects at Ames National Laboratory are compelling, collaborative, and mission-oriented research that accelerate progress in our strategic directions. The aim of these projects is to strengthen Ames National Laboratory’s emerging scientific leaders and core capabilities, to further enhance our scientific and technological vitality by stimulating R&D innovation in support of the Laboratory’s foundational strengths and strategic initiatives, and to build capabilities to respond to rapidly emerging R&D opportunities of clear potential benefit to DOE’s mission. LDRD funding strengthens our core capabilities either by exploiting targets of opportunity in expanding current capabilities, or by exploring and implementing new capabilities that provide scientific advantages and position Ames National Laboratory to be a leader in existing and emerging scientific fields. For FY2022, the Ames National Laboratory LDRD focused on transformative science to accelerate progress in our strategic directions, especially the initiatives discussed below. Of particular interest are areas that span multiple disciplines, or that develop new technical capabilities that enhance our ability to address our strategic directions.
This report provides an analysis of the financial, operational, and strategic advantages of incorporating Security-by-Design (SeBD) early in the lifecycle of nuclear power plant projects. By framing security as a foundational design element rather than a late-stage add-on, owners, vendors, and operators can reduce budget overruns, strengthen regulatory compliance, and increase revenue opportunities. The report details key lifecycle phases, highlighting the strategic imperative for organizations (including project developers, investors, vendors, and regulators) to adopt SeBD. Drawing on industry estimates, real-world case studies, and comparative cost analyses, the findings underscore that even a modest upfront investment in SeBD can yield substantial long-term returns by preventing costly retrofit activities, minimizing regulatory delays, and positioning nuclear vendors for the ability to adapt in the evolving security market. By avoiding excessive retrofit expenses and positioning security as a built-in feature rather than an afterthought, nuclear projects can protect their financial performance, enhance public trust, and secure a competitive edge in an increasingly complex global energy market. The authors advocate for SeBD’s strategic implementation, supported by established quality management methodologies, thereby promoting continuous improvement and defect avoidance. Ultimately, early SeBD integration represents a strategic investment, yielding significant returns by preventing costly retrofits and positioning nuclear projects for enhanced competitiveness and public trust.
Advanced energy technologies have the potential to enhance energy security and resilience; however, they can introduce new vulnerabilities even as they mitigate existing ones. This dichotomy highlights that both action and inaction carry strategic risks in a contested and logistically complex operating environment. Regardless of U.S. civilian or military adoption of such technologies, key allies and adversaries are on adoption paths that will impact the U.S. military at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The global adoption of advanced energy technologies presents the potential for both positive and negative consequences for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) missions in the next 10-20 years. Three categories of risk drivers are presented in this analysis: infrastructure-related, adoption-related, and response-related. Each risk type can generate consequences for DOD, including power disruptions, suboptimal DOD mission performance and operational effectiveness, higher costs and shortages for both legacy and advanced energy technologies, and loss of U.S. influence and strategic deterrent value. Specific impacts could include tactical impacts, operational impacts, and strategic impacts. Mitigation strategies could include energy resource and technology planning, cybersecurity, supply chain resilience, workforce development, exercises and simulations, investments in commercialized technology, operational testing and pilot programs, research into emerging technologies, partnerships and working groups, common standards, budget planning, and repurposing infrastructure.
The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program yields foundational scientific research and development (R&D) essential to growing SRNL’s core competencies, in alignment with SRNL’s Strategic Plan to provide long-term benefits to the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other customers and stakeholders. Five strategic goals are outlined in SRNL’s strategic plan: 1) Provide applied science and engineering for EM’s active clean-up sites and LM’s post closure management sites 2) Provide science-based solutions for gaps identified in nonproliferation strategic vision and support the government in activities impacting national security 3) Lead Science, Technology & Engineering as the central technical authority for processing tritium loaded reservoirs and support production of plutonium pits 4) Align science and energy security programs by focusing modern modeling, simulation, and data analytics tools on materials engineering and performance applications 5) Build a workforce for the future