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A preflight risk assessment system (SAFE) was developed at NASA-Ames Research Center for civil EMS operations to assist pilots in making a decision objectively to accept or decline a mission. The ability of the SAFE system to predict risk profiles was examined at an EMS operator. Results of this field study showed that the usefulness of SAFE was largely dependent on the type of mission flown.
The principal capabilities of NESSUS (Numerical Evaluation of Stochastic Structures Under Stress), an advanced computer code developed for probabilistic structural response analysis, are reviewed, and its structural reliability assessed. The code combines flexible structural modeling tools with advanced probabilistic algorithms in order to compute probabilistic structural response and resistance, component reliability and risk, and system reliability and risk. An illustrative numerical example is presented.
This paper proposes the use of a new tool more quickly develop initial cost and risk estimates of alternative flight options for both single missions and the partnering of missions into a single space flight. this work is particularly useful for small missions that require low-cost opportunities for accessing space.
This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.
Topics covered include: Instrument for Analysis of Greenland's Glacier Mills Cryogenic Moisture Apparatus; A Transportable Gravity Gradiometer Based on Atom Interferometry; Three Methods of Detection of Hydrazines; Crossed, Small-Deflection Energy Analyzer for Wind/Temperature Spectrometer; Wavefront Correction for Large, Flexible Antenna Reflector; Novel Micro Strip-to-Waveguide Feed Employing a Double-Y Junction; Thin-Film Ferro Electric-Coupled Microstripline Phase Shifters With Reduced Device Hysteresis; Two-Stage, 90-GHz, Low-Noise Amplifier; A 311-GHz Fundamental Oscillator Using InP HBT Technology; FPGA Coprocessor Design for an Onboard Multi-Angle Spectro-Polarimetric Imager; Serrating Nozzle Surfaces for Complete Transfer of Droplets; Turbomolecular Pumps for Holding Gases in Open Containers; Triaxial Swirl Injector Element for Liquid-Fueled Engines; Integrated Budget Office Toolbox; PLOT3D Export Tool for Tecplot; Math Description Engine Software Development Kit; Astronaut Office Scheduling System Software; ISS Solar Array Management; Probabilistic Structural Analysis Program; SPOT Program; Integrated Hybrid System Architecture for Risk Analysis; System for Packaging Planetary Samples for Return to Earth; Offset Compound Gear Drive; Low-Dead-Volume Inlet for Vacuum Chamber; Simple Check Valves for Microfluidic Devices; A Capillary-Based Static Phase Separator for Highly Variable Wetting Conditions; Gimballing Spacecraft Thruster; Finned Carbon-Carbon Heat Pipe with Potassium Working Fluid; Lightweight Heat Pipes Made from Magnesium; Ceramic Rail-Race Ball Bearings; Improved OTEC System for a Submarine Robot; Reflector Surface Error Compensation in Dual-Reflector Antennas; Enriched Storable Oxidizers for Rocket Engines; Planar Submillimeter-Wave Mixer Technology with Integrated Antenna; Widely Tunable Mode-Hop-Free External-Cavity Quantum Cascade Laser; Non-Geiger-Mode Single-Photon Avalanche Detector with Low Excess Noise; Using Whispering-Gallery-Mode Resonators for Refractometry; RF Device for Acquiring Images of the Human Body; Reactive Collision Avoidance Algorithm; Fast Solution in Sparse LDA for Binary Classification; Modeling Common-Sense Decisions in Artificial Intelligence; Graph-Based Path-Planning for Titan Balloons; Nanolaminate Membranes as Cylindrical Telescope Reflectors; Air-Sea Spray Airborne Radar Profiler Characterizes Energy Fluxes in Hurricanes; Large Telescope Segmented Primary Mirror Alignment; and Simplified Night Sky Display System.
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Presentation to provide and overview of software's role in ground systems and how the security of the software is important and how it can be improved.
No abstract available
No abstract available
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This presentation discusses use of Core Flight Systems in NASA Langley Research Center's drone flight test environment for autonomy algorithms research.
The Space Radiation Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) was impressed with the strong research program presented by the scientists and staff associated with NASA's Space Radiation Program Element and National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI). The presentations given on-site and the reports of ongoing research that were provided in advance indicated the potential Risk of Acute and Late Central Nervous System Effects from Radiation Exposure (CNS) and were extensively discussed by the SRP. This new data leads the SRP to recommend that a higher priority should be placed on research designed to identify and understand these risks at the mechanistic level. To support this effort the SRP feels that a shift of emphasis from Acute Radiation Syndromes (ARS) and carcinogenesis to CNS-related endpoints is justified at this point. However, these research efforts need to focus on mechanisms, should follow pace with advances in the field of CNS in general and should consider the specific comments and suggestions made by the SRP as outlined below. The SRP further recommends that the Space Radiation Program Element continue with its efforts to fill the vacant positions (Element Scientist, CNS Risk Discipline Lead) as soon as possible. The SRP also strongly recommends that NASA should continue the NASA Space Radiation Summer School. In addition to these broad recommendations, there are specific comments/recommendations noted for each risk, described in detail below.
This paper describes some of the processes employed by the X2000/IFDP system engineering team to manage risk.
Adverse events during implementation can affect final capabilities, schedule and cost of a computer system even though the system was accurately designed and evaluated. Risk analysis enables the manager to forecast the impact of those events and to timely ask for design revisions or contingency plans before making any decision. This paper presents a structured procedure for an effective risk analysis. The procedure identifies the required activities, separates subjective assessments from objective evaluations, and defines a risk measure to determine the analysis results. The procedure is consistent with the system design evaluation and enables a meaningful comparison among alternative designs.
NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the moon and eventually enable a human Mars mission. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the crew health and performance (CHP) research and technology development (R&D) necessary to enable these future missions. These organizations include flight programs as well as other organizations such as the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Human Research Program, Space Technology Mission Directorate, and System Capability Leadership Teams, each of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for the management of risks and strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA for identifying and prioritizing R&D needs. Alignment and evolution of these strategic planning constructs is ongoing and will allow for alignment and traceability between M2M objectives and R&D investments at a detailed level. While this reorganization is ongoing, and even after it is established, there is a recognized need among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&D priorities in a unified and digestible way that synthesizes the considerations and perspectives of the CHP community across NASA. To achieve this, the HMTA facilitated a series of group discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, which culminated in a product identifying the eight highest priority mission-enabling CHP capabilities for human missions to Mars, referred to as the “Top Human System Capability Needs for Mars”. The list includes Earth-Independent Human Operations; Mars Duration Food System; Mars Duration Effects on Human Physiology; Risks Mitigations for Vehicle Atmospheres; Computational Injury & Anthropometric Models; Exploration Exercise Countermeasures; Individual Variability in Responses to Spaceflight; and Sensorimotor Countermeasures. Existing strategic planning and risk management tools and processes were considered, as well as practicalities of technical, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&D risk mitigations and technology solutions. The product is not owned by any one organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. It is anticipated that this list will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&D progress and the evolving M2M architecture.
NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.
NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.